JOURNAL
OF THE
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY

Editor

S. N. GAJENDRAGADKAR

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EDITORIAL

We sincerely apologise to our subscribers and readers for the inordinate delay in bringing out this issue of our journal. We are conscious of the fact that contributors are usually keen on having their articles speedily published, may be because quite a few of them cease to have academic interest after a certain lapse of time. Reviews of important publications have to come out in reasonably good time to be useful. This time the delay was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Committee. We however assure our subscribers and readers that every effort will be made in future to see that this does not happen again.

In the large course of its development, the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay came to be devoted substantially, if not solely to orientology. Though the journal has done good service to this branch of study, extending its horizons and making valuable contributions towards its development, a time, we believe, has come to expand its scope. Different disciplines—natural and applied sciences, humanistic and social studies—are developing at a relentless speed and as a result are coming closer. The value of interdisciplinary approach is not only being recognised but actively pursued. The editorial committee therefore feels that these significant advances in the different branches of learning should be reflected in the journal of the Society. Accordingly a positive constructive effort will be made in future to include in the journal articles from various fields of study to enable the readers to get a comprehensive idea of the research work done in different disciplines. The Editorial Committee, therefore, appeals to all its members and contributors to help us in this task and thus enable the Society to make the journal truly representative of the fruits of academic work done in the field.

It is a matter of profound sorrow that MM. Dr. P. V. Kane, the doyen of Sanskritists passed away on 18th April, 1972.

Dr. Kane was intimately associated with the Asiatic Society, Bombay. He was a member of the Managing Committee and its Vice-President for long and the Editor of its journal nearly till the end. His passing away is an irreparable loss to the Society. MM. Dr. P. V. Kane was a profound scholar of Indology and has made original and significant contributions to the different branches of oriental learning, particularly Dharma-śāstra, Pūrvamīmāṁsā and Poetics. The magnum opus amongst his works is the 'History of

Dharma-śāstras' in five volumes. This is veritable mine of information on Ancient and Medieval Religious and Civil Law in India and is an eloquent testimony to industry, tenacity of purpose and single-minded devotion to the cause of oriental Scholarship. 'The History of Sanskrit Poetics' and other innumerable works and articles covering fields like Mīmāṁsā, astronomy, astrology, ancient geography indicate very eloquently the extensive sweep of his research interest and activity. Dr. Kane lived fully and as a whole. He was a 'Rasika' in the true sense of the term. It is a matter of great gratification to his innumerable admirers that he became a recepient of almost all the honours which the Government and the academic bodies could bestow on him.

In recognition of the long, continuous and fruitful association of Dr. Kane with the Asiatic Society of Bombay, the Managing Committee has named the research room in which he worked all his life as the "Bhāratratna MM. Dr. P. V. Kane Research Room." The Society has also now established a MM. Dr. Kane Research Centre to promote and popularise the cause of orientology, so dear to the heart of Dr. Kane.

The article 'Amudaṅka-Ṇāḍāam, Once Again' by Prof. G. C. Jhala appearing in the volume has a tragic history associated with it. The author passed away after he had sent it to the journal for publication.

Prof. G. C. Jhala was a deep student of Sanskrit and Prākrit, enjoying a high reputation amongst his co-workers for scholarship and devotion to the subject. His numerous contributions to the various research journals speak highly of the depth of his learning and originality of thought. He joined the St. Xavier's College as a lecturer in Sanskrit in 1930 and continued to grace the chair of the Head of the Department from 1945 to 1963 when he retired after a distinguished service of 33 years. This long fruitful association benefited the department a great deal.

Prof. Jhala was an active member of the Society since December 1944. He was a member of the Committee of Management from 1949 to 1963 and was for sometime the Hon. Secretary of the Society. He was an active member of the journal committee and also contributed various articles to Society's journal. The Society's silver Medal for the year 1971 was posthumously awarded to him for his contribution to Oriental Scholarship. Amongst his various publications mention can be made of Kalidāsa—a study, and Sunderkāṇḍa—part of the critical edition of Rāmāyaṇa published by the M. S. University of Baroda. Such a devoted service to Indology was cut short by the cruel hand of death so suddenly on 11th January, 1972.

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इ	i	ख	kh	ढ	ḍh	य	y
ई	ī	ग	g	ण	ṇ	र	r
उ	u	घ	gh	त	t	ल	l
ऊ	ū	ङ	ṅ	थ	th	व	v
ऋ	ṛ	च	c	द	d	श	ś
ॠ	r̄	छ	ch	ध	dh	ष	ṣ
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TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC AND
ALLIED ALPHABETS

ARABIC

ا	a	ز	z	ق	q	◌ِ	i or e
ب	b	س	s	ك	k	◌ُ	u or o
ت	t	ش	sh	ل	l	◌َ	ā
ث	th	ص	ṣ	م	m	ي	ī, e
ج	j	ض	ḍ	ن	n	و	ū, ō
ح	ḥ	ط	ṭ	و	w	ی	ai, ay
خ	kh	ظ	ẓ	ه	h	و	au, aw
د	d	ع	ʿ	ي	y	silent t	h
ذ	dh	غ	gh	ء	'		
ر	r	ف	f	◌	a		

PERSIAN

پ	p	چ	ch	ژ	zh	گ	g

Statement about ownership and other particulars about the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay.

FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

1. Place of Publication   Bombay.

2. Periodicity of its
   Publication   ...   Annual.

3. Printer's Name   ...   H. N. Dastoor.
   Nationality   ...   Indian.
   Address   ...   Associated Advertisers & Printers, 505, Tardeo Arthur Road, Bombay-400 034.

4. Publisher's Name   ...   Shri Rusi J. Daruwala.
   Nationality   ...   Indian.
                         Hon. Secretary.
   Address   ...   The Asiatic Society of Bombay,
                         ...   Town Hall, Bombay-400 001.

5. Editor's Name   ...   Dr. S. N. Gajendragadkar.
   Nationality   ...   Indian.
   Address   ...   The Asiatic Society of Bombay, Town Hall, Bombay-400 001.

6. Names and Addresses of individuals who own the news-paper and partners, share-holders holding more than one per cent of the total Capital.   The Asiatic Society of Bombay, Town Hall, Bombay-400 001

I, Rusi J. Daruwala, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Rusi J. Daruwala

Signature of Publisher.

PRADVEṢO VĀ PRAJĀSU

By

K. V. APTE

The Tarka-pāda (BS II-2) of the Brahma-sūtras that systema-tically expose Upaniṣadic philosophy is intended to refute philoso-phical theories opposed to the Vedānta view, by means of logical arguments. These Brahmasūtras have been commented upon by many Ācāryas like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Vallabha, etc. The present article deals with some portion from the commentary (bhāṣya) of Śaṅkara concerned with the general criticism of Buddhism, which supplies the words of the title of this article.

Śaṅkara directs BS II-2.18-27 against Buddhist Realism, BS II-2.28-31 against Buddhist Vijñāna-vāda, dismisses Buddhist Śūnya-vāda towards the end of his commentary on BS II-2-31, and understands BS II-2-32 as a general condemnation of Buddhism as a whole.

Śaṅkara's general criticism of Buddhism can be divided, for the sake of convenience, into the following three parts:—

(a)   What more can be said?   From whatever point of view, the nihilist philosophy (Vaināśika-samaya) is tested with regard to its logical probability, it tumbles down like a well dug amidst sands. We do not see any logical reason about it.   And for this reason, any further dealing with Nihilistic philosophy (Vaināśikatantra) is useless.

(b)   Moreover, the Buddha (Sugata) by propounding three doctrines contrary to one another, namely, Bāhyārtha-vāda, Vijñāna-Vāda and Śūnyavāda has clearly shown his tendency to make inco-herent assertions (asambaddha-pralāpitvam), or may be, his malice or hatred towards disciples (pradveṣo vā prajāsu) evincing a desire that these disciples may be thoroughly confused by believing in such contradictory theories.   (The word prajā is usually translated as people.   But here it means, as is made clear later on, disciples).

(c)   So in every way, this philosophy of Buddha (Sugata-samaya) deserves to be disregarded by the persons desirous of salva-tion (BSSB II.2.32).

The present article intends to see how far Śaṅkara is right in what he has said in this general criticism.   In that connection, two

words from (A), namely, Vaināśika-samaya and Vaināśika-tantra, the word Sugata from (B), and the word Sugata-samaya from (C) deserve attention. The remaining portions in (A) and (C) being merely the personal opinions of Śankara are not taken for discussion here. The part (B) is important and has been therefore considered fully.

Vaināśika-samaya,[1] Vaināśika-tantra:—

Śankara employs these two words in (A) to refer to Buddhist philosophy. Now, as the Buddhists do not call themselves Vaināśika, is Śankara right in using such a phrase?

Śankara starts his criticism of Buddhism after he has refuted the Vaiśeṣikas[2] whom he has called Ardha-vaināśikas. In that context, therefore, is to be understood the word Sarva-vaināśika or Vaināśika. According to Śankara's commentator Vācaspati, the Vaiśeṣikas are so called, because:—*Te hi paramāṇu-ākāśa—dik—kāla —ātma-manasām ca sāmāny-viśeṣa-samavāyānām ca guṇānām ca keṣām cit nityatvam abhyupetya, śeṣāṇām niranvaya-vināśam upayanti, tena te Ardhavaināśikāḥ.* From this it seems that Anityatva/ Niranvaya-vināśa was responsible for the use of the word Vaināśika. In that case, all forms[3] of Buddhism are Vaināśika, because 'Sarvam anityam', as Sogen[4] informs, is the first essential principle of Buddhist philosophy. Again, it may be added: All Buddhists can be called Vaināśika, as they admit *anātma-vāda;* for, 'Sarvam anātmam' is another essential[5] principle of Buddhist philosophy. Thus, "Buddhism, if tested by its own canonical books, cannot be freed from the charge of nihilism".[5a]

It seems that the Buddhists were popularly taken to be Vaināśikas, those who ruin the people. And though it is true that the Buddhists[6] did not call themselves Vaināśika, yet Śankara uses that popular nickname. (And there is no rule that the opponents should not be referred to by their nicknames). It seems that Śankara liked to mention rival philosophers by such nicknames; for he does it twice: He calls Vaiśeṣikas Ardhavaināśikas and uses the word Vivasana-samaya to refer to Jainism.

1. In his general introduction to his criticism of Buddhism, Śankara uses the word Sarva-vaināśika-rāddhānta (BSSB, II.2.18).
2. Vaiśeṣikas are refuted by Śankara under BS, II.2.11-17.
3. S. Mookerjee's opinion (BPUF, P. 267) that Śankara calls Sautrāntikas nihilists is not fully correct. Śankara has taken the word to refer to all schools of Buddhism which he takes for criticism.
4. Sogen, Systems, P. 7.
5. Sogen, Ibid, P. 7.
5a. Studies in Buddhism, P. 44. Also see: Ibid, Pp. 52, 57.
6. Vibhāṣā PV uses the word Vaināśika; but it is not clear in what sense it does so.

Sugata:—

Śaṅkara uses in (B), the word Sugata to refer to Buddha. Now, is Śaṅkara right in using this word?

Buddhist works refer to Buddha by the term Sugata. To wit:— ADD (529, P.401) uses the word Sugata. There is 'Sugato Buddhaḥ' in Divyāvadāna (P. 129). TSP (P.876) refers the word Sugata to Buddha. BCP (PP. 2-3) offers three explanations of the word Sugata. Further, we find Vibhāṣā PV, P. 167, PVB, P. 339, and TS, 336, P. 125 using the word Sugata.

Hence Śaṅkara rightly refers to Buddha by the word Sugata.
Sugata-samaya:—

Śaṅkara employs in (C) the phrase Sugata-samaya to refer to Buddhist philosophy.

Sugata is Buddha, as seen above. Hence Sugata-samaya is Buddhist philosophy.

Thus Śaṅkara is right in using the word Sugata-samaya to stand for Buddhist philosophy.

Part (B) of Śaṅkara's general criticism:—

Buddha by propounding three doctrines contrary to one another namely Bāhyārtha-vāda,[7] Vijñāna-vāda and Śūnyavāda showed his tendency to make incoherent assertions, evincing a desire that these disciples may be confused.... This is one point of Śaṅkara.

It is well known that Buddhism had many schools/sects. As McGovern observes, "Within the ample bosom of the Buddhist order are to be found schools teaching realism, idealism, nihilism, pantheism and pragmatism".[8] It is also well-known that Buddhism is primarily divided into Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The Hīnayāna had eighteen principal schools in India. Now, "The differences among these eighteen schools in Early Buddhism were not fundamental but generally related to superficial beliefs and practices".[9] And as McGovern points out, out of these eighteen sects of Hīnayāna, only two namely Sthavira-vādins and Sarvāsti-vādins[10] require attention. Further, "On all fundamental questions Thera-vādins (= Sthavira-vādins) and Sarvāsti-vādins[11] agreed." Throughout Kathāvatthu, only three distinct doctrines are said to be held by the Sarvāsti-

7. Under BS II. 2.18, Śaṅkara uses the following names:—
   Sarvāstitva-vādin, Vijñāna-astitva-mātra-vādin and Sarva-śūnyatva-vādin.
8. McGovern, Manual, Vol. I, Intro., P. 12.
9. Morgan, the Path of the Buddha, P. 39.
10. McGovern, Mahāyāna, P. 11.
11. E. J. Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, Pp. 163-164.

vādins[12] against the Thera-vādins. Hence, "the Thera-vāda and the
Sarvāsti-vāda, in spite of some important differences, may be consi-
dered as representing one[13] metaphysical stand-point."   Moreover,
Sarvāsti-vāda was the most important of all Hīnayāna schools for
many[14] reasons, and especially for its philosophy.   Thus, "the Sar-
vāsti-vādins may be called the Hīnayāna school par excellence".[15]   I
have shown elsewhere[16] that Śaṅkara takes Sarvāsti-vāda as equal
to Bāhyārtha-vāda so as to include in it both the Vaibhāṣika[17] and
Sautrāntika schools of Hīnayāna.[17a]

Regarding Mahāyāna schools, "tradition tells us that there were
but two main philosophic systems of Mahāyāna in India, one the
early Mādhyamika School represented by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva,
and the other the Yogācāra school represented by Asaṅga and Vasu-
bandhu".[18]   That is to say, in India, the Mahāyāna developed on two
lines of Mādhyamika or Śūnya-vāda, and Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda,
and continued by Candrakīrti, Śāntideva (Mādhyamika), and Diṅ-
nāga and his school (Vijñāna-vāda).

Moreover, such a threefold division of Buddhist Schools is men-
tioned by Jinaprabha, a teacher in the lineage of Nāgārjuna.[18a]   He
flourished about the end of 7th century A.D.   From Chinese and
Japanese Buddhist sources, we know that Jinaprabha divided the
whole Buddhist system into three categories and ascribed them to
three different schools thus:—The doctrine holding (i) both subject
and object are existing, (ii) the subject is existing but object is not
existing, (iii) both subject and object are not existing.[18b]   This
Kimura clarifies by saying:—The first indicates the Hīnayāna doc-
trine, the doctrine of the Sthavira-vādins and the Sarvāsti-vādins; the
second indicates the doctrine of the Yogācāra school, the third in-
dicates the Mādhyamika doctrine.[18b]   Again, Śilabhadra, (c. 636

12. E. J. Thomas, Ibid, P. 164. Also see: B. Sangharakshit, A Survey of Bud-
     dhism, P. 193.
13. Murti,   CPB,   P.   66. Vide:—Yadyapi Sthaviradi-anyeṣām sravaka-yananam
     Vaibhāṣika-vādataḥ   asti bhedaḥ,   tathāpi   bāhyārtha-anapalāpādi-anekeṣu
     aṁśeṣu teṣām asti aikamatyam (R. Sankrityayan, A. K. Bhumika, P. 22).
14. For these reasons, see: B. Sangharakshit, A Survey of Buddhism, P. 193;
     Takakasu, Essentials, P. 57; McGovern, Manual, Vol. I, Intro., PP. 9, 10;
     N. Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism, Vol. II, P. 117; Sogen, Systems, PP. 101-
     102; McGovern, Mahāyāna, P. 12; Murti, CPB,, P. 56.
15. McGovern, Mahāyāna, P. 12.
16. In my "Criticism of Buddhism and Jainism in Brahmasūtras."
17. "The philosophers of the little vehicle (Hīnayāna) were divided into two
     schools: on the one hand, the Vaibhāṣikas...., on the other hand, the Sau-
     trāntikas" (Poussin, 'Sautrāntikas'. ERE, Vol. XI, P. 213).
17a. Cp: "Fa Hian (C. 400 A.D.), a Chinese Buddhist Pilgrim, ... states that
     he found four Buddhist philosophic systems fully developed in India. Two
     of these, the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra represented the Mahāyāna, while the
     others—Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika—were of the older Hīnayāna school".
     (Zimmer, Philosophies of India, P. 510).
18. McGovern, Manual, Vol. I, Intro.. PP. 3, 13-14.
18a. Kimura, A Historical Study, P. 184.
18b. Kimura, Ibid, P. 185.

A.D.), a teacher in the lineage of the Yogācāra school, gives a three-fold[18c] division of Buddhist schools.

The above discussion will show that Śaṅkara is right in referring to three schools of Buddhism.

Śaṅkara has further said that the doctrines of these schools are contrary to[18d] one another. That is quite true:—Bāhyārtha-vāda maintains the reality of all things (Dharma). Vijñāna-vāda rejects the reality of external things. Śūnyavāda rejects the reality of all things.

Further, all these schools maintain that their doctrines were preached by Buddha. And that Buddha taught different doctrines to suit the requirements of his disciples is mentioned in Buddhist works both of Hīnayāna[19] and Mahāyāna.[20]

Hence Śaṅkara has rightly said that Buddha taught these three contrary doctrines. Again, this led Śaṅkara, as it was not his business to see whether the contrary views are reconcilable or not, to observe that Buddha made incoherent assertions. Moreover, from another point of view also, Buddha can be shown to have made incoherent statements. Consider the following inconsistent speeches put in the mouth of Buddha:—(a) Buddha is represented to have said that *he did not preach*[21] *anything at all,* and also that he preached different doctrines according to tendencies, etc. of the people as noted already. (b) Buddha is said to have "preached truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine (*anantaram abāhiram kṛtvā*)". Yet Buddha is made to say: *"So' ham Kāśyapa...na sahasaiva sarvajñā-jñānam samprakāśayāmi"* (Saddharma, p. 91. Also see: Saddharma, V. 43, P. 94). (c) It is said that Buddha preached three *yānas (Trīṇi yānānyapadarśayāmi/* Saddharma II. 69, P. 36. Also see: Saddharma II. 21, P. 26; III. 89,

18c. For details. see: Kimura. Ibid. Pp. 187-189.
18d. See:—(a) *Skandhāyatana-dhātavo hi sarva-kālika-vastūni* (Nālandika on AK, IV. 35); *tesām dharmāṇām traikālye astitvam vadati* (Nālandikā on AK, V. 25).
        (b) *Vijñapti-mātram eva satyam* (VMS. P. 4); *bāhyam artham na vidyate* (Laṅkā. II. 25, P. 25); *mithyābhūtam bāhyavastu* (A. P. Vyākhyā, P. 38), *bāhyārtho na sadbhūtah* (VMS, P. 6); *bāhyo na vidyate hyarthah* (Laṅkā, Sagāthaka. 154, P.285); *bahyārtho vastuto nāsti* (A. P. Vyākhyā, P. 37).
        (c) *Sarvasya ca bāhyasya ādhyātmikasya ca vastunah svabhāva-śūnyatayā* (CSV, P. 29); *Śūnyāh sarva-dharmā niḥsvabhāva-yogena* (MKV on MK 22. 11).
19. *Mohendriya-ruci-traidhāt skandhādi-trayadeśanā* (A.K., I. 20). Also see: Vibhāṣā PV, P. 6; Divyāvadhāna. PP. 28-32, 44. 47, 61, 103, 129; Sphuṭārthā Chap. I, P. 41.
20. *Ahamapi Śāriputra...... sattvānām nānā-dhātu-āśayānām āśayam viditvā dharmam deśayāmi* (Saddharma. P. 32). Also see: Saddharma, P. 30; II. 109, P. 41; Pp. 13, 32, 53, 90; V. 4, P. 91; V. 60-62, P. 99; Laṅkā III.15, P . 204; Laṅkā, Sagāthaka, 612, Pp. 340-341.
21. *Yasyām ca rātryām dhigamo yasyām ca parinirvrtah / Etasminnantare nāsti mayā kim cit prakāśitam / /* (Laṅkā. III.7, P. 144). Also see: MK 25.24, P. 538; MKV, Pp. 366, 538; Laṅkā, Chap. III. Pp. 142-143; BCP, P. 420.
22. V. Bhattacharya, Basic Conception, P. 17.

P. 67; VIII. 106, P. 132). And also: Buddha preached only[23] one yāna, Mahāyāna or Buddhayāna.[24] (d) It is said that Buddha's teachings differed according to capacities, etc. of people. Yet 'Citta alone' doctrine is intended to discard all other views (*Sarva-dṛṣṭi-prahāṇāya citta-mātram vadāmyaham/Laṅkā, Sagāthaka*, 278, P. 301), or *Sarva-saṅkalpa-hānāya śūnyatāmṛta-deśanā* (Catuḥstava of Nāgārjuna as quoted in P.L. Vaidya, Madhyamaka-śāstra, Intro, P. xiii). (e) Amitārtha-sūtra represents Buddha saying: "After my perfect enlightenment, I preached several doctrines to suit the requirements of different people of different capacities and desires, as means or expedient (*upāya*). *During the last forty years, I have not revealed the true doctrine.* Now I shall preach this Mahāyāna[25] Amitārtha-sūtra."—All this is sufficient to show that Buddha made incoherent assertions.

Śaṅkara has further said that Buddha made incoherent statements so that these disciples may be confused by believing in such contrary views.

Buddha is represented to have said that his Dharma is so diffi· cult that it can be understood only by intelligent[26] persons. So, "sometimes disciples, after hearing Gotama, went away and asked other advanced disciples the meaning of what he said." (A.J. Bahm, Philosophy of the Buddha, P. 29). Moreover, "how his (Buddha's) direct or indirect disciples differed in interpreting his teaching is also clear from the various councils held and the formation of a number of schools, each claiming to be true expounder of Buddha," (V. Bhattacharya, Basic Conception, P. 26).

There is no wonder therefore if Buddha's disciples did not understand him and were confused regarding his true teaching. Now, what Śaṅkara did was to slightly twist the matter, and he said that Buddha wanted to confuse his disciples. In this context, one should remember that Śaṅkara is playing the role of a critic, a debator, and that such "sophistical accusations" were allowed to a bonafide debator, though not as a principal method of[27] proof or argument. Hence Śaṅkara is justified in levelling such a charge against Buddha.

23. *Yānamekaṁ vadāmyaham* (Laṅka, Sagāthaka, 445, P. 321). Also see: Saddharma, II. 54; P. 34; II. 69-70, P. 36; II. 105, P. 41.
24. *Tathāgataḥ ekameva Mahāyānaṁ deśayati* (Saddharma, P. 61); *ekameva idaṁ Śāriputra yānam yadidaṁ Buddhayānam* (Saddharma, P. 33. Also see: Saddharma, Pp. 30, 95).
25. Kimura, A Historical Study, PP 57-58.
26. *Adhigato me dharmo gambhīro .... durdarśo duravabodhaḥ atarkyaḥ .... paṇḍitavijña-vedanīyaḥ* (Sphuṭārthā, chap. II, P. 13). Also vide: Divyāvadāna, P. 432.
27. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist, Logic, Vol. I, P. 343.

Further, as Buddha's disciples were uncertain regarding the exact teaching of Buddha, it is logical to presume that it led to strife and quarrels among his disciples. And we find that there were quarrels/mutual condemnations not only among different Buddhist schools but in a particular school also. And this is clear from the following extracts from Buddhist works: (a) *Tadetad a-Bauddhiyam* (Vibhāṣā PV, P. 95); *bhavata Sankhyayan parinamo' zhyupagato bhavati* (ibid, P. 106); *Sthiti-bhagiya nama Sakyah sva*, (*sva-*) *—lāṅgulika-dvitīya-nāmānaḥ* (Ibid, P. 148); *mithyā-vāditvāt ete Lokāyatika-vaināśika-Nagnāṭa-pakṣe prakṣeptavyāḥ* (Ibid, Pp. 258-259). Dharmatrāta is thus criticised: *Tadeṣa vārṣagaṇya-pakṣabhajamānatvāt tad-vargya eva draṣṭavyaḥ* (Ibid, P. 259). For criticism of Sautrāntika, vide Ibid, P. 224. (b) *Ye ca Vaibhāṣikā ākāśādivastu sattvena kalpayanti, te yuṣmat-pakṣe eva nikṣiptāḥ, na Śākyaputrīyāḥ* (TSP. P. 140).—For criticism of Vātsīputrīyas, vide TS, 336-349. Pp. 125-130. (c) The Hīnayānists criticise Mahāyānists:— *Atra punaḥ kecid Buddha-vacane bahiṣkṛta-buddhayaḥ prāhuḥ 'Na hi Piṭaka-traye bhagavatā Bodhisattva-mārga upadiṣṭaḥ.' Te evam vyāhartavyāḥ:—'Bhrāntā hi atra bhavantaḥ'* (Vibhāṣā PV, P. 195). (d) The Mahāyānists on the other hand said:—*Hīnayānābhirūdhīnām mṛtyu-śaṅkā pade pade* (CVP, 52, P. 4); *anupāyo hi Śrāvakayānam Buddhatvasya* (com. on MSL, P. 4); *na Hīnayānena nayanti Buddhāḥ* (Saddharma. II. 55, P. 34).—In general, we may note what Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā has to say in this connection: (i) *Svayuthyairapi paraspara-vivādaḥ sambhavati;* and (ii) *Asti hi eka-bhedā*-vasthitanam *Sautrāntikādīnāmanyonyam vivādaḥ* (BCP, Pp. 434-435).

This must have led Śaṅkara to observe that by making incoherent assertions Buddha manifested his hatred or malice towards his[28] disciples. It is true that Buddhist schools quarrelled among themselves. A quarrel is not a pastime; it involves some malice.— So this statement of Śaṅkara, like the previous one, is to be taken as a sophistical accusation.

All the above discussion will show that what Śaṅkara has said, apart from his personal opinions, in his general criticism of Buddhism is correct, or justifiable as sophistical accusations.

Regarding the part (B) in Śaṅkara's general criticism of Buddhism, some scholars have expressed their unfavourable opinions with reference to Śaṅkara's attitude, etc. towards Buddha and Buddhism. These opinions require examination. So first these opinions are given and then they are examined.

28. The word Prajā does not denote people in general but only the spiritual progeny i.e. disciples of Buddha. This is again clarified later on.

(1)   Bharat Sinha Upadhyay makes following observations:—
(i) "These remarks are inspired by his (= Śankara's) enthusiasm
(āveśa) of his being Ācārya.   (ii) There is no reason to account
for this, except that Śankara was ignorant of fundamental ideas of
Buddhism.   In Śankara's degradation of Buddhism, his ignorance of
or slight acquaintance with Buddhism is revealed.   Śankara did not
know what was the original teaching of Buddha and how it deve-
loped in later Buddhist schools.   Hence attributing the later philo-
sophical views of Buddhism to Buddha, he has shown his ignorance
(anabhijñatā).   (iii) He should have noted that in Vedic literature
also there are mutually contradictory views.   (And a reconcilia-
tion can be worked out in case of both the Buddhist and Vedic
literature).   (iv) It is not known how Buddha can be a hater and
deluder of people.   (v) It seems that Śankara, the champion of
non-difference (abheda-vādi), was not equanimous, and could even
abuse at unguarded moments."[29]

(2)   Gauḍapāda accepts his fellowship of Buddhism.   "This
feeling of just acknowledgment was superseded in the person of
Śankarācārya, by a spirit of sectarian animosity and even extreme[30]
hatred," says Stecherbatsky.   C. Sharma in the same strain states,
"Gauḍapāda had love and respect for Mahāyāna.   Śankara has no-
thing but strong and even bitter words[30a] for it."   Again, "He
(= Śankara) preserves the best that was in Mahāyāna in his own
philosophy.   But outwardly he is an enemy of Buddhism."[31]

(3)   Śankara is said to be "an ardent hater"[32] of Buddhism.
"He (=Śankara) has nothing but bitter and strong[33] remarks for
Buddhism."   Again, C. Sharma writes, "Śankara's attitude towards
Buddhism is that of hatred and animosity.   He uses harsh words
for Buddha and Buddhists."[34]   Dr. Belvalkar remarks, "That the
Buddha who claimed to have been filled with extreme compassion
not only for the humanity but for the whole universe should have
been charged with hatred and ill will for the world was the most
unkindest[35] cut of all."

Let us now examine these opinions serially.   (1) (i) There
is no reason for such a remark in (i) on the part of Upadhyay.
For, here 'Śankara is arguing not as an Ācārya but as a debator.
In arguments, the status of a debator is insignificant.   Upadhyay
wrongly assumes that Śankara is arguing as an Ācārya.   (ii) I have

29. Bharat Sinha Upadhyay, Bauddhadarśana, Vol. II, Pp. 1025-1026.
30. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, P. 22.
30a. C. Sharma, A critical Survey. P. 253, and Dialectic, P. 140.
31. C. Sharma, Ibid, P. 253, and Ibid, P. 140.
32. Stcherbatsky, C. B. Nirvana, P. 38.
33. C. Sharma, Ibid, 334, and Ibid, P. 265.
34. C. Sharma, Ibid., P. 272, and Ibid., P. 20.
35. Belvalkar, BS, Notes, P. 166.

elsewhere[16] shown that Śaṅkara was not ignorant of the various doctrines of the Buddhist schools he has criticised and that he was sufficiently acquainted with Buddhism. Again, it is to be noted that in his refutation of Buddhism, Śaṅkara is not criticising the so called views of Buddha himself; hence a reference to his ignorance about Buddha's teaching is completely irrelevant. Moreover, the idea in Upadhyay's remark, "Śaṅkara did not know.... Buddhist schools", seems to be this: the views of Buddha and of Buddhist schools were different. This assumption leads to a peculiar position thus:—Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna schools say that their doctrines were preached by Buddha himself. Now if these schools had no basis in Buddha's teachings, their claim that they embody the true teaching of Buddha is baseless. If the teachings of these schools were founded on the preachings of Buddha, some common views must be assumed between the teachings of Buddha and of Buddhist schools. And in the latter case, Śaṅkara can legitimately say that Buddha expounded contrary doctrines as preserved in these schools. (iii) It is not that Śaṅkara is not aware of contradictory passages in Vedic literature. He tries to reconcile some of them whenever an occasion demands. Yet Śaṅkara need not have bothered about the possibility of reconciling Buddha's contrary statements; for, the words of Buddha are those of a man, and not *apauruṣeya* and authoritative words like those of Vedas. Hence Śaṅkara does not deserve to be blamed on the ground of reconciliation; for, it is not the business of a critic to reconcile the opponent's views. (iv) Upadhyay's point (iv) would be examined in the sequel. (v) Upadhyay's (v) is a worthless remark. When Śaṅkara has assumed the role of a debator and a critic in empirical matters, why should anyone expect 'non-difference' and sympathy from him? Moreover, to call Śaṅkara's words 'abuse' is to raise the status of abuse. It is to be noted again that such 'abuse' is found put in the mouth of Buddha himself, in Buddhist works (See in the sequel). And, if Buddha, the so-called perfect person, can 'abuse' his rivals at times, Śaṅkara as a critic can do the same and hence he does not deserve condemnation.

(2) Regarding the attitudes of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara towards Buddhism, one finds the following justification:—"Gauḍapāda's attitude was conciliatory, sympathetic and friendly. He proposed rapproachment between the Vedāntist and the Buddhist.... But obviously, he failed in his mission to win over the Buddhists. Śaṅkarācārya's uncompromising attitude to the Buddhists was most probably influenced by this failure of Gauḍapāda's mission and the unfriendly reaction of the Buddhist church[36]". C.

36. Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. I, P. 594.

Sharma writes, "the vital error of the Svatantra-Vijñāna-vādins to-
gether with other things which degraded Buddhism changed the
love and respect towards Buddhism shown by Gauḍapāda into the
mutual animosity and hatred exhibited[37] by Śaṅkara."—This justi-
fication is doubtful. Further, this will imply that Śaṅkara was not
aware of the difference between his own philosophy and Buddhist
philosophy he has criticised, an implication not at all correct.

Moreover, leaving aside the above remarks about Gauḍapāda,
one has to consider the remaining portion. There it is urged that
Śaṅkara preserved in his own philosophy the best that was in Mahā-
yāna. This implies that Śaṅkara borrowed from Mahāyāna. In
this connection, there are three views regarding the relationship
between Vedānta and Buddhism. Some think Vedānta is the bor-
rower; others hold Buddhism is borrower; still others opine that
both developed independently. The last is the most reasonable
and acceptable view. In that case the opinions that Śaṅkara is *out-
wardly* an enemy or he has *outward* animosity have no signifi-
cance. And again it may be pointed out that the so-called sectarian
animosity can be found in nearly all the debators and even in
Buddha.

(3) The critics have urged that Śaṅkara expresses extreme
hatred and uses bitter, strong and harsh words for Buddha and
Buddhists.—Considering the entire general criticism of Buddhism,
one fails to feel this 'hatred'. Is it that one critic follows another
blindly in speaking of 'hatred'? Again, it can be said that the so-
called bitter, strong or harsh words are part of the game—the de-
bate in which sophistical accusations were allowed.

It seems that these critics of Śaṅkara take *'pradveṣo vā prajāsu'*
etc. as expressing Śaṅkara's hatred for Buddha. But that is not
correct, as considered already. That Buddha's contrary teachings
created hatred/jealousy/quarrels among his various disciples is the
point of Śaṅkara.

It further appears that the critics take the word *prajā* to refer
to all people or the entire world. This interpretation of the word
prajā is not correct in the present context. Obviously, here *prajā'*
refers to Buddha's *prajā* i.e. his spiritual lineage i.e. his pupils or dis-
ciples. It is well-known that in India disciples are looked upon as
forming *jñāna-vaṁśa* or *vidyāvaṁśa* or as off-springs of the spiri-
tual teacher.

And Śaṅkara's so-called bitter words can be taken at the most
to be sophistical accusations which, as noted already, were allow-
ed to a bonafide debator.

37. C. Sharma, A Critical Survey, Pp. 333-334, and Dialectic, P. 265.

Still if somebody is not prepared to admit the above views and urges that Śaṅkara should not have accused Buddha even sophistically, as Buddha was a good man, we point out the following fact:— This good and compassionate[38] Buddha uses strong and bitter words for his rivals. To wit a few:—(i) Buddha says: 'They by nature wrangling, quarrelsome, disputatious.... Monks, wanderers belonging to other sects are blind, unseeing.... Each of the views is a thicket, a wilderness, a tangle, a bondage and fetter of views attended by ill, distress,[39] perturbation, fever." (ii) Buddha stigmatised Gośāla Maskariputra as the bad man who like a fisherman was catching men only to destroy[40] them". (iii) Buddha calls Kapila[41] *durmati* and says that Kaṇāda, etc. ruin[42] the people.

Now, if kind and compassionate Buddha condemns unkindly his rivals, why should anyone expect sympathy and kindness from Buddha's opponents like Śaṅkara? If Buddha's rivals adopt tit for tat policy, how can that be condemned?

38. *Buddhasyaiva bhagavato mahākṛpā* (Vibhāṣā P. V, P. 391). Also see: Divyāvadāna, Pp. 77, 88, 95; ADD 508, P. 391; MK 27.30, P. 592.
39. As translated from Majjhima I. 4.26 and Samyutta III. 110, in Horner and Coomarswamy, Gotama the Buddha, Pp. 98-100.
40. Referred to in Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I. P. 132.
41. *Pradhānād jagadutpannam Kapilāṅgo'pi durmatiḥ / Śiṣyebhyaḥ samprakāśeti //* (Laṅkā, Sagāthaka, 558, P. 334).
42. *Bhaviṣyantyānāgate kāle Kaṇabhug-bāla-jātikāḥ / Asatkārya-vāda-durdṛṣṭyā janatām nāśayanti ca //* (Laṅkā, Sagāthaka, 548, P. 333).

ABBREVIATIONS

A critical Survey	A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy by C. Sharma.
ADD	Abhidharma-dīpa edi. by P. S. Jaini.
A Historical Study	A Historical Study of the Terms Hinayana and Mahayana and the Origin of Mahayana Buddhism by R. Kimura.
AK	Abhidharma-kośa of Vasubandhu with Nālandikā of R. Sankrityayan.
AP Vyākhyā	Ālambana-parīkṣā-vyākhyā of Dharmapāla.
Basic Conception	Basic Conception of Buddhism by V. Bhattacharya.
Bauddha-darśana	Bauddhadarśana Tathā Anya Bharatiya Darshana by Bharatsimha Upadhyay.
BCP	Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā.
BPUF	Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux by S. Mookerjee.
BS	Brahma-sūtras.
BSSB	Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkara-bhāṣya.
CB Nirvana	Conception of Buddhist Nirvana by Stcherbatsky.
Com	Commentary.
CPB	Central Philosophy of Buddhism by T. R. V. Murti.
CSV	Catuḥśataka-vṛtti of Candrakīrti.
CVP	Citta-viśuddhi-prakaraṇa.
Dialectic	Dialectic in Buddhism and Vedanta by C. Sharma.
ERE	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
Essentials	Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy by Takakasu.
Gotama the Buddha	The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha by Horner and Coomarswamy.
Intro	Introduction.
Laṅkā	Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.
Mahayana	Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism by McGovern.
Manual	Manual of Buddhist Philosophy by McGovern.
MK	Mādhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna.
MKV	Mādhyamaka-kārikā-vṛtti of Candrakīrti.
MSL	Māyānasūtrālaṅkāra of Asaṅga.
PVB	Pramāṇa-vārtika-bhāṣya of Prajnākaragupta.
Saddharma	Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra.
Sphuṭārthā	Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā-sphuṭārthā by Yaśomitra.
Systems	Systems of Buddhistic Thought by Sogen.
TS	Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita.
TSP	Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla.
Vibhāṣā PV	Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti on Abhidharmadīpa.
VMS	Vijnapti-mātratā-siddhi edi. by R. Sankrityayan.

TEACHER–PUPIL RELATION*

(VEDIC VIEW)

By

G. K. BHAT

(1)

I intend to examine in this study some aspects of the teacher-pupil relation and deduce from such examination some cultural and educational inferences. A select data should suffice my purpose. In this paper I will present the data from the Veda-samhitās and the Vedāṅga Nirukta and try to interpret it. The picture which will emerge may not be full of details; but, I hope, it will not be wanting in its significant outline and essential colours.

(2)

The Ṛgveda (RV.), we know, is a collection of praises and prayers addressed to several Deities that are, in the main, personifications of Nature-forms. The various aspects of Nature evoked the feelings of wonder and awe and admiration. Their grandeur and majesty affected the mind deeply and turned it to seek their brilliance and beneficence as a precious gift in the daily life of the human world. Such an attitude of the mind is an attitude of reverence which, in course of time, arranges a worshipful approach to the Forces of Nature conceiving them as Divinities. These are, thus, the significant aspects of the RV. collection : the praises and prayers, brought into connection with a worshipful approach to the Deities. And although there are in the RV. Samhitā minor Divinities and even some worldly objects and psychological concepts to which the poets address themselves, the general attitude of reverence and of ritual approach remains, I think, unaffected. The impression that the RV. creates on our minds is that of the power of the Divinities over the world of mortals, and of the mortals seeking Divine beneficence to make the mortal life full of prosperity and happiness and bliss. That is why, the RV. is full of prayers and praises, arranged round the ceremonially kindled fire. There are occasional touches of incidents in common life : like, for example, a fight, a marriage, a

river-crossing, drinking of Soma and gambling with dice; and, naturally, gifts received at sacrificial performances, for which the poets wax eloquent in their praises of the donor.

It is easy to understand, I believe, that the development and spread of culture and especially cultural institutions are possible only with settled conditions of life. It is not, therefore, surprising to find that the word *ācārya* does not occur in the RV.; and the word *guru* occurs at six places[1]; but it has only an adjectival sense in the context.

It is obvious that the study of the Veda must have started only when the Vedic Aryans settled down in the land of Northern India, and the daily business of living created, among other things, the necessary conditions for academic pursuits. In fact, the collection of the scattered hymns, made in different families of Vedic Ṛṣis and ostensibly spread over different periods of time, must have been the first step towards an academic activity.

(3)

The teacher-pupil relationship must presuppose the formation of something like a school, provision of a working curriculum and, if possible, a manual or handbook of study.

The first clear evidence on this academic aspect is found, I think, in the Nirukta of Yāska (about 700-800 B.C.). Yāska writes:

Sākṣātkṛta-dharmāṇaḥ ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ /

Te (a)varebhyo (a)sākṣātkṛta-dharmabhya(ḥ) upadeśena mantrān saṁprāduḥ /

Upadeśāya glāyanto (a)vare bilma-grahaṇāya imam grantham samāmnāsiṣuḥ, Vedam ca Vedāṅgāni ca /[2]

It appears from this passage that Yāska is speaking of three generations of teachers and pupils :

(a) The first is that of the revered Sages who had a direct vision of the nature of Piety. These obviously are the first composers of the Ṛgvedic hymns, the *mantra-dṛṣṭāraḥ*, as tradition describes them. Yāska's phrase, *sākṣātkṛta-dharmāṇaḥ*, which means that the Sage-composers had a *sākṣātkāra*, a direct intuition into the nature of divinities, already states that as early as Yāska's times the Sage-composers were regarded as nearer to the Divine, and that the *mantras* or the 'thoughtful utterances'[3] that they have left for

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1. RV.I.39. 3; I. 147.4; IV. 5. 6; VII. 56. 19; VIII. 47. 7; X. 37. 12.
2. Nirukta, I. vi. 20. Read: साक्षात्कृतधर्माण ऋषयो बभूवु: । ते‌ऽवरेभ्यो‌ऽसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्य उपदेशेन मन्त्रान संप्रादु: । उपदेशाय ग्लायन्तो‌ऽवरे बिल्मग्रहणाय इमं ग्रन्थं समाम्नासिषु: वेदं च वेदाङ‍ गानि च ।
3. Cf. मन्त्रा: मननात् । Nirukta, VII. 12.

posterity were heard by them, so to say, from Divine lips. It is this concept that bestows *apauruṣeyatva* or superhuman origin on the Ṛgveda, and the designation *Śruti*, 'intuitively inspired or heard wisdom', on the Vedic literature. This concept appears to be established quite early in the cultural tradition of India.

(b) The sages of the first generation who had divine intuition assumed now the role of teachers and transmitted the *mantras* to the second generation, who thus become the pupils of the earlier sages. This transmission was done by the process of *upadeśa*, instruction, which was imparted orally (as the word *upadeśa* implies).

The process of transmission of Vedic wisdom was thus started; and it may be presumed that these pupils of the first generation would, in their own time, become teachers and continue the process of transmission to the next generation. But there is a vital difference that Yāska notes between the first and the second generations of teachers : These teachers of the second generation lacked *intuition* (*asākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ*), and by *tuition* only could obtain the store of divine *mantras* from the earlier sages. But since these teachers had the opportunity of learning directly from the original composers they could grasp thoroughly the meaning of the *mantras* and, in their turn, could pass on this heritage to the next generation. In the cultural sense this should mean that the original activity of inspired composition ceased practically with the first generation; the second generation did not add anything, or possibly very little, of real significance to the original stock of the Vedic hymns. But as they were nearer in time to the generation of the composers they could learn the hymns directly, understand them, preserve them, and be fully equipped to transmit them to the following generation.[4]

(c) The third generation seems to have lacked the advantage of direct contact which the second generation enjoyed. This must have been obviously due to the passage of time and the distance that separated the first and the third generations. But Yāska tells us that these teachers of the third generation (who were pupils in the second generation) did not possess the same ability which their own teachers had : Yāska describes them as *upadeśāya glāyantaḥ*, 'languishing, getting lean, in the ability for instruction'.

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4. See, Nirukta, I. vi. 20 and Durga's commentary or Bakshi's *Vivṛti* on the passage: '..अवरेभ्य: अवरकालिकेभ्य:, विज्ञानशक्तिहीनेभ्य: असाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्य: शाखाप्रवर्तृभ्य: श्रुतर्षिभ्य:..' ।
Bakshi adds in a footnote: तेषां हि तत: पश्चाद् ऋषित्व उपजायते, न यया पूर्वेषां साक्षात्कृतधर्मणां श्रवणमन्तरेण एव, इति ते श्रुतर्षय: उच्यन्ते ।
'..अवरे निघण्ट-ब्राह्मण-वेदाङ्ग-कारा: उपदेशाय ग्लायन्त:...कथं इमे अल्पायुषो अल्पग्रहणशक्तिका: च एतावन्तं शब्दत: अर्थतश्च समुपदिश्यमानं अर्पजातं प्रहोतुं शक्नयु: इति खिद्यमाना:, तेषु अनुकम्पया बिल्मग्रहणाय..।'

The pupils of the third generation were in no better position. If the problem of the teachers was *upadeśa-glāni,* the problem of the pupils was *bilma-grahaṇa:* Yāska's meaning of the word *bilma* is *bhāsana* or *bhedana* ; the pupils could not grasp the Vedic *mantras* with 'illumination'; it was necessary for their proper understanding to 'split up' the *mantra,* as it were, and teach it to them part by part, word by word.

Again, culturally interpreted, this should mean that the passage of time had very far removed the teachers and pupils of the third generation from the age of original composition; with the result that contact with the 'knowers' was no longer available. Not only that : The passage of time played another trick on the process of understanding. The Vedic language in which the *mantras* were composed had started to be somewhat obscure to the later generations; naturally, they could not get 'illumination' into the *mantras;* that is to say, they were unable to understand the full meaning of the *mantras,* although they easily learnt by heart the words of the Veda. To meet this problem the teachers of this generation had to devise the method of imparting instruction by explaining the meaning of, at least, obscure and difficult words before the sense of the full *mantra* could flash on the mind of the pupils. This is what Yāska means by *bilma-grahaṇa.*

This necessity led to a significant academic and literary activity to which Yāska testifies in his observation : *imam grantham samām-nāsiṣuḥ Vedam ca Vedāṅgāni ca.* This activity was threefold :

(i) The teachers first did *Veda-samāmnāna,* that is to say, a systematic compilation of the hymns of the Veda. This is what we know by the phrase *Veda-saṁtitā,* which (*Saṁhitākaraṇa* or *samām-nāna*) means the arrangement of the entire stock of the hymns into eight *Aṣṭakas,* with their internal divisions of *Vargas.* It is possible to assume that this arrangement was made for the facility of teaching; so that in one instruction period (*varga*) a definite convenient portion of the hymn could be taught to the pupils in a class (*Varga*). The division of the hymns into ten *Maṇḍalas,* although more systematic and neat, is obviously inspired by literary principles. That is why, probably, the traditional training still uses the *aṣṭaka-varga* arrangement.

(ii) The second thing that was done by the teachers was to compile a list of obscure and difficult words in the Veda, and arrange the lists in some systematic way. Yāska refers to these lists by *imam grantham;* and it is what we know to be the *Nighaṇṭu.*

(iii) This was a useful beginning. But obviously it could not be enough as time marched onward. It was necessary to add mean-

ings and explanations to the words conveniently listed; and, if possible, provide rules also for the several aspects of the Vedic study, like accurate pronunciation, grammar, prosody, etymological exposition, the employment of the *mantras* in ritual context, and the appropriate time and procedure of such employment. The efforts to fulfill this need led to the compilation of what we know to be the *Vedāṅgas : Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta, Chandas* and *Jyotiṣ.* Yāska mentions this by the phrase *Vedāṅga-samāmnāna.* The *Vedāṅgas* are allied to the Vedas as auxiliary sciences and are textual aids to the study of the Veda.[5]

(4)

It is fortunately possible to add to this data the information about the establishment of Vedic schools and the use of manuals as aids to Vedic study. In connection with the Veda-saṁhitā Yāska says :

Pada-prakṛtiḥ Saṁhitā /

and he adds :

Pada-prakṛtīni sarva-caraṇānām pārṣadāni/[6]

The description of *Saṁhitā* which Yāska gives is borrowed later by Pāṇini (about 400 B.C.). However, the exact connotation of the word is slightly different for the two authors. As Yāska happens to be a sort of a literary historian for the *Saṁhitā* compilation, the *Saṁhitā* is to him the original (*Prakṛti*), and the *pada*-division intended for the facility of study is a derived result (*Vikṛti*); so that Yāska's description means, *Padānām prakṛtiḥ Saṁhitā /*

Pāṇini has, on the other hand, to deal with not a finished text but with individual words ; because that is what the Science of grammar is supposed to do. For Pāṇini, therefore, the word would be the basis, the original unit, of which the sentences and the text of the *Saṁhitā* are composed: *Padaḥ prakṛtiḥ yasyāḥ /*

However, it is clear that Yāska is aware of the fact that, in the altered circumstances when the meaning of Vedic *mantras* was not transparently clear to the people who came to study them, the explanation will have to start with single words ; and this is what he says in his second observation. The word *Caraṇa* means a Vedic school. It denotes a compact group of people who are allied to a particular branch of the Veda and who are devoted to the study of the Veda according to the particular canons of that

5. It is obvious that by *Vedāṅgas* we are not to understand the present works which are known under the name. Yāska could not have referred to his own Nirukta in the statement. The works must be the earliest works in the field which are either lost or were superseded by the present standard works.
6. Nirukta, I. vi. 17. Cf. also Pāṇini, I. 4. 109; *Ṛk-prātiśākhya*, I. 2, for the statements.

branch.[7] The word *pārṣada* literally means, 'what belongs to a *parṣad* or *pariṣad*', that is, an assembly of people; and this is a reference to what we know as the *Prātiśākhya*, a manual of rules of Vedic study, special to a particular branch. It is possible that Yāska may be using the word *pārṣada* to denote some kind of *Vedāṅga* text.

The data, so far, is quite clear. Yāska's observations tell us definitely about the following :

   (i) the generations of teachers and pupils;
  (ii) the establishment of Vedic schools;
 (iii) the growing need for convenient manuals or handbooks for Vedic study and their compilation;
  (iv) the study of the Veda as the basic curriculum; and
   (v) the procedure for expounding and teaching, which adopted individual difficult words as the basic unit, the *Saṁhitā* text being already reduced to *Pada* text.

(5)

With the academic requirements thus provided, the teacher-pupil relation could be taken as established. The aspects of this relationship must now be examined and explained.

The teacher-pupil relationship would naturally depend upon, first, the attitude of either parties to learning and to the subject of study; and secondly, on the demand that the basic attitude would make on the process of teaching and learning.

It appears that the distance in time which separated the composition of the Veda from its actual study in the Vedic schools had created linguistic difficulties. As an observer of language-facts, Yāska has noted the difference between *āmnāya* and *bhāṣā* : the first, meaning the language of the Veda, the dialect or dialects in which the Vedic hymns were composed; the second (*bhāṣā*), meaning the spoken language of the time, the everyday speech : A number of words had dropped out from usage; new words were added; old words were used in new grammatical forms, or changed their meaning; some retained an identical sense both in *āmnāya* and *bhāṣā*.[8] An expounder of the Veda had to take stock of this linguistic situation, which is inevitable in the development of any language. But while there were teachers who were ready to cope up with this problem, as the data presented by Yāska shows, there were other people, it appears from Yāska's testimony again, who did not bother about

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7. Jagaddhara, commenting on 'तैत्तिरीयिण: काश्यपा: चरणगरव:' in his commentary on the *Mālatīmādhava*, I.4.4.
8. See, Nirukta, I.ii.1, where Yāska writes: इह इति भावायां चान्वध्यायं च । Cf. also generally I. v, II.i.2-3 (where Yāska is discussing principles of Etymology).

the meaning of Vedic *mantras*. It is these people that Yāska refers to in the personality of Kautsa who held the view that the Vedic *mantras* were not intended to convey any meaning.[9] Men like Kautsa believed that the words of the Veda had no semantic significance; because the meanings they conveyed were often obscure, contradictory, inconsistent or non-sensical. It was enough, therefore, for men like Kautsa to master the words of the Veda and learn the use of the Vedic *mantras* in the ritual context correctly. For, the significance of the *mantras* did not lie in their meaning but in the ritual action that they expressed or implied.[10]

Such a class of people still exists and is known by the general name of Vedapāṭhakas : the men who use their energy in learning by heart the Vedic texts, without understanding their meaning, and who are able to recite them on different ritual occasions. It is true that we owe the preservation of our ancient literature to the tireless and somewhat dull activity of these Vedapāṭhakas. But it is also true, in the present context of this study, that such a process of learning could never have been very enlightened and would not have demanded much from the instructors and learners except the knowledge of accurate enunciation (pronunciation and accent) of the words of the Veda and a retentive memory. The teacher-pupil relationship could not have really blossomed with such a class of people.

Fortunately, however, there were other people who made it their business to understand and expound the meaning of the Veda, believing that the Vedas must have a meaning, since the stock of the vocabulary of the *āmnāya* and the *bhāṣā* was a common and identical stock. And, therefore, if the Veda did not yield any meaning, the fault was our own; we were blind men who did not see the pillar and hit our head against it.[11] It is obvious that it is in the circle of such people that the Vedic study must have acquired a special significance.

There was also another fortunate circumstance. All people, whatever their attitude regarding the meaning of the *Veda-mantras*, held that the Veda was a divine revelation; and this automatically compelled reverence for the Veda and Vedic learning.

(6)

There is a very frequent occurrence of the word *Brahman* (neuter) in the Ṛgveda. *Brahman* means a 'prayer', the words of

9. Cf. Nirukta, I. v. 15-16 : यदि मन्त्रायप्रत्ययाय, अनर्थकं भवतीति कौत्स: । अनथका हि मन्त्रा: ।
10. *Ibid.,* I. v. 16 : "एतद्घ यज्ञस्य समृद्धं यद् रूपसमृद्धं, यत् कम क्रियमाणं ऋगु यजुर्वा अभिवदति ।"
11. *Ibid.:* अर्थवन्त: शब्दसामान्यात । and नेष स्याणोरपराघो यदेनमन्घो न पश्यति, पुरुषापराघ: स भवति ।

the prayer, and thus denotes the Ṛgvedic *mantra*. It also has an additional connotation which is linked with the idea of divinely inspired utterance. It implies the sense of divine potency or power. The Ṛgvedic god Brahmaṇaspati or Bṛhaspati is a personification of the Ṛgvedic mantra and the mystic power it symbolises. This power is described as the 'blazing missile' or the 'hottest glow', which Brahmaṇaspati is called upon to use against the demons who hold the god to scorn.[12] Brahmaṇaspati has the power to quell the fiercest of administrators who has an ungodly mind and who wishes to inflict harm on the sincere worshippers of the god.[13] This is the reason why, the Ṛgvedic Indra courted Brahmaṇaspati's help in his seizure of Vala; and Saramā threatened the Paṇis, the guardians of the cows locked by Vala in a mountain-cave, with the terrific power of Brahmaṇaspati's *mantra*.[14] The Vedic *mantra* is thus a mighty weapon, a guard against any danger or calamity, and a means to secure godly bliss as well. Used in the context of enemies or rivals it could well be a magical power. This is how the authors of the Atharvaveda use the *mantra*. The *mantra* has both a blissful quality as well as a dreadful impact. It is therefore believed that even the mastery of the Vedic word would bestow on the learner an uncommon power to combat evil and obtain desired ends. The Atharvaveda contains an invocation to Medhā,[15] which is described as 'equipped with Brahman' and 'mastered by those who move with Brahman'. There is a fervent desire expressed in the hymn to obtain this Medhā. The opening Sūkta of the Atharvaveda is a prayer to be united with and never be estranged from 'learning' (*Śrutam*) and for its life-long retention.[16] Let us remember that *medhā* is the 'power to retain learning', as contrasted with *prajñā*, which is either the 'god-gifted intuition' or the 'power of quick intellectual grasp';[17] although, both denote powers of the human intellect. I wish to suggest that even those who mastered the words of the Veda, without caring for its meaning, firmly believed in the godliness and the power of Vedic utterance.

12. See, RV.II.23. 14: तेजिष्ठया तपनी रक्षसस्तप ये त्वां निदे दधिरे दृष्टवीर्यम् ।

13. RV. II. 23. 12: अदेवेन् मनसा यो रिषण्यति शासामुग्रो मर्यमानो जिघांसति ।

14. See, RV. X. 108. 6 (Saramā-Paṇi-Sūkta): बृहस्पतिर्वं उभया न मृळात् ।

15. Atharvaveda (AV.) VI. 108. 2, 4: मेधामहं प्रथमां ब्रह्मण्वतीं ब्रह्मजतामृषिष्टुताम् ।
    प्रपीतां ब्रह्मचारिभिर्देवानामवसे हुवे ॥

    यामृषयो भूतकृतो मेधां मेधाविनो विदुः । तया मामद्य मेधयाग्ने मेधाविनं कृणु ॥

16. AV., I. 1: *2d, 3d,* मय्येवास्तु मयि श्रुतम् । *4cd:* सं श्रुतेन गमेमहि मा श्रुतेन वि राधिषि ॥

17. Read: मेधा कालान्तरे स्मृत्यनुकूला धारणावती धीः । प्रज्ञा प्रतिभा नवनवोल्लासशालिनी वृद्धिः, यद्वा गुरूक्तसकल-अर्थावबोधन-सामर्थ्यवती धीः । (Given by Bhataji Shastri Ghate in his Comm. on Uttara-rāma-carita, II. 3. ff.)

What was believed then by those who knew the words of the Veda and also their meaning can best be imagined : The Vedic words assumed for them the status of Ultimate Truth, the Final Reality.

(7)

With this notion it was inevitable that the Vedic words would acquire an esoteric significance. This development is seen particularly in the Upaniṣadic literature. The thinkers of the Upaniṣads made a distinction between 'right learning' and what was 'not learning' (*Vidyā* and *avidyā*), and insistently held that right learning or right knowledge led to immortality, a kinship with the Divine.[18]

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad[19] tells us of Yājñavalkya and his two wives. When Yājñavalkya decided to renounce the world and become a Parivrājaka, he divided his property between his two wives. Kātyāyanī, who is described as *strīprajñā*, a worldly woman of domestic ability, did not say anything to her philosopher-husband. But Maitreyī, who was a Brahmavādinī, that is to say, interested in metaphysical discussions, immediately raised a question. She wanted to know if she could become immortal with the possession of wealth. Yājñavalkya told her that wealth could buy material happiness but not immortality. Maitreyī then refused to take the inheritance and pressed her husband to initiate her into the esoteric knowledge. Yājñvalkya then says :

> You were dear to me and now you have become dearer still !
> I will be very happy (*hanta*) to explain this to you, my dear ![20]

This conversation between the philosopher and his unworldly wife is typical of the philosophical attitude to learning, and of the kind of pupil the teacher loved to instruct.

The divine and esoteric significance that came to be attached to the words of the Veda in this age determined and moulded the teacher-pupil relation. The actual result of this development may be described as follows :

(a) Socially speaking, the process of learning became exclusive.

This is reflected in our several Śāstras which insist on the special *adhikāra* of the pupil for approaching the study of a particular Śāstra. Even Yāska, for instance, lays down rules for the teaching of the Science of Etymology and for excluding certain kinds of people from its study.[21]

18. Cf. 'विद्याऽमृतमश्नुते ।' Iśāvāsya, 11d.
19. Bṛh. Upa. IV.5.i-iii.
20. *Ibid.* Read: प्रिया वै खलु नो भवती सती प्रियमवृधत् । हन्त तर्हि भवति, एतव व्याख्यास्यामि ।
21. Nirukta, II. i. 4: न अव्याकरणाय, न अनुपसन्नाय, न अनिर्वंविवे वा । नित्यं हि अविज्ञातुः विज्ञाने अवृया । उपसन्नाय तु निशृण्वाद् यो वा अलं विज्ञातुं स्यात्, मेधाविने तपस्विने वा ।

In social practice the exclusiveness resulted in barring the lower order of society from Vedic study, and, in fact, from all important theoretical learning. All knowledge is, of course, sacred.[22]   But the very sacredness of knowledge made it into a special privilege. *Vidyā* is not an open stream at which any one could come to drink. It is a fount at which only the qualified and the privileged could be admitted.

(b) Academically speaking, the exclusive concept of knowledge made special demands on the teacher-pupil relationship.

The teacher had his absolute choice in selecting his pupil and in deciding what and how he will teach. This was quite possible because education was free. On his part, the pupil had to win his Guru's favour and grace in order to obtain the knowledge he sought to possess.

This aspect of the teacher-pupil relationship is clearly reflected in what is known as the Vidyā-sūkta:[23]

"Verily VIDYĀ approached Brahman (Creator-god, or Preceptor) and said : Guard me. I am your precious treasure. Do not speak about me to one who is scornful, is not straight, is undisciplined. Thus will I preserve my vigour.

"He who gives the gift of immortal truth, penetrating the ears with Reality and (yet) causing no pain, regard him as the father and the mother. None may malign him, whatsoever be the occasion.

"Those Brahmins (pupils) who, although taught (by the teacher) do not respect the teacher by word, in mind or by action, just as the teacher would not take them near him (to share a meal with them), in the same way, whatever learning they may have acquired will not serve them.

"Whom you regard as pure, unblundering, intelligent and possessing the strict discipline of student's life, and who will never malign you whatsoever the occasion, to him you may speak about me : He is the guardian of the treasure, O Brahman!"

The concept and view of knowledge, and what was demanded from the teacher and the pupil in the process of the acquisition of knowledge, are transparently reflected in this speech of Vidyā.

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22. Cf. Bhagavadgītā, IV.38: न हि ज्ञानेन सदृशं पवित्रमिह विद्यते ।
23. See, Nirukta, II.i.4. Yāska quotes these verses; they are found in Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra; they are used by Manu, *Manusmṛti*, II. 114-115; Sāyaṇa also has quoted them in his Introduction to his Bhāṣya on the Ṛgveda.

SAṬṬAO NAṬṬIDAVVO*

By

USHA R. BHISE

The *saṭṭaka* has been called a close associate of the *nāṭikā*. It resembled the *nāṭikā* in most of its characteristics; nevertheless, it was a play with a definite technique and it is this technique that imparts individuality as well as grandeur to this form of literature which would otherwise have passed as a very poor specimen of stagecraft. It has often met with adverse criticism at the hands of scholars, who disregard the technique and tend to maintain that it is poetry characterised by elaborate imagery and stylistic expression, good enough for arm-chair reading but lacking the effect which a drama should achieve.

The word *saṭṭaka* is of non-Sanskritic origin, derivable from the Dravidian √*āṭu*, to dance and reminds one of words like *kūḍi-āṭṭam, rāmanāṭṭam, mohini-āṭṭam,* current in Kerala. They denote the different forms of dance performances. *saṭṭaka* seems to be a sanskritised form, which may be analysed into *sa+aṭṭa+ka*, meaning a performance with the *aṭṭa* or the dance element in it.[1] The formation of the word suggests the place of its origin to be Kerala, where dance performances like the *rāman-āṭṭam* etc. were presented. The technique of pantomime that lay at the basis of these performances is known to be Kathakali, the dance which tells a story. The central principle of such a pantomime is imagination; it uses the language of gestures and eye-movements. In cultivating this scientific mimicry, the whole range of literary expression has been reduced to elementary notions, for which there are separate finger signs. The *mudrā-s*, hand poses, are full of significance and meaning. They are based on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra and are fully symbolical, capable of denoting objects, action and even inflection. They aim at indirect suggestion. Beholding the performance means understanding the relationship between rhythm and emotion. The *mukhābhinaya* and *netrābhinaya* are capable of producing *rasa* and giving aesthetic joy, which a piece of literature, and a drama in particular, is supposed to create. The tenderest and the most violent emotions are conveyed without the use of a single spoken word. The background is created without any scenic effects.

1. Intro. to Candalehā; ed. A.N. Upādhye, Bombay, 1967. p. 29.

Having claimed a Kathakali back-ground for the *saṭṭaka-s,* let us examine if the claim is historically justified. The earliest known author of *saṭṭaka* is Rājaśekhara (10th century), who wrote Karpū-ramañjarī. Even though, in its most advanced form the Kathakali emerged in the 17th century, it has got a tradition which is not less than a thousand years old. The earliest beginnings may be traced to *Kūḍi-āṭṭam,* which was current in the 4th century and took an elaborate shape in the 8th century. Thus it may be safely conclud-ed that Kathakali existed, at least in its earlier form, in the 10th century. Rājaśekhara was patronised by the ruler of Kanauj, but there are evidences to show that he had traversed a major part of South India. cf. Kṣemendra's[2] Aucityavicāracarcā v. 27: *karṇāṭīdaś-nāṅkitaḥ śitamahārāṣṭrīkaṭākṣāhataḥ praudhāndhrīstanapīḍitaḥ pra-ṇayinībhrūbhaṅgavitrāsitaḥ/lāṭībāhuviveṣṭitaśca malayastrītarjani-tarjitaḥ s'oyam samprati rājaśekharakavir vārāṇasīm vāñchati. / /* The internal evidence shows that he was acquainted with southern cus-toms and places, alluding to rivers like Tāmraparṇī, Kāverī and Narmadā.[3] Perhaps it was Rājaśekhara, who was responsible for carrying this South Indian form of art to the North and popularising it there through Karpūramañjarī. So far, we do not possess any evidence which would prove the existence of *saṭṭaka* prior to Rāja-śekhara. The prologue of Karpūramañjarī contains the earliest ever recorded definition of *saṭṭaka.* The form *saṭṭaka* is referred to by several authors on Sāhityaśāstra including Abhinavagupta (close of 10th century), Hemacandra (1089-1172 A.D.), Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra (middle of 12th century), Śāradātanaya (1175-1250 A.D.), Sāgaranandin (13th century), Vidyānātha (beginning of 14th century) and Viśvanātha (1300-1384 A.D.). All these belong to the late 10th century onwards. The Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya (early 10th century) is silent about it and it may be conjectured that *saṭṭaka* had not gained a wide publicity and recognition in the days of Dhanañjaya. A further evidence for Rājaśekhara being the origi-nator of this form is that all the works, which refer to *saṭṭaka,* illus-trate their points by quoting from Karpūramañjarī. Making *saṭṭaka* a variety of the *nāṭikā* was a clever device used by these authorities to bring it into conformity with the Bharata's school of dramaturgy and thus gain the sanction of literary critics for it.

After discussing the possibility of Kathakali elements being woven into the fabric of *saṭṭaka-s,* it will be worthwhile to see if there is any internal evidence which would conform to it. On exa-mining the details of the *saṭṭaka-s,*[4] it is found that not only does Kathakali technique harmonise with them, but it tends to solve cer-

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2. Quoted by Konow: Intro. to Karpūramañjarī, p. 187 (Harvard Or. Ser.).
3. V. S. Apte: Rājaśekhara, his life and writings, 1886, p. 20.
4. I propose to discuss Karpūramañjarī and Candralekhā in particular.

tain problems with which a critic of *saṭṭaka-s* is faced. One such problem is their division into *yavanikāntara-s* instead of the traditional *aṅka-s*. The curtain known as *therissila* has a peculiar function on the Kathakali stage. This curtain made of pieces of silk is held up by two persons at the beginning of the performance and the propitiatory dance is performed behind it. After this event the curtain is lowered and a divine couple makes entry on the stage. The curtain is dropped to the ground and removed during the performance. Before the entry of every important character it is similarly held up and removed afterwards. Thus it marks the important events of the play. The *yavanikāntara* is a remnant of this practice rather than the invention of new terminology. The Prelude called *sthāpanā* and the following garden scene is a queer blending of the traditional *prastāvanā* and the opening scene of the Kathakali performance, that is presented by the hero and the heroine appearing in a pleasure garden. The term *sthāpanā* may be related to *purappād*, which means setting forth and is a pure dance prelude by a divine pair.

The *carcarī* dancers as described by the Vidūṣaka in the fourth Act of Karpūramañjarī display certain features which could have been borrowed from the Kathakali. Attention may be drawn to words like *masīkajjalakālakāā* 'body painted black by collyrium', *paḍisīsaehiṁ* 'by the masks' and *rammamaddalaraveṇa,* 'by the pleasant sound of *maddala* drum'. Out of these the first one refers to the custom of painting the *tāmasa* characters with black colour; the second refers to the custom of wearing masks while the third one explicitly refers to *maddala*, a drum played on both sides with fingers.[5]

If the first Act of Karpūramañjarī is taken into consideration, one feels embarassed at the idea of seeing a bathing girl on the stage. This scene crosses the limits of decency and one wonders how the scene was received by the spectators when it was first staged. Bharata's dramaturgy would certainly prohibit such scenes from being shown on the stage. Even here the situation may be softened by taking resort to Kathakali technique, which can denote anything by its code of *mudrā-s,* that aim at indirect suggestion rather than direct exposition. This would mean that there was a well-dressed dancer on the stage, gesticulating wet garments, wet tresses of hair sticking to her face etc. Thus, Rājaśekhara may be saved from the blemish of displaying bad taste through this scene.

With Candralekhā of Rudradāsa we come to the days when Kathakali appeared in its most mature form and had received power-

5. Also *vide* Dr. Kapila Vatsyayan: Classical Indian dance in literature and the arts. New Delhi, 1968. pp. 273 ff.

ful impetus from the Zamorins, one of whom was responsible for the presentation of *Kṛṣṇa-āṭṭam*. The imagery which abounds in lotuses, bees, *malaya*-breezes, snakes, the knitting of eye-brows, side-glances, *karṇa-sudhā* and the whirling movements of bees and waters—all this fits perfectly well into the Kathakali *mudrā-s*. The long sentences, imitating the style of Bāṇabhaṭṭa, may appear to be cumbersome if they are meant for plain dialogue. Nevertheless, in the context of dance, each phrase is full of action, enough to inspire the dancer for showing his skill and pleasing the spectators with graceful movements, pushing aside the dialogue element for the time being. The descriptions, especially of gardens, give an opportunity to the dancers of engaging the audience with pieces of superb skill.

Such of the scenes in these *saṭṭaka-s*, as present a sub-scene and would have required a special stage set-up, are made easily presentable through this technique. In Karpūramañjarī we come across the double scene thrice. In the Karpūramañjarī we come across *ṣaka* behold the swinging scene in the plantain arbour; again, the king witnesses the *aśoka-dohada*, standing in another part of the garden. The third one is the watching of *carcarī* from the top of a palace. In Candralekhā we come across a double-scene viz. that of the musical concert that is watched by the king and the *vidūṣaka*, while the Ānanda-sundarī of Ghanaśyāma presents a *garbhanāṭaka*. In the absence of an elaborate stage set-up, this zonal treatment of the stage can be made possible only through a highly imaginative medium.

The foregoing discussion would point out that the so-called blemishes of the *saṭṭaka-s* would be toned down if a powerful medium of dance is imparted to their presentation.

KANA—AN—HAUN : A FEAST FOR THE DEAD OF THE CAR NICOBARESE—A CASE STUDY :

By

SUDHENDU CHANDA

ABSTRACT:

This is an attempt to depict an interesting picture of a traditional communal feast which the islanders celebrate once in three years in honour of the departed souls of their dead ancestors. It is a great event of the Car Nicobarese although the feast is not an annual one by any means. It is celebrated when the community is able to provide the materials necessary for its proper carrying out. The article is written in the same case-history form as it was collected by the writer in 1968.

INTRODUCTION:

In the Nicobar Group of Islands, numbering 21, Car Nicobar of which native name is Pu, is situated towards extreme north of Chowra and seventy miles south of Little Andaman in the Bay of Bengal. It has an area of 49.02 square miles with a total population 9,946 as per census of India, 1961. The island is thickly inhabited by a tribe known as Car Nicobarese. Ethnically they belong to Mongoloid Group. They speak their own language e.g. Car Nicobarese. The island consists of 15 villages. The materials for this paper were collected from the three villages, namely Arong (Population: 577); Kakana (844) and Big Lapati (785). The basic occupation of the people consists of raising plantations of coconut, arecanut, and other vegetables and fruits, livestocks and fishing.

The Car Nicobarese are Christians (Protestants) belonging to the Church of India. They are patrilineal in descent and patrilocal in residence. A few Mohammedan families are also found in this island but they do not organise such festival.

The Car Nicobarese celebrate various traditional festivals (Kinmilap). The mode of celebrations of the festival is uniform in all villages. In the past the object of such festival was to evoke spirits; but now the people have started giving less importance to such rituals and beliefs and try to make the occasion for mass feasting and general enjoyment. But few festivals are still performed in order to gain favour from spirit before the villagers undertake any

enterprise in their economy, viz. fishing, hunting and plantation and also to mark the changes in the season.

DETAILS OF FESTIVAL:

I. *Ka-na-an-haun :*

On 21st June, 1963, the villagers of Kakana held a meeting in the Elpanam with all the captains (ma-ku-panam) and lineage's heads (ma-ku-kinem) of Kakana for the 'Ossuary Feast (ka-na-an-haun)' in the following year. The meeting lasted for two hours and it was decided that the actual festival would be held on 18 January 1964. After that, it was decided to inform to different villages, in order to help them to prepare themselves by that time.

A second (net) meeting of all the village captains (ma-ku-panam) was held on 15 November 1963 at the Elpanam of Kakana (Sa-pe-he). The Chief Captain (Tokirong-ma-ku-panam) and the Vice-Chief Captain (Ranetmi non ma-ku-panam) of the Island Council (Nuolo-ka-ho panam) were present. From the village Kakana, First Captain (ma-ku-panam) Sri Edward Kutchet (67), the Second Captain (In-net-takma-panam) Shri Hokka and the Third Captain (Li-nuoi-takma-panam) Sri Sim were represented. The meeting lasted for an hour and it was decided that the festival would be held on the previous selected date, i.e. 18 January 1964, on the full-moon day (Chawichingeat).

About eight (hev-ho-re) months (roi) prior to the feast (chat-heoe), i.e. 21 June 1963, all the people of the village Kakana including the Captains, consulted one another and fixed the festival month, i.e. 18 January 1964 and informed the rest of the villagers and obtained their promise to help in the matter. The meeting was held in the courtyard of the Elpanam.

Then they sent messengers (Homnal) to give notice to all the villagers of the island about their proposal and sent preliminary invitations. There were two kinds of invitations, general (Inlot-kuhon) and special (Liro-lot-ku-hon). The general invitation was to be given to their friends and relatives, that they might join them in the feast and help in other respects. The special invitation was that of one family among the participants of the feast (chat-heoe) inviting the people of another village, that they might give a performance in their house (patti) on the occasion. Sixteen families (mikuono) of the village had commemorated the feast, they invited the people of sixteen villages for the purpose, while those of the two adjacent small villages, namely Ackuchaung and Pesa were invited in a general way.

On 11 January 1964, the villagers of Kakana sent men to all the villages to inform the people that the feast of Kana-an-haun would take place in a week's time and that they should come at the proper time. This was the final invitation which they called Mi-nga-la.

Their first duty after sending out invitations (Mi-nga-la) was to make a Na-kopah (food for burial ground). A few well-carved wooden poles, about 30 to 40 feet in height with cross battens, were prepared and fixed in the ground at Elpanam as well as in the interior of the village in front of the houses (patti) of the commemorators. On these they hang up varieties of yams (to-ki-nion) tender coconut (taoko) bundles of betel leaf (tuku-cha), bunches of coconut, areca nuts (tisa-a) pandanus fruit (ku-vony) and other eatables to which they are accustomed, altogether about fifteen kinds. Below the post, they kept wooden boxes (hoptep) containing a few new clothes, bottles of 'Toddy' and earthen pot from Chowra (kuntafal) and fence (kin-longo) them carefully. The pole with all the contents from top to bottom was decorated nicely with flags of various colours, and shell-made toys. This was the result of 30 men's labour for about two months. From the day this na-kopah was fixed in the ground they were restricted from killing pigs (haun) in the village (panam).

On these occasions they took great care in repairing their own huts (patti) and erecting new ones, in making new roads and paths, which they did up to the limit of their village in each direction. The open ground at Elpanam and the graveyard (oukupha) were also cleared and kept tidy. In the meanwhile, they tried to procure sufficient provisions for the festival.

A month before the festival in the month of December, they prepared some more Na-kopah, which were fixed on the ground of Elpanam, and on the ground of each captains' house, just a week before the feast with fresh eatables hanging on them. After fixing these poles, the participants sent final notice to the guests in all villages.

A week before the festival day, i.e. on the 12th they prepared a "KUIMETELA" (hand stone of a tomb) in the following way. A well-carved round log of wood about three feet long and one foot in diameter, with four holes on the top was prepared and kept in readiness. At the approach of the feast men and women joined together and adorned it by rolling round the log a piece of white calico (Hita) and fringed it with red and blue broad-cloth, tearing them into pieces and folding it like ribbon (kinbung-kauyo). Four large soup ladles (kintoh) were fastened to the holes of the log and in the middle of it, a cross-shaped iron-spike about three feet in length,

called the Merahta, adorned with a number of spoons (sanel) and soup-ladles of all sizes. It also contained hunting weapons (shonen-kap at an), such as bow and arrow (Linreny).

Dahs (fal), different types of axes (Haning), iron pocker (Lanoka) for catching octopus, and for catching small fish (chokka) toys and other curiosities, which glitter much on the iron rod.

The men then prepare three long temporary bamboo cages (Sanre-ka-haun) with separated enclosures for each pig, so that a dozen pigs might be enclosed in each cage. One was made underneath the house and the rest in front of the house. Some people meantime decorated the canoes and filled them with all sorts of eatables and curiosities and kept them in front of the house of the owners of canoes. They obtained the help of their friends in the villages of Kemois and Malacca, who neglecting their own affairs, willingly came and helped them in their work, for which purpose they even brought with them food for their own requirements. Of course, the villagers also supplied them with food sometimes.

After all these preparations were over, then commenced the preliminary ceremony called Wani-patti (house decoration) which took place on 18 January, a day before the festival. This was done as follows:

The interior of the house was decorated profusely with tender coconut leaves (roitaoko) areca-nut leaves (tukocha) and with a number of flags of different colour of cloths (hila), bunches of tender coconuts (taoko), areca-nuts (tisa-a) and betel-leaf (tukocha) were tied all around the posts of the house outside that the guests might take at their leisure. Several pieces of red-cloths, chintz and calico were hung up tied to a string in the interior of the houses as well as underneath the houses. The merahta (iron-pike) and the adorned canoes (ap) were placed on either side of the Na-kopah. The bamboo cages intended for pigs (haun) were also decorated. When these further arrangements had been made they killed a pig owned by first captain, sprinkled the blood over all the decorations as a sacrifice and sang songs and danced around the houses for the first time with their general guests.

Then on the festival evening (harap), i.e. on 19th, they brought nine pigs from the piggery (Sanra-ka-haun) in the jungle and left them in the cages and danced before them. The pigs that were left in the cage underneath the houses were only for exhibition, intended to show the condition of their wealth and at the same time they were dedicated for future festival. In the cages outside were left those pigs that were to be slaughtered during the festival. There was another cage besides these in which they left those pigs brought

to them by their friends as festive gifts (olyala). Then in the next
morning i.e. 20, January 1964 the preparations were made for dig-
ging up the false bones (formally these are the real bones of the
dead but now human wooden skeletons were made and dug in the
soil at least 3 months before this feast) of the dead were made by
the deceaseds' relatives. Water was drawn from the ceremonial clear-
ed wells and covered over with banana leaves. The women squated by
the memorial posts (kuimetela) at the false graves and lamented. A
fence of palm leaves was made right round the burial ground, except
for one existed near the uncleaned place in the jungle where the bones
were to be thrown away. Then the bones of those who have been
dead for two years or more, were dug out by their friends while the
witch-doctor (Tomiluno) standing by the side of each false grave
tried to keep the evil spirits (malaha-tawf-eali) away by waving a
bunch of coconut leaves (el-roitaoko). If by any chance the bones
were found to have flesh on them they were put back and covered
over again until next festival. But in some cases, the skull was
wiped clean by hand, wrapped in white calico and placed on a spathe
of palm. The other bones were taken out one by one and placed
on the same spathe. This was then carried to the Dead-house (elpa-
nam) on the el-panam and placed on the top of big yams that were
scattered under the Dead-house for this purpose.

Then this spathe containing all the bones is wrapped round with
white and red calico by the deads' friends and relatives with the
help of witch-doctor. When all the digging was completed and the
bones wrapped up, the bundles containing the bones of more impor-
tant persons such as former witch-doctors, captains of the village,
Chief Captain of the island were re-intersed in the grave from which
they were taken out while the others were carried to their respective
grave and re-intersed only after washing these again with clean
water to purify them from the evil spirits. After all this, the grave
diggers and others went down to the sea and took bath.

Kiriam-he-lakhut:

It was the second chief festival. By 8 or 9 p.m. the village
Kakana was filled with almost all the islanders. The special
and general guests were assembled in the village courtyard. The
men were adorned with a new loin-cloth of various kinds and colours,
a ta-chokla or head ornament and ta-seha, a necklace made of shell
and iron pieces. The women were adorned with necklaces (koning),
ear-rings, bangles (kin-sook-nang) (Marecooli) made of twisting silver
wires and shell on hand, strings of silver coins and head ornament
(tapoirai-aneumo). These ornaments (yannooto), the villagers
purchased from the shop or canteen and also from Port Blair. The
normal dress of the men was beach-shorts of bright colours (pichu-

ma) which were made from thin cotton (tuse) materials available from the trading shops and sewed at home by women. So far upper garments were concerned, they wore sports shirts (toinyut) and shirts (inyut) purchased from the local shops.

The women wore Burmese type of dress of bright colours and printed materials. The upper garments were tight blouses (inyat) and the lower a loongi-like 'Sarang' (hita). A piece of cloth was tied on the waist (hita-lin-kol-ngo-kel) over the lungi to keep it in position. The women also wore brassiere (kuli) under-to keep it in position. The boys wore shirts and under-wear (pichuma) and the girls wore frocks (inyat) and small underwear (yelopichu-ma).

Some of them came already adorned from their houses. Others brought all these things with them and adorned themselves on the spot.

The special guests brought with them one to three pigs of moderate size as present (olyala) to the party by whom they were invited. The women brought with them basket (kouka) filled with prepared food such as boiled yams and coconut etc. for the luncheon (sakam-nya-anku) with which they refreshed themselves on that night (parve-yamat) together with pork given at the time by the inviting party. Then they commenced to sing and dance by turns. The men gave their performance first until they were tired. The females did the same. The former in their dance hold one another by hand stretching their arms and danced together in a circle or in the form of a segment, or instead of stretching their arms, the dancers hold each other by putting their right hand on the shoulder of the next partner and then left on the waist of the former. But the women danced in the following way:

Before the main dancing and singing started, the dancers took three quick steps in anti-clockwise direction with their right foot only and with the left foot held up. Then they changed the legs and took three similar steps with the left foot in the opposite i.e. clockwise direction. In this way after moving three times in anti-clockwise direction and two times in clock wise direction, the dancers started the main songs and dance. In the main dance the steps were a little slower and the movement in circles was usually in anti-clockwise direction. The steps were very simple. The steps taken with the right foot were firm and the ground was beaten hard to emphasise the beat, while that of the foot were light and the latter leg was also thrown back a little. At the conclusion of the song, the main dance ends, but before break up the dancers repeated the more vigorous one-legged steps as executed in the beginning and in the same order.

Ku-wan-ka-ku-haun:

In morning of 10 January 1964, while dancing was still continuing, they brought down some strong and well-built wooden cages about four feet long and three feet in width and height in square or rectangular shaped. These cages were gaily decorated with flags, chintz and garlands of banana leaves. On the top of the cage was prepared a wooden terrace with curtains so as to seat two men. The cage was fastened on either side by two long substantial bamboos. One boy and a girl were seated in the terrace or platform (tahaklo) with a quantity of coconut. When everything was ready, new red loin-cloth with white tussels (ken-iyo) and tachokla (the head ornaments made of banana leaves) were supplied to them. Then the cages with pigs and the children upon them were carried round from house to house in a procession with singing and dancing in the same manner as before, each cage was borne by twenty-five men. Some of them, who were not able to prepare a cage, substituted long bamboos, trying the legs of the pigs and fastening them across the bamboo, or two strong wooden poles were taken to which the four legs of the pig were tied firmly and the animal with its face upward and its back rested on some coconut leaves was carried by six persons holding the poles. Thus they proceeded round the village and returned home through Elpanam.

Now after returning to the original spot, they let these pigs as well as other pigs, detaining only those that were to be slaughtered on the day for the guests. Then they began to kill the pigs one by one by piercing the hearts of the animal with sharp knives. (This was done because of their feeling for the pigs that they involved an almost painless way of killing) and fenced the spot. Then the decorated things in the canoes (op) and in the house, were thrown away in the yards (only fruits and garlands of bananas and coconuts) and other costly materials were taken to their respective houses. Only the merahta or iron spike was preserved with its decorations until further orders.

Now came 'yang-haun' meaning 'in return'. A dozen of pigs or ordinary sized were distributed by the inviting party to the group of performers. They took them away alive to their houses. This was given in place of a festive dinner. The dancing party who received the above things, according to the number of groups, killed a few of the pigs, cut them into pieces and distributed the flesh to each family of their group. They roasted and cooked these pieces and ate as much as they could and brought the remaining portion to their houses. The pigs that were not killed were also brought to their village and kept reserved for future festivals.

A.S.—1

The returning spectacle of these people, irrespective of whether male or female, young and old, each of them ate pieces of a roasted pork. The general guests, that was to say of the nearest village, waited there till the end of the feast to help the party and to give a performance every night. They took their share of food with the commemorators.

Again at night they resumed the performance with the help of the general guests and on the following morning they killed the big pigs, numbering at least twenty-five which were carried in procession. Some portions of these were distributed to their friends and relatives, while from the remaining portions of the pork, they separated the fatty part and prepared lard (noya-haun) from it by pounding it in a wooden mortar (tin-loam) and boiling it in an earthen vessel. This lard was preserved in coconut shells (ka-fut) and used in all their meals. They also presented a few shells of this lard (noya haun) to those of their friends who had assisted them. This portion of the ceremony was called "Wana-ka-kua". It was observed from 20th January to the 24th January night.

The above festival was observed for four days. Then commenced the ceremony of 'Kisu-ta-el-patti' on 25 January 1964. On this occasion, they removed all the decorations of the house and danced and sang songs inside. This was done in order to purify the house.

Then came the ceremony of tanang-la-patti on 26th January. That day, the villagers engaged themselves in covering the houses and Elpanam with green coconut leaves to prevent pollution of the evil spirit (Sio Alenchon and Hunaya). They took their supper at the Elpanam and danced there all the night.

Two days after that, on the 28th, they removed the coconut leaf covering from the house at Elpanam and gave another performance. This was called Kiriam-nga-rit-droi-ta-okka. This was done in the morning and after that some sports, such as volley ball and a little wrestling, took place. When that was done, the villagers challenged Arong villagers to a boat race. With this ends the feast of Kana-an-haun. The ossuary feast marks the ends of the mourning period of all the villagers as well as islanders and after this life returns to normal (as Car Nicobarese say) once more until the next death occurs.

When everything was over they carefully gathered all the tusks and jaws bones of the pigs killed in each house during the festive season, fastened to a long string and threw it into the sea.

Thereafter pig-fighting was held and it lasted for an hour.

Then the guests were given a farewell feast only by coconut, bananas, pandamus and yams. Towards the evening as darkness fell, the guests and invitees left the village Kakana for their own village by bus, cycle and some on foot. The remaining guests of distant villages, spent that night in the village and left in the early morning on the 29th January.

DISCUSSION:

Sea (Kamate), Sky (kala-hoiya), Elpanam and plantations have the special importance to the Car Nicobarese. They regard it as sacred and in fact they are bound by very powerful traditional customs to these although they are christian by religion. In any festival or feast the villagers gather, take active part in doing various types of works in order to make the festival or feast more effective, attractive and enjoyable.

Among the Car Nicobarese though Teo is the only God who has given the man (tarik) everything and bring them up from their childhood onward, the supernatural world of the tarik of Car Nicobar is full of Sio, or spirits. The author was told by some Car Nicobarese that these spirits can be seen, recognized, propitiated or driven away by the witch-doctor (Tomiluno). These spirits are divisible into two broad categories (a) good (malaha) and (b) evil (malaha-tawf-eali). The spirits of the dead ancestors (Malaha) try to do good to their living descendants and are, therefore, classed as good spirit. The evil spirit is also called Sio, who are responsible for causing sickness, death and all kinds of misfortunes to the people. The jungle Sio (Sio-aluchon) and the Sio-hunaya are responsible for the sickness of the people, causing death to the offender who displeased them or disturb them in the jungle by cutting trees etc.

The main objects of worship in this feast is the 'malaha' who has given the tarik (man) everything and bring them up from their childhood onward and also the Sio (Spirits) which can be seen, recognized, propitiated or driven away by the witch-doctor (Menluana). This Tomiluno or the witch-doctor is an elderly man of the village and who has got some supernatural power. The Tomiluno is selected by the villagers. The Tomiluno who conducts the ceremony is merely, the active representative of the community and what he does and says, he does and says for the villagers as a whole. To remember their ancestors, to show due respect and also to thank them for the good things they had done for the benefit of their future generation, the Car Nicobarese organise this feast for the dead or the better known as *Kana-an-haun*. It is also performed in order

to honour the spirits of jungle (Sio-aluchon) and the Hunaya, the spirits who can transform themselves into any shape as they like.

This feast included different sorts of games, dances and folk-songs which proves an occasion for the expression of friendship and peaceful nature that exist between the families as well as in the kinem (lineage). It is an occasion through which they worship their supernatural world and express due respect to their dead an-cestors. The Car Nicobarese look upon this feast as a sacred occa-sion which provides an arena for the expression of inter-family and inter-lineage friendship. It is an occasion when the kinsmen and women are united and the bond of kinship is more strongly felt. Co-operation between lineage also is received at these festivals. Every kinem (lineage) of the island is required to send at least one adult male and female in it to the collective dances. Again there is collec-tive hunting and fishing at the end of the feast to which also every kinem has to send an adult male. Presence and active participation of the villagers emphasize on the integrated social life of the Car Nico-barese community. Help either in kind or cash emphasizes on the obligation that binds one with the other. The participation of all the kinems in the common tasks stresses not only the unity of the larger groups such as village (panam) but also of the unity and in-dividuality of the participating kinems or families. The solidarity of the family and kinem (lineage) and finally to their society as a whole is, therefore, strengthened through this festival.

Holding of such a feast for the dead in such Christian religious organisational set up of the present Car Nicobarese is of importance when it is viewed from religious point.

Car Nicobarese of all ages believe that by holding such feast for the dead ancestors, they would obtain some specific benefit in the form of health and long life, success in hunting and fishing, the growth of crops and the multiplication of pigs and other livestocks.

"POETIC CONVENTIONS IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE".*

By

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"अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेक: प्रजापति: ।
यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तयैतत् परिवर्तते ॥"

This is true of all poets in all languages. In Sanskrit literature the poets have often created a world of their own and have set up some common matters, which cannot be found in the ordinary creation of ब्रह्मन्. These are technically known as कविसमय[S] or कविसङ्केत[S]. A poet would use in his composition an idea, absolutely unknown to the world of reality. It might appeal to another poet, who repeats it. A critic who comes across the use of such an idea again and again would appreciate it and recommend its employment by other poets. That is how these conventions creep in literature. Sanskrit literature is very rich in these poetic conventions.

Origin and development:—

As noted above कविसमय[S] are first introduced by the poets and then regularised by the critics. The theory follows the practice. In Sanskrit literature it is राजशेखर (रा) (9th Cent. 10th Cent. A.D.) who used the expression 'कविसमय' for the first time and dealt with the poetic conventions in details in his काव्यमीमांसा. While introducing the topic he mentions a view of some predecessor-critics who take an objection to the use of such conventions in literature. It is thus obvious that before रा. some critics had already given some thought to this topic. The wellknown critics preceeding रा. like भामह, दण्डिन् वामन, रुद्रट, उद्भट have not discussed this topic, but early poets had used the conventions in their works.

(1) अश्वघोष has used the कविसमय about सरोज[S] blooming during day only and कुमुद[S] during night only. e.g. बुद्धचरित I 8. He refers to the उदयगिरि in the Eastern quarter and the अस्ताचल in the Western quarter. He described the God of Love as पुष्पशर and पञ्चबाण. He refers to the चक्रवाक् pair as a symbol of ardent passion e.g. सौन्दरानन्द IV 2.

(2) In the course of his 13 plays भास has used the following कविसङ्केत[S]-कुमुद blooming at night (अविमारकII), चक्रवाक pair as a symbol of

ardent love (स्वप्न I) and their separation at night (स्वप्न III), मलय as the home of sandal (अविमारक IV). He describes glory as white and love as red and also refers to the Rising mountain and the Setting mountain.

(3) कालिदास is very much fond of these conventions. His works are full of them. e.g. the sun causing the day-lotuses to bloom and the moon the night-lotuses (शा. V 28), कलहंस going to the मानस lake during the rainy season (मेघ 11), चक्रवाक as symbol of sexual love and their separation at evening (शा IV, रघु III २४), चातक begging of a cloud (रघु V 17), a female crane conceiving merely on hearing the thunder of the cloud (मेघ 9), a swan separating water from milk (शा VI), चन्द्रकान्तमणि, the Lunar gem oozing at the touch of the rays of the moon (मेघ 67) and सूर्यकान्तमणि burning when touched by the rays of the sun (शा II). a female cuckoo getting her eggs hatched by a female crow (शा V), गन्धद्विप scaring away the elephants by means of the fragrance of its ichor (वि IV 18), an owl being afraid of the light of the sun (कु I 12), throbbing of the left eye in the case of women or the right arm in the case of men as an auspicious omen, (शा I and VII, मेघ 92). The use of common conventions like glory, smile and laughter being white, love and wrath being red etc. are naturally present in कालिदास works. He has also used some in-teresting pregnancy-longings, दोहद in connection with the अशोक tree and the वकुल tree. The first desires to be kicked with the left foot of a beautiful woman (मेघ 75, मालविका III) and the other desires to be sprinkled over with a mouthful of wine by her (मेघ 75).

The two महाकाव्य of कालिदास served as models for later writers of महाकाव्य. Hence the things described by him were repeated by later poets. The कविसङ्केत used by कालिदास were also utilised in (4) भारवि's किरातार्जुनीय (5) माघ's शिशुपालवध (6) the plays of श्रीहर्ष and (7) कादम्बरी and हर्षचरित of वाणभट्ट.

Now the use of कविसमय by the early poets like अश्वघोष, भास and कालिदास was definitely known to the early critics like भामह and दण्डिन् but as already observed they have not dealt with this topic. Pro-bably they might not have approved of these conventions. Though they have not discussed the कविसमय they seem to have taken a note of these conventions in an indirect manner. This can be seen from their treatment of काव्यदोष the defects of poetry.

(1) भरत (about 1st Cent. A.D.) in his नाटचशास्त्र has mentioned a defect न्यायादपेत (illogical). which अभिनवगुप्त divides in two types (i) देशकालविरुद्ध — That which involves contradiction of place or time and (ii) कलाशास्त्रविरुद्ध—That which involves contradiction of fine arts or technical sciences.

(2) भामह (7th Cent. A.D.)—In Chapter I of his काव्यालंकार he mentions a defect अयुक्तिमत् (that which does not stand the test of reason). In Chapter IV he discusses काव्यदोष in details. Here he mentions a defect प्रसिद्धिविरुद्ध (contrary to the established tradition). He divides it as (i) कालविरुद्ध (ii) देशविरुद्ध (iii) लोकविरुद्ध (iv) न्यायविरुद्ध and (v) आगमविरुद्ध.

He illustrates देशविरुद्ध by the mention of देवदारु trees on the mountain मलय implying that मलय is the home of चन्दन. His instance of कालविरुद्ध describes the mango trees as blossoming in the rainy season. His instances of लोकविरुद्ध are simply cases of excessive exaggeration.

(3) दण्डिन् (7th Cent A. D.) has discussed काव्यदोष in the fourth परिच्छेद of his काव्यादर्श. Among the 10 defects he discusses देशविरोध, कालविरोध, लोकविरोध, न्यायविरोध, & आगमविरोध. He illustrates देशविरोध with a verse describing कावेरी in चोल, चन्दन trees on the banks of कावेरी, camphor on मलय, and elephants born in कलिङ्ग. Coming to कालविरोध he illustrates it by the mention of पद्मिनी blooming at evening and कुमुद्वती during day, निचुल trees blooming in the spring and there being दुर्दिन in ग्रीष्म, cackling of swans in the rainy season and peacock-dance in the autumn, clear sun-shine in हेमन्त and use of sandal paste in winter.

(4) वामन (About 800 A.D.) discusses in his काव्यालङ्कारसूत्राणि Chap. II, the defect लोकविरुद्ध. He explains लोकविरुद्धानिऽऽदेशकालस्वभावविरुद्धानि. He gives the mention of मथुरा in सौवीर as an instance of देशविरोध, description of कदम्ब flowers in spring as of कालविरोध and the mention of मञ्जरी of सप्तच्छद as an instance of स्वभावविरोध.

These defects of poetry discussed by the ancient critics give sufficient warnings to a novice in the field of poetry about the things which should be scrupulously avoided from a good literary composition. By the time of राजशेखर it was already established that a good poet should avoid such things. This has led to the conventional description of every thing like a mountain, a season, the sun-rise, the sun-set, the moonlight etc. *It is out of such prescriptions and prohibitions that the poetic conventions or कविसमय have evolved.* e. g. when the critics laid down that sandal should not be described as growing on any mountain other than Malaya or that देवदारु and other trees should not be described as growing on Malaya, obviously the convention that the mountain Malaya is the only abode of Sandal gets formed. In the course of discussion of कालविरोधदोष दण्डिन् had already mentioned that description of blooming of पद्मिनी at evening or of कुमुद्वती during day is a defect. Similarly the description of peacock-dance during the autumn or of cackling of swans during the rainy season involves कालविरोधदोष according to him.

All these cases are covered by the कविसमय of Sanskrit poets.

Now *on the background of the poetic conventions used by Sans-krit poets and the* काव्यदोष*s *discussed by his predecessor-critics* राजशेखर *formulated his own synthetic theory of* कविसमय. At the end of Chapter XVI he frankly admits that he has not given any thing new in this regard. He has just expressed in explicit terms the conventions which were left in an implied form by the poets.

सोऽयं कवीनां समय: काव्ये सुप्त इव स्थित: ।

स साम्प्रतमिहास्माभियंथाबुद्धि विवोधित: ॥

Let us now look to the treatment of कविसमय in राजशेखर's काव्यमीमांसा. He aptly defines it as follows: –
" अशास्त्रीयमलौकिकं च परम्परागतं यमयंमुपनिवघ्नन्ति कवय: स कविसमय: । "
"All such matter, which the poets use, as is not vouchsafed either by scientific knowledge or by the behaviour of the world, and which has just come down by tradition among the poets, constitutes कविसमय. He explains, "These are matters, which were actually experienced by the ancient scholars. In course of time they might have undergone a change. Still we poets do use them". However he makes it perfectly clear that he approves of such poetic conventions only as have been established by ancient critics and discards all such matter, which is passed in the name of poetic convention by pseudo-poets. Then राजशेखर divides them in 3 classes as: (i) heavenly (ii) earthly and (iii) nether-worldly. Further he divides the earthly conventions in 4 grammatical divisions of जाति, द्रव्य, गुण and क्रिया.

Each is again divided three-fold as (a) Employment of non-existing matter (b) Non-employment of existing matter and (c) Restriction.

It is this last classification which is of significance to us. Let us analyse रा's कविसमय under these three heads as follows:—(a) Employment of non-existing matter:—Lotuses in any river, swans in any reservoir of water, gold and gems on any mountain, darkness as capable of being held in a fist or of being pierced with a needle, moonlight as capable of being carried in a pitcher, the separated Cakravāka pair resorting to opposite banks of a river during night, Cakoras drinking in moon light, whiteness of glory and smile, darkness of infamy and sin, redness of wrath and love, dwelling of a hare or a deer in the moon, the God of Love being bodiless or possessing a handsome form.

(b) Non-employment of existing matter:—Mālatī not blooming during spring, a sandal-tree not yielding flower and fruit, Aśoka tree not giving fruit, no moon light in the dark-half of a month and no darkness in the bright-half of a month, no blooming of blue lotuses and no falling down of Śephālikā flowers during day, no red

colour of Kunda buds, no green colour of lotus buds and no yellow colour of Priyaṅgu flowers.

(c) Restriction:—The crocodiles described as staying in the sea only, pearls found at the bottom of the river Tāmraparṇī only, Sandal growing on the mountain Malaya only, Birch trees (भूर्ज) growing on the mountain Himālaya only, the cooing of a cuckoo heard in the Spring only and the dance of the peacocks described in the rainy season only.

In the last two Chapters of his काव्यमीमांसा राजशेखर gives all details as to which matters should be described in particular provinces and during particular seasons. This is an extension of the देशविरोध दोष and कालविरोध दोष as noted by his predecessors.

A comparative study of रा's conventions and the defects as noted by the ancient critics will *show that some of his poetic conventions can be easily converted into defects of poetry according to the earlier critics:—*

देशविरोध दोष – चन्दन if described elsewhere than on मलय, pearls if described as found in a river other than ताम्रपर्णी etc.

कालविरोध दोष–मालती blooming in वसन्त, blooming of blue lotuses or falling of शेफालिका flowers during day, description of the notes of a cuckoo in a season other than the Spring, description of peacock-dance in a season other than the rainy season, description of darkness during the bright half and of moonlight during the dark half of a month. etc.

But many of the कविसङ्केत's of राजशेखर are actually involving the defect लोकविरोध. रा. does not deny it. His definition of कविसमय as अशास्त्रीय and अलौकिक makes sufficient allowance for the same. In Chapter XVIII he is discussing as to how the breeze in the rainy season should be described. He notes down that according to the poets "वर्षासु पूर्वो वायुः" while, the ancient teachers say, "वर्षासु पाश्चात्यो वायुः, पौरस्त्यस्तु वर्षाया: प्रतिहन्ता", Then रा. clearly gives his opinion that the Eastern breeze must be described during the rainy season, for the poetic tradition is more important than the fact to a poet: 'वस्तुवृत्तिरतन्त्रम्, कविसमय: प्रमाणम्' इति यायावरीय: ।

A few of रा's successor-critics were highly enamoured of this topic of कविसमय and have discussed it in details. In his काव्यानुशासन, हेमचन्द्र (12th Cent. A.D.) has reproduced all these कविसमय of रा while commenting upon सूत्र I 10–सतोऽप्यनिबंधोऽसतोऽपि निबन्धो नियमश्छायाचुपजीवनादय: शिक्षा: । विश्वनाथ (14th Cent. A.D.), the author of साहित्यदर्पण has discussed काव्यदोष in the seventh Chapter. In the course of his discussion he

says that निर्हेतुतां (Being without a reason) ceases to be a fault in the case of wellknown matters like the separation of चक्रवाक at evening. Then coming to the defect ख्यातविरुद्धता (contradiction of well-established matters) he says clearly, 'कवीनां समये ख्याते गुण:ख्या तविरुद्धता' (In the case of poetic conventions it turns out to be a merit). Then he gives a long list of the कविसमयऽ in verses 23 to 25. To the list given by रा. ho adds for the first time, the two वृक्षदोहदऽ as:—पादाघातादशोकं विकसति बकुलं योपितामास्यमद्यै : ". Similarly he gives in explicit terms the कविसमय about the flowery arrows of cupid, and says 'भिन्नं स्यादस्य वाणैर्यद्वजनहृदयं स्वीकृटाक्षेण तद्वत्" This topic of कविसमय was extremely popular with the poet-critics belonging to the कविशिक्षा school. In his अलंकारचिन्तामणि जितेन्द्र repeats all these conventions adding a few of his own as 'नीरेभाद्यं खगंगायाम् (water-elephants in the आकाशगङ्गा)" रमाया: पद्मवासितम् (Lakshmi staying in a lotus)"समुद्रमथनं तत्र सुरेन्द्रश्रीसमुद्भव:" (The churning of the ocean and the rise of the glory of इन्द्र or of विष्णु लक्ष्मी from it). In addition to the redness of love and anger he mentions it as belonging to बिम्ब fruit, बन्धूक flower and the disc of the sun.

काव्यकल्पलता of अमरसिंह and कविकल्पलता of देवेन्द्र repeat the कविसमयऽ of रा. In enlisting the things which are conventionally white देवेन्द्र adds छत्र (a parasol), अम्भस् (water) and वासस् (a garment).

In the seventh chapter of his साहित्यकौमुदी विद्याभूषण describes all the कविसमयऽ of रा. adding that about the अशोकदोहद as— "पादाघातेन पद्धिन्या: स्यादशोकस्तु पुष्पित: ।"

केशवमिश्र (16th Cent. A.D.) gives a detailed treatment of कविसमय in the 15th मरीचि of his अलंकारशेखर In the list of things which are non-existent he adds 'प्रतापे रक्ततोष्णत्वे'. In case of the colour conventionally attributed to various things he enlarges the list as follows:

White-colour ध्वज (a banner), चामर (a chowry), हंस (a swan) हार (a necklace of pearls), बक (a crane), and भस्म (ashes).

Black colour—a mountain, a tree, a creeper, a cloud, the sea, a Bhilla, an Asura, smoke, mud and hair.

Red colour—a mineral, a ruby, Japā flower, a gem, the sun, a Padma lotus, sprouts, Bandhūka flower, pomogranate, and nails.

Yellow colour—a rice plant, a frog, a bark garment, and pollen dust.

In addition to the अशोकदोहदऽ he mentions बकुलदोहद as:—'केसराशोकयो: सत्स्त्रीगण्डूषात् पादघाततो मासान्तरेऽपि पुष्पाणि ।'

In connection with the वृक्षदोहद मल्लिनाथ, while commenting upon मेघदूत 75 has quoted the following verse, enumerating very interesting and romantic pregnancy-longings on the part of various trees:—

"स्त्रीणां स्पर्शात् प्रिय जैंविकसति वकुल: शीधुगण्डूयसेकात्
पादाघातादशोकस्तिलककुरवकौ वीक्षणालिङ्गनाभ्याम् ।
मन्दारो नर्मवाक्यात् पटुमृदुहसनाच्चम्पको वक्त्रवाता–
च्चूतो गीतान्नमेरूविकसति च पुरो नर्तनात् कर्णिकार: ॥"

I have not come across the use of these दोहद^s excepting अशोकदोहद and वकुलदोहद in Sanskrit literature, nor could I trace this stanza to its source.

A survey of these कविसङ्केत^s in Sanskrit literature can easily point out that many of them are based upon just a matter of common sense and general observation. It is quite natural to look upon glory and smile as white or anger and love as red just as it is natural to look upon knowledge as light and ignorance as darkness. Similarly the restrictive conventions like the notes of a cuckoo being heard in the spring only or the peacock-dance witnessed in the rainy season only are matters of general observation. These conventions are found not only in Sanskrit literature but even in literature of other languages like English. The convention about the cupid piercing the hearts of young folk with his flowery bow and arrows also is one such common convention.

The poetic conventions of Sanskrit critics which we can really describe as असतोऽपि निबन्धनम्' or 'वस्तुगत्या यन्न भवति तस्य निबन्धनम्' are the following cases only:—

(1) Separation of the Cakravāka birds during night.
(2) Cakora birds drinking in the moon light.
(3) The swans going to the Mānasa lake during the rainy season.
(4) Aśoka and the Bakula trees having pregnancy longings.
(5) A hare or a deer staying in the moon.

In addition to these conventions, noted by Sanskrit critics there are some such cases, which have not been noted by them, but which have been freely used by the poets like Kālidāsa e.g.:—

(1) A female crane conceiving simply on hearing the thundering of the clouds.
(2) A swan being able to separate water from milk.
(3) A female cuckoo getting her eggs hatched by a female crow.
(4) चन्द्रकान्त gem oozing at the touch of the rays of the moon and सूर्यकान्त gem burning at the touch of the rays of the sun.
(5) An owl avoiding the light of the sun.
(6) A गन्धद्विप scaring away other elephants merely by means of the fragrance of its ichor.

(7) The कल्पवृक्ष (Desire-yielding tree), the कामधेनु (the Desire-yielding cow) and the चिंतामणि (the Desire-yielding gem) fulfilling all desires.

(8) Throbbing of the left eye in the case of women and that of the right arm in the case of men as auspicious omens.

Such matters are really अशास्त्रीय, अलौकिक, and परम्परागत These are nothing but the flights of imagination of Sanskrit poets.

REVIEW OF WORKS ASCRIBED TO
SAINT NĀMDEO

By

J. S. DESHPANDE

Dnyāneshwar, Nāmdeo, Eknāth, Tukārām and Rāmdās are easily the greatest saint-poets of Mahārāshtra. The very fact that their poetry has survived centuries of changes and turmoil shows that poetry contains something having permanent values. It has played a substantial part in making up the mental frame of people of the state and it has become an inseparable part of Marathi language. The 7th birth centenary of Nāmdeo was celebrated last year and it would be in the fitness of things to review the various works ascribed to him.

Dnyāneshwar or Dnyānadeo, and Nāmdeo are the oldest of the five saint poets. We are not fortunate enough to have authentic information about them. In case of Dnyāneshwar, we have at least the satisfaction of knowing that Dnyāneshwari and Amritānubhava composed by him have come down to us in a language which bears clear stamps of the Yādav era and we know the date of composition of the former work which is 1290 A.D. It is a different picture in case of Nāmdeo. The compositions ascribed to him display an assorted mixture of handiwork of different authors and the language of Yādav period is not noticeable in any of them. There have been more than one Dnyāndeo, Eknāth, Tukārām and Rāmdās and it is not surprising if there were quite a few poets having the name 'Nāmdeo'. The problem that faces a research worker is to determine those compositions which can be said to have come from the great Saint Nāmdeo who was born in 1270 A.D. and died in 1350 A.D. according to tradition.

If we search for references to Dnyāneshwar in the pre Ekanāth period, we get disappointed. In fact I could find only two in Mahānubhāv works. One reference is made by Nrisinha. This has been quoted in "Prāchin Marāthi Kavitā", Vol. VI. (Rukminiswayanwar of Nrisinha). The second one is with me in an unpublished work of Mahānubhāv Panth pertaining to the former half of the fourteenth century. But references to Nāmdeo are many. Nāmdeo was obviously more widely known than Dnyāneshwar in that period.

The Pandharpur inscription of Śaka 1195-99 includes two Nāmdeo, one of the town of Māhur and the other is son of Rupadev of

Pravarkhed. These two are clearly different from Saint Nāmdeo who was in Śaka 1192. Further on, Smritisthal which is an Old Mahānubhāv work records that Nāmdeo met Dāmodar Pandit a Mahānubhāv saint poet, discussed some matters with him and later on composed verses such as "Disa gele Vayāvin". This verse is available in the published Gāthā of Nāmdeo, and the name of the poet has been stated in it as 'Vishnudās Nāmā. The Smriti (Smriti 244) states that Nāmdeo was not made a Mahānubhāv. But the Mahānubhāvs seem to have had some affinity for Nāmdeo. Some Parvās of Bhārat of 'Vishnudās Nāmā' in Mahānubhāv garb are found with Mahānubhāv Centres. One Arati beginning with "Ajichā dina Amhā soniyāchā" occurs in Nāmdeo Gāthā. I found the same Arati with additional lines in a Mahānubhāv manuscript, but the poet was stated to be Mhāhimbhat the author of Lilācharitra and other works. The Mahānubhāv literature refers to other Aratis of Mhāhimbhat but not to this one. I feel that true Arati is of Saint Nāmdeo only. It has however been apparently preserved in the original form.

Nāmdeo is also mentioned in the fifth part of Mahikāvati Bakhar which, according to Rājwade, was composed by about 1460 Śaka. It refers to the meeting of Pātshāha Malik Bahādur with Nāmdeo when the latter was proceeding to Kāshi. Dagdo Shivdās and Krishnadās Dāmā, both presumably pre Ekanāth writers, mention Nāmdeo in 'Nirvansār' and 'Adiparva' respectively. Both these works are unpublished. The latter states that Nāmdeo composed Bhārat (Nave Navnit p. 130). Kabir, Narsi Mehta, Mirābāi all refer to Saint Nāmdeo of Deccan with reverence and the Grantha Sāheb of Sikhs includes a number of Hindi verses of Nāmdeo. While referring to ancient poets and their works, Eknāth refers to Nāmdeo in his Bhāgwat. All these references show clearly that Nāmdeo the contemporary of Dnyāneshwar was known throughout India. His devotees are even today found all over India besides Maharashtra more particularly in Punjab and Rajasthan.

The works attributed to Nāmdeo can be classified as (1) The Bhārat (2) The long Ākhyānās or narrative poems. (3) The smaller miscellaneous poems and (4) The Abhangās. As regards Bhārat, manuscripts of its Parvās are found in many places. Some exist in the Mahānubhāv garb. The name of the poet appears as Vishnudās Nāmā which may be a proper name, or may mean 'one who bears the name of 'Vishnudās' or may be an epithet meaning 'Nāmā the servant of Vishnu'. It is quite possible that many people including Nāmdeo himself used it as an epithet. The Abhanga from Smritishthal quoted about shows that Nāmdeo did call himself 'Vishnudās Nāmā'. It is seen that there were other poets of the same name. There is a Shukākhyāna by Vishnudās Nāmā. From the reference in it to

the Samvatsar i.e. year in which it was written, it is seen that the year was 1595 A.D. This Vishnudas Nāmā is therefore quite different from Nāmdeo. In the course of scrutiny of the manuscripts of Bhārat, I came across Parvās bearing the same name but having nothing in common. This shows that many persons calling themselves Vishnudās Nāmā tried their hands at Bhārat. It is however also seen that many of the Parvās have a common core. The language of all these is of post Yadav period, whereas Krishnadās Dāmā specifically states that Namdeo wrote Bhārat. For solving the riddle of Bhārat, it would be necessary to bring together all the manuscripts, study them, and the common core of the oldest version should be reconstructed. This is a highly laborious and expensive task. Who will undertake such laborious task? If at all some one is ready, who will finance it?

There was a poet 'Nāmā Pāthak' of Kendur in Poona District. I have shown in "Prāchin Marāthi Kavitā" Vol. II that his period is about 1450 A.D. Manuscripts of his Chandrahāsakathā are available. In one manuscript it is found that one Prasanga gives the name of the poet as 'Visnudās Nāmā' while another gives it as Nāmā Pāthak. His Hanumant Garudākhyāna is also found in the name of 'Vishnudāsa Nāmā'. In one manuscript of his Ashwamedha there is a curious end. It says "Pāthak Nāmā mhanata Vishnu (das) Nāmayā. This seems to indicate that Nāmā Pathak was also known as Vishnudās Nāmā.

I conducted a survey of the Ākhyānās of Namdeo and published the following in "Prāchin Marāthi Kavitā," Vol. V:—(1) Tirthāwali (2) Krishnajanma (3) Budhbāvani (4) Santāvali Ākhyāna (5) Moolakāsurvadha (6) Vastraharana (7) Lava-Kusha Ākhyāna (8) Garuda Ākhyāna (9) Tulsi Ākhyāna and (10) Harischandra Purāna. These have been discussed in the book. The Tirthāvali and Krishnajanma are pretty old as the manuscript pertains to Saka 1556. The language of none of these is of the Yādav era. From a study of them one is forced to the conclusion that the first nine ones cannot be compositions of Saint Namdeo of the Yādav period. There is a doubt about the last one. It must have been a well known ancient work since it was translated into Portuguese in the former half of the seventeenth century. The Dhulia and Tanjore versions show that there must have been a common core which was quite old. However it is remarkable that there is a fragment of this Ākhyāna, which widely differs from the Tanjore and Dhulia versions. I have also got with me a Mahānubhāv version of this Purāna. More research is necessary in this matter.

Amongst miscellaneous poems, the chief ones are (1) Lives of saints (Sant Charitre) (2) Lives of persons in Purānās (3) Auto-

biographical poems (4) Samādhi Prakaran (5) Two Tirthāvali (6) Bal Krida and (7) Miscellaneous small poems. Most of the lives of saints are necessarily of a later date as the saints described lived subsequently. The lives of persons from the Purānas need careful analysis. The autobiographical poems can hardly be of Nāmdeo. The language and the manner of narration show that they are some body else's creation. The Samādhi Prakaran deals with Samādhi of Dnyāneshwar and his brothers and sister. It is good and moving poetry. But from the narration of miracles and the description of the procedure for Samādhi which is hardly according to Shāstrās, one has to conclude that at best a small part of the poem might be of Nāmdeo. The Tirthāvalis are different from the one already described above. The one described above bears a wrong name. It does not deal with travels of Nāmdeo to Tirthās, whereas these two are properly named. The longer one is well known and is included in all Gāthās. It deals with the journeys of Nāmdeo and Dnyāneshwar together. This is also full of miracles and it needs to be examined carefully to see whether any part can be considered as original. The second poem is not much known. It is published only in the Gāthā of Subandhu. It deals with an all India journey of Nāmdeo. Its manuscript is of 1581 A.D. and though it is merely a descriptive poem, it is possible that it may be of Saint Nāmdeo. As regards Bal Krida, it is full of many good poetic pieces. But it contains a reference to Bahirambhat who belongs to a period later by about one hundred years. It is possible that many subsequent additions have crept in, but it appears that there is an older central portion.

Now we come to the last and most important part, the Hindi verses and Marathi Abhangās. About 300 Hindi verses of Nāmdeo have been collected. Some of them may not be of Nāmdeo. It is necessary to analyse them with reference to the Hindi of 13/14th century. These verses show a clear influence of Marathi and many show remarkable resemblance to the Marathi verses. This work is yet to be done in detail.

The Abhangās form the real work of Nāmdeo. A general look at them shows that Bhakti is the chief sentiment in them. The Abhangās of all saints have come down orally and it seems that they were committed to writing only after 1650 A.D. The result is that they have been modernised and contain subsequent additions. With this state of affairs, it is difficult to determine which ones are really of Saint Nāmdeo. There are however a few criteria by which a reasonable guess can be made. But this work too is yet to be done.

The 7th centenary of Nāmdeo was celebrated with lot of expenditure and publicity, and many books were published by persons

from the academic field. None of these books attempted to indicate the problem of authorship of the various works attributed to Nāmdeo. If an attempt is to be made to solve this problem, all manuscripts of works of Nāmdeo have to be collected and analysed. Who will finance such a project is the main hurdle. Nāmdeo was not just a Mahārāshtrian saint. He was an all India Saint and he is perhaps revered more in Punjab and North than in Mahārāshtra. He served the cause of what we call today national integration. A research on his works needs to be done. Let us pray that it will be done somehow before the existing manuscripts get lost and let us hope in the words of Nāmdeo that 'the torch of knowledge will be lighted."

EVOLUTION OF THE BUDDHIST ROCK-CUT SHRINES OF WESTERN INDIA

By

M. K. DHAVALIKAR

The rock-cut cave temples of Western India constitute a most priceless heritage of India. Although the beginnings of the rock-cut architecture are noticed in north India in Bihar, this particular art idiom did not find as much favour with artists in other parts of the country as it did in Western India. The reason for this is not far to seek. It was, in the main, due to the particular type of trap rock of the Sahyādrī ranges which yielded easily to the chisel of the sculptor. This explains the existence in Western India of over a thousand cave temples. At least in Western India, the credit of excavating rock temples goes to the patrons of Buddhism. But later, in course of time, Hindus and Jainas also caused to carve out caves. Be that as it may, all the earlier rock-cave temples datable to the couple of centuries before and after the Christian era belong to the Hīnayāna faith of Buddhism whereas all the later caves were the work of the followers and patrons of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

The development of the Hīnayāna cave temples has already been adequately discussed by several art historians but the chronology of the Mahāyāna Buddhist caves is somewhat controversial. The fact of the matter is that no serious attempt appears to have so far been made to trace the evolution of the Mahāyāna caves except that of Walter Spink who, for the last fifteen years, has concentrated his attention on the cave architecture of Western India, more particularly that of Ajanta.[1] But for the solitary attempt of Spink, the problem has not received the attention it deserves. This only demonstrates the (lamentable) lacuna in our knowledge so far as the history of rock-cut architecture in India is concerned. This becomes all the more enigmatic in view of the magnitude of the evidence.[2] There is hardly any form of Indian architecture for which there is such a vast plethora of evidence. It will thus be seen that although the early and the late phases of the Buddhist rock-cut cave temples have been studied in great detail, we do not as yet know absolutely anything about the transitional phase between the two. Fergusson and Burgess observe: "It is not at pre-

1. Walter M. Spink, "From History to Art History: Monuments of the Deccan," *XXIV International Congress of Orientalists, Summary of Papers* (New Delhi, 1964), pp. 242-43.
2. W. M. Spink, "Ajanta to Ellora," *Marg*, Vol. XX, No. 2, March 1967.

sent possible to state with precision the exact period at which the transition from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna took place... the last caves of the Hīnayāna are those at Nasik and their age depends on our being able to ascertain when Gautamiputra excavated No. III and what Yajnasri really did in No. XV. Even then the uncertainty that hangs over the lists of the Andhrabhrityas prevents our being able to fix these dates with certainty. It is probable they reigned in the third century, but nearly as probable, that the last named king flourished in the fourth. Be that as it may, there seems to have been a pause in the fashion of excavating the caves after the disappearance of these Satakarnis. We have no cave that can with certainty be dated in the fifth century, probably not one in the latter half of the fourth, but with sixth century and a half nearly all the Mahāyāna caves were excavated."[3]

It is generally presumed that the art activity of the Hīnayāna Buddhists came to an abrupt end in the second century A.D. and that the work was started again in the last quarter of fifth century during the reign of the Vākāṭaka monarch Hariṣeṇa at Ajanta. This gap of about three centuries is difficult to explain. It is usually ascribed to the decline of the Sātavāhanas which led to political instability. But it is common knowledge that a vast majority of the caves owe their existence to the piety of merchants, laymen and the common man as the inscriptional evidence would show. Besides, the period that intervened between the Sātavāhanas and the Vākāṭakas does not appear to have been one of stress and strain, for the Ikshvākus were ruling quite peacefully in southern Deccan while the Western Kṣatrapas held sway over Western India. The hiatus in between the two phases of architecture is presumably due to the marked change in the general layout of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna Buddhist establishments. If at all the art activity came to an abrupt end, as is generally thought, we would be hard put to explain the fate of innumerable architects, sculptors, stone masons and painters etc. If there was no art activity during this period, these artisans, facing imminent starvation, must have changed over to other profitable professions. During the hiatus of three centuries, this precious art of rock-cutting must have surely been lost. It is equally difficult to believe that the Western Indian artists produced magnificent edifices in the last quarter of fifth century without any previous experience. How could they achieve it without adequate experience and tradition? Has not Buddha said that nothing dies without leaving a trace? Unnatural death can sometimes be explained but not the unnatural birth. This undoubtedly implies that the rock-cut activity must have been going

3. James Fergusson and Jas. Burgess, *Cave Temples of India* (London, 1860), p. 298.

on in the third and fourth century, albeit on a restricted scale. The present paper therefore attempts at tracing the evolution of the rock-cut Buddhist shrines from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna the evidence for which is furnished by some of the lesser known, late Hīnayāna caves in Western India. These caves have not attracted the attention of art historians so far, for the simple reason that they are devoid of any sculptural ornamentation and are severely plain. But they are nevertheless of crucial importance inasmuch as they form a link between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna rock cut shrines.

The Hīnayāna monastic establishments are characterised by a chaitya-griha and a vihāra; the former was the shrine proper and the latter was the residence of monks. The development of the chaityas from the modest beginnings at Bhaja into the most ornate and magnificent chaitya at Karla has been adequately dealt with by several scholars. The Hīnayāna chaitya which is usually apsidal on plan is divided by a collonade of pillars into the central nave and side aisles while in the apsidal end is the stupa which was the principal object of worship. The vihāra consisted of an open astylar hall, squarish on plan, and having an open front and cells on three sides for monks. In sharp contrast to this, the Mahāyāna caves usually consist of a squarish pillared hall with cells in side walls and shrine in the back wall containing an image of Buddha. Thus, stylistically there is a world of difference in the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna architecture so far as Western Indian cave temples are concerned. The basic difference is that the Hīnayānists preferred to have the shrine and the residence separated from each other whereas the Mahāyānists, save for a few exceptions, combined both the elements and made arrangements for the residence of monks in the shrine itself by providing cells in side walls. In other words, in the Mahāyāna caves we find the chaitya and the vihāra combined together. In the Hīnayāna caves at Bhaja, Ajanta (early group), Kondane, Bedsa, Karla, Junnar etc. the chaitya and the vihāra were two different architectural entities. It is therefore enigmatic that the Mahāyānists should have combined both the concepts. The problem becomes all the more difficult because of the absence of concrete evidence showing the different stages of evolution from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna forms of architecture. It is equally likely that certain ritualistic requirements might have compelled the Mahāyānists to combine the chaitya and the vihāra into one harmonious entity. It can simply not be possible that one fine morning the Mahāyānists directed their architects to produce such an edifice which was basically a shrine containing an image of the 'Enlightened One', but having, in addition, cells in the side walls to serve as residence for monks. What is therefore required is to study carefully the evidence furnished by the late

Hīnayāna caves and find out, if possible, whether they afford any clues regarding the evolution of a typical Mahāyāna shrine-cum-vihāra.

The Hīnayāna caves, as is well-known, consisted of two types of monuments, the chaitya and the vihāra. Of these, the chaitya was almost invariably apsidal on plan and contained a stupa at the back while the vihāra was a squarish hall, usually astylar, and having cells for monks on the sides, the front being open. All the early caves conform to this standardized pattern with the solitary exception of a chaitya at Ajanta (cave 9) and the Bedsa vihāra, both of which mark a distinct deviation in the plan of the early chaitya and vihāra respectively. In sharp contrast to this, the Mahāyāna caves are all quadrilateral on plan with a shrine in the back wall containing an image of Buddha and having cells in the side walls. This undoubtedly is a combination of a chaitya-griha and a vihāra. In fact it bears a close resemblance with the Hīnayāna vihāra of the earlier period. But for the shrine in the back wall and the pillard *maṇḍapa,* there is no difference whatsoever between the two. When exactly this change took place, we are not in a position to say. But the available evidence shows that by the middle of fifth century the typical Mahāyāna plan of the shrine-cum-vihāra was completely standardized.

The examples of quadrilateral chaityas of earlier period are few and far between. They are to be found at Junnar, Karad, Kanherī, Kuda, Shelarwadi and Mahād. All these are modest excavations and they have not been properly studied so far. Although Fergusson and Burgess, pioneers in the study of Western Indian cave architecture, have given us brief descriptions accompanied by ground plans of a few caves, no serious attempt seems to have been made to fix their relative position in the development of the rock-cut chaityas in Western India. They are all Hīnayāna excavations and have therefore been dated to the centuries around the beginning of the Christian era. Fortunately some of them such as those at Kuda, contain donative inscriptions which, though undated, are of great help in dating them approximately on grounds of palaeography. These are rather obscure caves but they have a vital bearing on the development of the Mahāyāna shrines.

It appears from the available evidence that the deviation in the plan of a Buddhist chaitya had already, though imperceptibly, begun even in the first century B.C. This is clear from the plan of cave 9 at Ajantā which is rectangular on plan (Fig. I, 1). This was the first experiment to effect a change in the plan of the chaitya-*griha.* But for the plan, the cave is similar to the early chaitya-*grihas,* for it contains a stupa in the back end and the pillars

are also disposed in such a manner (as if the hall is) apsidal. In sharp contrast to this, the architects at Bedsa have carved out a vihāra which is apsidal on plan. These are rather early experiments which undoubtedly contained the seeds of later development.

Another noteworthy deviation in the layout of the early series of caves is witnessed at Nasik. Here cave 3 of the Pandu Lena group consists of a verandah, a hall with cells (18) in side walls as also in the back wall. In front of the cells is a bench 1 ft. 8 in. broad and 1 ft. 2 in. high. There are six cells in the back wall. Between the third and the fourth cells of the back wall (that is, in the centre) is a relic shrine which is represented by a chaitya in low relief.[4] A careful examination shows that the chaitya in low relief was not an afterthought, but that it was carved along with (the excavation of) the cave.[5] The cave, according to an inscription in it, was a gift of the great queen Gautami Balasri in the 19th regional year of Vasishthiputra Pulumayi (149 A.D.). A very similar stupa is also carved in the centre of the back wall of the vihāra No. 8.[6] But in this case the carving appears to have been executed later. These instances show the awareness among the Buddhist to have a chaitya and a vihāra together in one unit. These are rather isolated examples and it took a considerably long period for the Buddhists to combine the chaitya and the vihāra into a harmonious whole.

The change in the plan of chaitya-*griha* introduced in the first century B.C. at Ajantā is also effected at Junnar where, however, we witness some more development.[7] The Lenyadri Chaitya VI conforms to the standardized plan of the Hīnayāna chaitya (Pl. I, 2). It is apsidal on plan and has its pillars disposed in the usual manner around the stupa. At Junnar again in the Buddha Lena group we come across a chaitya which, though unfinished, is apsidal on plan. Only some of the pillars on the right are finished while those on the left are not to be seen at all. The artists must have possibly realized that they could do even without pillars. The facade is complete and the inscription (No. 7) on it records that it was donated by a *yavana*.[7a] Paleographically the characters are similar to those of the Karla inscriptions and the cave may be therefore be assigned to Circa 100 A.D.

The chaitya in the Ambika group on the Manmodi hill at Junnar marks a further stage of development. Though unfinished, the

4. *Ibid.*, Pl. XXI, 2.
5. *Ibid.*, Pl. XIX, 1.
6. *Ibid.*, Pl. XIX, 2.
7. For an excellent discussion of Junnar caves see Vidya Dehejia, "Early Buddhist Caves at Junnar," *Artibus Asiae*, Vol. XXXI (1969), pp. 147-66.
7a. Inscription numbers are from Jas. Burgess, *Inscriptions from the Cave Temples of Western India* (Bombay, 1881).

chaitya was possibly apsidal on plan (Fig. I, 3). Nonetheless, it is clear that the artists in this case have done away with pillars. Moreover, the cave also has a narrow pillared verandah; the pillars are octagonal and they have a *ghata* on the stepped base as the capital. But the capital of the pilasters consists of an inverted *ghata* with stepped abacus; the pillars do not have the stepped abacus. The inscriptions (Nos. 20-21) in the cave appear, on palaeographical grounds, of the time of Pulumavi and may therefore be assigned to the middle second century A.D.

Another instance of an apsidal and astylar chaitya is at Thanala which is dated to first century B.C. However, on comparison with the Junnar example, it can be dated to the end of first century A.D.

The chaitya in the Bhima Shankar group marks a distinct change in the evolution of the chaitya-*grihas* (Fig. I, 4). This astylar chaitya is rectangular on plan and has a narrow verandah in front with pillars and two pilasters resting on balustrade. The pillar capitals have a rounded *ghata* which represents the final phase of development of the bell capital. The cave is somewhat unfinished for the stupa in the back end of the hall has been left uncarved as an enormous block of rock out of which a squatting image has been carved recently, now called Bhima Shankar. There is a fragmentary inscription (No. 34) in the cave which can palaeographically be assigned to the middle of second century.

Chaitya XV in the Lenyadri group is complete and is identical with that of the Bhima Shankar group (Fig. I, 5). Though small, it is rectangular on plan and the stupa within has a *chhatra* carved in the flat roof above. It also has a narrow verandah in the front. But the pillars of the verandah are damaged; only the stepped bases and the stepped abacus remain. The only solitary record (No. 12) on the wall outside the chaitya records the gift of a goldsmith of Kalyan. The record can be assigned to the middle of second century.

The two chaityas in the Shivneri group are in the same tradition. Chaitya XLVIII (Fig. I, 6) is rectangular on plan, but its vestibule is separated from the main hall by four pillars, that is, two pillars and two pilasters. In the back end is the stupa, the *chhatra* of which is carved in the flat roof above. The other chaitya (No. I) is squarish on plan and has a verandah attached to it (Fig. I, 7). Both the chaityas can be dated to the middle of second century on the basis of epigraphical evidence (Nos. 1-9).

There are a few quadrangular chaitya-*grihas* at Kānheri but they cannot even be approximately dated in the absence of any significant architectural features. But the most important evidence is furnished by the caves at Kuda which belong to the Hīnayāna

series. They also have, in addition, copious inscriptional records which, though undated, are helpful in dating the caves on grounds of palaeography. The change in the layout of the chaitya-griha from apsidal into quandrangular which we witness at Junnar is further developed at Kuda. Thus cave I at Kuda (Fig. II, 3) is a far cry from the earlier apsidal shrines. It consists of a rectangular shrine containing a stupa and joined to the hall by a vestibule (*antarāla*). In the front is a verandah which has in its left end a cell containing a bench which indicates that it was used for residential purposes as well. This is a new addition to the quandrangular chaitya-*griha* and represents the first instance where the idea of combining the shrine and the residence takes concrete shape. Cave VI (Fig. II, 4) is also similar to cave I in all essential details but for the cell which is carved in the left wall of the *antarāla*. Besides, in the back wall of the cell is a recess which was probably intended for storing valuables, if any. Caves VIII and IX (Fig. II, 1), though simple in conception, are also nevertheless equally important from the point of view of the present study. Cave IX consists of an oblong verandah with a cell on its left which is connected with it. Cave XV (Fig. II, 2) has a similar pillared verandah and an oblong shrine, but has a cell each on the right and the left end of the verandah. The oblong shrine contains a stupa.

All the four chaitya-*grihas* at Kuda described above contain inscriptions (Nos. 1, 9, 15 & 23). They have been engraved with great care and read almost like signboards. The epigraphs from cave I and VIII for instance show developed forms of several letters such as *ya, dha* and the triangular *sa*. The letters *a* and *ka* are elongated as in the Ikshvaku records from Nagarjunakonda; in fact they closely resemble the latter. We would not therefore be far off of the mark if we assign the quandrangular chaitya-*grihas* at Kuda to the third century A.D. Incidentally it may also be noted that a majority of the Kuda caves are the work of the family of Mamdava Mahābhoja. It is enigmatic that this Mahābhoja does not state the name of his overlord. The second quarter of third century was a period of political instability, the Sātavāhanas had vanished from the scene in the first quarter of that century and local chieftains therefore probably became independent. The Mahābhoja of Kuda also seems to have carved out a principality of his own.

Cave VI (Fig. II, 4) is the only cave at Kuda which has been adorned with sculptures. Of the two principal panels on the wall, that on the left depicts a life size *mithuna*. Stylistically, it appears to be later than the *mithunas* in the Yajnasri cave at Kanheri and may therefore be dated to third century. This dating is also corroborated by the palaeography of inscription in the caves. But according to Fergusson and Burgess, "they (sculptures in cave VI) bear

Fig. 1

1. Ajanta Cave 9.
2. Lenyadri (Junnar) Chaitya VI.
3. Ambika (Junnar) Chaitya.
4. Bhimashankar (Junnar) Chaitya.
5. Lenyadri (Junnar) Chaitya XV.
6. Shivneri (Junnar) Chaitya XLVIII.
7. Shivneri (Junnar) Chaitya I.

Fig. 2

1. Kuda Cave IX.
2. Kuda Cave XV.
3. Kuda Cave I.
4. Kuda Cave VI.
5. Shelarwadi Cave IV.
6. Karad Chaitya XLVIII.
7. Mahad, Chaitya Cave VIII.

Fig. 3

1. Mahad Chaitya Cave I.
2. Ajanta Cave 15.
3. Ajanta Cave 20.
4. Ajanta Cave 11.
5. Ajanta Cave 7.

Fig. 4: Ajanta Cave 16.

a very striking resemblance to those in the front wall of the great chaitya cave at Karli.... there seems little reason to doubt that they all belong to about the same age, and that not much later than the time when these Kuda caves were first excavated within the first century before Christ."[8] Sarkar also states that, "in all the archaeological records the cave temples of Kuda appear to be the earliest remains of Buddhist quadrilateral stupa shrines though its period of emergence might not have been far removed in point of time from the *griha-stupa* A-14 of the Kalawan monastery at Taxila, ascribable to the latter half of the first century A.D."[9]

Some scholars think Kuda caves to be of a very early period. Soundara Rajan is of the opinion that the quadrilateral chaitya-*grihas*, such as those at Kuda, are of a very early date. He observes: "However, there is no doubt that generally the very earliest rock-cut chaityas had a rectangular rather than apsidal plan, were astylar and only the rear elevation profile took a curvature behind and above the votive stupa. Cave VI at Kuda, Cave No. XLVIII and cave IV respectively at Karad and Shelarwadi bear out this point while cave V at Karad is an example of the astylar chamber, only the rear roof of which is curved. It is also interesting to note in this connection that even at Ajanta, of the two oldest chaitya caves, viz. IX and X, the smaller one which is clearly earlier, has a rectangular plan although it has the row of pillars in an apse around the stupa."[10] This view, however, is no longer tenable in the light of stylistic and palaeographical evidence from Kuda caves.

One of the chaitya caves at Karad (No. XLVIII) (Fig. II, 6) is similar in conception to cave VIII at Kuda. It has an oblong shrine containing and a pillared verandah in the front. In the back wall, flanking the shrine, are two cells each. It marks an important stage in the idea of combining the shrine and the vihara, for here we have a quandrangular shrine with four cells for monks. But in the chaitya at Shelarwadi (Cave IV) we find that the plan of shrine and vihara is combined in the process of standardization (Fig. II, 5). It consists of a rectangular stupa shrine attached to a huge squarish hall having cells on all three sides except at the front. Stylistically it comes closer to the Mahāyāna shrines at Ajanta. Although this cave has been dated to the time of Vasithiputra and Gautamiputra II Satakarni.[11] it can stylistically and also palaeographically be assigned to the late third century.

8. Fergusson and Burgess, *op. cit.,* p. 208.
9. H. Sarkar, Studies in *Early Buddhist Architecture of India,* (New Delhi, 1966), pp. 42-43.
10. K. V. Soundara Rajan, "Beginnings of the Temple Plan," *Bulletin of the Prince of Wales Museum of Western India,* No. 6 (1957-58), p. 76.
11. Jas. Burgess, *Report on the Buddhist Cave Temples and Their Inscriptions,* (Varanasi, 1964), *ASWI,* IV, p. 92.

Two more illustrations from Pāla near Mahād complete the process of standardization. The chaitya cave (VIII) consists of a squarish hall with a verandah at the front the pillars of which are destroyed (Fig. II, 7). But fortunately their capitals and the bases remain as evidence to show that they were similar to those from Nasik and Junnar. There are altogether eight cells in the side walls of the hall; three each in the sides and two in one back wall flanking the shrine. The chaitya is, however, hewn out the shrine and only the umbrella attached to the roof remains. An inscription (No. 1) in the cave records that this chaitya-*griha* together with eight cells and two cisterns were the gift of prince Kaṇabhoa Viṇhupālita. Thus the epigraphical evidence is the concrete proof of the combination of the chaitya and the vihāra.

The chaitya cave I at Mahād or Pāla (Fig. III, 1) is not only the latest excavation at Mahād but also appears to be the latest of the earlier series. It consists of a quadrangular hall with a pillared verandah at the front. There are in all six pillars and two pilasters in the verandah. Of these, only the left pilaster and the first pillar on the left is finished. The pilaster is decorated with vertical corrugation bordered by lotus petals while the pillar has a square base, a sixteen sided shaft and a square capital. Thus a new type of pillar comes into being. The other pillars in the verandah were also intended to be of the same fashion as their unfinished square shafts would show.

The hall of the chaitya-*griha* is provided with a large door flanked by a window on its either side. We have already seen that windows are introduced for the first time at Kuda. But there is no vestibule (*antarāla*) in this cave. Instead there is a running bench in the hall on all its sides as in Kuda caves 2 and 6. In the left and the back walls of the hall are a number of crudely excavated cells. In the centre of the back wall is a rectangular shrine wherein a rough squarish mass of rock was left. It was possibly intended to carve a stupa in it, but we find instead a seated Buddha sculptured on its front in low relief with attendants on either side and the wheel (*dharma-chakra*) and the deer below; while other attendants, who are shown standing, are carved on the right and left sides of the block. At the back another Buddha figure has been roughly indicated.

The cave can be dated to the middle of fourth century on the basis of epigraphical evidence from cave 27.[12] The inscription in this cave contains some letters such as the triangular *va*, the elongated *a* etc. They can be compared with those in the third century Kshatrapa records. But the most noteworthy paleographical

12. *Ibid.,* Mahād Inscription No. 2.

feature is the elaborate form of medial *e* which is introduced in the fourth Century A.D.   The cave 1 which is decidedly later than cave 27, can therefore be dated to the middle of fourth century.

The two chaitya-*grihas* at Mahād (Pāla) have almost an exact parallel at Ajanta in Cave 15 (Fig. III, 2).   The latter consists of a quandrangular hall which is astylar and has a running bench in it as at Mahād.   It once had a verandah at the front which is now completely ruined.   It has cells in the side walls, five each, and in the back wall is the shrine which is joined to the hall by an ante-chamber (*antarāla*).   This type of *antarāla* joining the hall and the shrine is already to be seen in cave 1 at Kuda.   But here at Ajanta, we find for the first time a Buddha image carved in the back wall of the shrine.   The Buddha image is very simple and plain; there are no attendants and other paraphernalia which becomes a charac-teritsic feature of the later Mahāyāna shrines at Ajanta.   Another interesting feature of this cave is the carved doorframe of the hall. The carving is simple and plain as compared to other door-frames at Ajanta.   The door jambs have dwarfs or the *gaṇas* at the base and on the top are female figurines on *makaras* simulating the river god-desses; in the central portion we have a single male figure instead of a *mithuna* as in other cases.   But on closer examination it is re-vealed that they were carved later.   Yet the most noteworthy fea-ture is the stupa protected by *nāga* hoods on the lintel and on the *kapota* above are doves which are sculptured in a very naturalistic manner.   While the layout of the cave is similar to the preceding ones, the door frame is undoubtedly the result of the influence of the early Gupta temples which were now coming up in Central India.   There is no epigraphical record to date the cave and it has therefore to be dated approximately only on stylistic grounds.   For-merly all the later Mahāyāna caves at Ajanta were hanging in a sort of chronological vacuum, for they were dated from the end of fifth to seventh or even eighth century.   The only laudable attempt to fix them on a firmer basis is that of Spink according to whom the cave in question can be assigned to 465-490 A.D.[13]   This is as it should be, for according to Spink all the Mahāyāna caves at Ajanta were the work of a couple of generations and that they were all excavated during the reign of Hariṣeṇa who ruled in the last quar-ter of fifth century.   Almost all the Mahāyāna caves at Ajanta have a standardized plan but there are a few exceptions such as cave 15, which, as its ground plan and architectural features show, must have preceded the other Mahāyāna caves at the site.   Cave 16 is now generally accepted to be one of the earliest caves at Ajanta among the Mahāyāna group, for it can firmly be dated to the reign of Hari-

13. Spink, *op. cit., XXIV ICO. Summary of Papers,* 242-43.

ṣeṇa on the basis of an inscription in it. If we then compare
cave 15 with cave 16 we find that some time must have elapsed be-
tween the two, notwithstanding the fact that both are organically
related to each other.   But in between the two there are a few
more caves at Ajanta such as Nos. 20, 11 and 7 (Fig. III, 3, 4, 5)[13a]
which enable us to trace the development from cave 15 to cave 16
(Fig. 4). We may not therefore be far off of the mark if we date
the cave 15 to the late fourth or the earlier half of fifth century.
It is significant that even Burgess thought this cave to be the ear-
liest in the Mahāyāna group, for he said that, "This cave, again,
is probably an earlier cave than the last or any that follow it."[14]

The next stage in the development of the Mahāyāna caves is
marked by cave 11 which is a most interesting edifice.[15] It con-
sists of a pillared verandah joined to a quandrangular hall which
contains a small *maṇḍapa* in the centre formed by four pillars. Thus
we find pillars introduced in the hall for the first time in the later
group at Ajanta.   There are cells at both the ends of the verandah
and on the left wall of the hall as also in the back wall.   But there
is no antechamber (*antarāla*) joining the hall and the shrine.   The
most interesting feature of this cave is the Buddha image in the
shrine which is carved against an unfinished stupa, and reminds
us of the shrine in cave 1 at Mahād.   But in this case the stupa is
carved in the back wall and there is therefore no provision of the
circumambulatory passage (*pradakṣina-patha*).   The cave can be
assigned, on the basis of a painted inscription[16] in it, to the latter
half of fifth century.[17]   From here onward, the plan of the Mahā-
yāna shrine is standardized.   Nonetheless, minor development is to
be   seen   in several   shrines.   The   development   of   Mahāyāna
shrines at Ajanta   and Ghatotkach has   been traced in   great de-
tail by Spink.[18]   The writer has also shown elsewhere that the main
cave at Dharasiva (District Osmanabad, Maharashtra) also belongs
to the same series.[19]

The foregoing analysis of the evidence of the late Hīnayāna
caves temples of Western India shows that the bold attempt at

13a. Cave 20, although aśtylar, has many late features.
14. *ASWI*, IV, p. 53.
15. For a thorough analysis of the architectural peculiarities of cave 11 see Walter
    M. Spink "Ajanta's Chronology: the Problem of Cave Eleven," *Ars Orientalis*,
    VII (1968), pp. 155-168.
16. M. K. Dhavalikar, "New Inscriptions from Ajanta," *Ars Orientalis*, VII (1968),
    p. 149, Fig. 3.
17. Spink has convincingly shown that there are two distinct phases of work
    which can be discerned in cave 11; the painted inscription belongs to the
    second phase of work. See Spink, *op. cit.*, *Ars Orientalis*, VII, p. 168.
18. "Ajanta and Ghatotkach, A Preliminary Analysis," *Ars Orientalis*, VI (1966).
19. M. K. Dhavalikar, "The Dharasiva Caves: A Resurvey", *Jr. of the Asiatic
    Society of Bombay*, Vol. 39-40 (1964-65), pp. 183-89 and also "*The Brhat-kathā-
    kośa* and the Dharasiva Caves," *JIH*, Vol. XLVI (1968), pp. 405-412.

combining the chaitya and the vihāra evidenced at Junnar Kuda, Karad, Shelarwadi and Mahād constitutes a landmark in the evolution of the Buddhist rock-cut shrines in Western India. The new plan was more in keeping with the Indian tradition, for the *chatuṣka* plan is the most characteristic feature of Indian architecture from a very early period. Even the Harappan houses consisted of an open, oblong court with rooms arranged on sides. As a matter of fact the apsidal plan is a misfit in the system of Indian architecture. As Sarkar rightly infers, it was perhaps borrowed into India from outside.[20] The apsidal structures were certainly in vogue in Palestine, Crete and Greece. According to Coomaraswamy, "Lydian excavated and monolithic tombs at Pinara and Xanthos on the south coast of Asia Minor present some analogy with the early Indian rock cut chaitya halls."[21] The abundance of apsidal chaityas in the rock cut sanctuaries in Western India may probably have been due to the predilection of the Yavana donors who had settled in large numbers in this part of the country. And that is why Aśoka deputed Yavana Dharmarakkhita to Western India to propagate the gospel of the 'Enlightened One'. There should be little doubt that this missionary was originally a Grecko-Roman who was converted to Buddhism. He appears to have been extremely successful in his mission; he must have won over a considerable number of *yavanas* as the inscriptional records from early cave temples in Western India would show. But unfortunately the decline of the Sātavāhanas and the Roman empire almost synchronized and the once flourishing trade gradually dwindled. This led to a sharp decrease in the patronage to Buddhism. Which is why the rock-cut activity was on the decline in the third and fourth centuries. Sporadic attempts were made here and there. The modest and unpretencious excavations at places like Kuda, Mahād, Shelarwadi, Karad and others belong to this period. They show that in all probability the artists were not compelled by their patrons to conform to the earlier standardized plan. The donors also do not appear to have been consistent in their benevolence as is borne out by several unfinished excavations at these places. But the artist seems to have been comparatively free to experiment with a new plan. However, it cannot be called an entirely a new plan, but rather a modified form of the earlier Hīnayāna Vihāras. They thus paved the way for their successors who standardized a new plan for the Mahāyāna Buddhists the finest examples of which are to be met with at Ajanta.[22]

20. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
21. *History of Indian and Indonesian Art* (London, 1927), p. 12.
22. For a discussion of the early Mahāyāna phase at Ajanta see M. K. Dhavalikar, "The Beginnings of Mahāyāna Architecture at Ajanta." Paper read at the Seminar on *The Chronology of Mahāyāna Caves at Ajanta*, Poona, March 1971 (in press).

THE PARTITION OF BENGAL, 1905

By

V. G. DIGHE

British conquest in India began from three coastal points—Madras, Bombay and Calcutta. The victory at Plassey in 1757 brought the old Mughal *subah* of Bengal to the British which was confirmed by the grant of *Diwani* in 1765. After Plassey progress in annexation was rapid and swift in the north. The defeat of the Maratha confederacy in 1803 and 1818 added large parts of Central India and of Orissa to British dominion in India. For purposes of administration these were placed under the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, as also the later conquests in the east, of Assam, in 1824. The two wars with the Sikh rulers of Punjab almost completed the process of conquests and annexations, and extended the frontiers of British India to their natural limits.

In 1836 the North-Western Provinces comprising the major part of modern Uttar Pradesh, were separated from the Presidency of Bengal and placed under a Lieutenant-Governor. In 1854 Bengal which had been administered so far by the Governor-General or his deputy, was entrusted to the charge of a Lieutenant-Governor. The Presidency then consisted of the territories of Bengal proper, Bihar, Orissa, Orissa tributory *mahals,* Chota Nagpur and tributory States and Assam; it covered an area of 239,000 square miles with a population then supposed to stand at 40 millions but which at the first official census turned out to be 62 millions.[1]

The supervision of the increasingly complicated work of administration of the numerous and distant districts in the province of Bengal, and devising measures to cope with emergencies, proved almost a Herculean task. The Indigo Commission in 1860 suggested redistribution of Bengal districts for toning up general administration and for checking the oppression of the Indigo planters. Some districts of Central Bengal were arcordingly redistributed to bring justice nearer to the peasants living in villages.[2] In 1866 there was a terrible famine in Orissa in which thousands of people perished and it was felt that the Lieutenant-Governor being far away from the scene of the calamity, was not able to judge of its gravity properly.

1. Govt. of India to S.S., No. 3, 2 Feb. 1905; See Home Dept. Public Progs, No. 166, Feb. 1905.
2. Bagal, J.C., *History of the Indian Association,* p. 153.

The State Secretary suggested a realignment of the overgrown province of Bengal.

A committee was set up by the Government of India in 1868 to go into the problem. Its viewpoint was correctly stated by Sir Bartle Frere when he remarked: "We find that for every five millions of people inhabiting a country larger, richer and more important in every way...than most third class European sovereignties we have one-eight of a Lieutenant-Governor, about 28 English gentlemen Covenanted Civilians and about 112 uncovenanted gentlemen....With these facts before us, can we say that Bengal has anything but the shadow of an administration? Can we wonder at a breakdown like that of Orissa? or that of the late Lieutenant-Governor's two predecessors....Bengal is practically ungoverned, for that is the long and short of the Commission's report and all that we have seen and heard of it."[3] As a result of much discussion Assam and three districts from Bengal, Sylhet, Goalpara and Cachar, were taken away and placed under a Chief Commissionership in 1874. Though public opinion was not then so well organized, the *Amrit Bazar Patrika* did not fail to enter a protest against the dismemberment of the Bengali-speaking region.

In 1891 there were discussions for the more efficient defence of the North-Eastern Frontier and it was proposed to transfer the Lushai Hills tract along with the Chittagong division to Assam. The transfer effected in 1892 included only the Hills tract.

Separation of Assam brought little relief to the province of Bengal with its growing population. In 1896-1897 there were fui ther discussions as to whether the Chittagong division of Bengal should be transferred to Assam. The Government of Bengal protested against its dismemberment and along with its protest, sent memorials addressed to the Viceroy by the residents of Chittagong, Noakhali and Tippera and by the British Indian Association, the Indian Association and East Bengal Association. Sir William Ward who was then Chief Commissioner was anxious to improve the prospects of Assam civilians and urged the transfer on the ground that on the completion of the Assam Bengal railway, the region traversed by the line would be better served if placed under one government and that it would also contribute to the development of the port of Chittagong. To make the province viable administratively and economically, he also suggested the incorporation of Dacca and Mymensingh districts with the province of Assam.[4]

3. Broomfield, J.M., 'The Partition of Bengal', *Indian History Congress Proceedings*, 1960.
4. Home Dept. Public A, Progs., Nos. 204-234 of May 1897; Chief Secretary, Assam, to Secretary, Government of India, Home Dept., dated 25 November 1896.

Sir William Ward's scheme as remarked above was opposed by the Government of Bengal and by Ward's successor, Sir Henry Cotton, who very cogently put forth the Bengal point of view. His main argument was that the Chittagong division and the two districts of Dacca and Mymensingh were parts of Bengal since 1760, they enjoyed constitutional privileges and amenities unknown in the backward province of Assam. To transfer them to that province would make them lose the benefit of the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue, of the High Court at Calcutta, their representation on the Bengal Legislative Council, and would adversely affect the local self-administration in the region. This, in all respects, would be a very retrograde step. "Chittagong", he added, "is homogeneous with Bengal; it is not homogeneous with Assam, but differs from it and from the administration prevailing in Assam in almost every respect. It is better on all grounds that Bengal districts should remain with Bengal."[5]

With the changing concept of government duties, administration was becoming more complex and entailed heavy burden on the Lieutenant-Governor of the province. Naturally much of the work had to be delegated to Secretaries which tended to create a feeling of antagonism between the local officers and the Secretariat, which affected the general character of the administration. The case for the relief of Bengal was thus clear; what was not clear was the form it should take. Bengal officials favoured organic changes—raising Bengal to the status of a Governor's province with an executive council, rejecting the idea of dismemberment. Bengal public opinion represented by Associations in Calcutta and outside and the British merchant community favoured the same idea; dismemberment was looked on with disapproval by all public parties who were keen not to lose the link with the capital.[6] In higher government circles, however, there was hostility to the idea of government with a council. Sir John Lawrence had laid down in 1868 that personal administration by a single head without a Council was the best form of government for many parts of India, Bengal included. Despite political awakening in the country, the thinking in higher circles had not progressed beyond this point.

There the position rested till the arrival in India in 1898 of Lord Curzon with an exalted notion of his imperial mission and his zeal for effecting measures that would make the British empire an enduring monument. India, to him, was the pivot of the British empire

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5. Sir Henry Cotton's note dated 26 January 1897, Home Dept., Public A, Progs. Nos. 204-234, May 1897.
6. H. Savage, Commissioner, Dacca to Chief Secretary, Bengal, 15 February 1904, with enclosures in Home Dept. Public A, February 1905, Noc. 155-167, pp. 281-287. Also Minute by C. E. Buckland of 29 February 1904 in the same Proceedings, pp. 275-280.

and he was determined to do everything that would strengthen the links that bound India to England. The imperial vision, he felt, had become dim to his predecessors who had contented themselves with preserving the *status quo,* with dealing problems as they arose. He would gear up the machine, vitalise all departments of government, construct for the future so that government could meet any challenge for the next quarter or half of a century. He carried out a number of reforms affecting agriculture and land revenue, police, education, railways, foreign affairs and princely States. Nothing could be more dear to his heart than reconstructing provinces and drawing the map of the country afresh. Bengal's growing national consciousness posed a distant threat to the stability of the empire. By dividing the province on communal lines Curzon would, at one stroke, set the Muslims of Eastern Bengal against the Hindus of Bengal, intensify the separatist feelings between the two communities and weaken the national movement.

The problem of the rearrangement of the territorial jurisdiction of Bengal was revived when the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces finding it difficult to administer the Oriya speaking tract of Sambalpur, approached Government of India in 1901 to substitute in that area Hindi in place of Oriya as the language of the Court. The district had been taken over by the British Government in 1849 and in the sixties added to the Central Provinces. The Secretaries and members of the Viceroy's Council went on noting and discussing ways and means of handling the problem. The file went to the Viceroy with suggestions from the members about the rearrangement, not only of Sambalpur *vis-a-vis* the Central Provinces, but that of the Punjab, Bombay, and Madras.

The Governor General was furious. He felt that "this was an extraordinary procedure—Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries calmly carving about and rearranging provinces". He asked, "is there no such thing as head of the Government? Would it be considered creditable that these really important isssues should have been under discussion for more than a year without the file ever being sent to the Viceroy and at the end a cut and dried reply submitted to him as though his signature were a sort of perfunctory postcript to the entire discussions?"

The situation according to him was absurd. The initiative and direction in such important matters, he insisted, must come from the highest authority. As Berar was soon going to be incorporated in British India he suggested that the question of readjustment of boundaries all round should be taken up. He asked the Council to discuss the future of Berar and of Sind in the new set-up.[7] He also

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7. Curzon's note of 24 May 1902 in Home Dept., Public A, Progs. Nos. 149-160 of December 1903, pp. 3-4.

asked his Council to consider whether (1) Assam should have a maritime exit which would involve the transfer of Chittagong, (2) whether Bengal overswollen should be rid off Chittagong and Orissa.

The discussions lasted for quite some time and when Denzil Ibbetson, the Home Member, suggested that Berar could conveniently go with Bombay, Curzon reacted sharply. The imperialist that he was, he would not be guilty of consolidating the subject people. He refuted his subordinate's argument by asking the question "is similarity of land revenue system to be the sole criterion?....I cannot contemplate any proposal which would add to the strength or solidarity of the Maratha community with anything but dismay..... The Marathas of the Bombay Deccan (are) the most able and the most dangerous of the opponents of our rule in India. Why then should we go and gratuitously make a persent to Poona of this enormous accretion of political strength....multiplying the forces of our enemies, consolidating the Maratha race?"[8] The Viceroy derived support from another member of the Council, Sir Andrew Fraser, who wrote, "I should deprecate increasing the area under Poona influences by the addition of the Berar districts.'"[9] The path of duty to the Viceroy was clear. He remarked "the last thing we want to do is to consolidate the Mahratta race. We hear quite enough of Sivaji as it is."[10]

Curzon's attitude towards the Berar problem was an indication of the frame of mind in which he was going to tackle the problem of overburdened Bengal. He laid down as an axiomatic truth that[11] "reduction of the territorial area and diminution of the administrative burden attached to a single government was not only politic but indispensable." Bengal was vast. The Lieutenant-Governor was called upon to administer an area of 189,000 square miles with a population of 78,493,000 souls and a gross revenue of 1,139 lakhs of rupees. This was too heavy a burden for one man. The result was that there was less personal and more secretariat government in Bengal and secretariat government was always the most uninspired and unprogressive form of administration. This state of affairs could not be tolerated. The one step open to reduce the gravity of the situation was to curtail the area of mischief and increase opportunities of contact between the administration and the people. This had been done once in 1874 and had to be repeated once more on a large scale, keeping in view the ultimate good of the people.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 22; Curzon's note dated 6 March 1903.
9. Andrew Fraser's note, 28 March 1903.
10. Curzon's minute, 19 May 1903.
11. Minute, 1 June 1903 in Home Department, Public A, Progs., Nos. 149-160 of December 1903, p. 59.

If curtailment of Bengal territories was to be effected, it could be done only in the direction of Assam and Central Provinces. The United Provinces and Madras with their large areas and big populations (112,000 square miles and 48,498,000 people for U.P. and 151,000 and 42,397,000 for Madras) had quite enough for themselves and could take no more. Only the Central Provinces and Assam could absorb more territory as they were young and growing. It is in these directions that the Viceroy proposed to give relief to Bengal.

Curzon therefore suggested the transfer of Chota Nagpur area, excepting Manbhum and Hazaribagh districts, to the Central Provinces on the ground of similarity of character and state of development of the people with those of the Central Provinces and their long neglect by Bengal. The transfer of Orissa with an area of 24,000 square miles and a population of 6,290,000 from Bengal to the Central Provinces was ruled out because of "a very strong feeling on the part of the educated and commercial classes in favour of *status quo.*" On the contrary, Curzon suggested that this opportunity be utilised to bring together under one umbrella all the Oriya-speaking tracts—(Oriya districts in Bengal, Sambalpur district and the adjacent Feudatory States in C.P., the Ganjam district, the Ganjam Agency tracts and the Vizagapatam Agency tracts in Madras Presidency). The Oriya-speaking people were keen to be welded by the link of language into a single administrative unit. "My proposal therefore is to unite the whole of the Oriya-speaking peoples both hill and plain, under one administration and to make that administration part of Bengal....In this way we shall solve the question of language once and for all."[12] Madras and the Central Provinces would be relieved of troublesome excrescences and the Oriya problem would be handed to one government.

This unification of Oriya-speaking people under one administration, Curzon was aware, would add to the Bengal province a population of four and a half million. This relatively small addition, he proposed to counter-balance by subtraction of large areas in the direction of the eastern frontier of Bengal, where lay the province of Assam.

Created out of Bengal about thirty years ago, Assam now required a 'lift forward'. The province was small in area (56,000 square miles) small in population (6,126,000) and small in revenue (128 lakhs). Its contracted area, its restricted opportunities, its lack of commercial outlet and its alien services made the province suffer from parochialism. "The province requires a strong lift forward in all direction. It requires territorial expansion in order to

12. *Ibid.,* p. 64.

give its officers a wider and more interesting field of work. It requires a maritime outlet in order to develop its industries in tea, oil and coal. With a service recruited as at present and confined within the present limits, Assam will never produce a really efficient administration."[13] Assam therefore had to be made a vigorous and self-contained province. This was to be done by giving relief to the overburdened and congested administration of Bengal.

The relief to Bengal was to take the form of transfer of the Chittagong division and of the districts of Dacca and Mymensingh to Assam. The Chittagong division consisting of four districts, had an area of 11,770 square miles and a population of 4,737,000; Dacca and Mymensingh districts though smaller in area (9,000 sq. miles) contained 6½ million people. All together Bengal would be relieved of the administration of 11 million people, which it was doing in a perfunctory manner and this would be added to a province where it would be welcome. The port of Chittagong would serve as a good maritime outlet to the province of Assam, especially its lower portion which had been opened by the new railway line. The port itself would receive special attention from the Assam Government which it was not getting on account of competition from Calcutta. The transfer of Dacca and Mymensingh districts divided as they were from Bengal by the Brahmaputra, would give the province of Assam a well-defined border. The increase in territory and population would bring about an improvement in the services, as the province of Assam could then have its own cadre and be independent of Bengal, and would have more prize posts for its civilians to develop interest in their work.

There was also a political advantage in the transfer. This was pointed out by Ibbetson. "The influence of Eastern Bengal in the politics of the province is great out of all proportion to its real political importance, in so much that the Bengali altogether overshadows the Behari, who is in everything save the use (or abuse) of language immeasurably his superior. It is an object of great political and administrative importance to diminish this influence by separating one of its great centres from the others."[14] Curzon was in full accord with these sentiments. He added "these Eastern districts of Bengal are a hotbed of the purely Bengali movement, unfriendly if not seditious in character."[15] These districts which were elements of weakness and dissension to Bengal, would be reduced to their proper level when transferred to another province.

The objections to the proposals were swept away by His Excellency as being of no primary importance. He was confident that

13. *Ibid.*
14. Ibbetson's Minute, 23 April 1903, Home Dept., Public A, Progs., Nos. 149-160 of December 1903, p. 39, p. 68.
15. *Ibid.*, Curzon's Minute of 1 June 1903.

"if we act in this (liberal) spirit, we shall most likely secure the end that we have in view, *viz.*, ultimate benefit of the community and the administration as a whole."[16] Bengal would be relieved of 11 millions of people while Assam would gain eleven and a half millions and would become a viable unit, administratively and economically.

The proposals were again examined by the Council, most of the members toeing the line and complimenting their chief on his wisdom and sagacity. Sir A. T. Arundel was, however, doubtful of the wisdom of uniting the Oriya-speaking tribes and tracts in a single province. The Ganjam Oriyas were already speaking of "the up-building of a nation and national character"[17] and "of their being dissociated politically from their Oriya brethren of the province of Orissa". The Oriyas of Ganjam and Vizagapatam were of a warlike and turbulent disposition. They had risen against government in 1871-81 and 1900. Knowing the existence of the explosive force among the Oriys, Arundel thought it was unwise to unite them in one administration. He pointed out the inconsistency of preventing the union of Berar with the Bombay Deccan, the severance of Chittagong, Dacca and Mymensingh from Bengal and the unification of Oriya speaking people.

But Curzon was not the man to accept advice from others. He made light of the objections saying "that the Oriyas were not as formidable a body of men capable of being a thorn in the side of Government like the Bengalis or the Marathas"[18] and pressed on with the scheme.

The Secretary prepared letters to be sent to the Provincial Governments of Bengal, Assam, Central Provinces and Madras. He reproduced His Excellency's arguments, not forgetting the political one. The Governor-General was startled when he saw the political argument included in the draft. He was averse to the idea that the public should know that Dacca and Mymensingh were being severed on political grounds. He noted on the file, "if the letter to Bengal were published in its present form it would create absolute consternation, and would effectually defeat the very end that we have in view. When I wrote my minute for the confidential information of my colleagues, it never occurred to me for a moment that its contents would be practically reproduced to be dissected by every newspaper scribe in Bengal. What I could safely say in the privacy of the Council Chamber is not necessarily suitable for proclamation on the house-tops."

Secretary has produced a draft which would be disastrous. I have therefore revised it.

16. *Ibid.*
17. Arundel's Minute. 19 June, 1903.
18. Curzon's Minute. 28 June, 1903.

"Neither do I propose to send a copy of my minute home....
It will be sufficient if I send a copy privately to Secretary of State
to explain the inner meaning of much that it has not been found
altogether advisable to say in the letter to Bengal."[19]

Government of India's letter to the Government of Bengal con-
taining the partition proposal was sent on 3rd December 1903.
There was a hue and cry against the scheme of partitioning as soon
as it was publicized.   The scheme was denounced in the press
and on platform.   The *Charu Mihir* (Mymensingh) of 15th
December wrote, 'the proposal made by the Government has struck
terror into the hearts of the people.   The shadow of an approaching
calamity is visible in their faces".   The *Ananda Bazar Patrika* on
16th December said, "we do not know for what great crime commit-
ted by the people of these districts Government is now resolved
upon inflicting on them this severe punishment.   They must now
exchange the benefits of their advanced system of administration
for reprehensible and poisonous effects of a backward administra-
tion".   The *Sanjiwani* was loud in its protests.   It wrote on 17th
"Lord Curzon has done many unpleasant acts and the Bengalis have
borne all that with a heavy heart.   But if he actually transfers the
Dacca, Mymensingh and Chittagong districts they will curse him for
ever as their worst enemy.".... It warned Government, "East
Bengal is not dead.   There will be seen waves of an indignant agit-
ation, the sight of which will bewilder the Government of India."
The *Basumati* of the 19th December, pleaded with Government:
"the Bengalis love their country very dearly and are unable to for-
get their cherished associations and ideas handed down to them
from their forefathers.   They would rather die than consent to be
called Assamese".   The *Dacca Prakash* of 20th December joined the
protest saying "we shudder to say that the most ancient land which
has, from time immemorial, felt it a glory to be called Bengal and
the curtailment of whose boundaries as laid down in Hindu times
was not deemed to be a right thing even by the Musalman emperors,
is now about to be dismembered under British rule,....a different
nationality is going to be assigned to a portion of a people who have,
from prehistoric times, been reckoned as members of the same fa-
mily".   The *Bengali,* the *Decca Gazatte,* the *Jyoti* and a host of other
papers condemned the proposal in the strongest possible terms.[20]

Many associations presented memorials to Government to point
out the grievous wrong being done to the people of Bengal and ap-
pealing it to abandon the scheme.   The memorial of the Bengal Na-

19. Home Dept., Public A, Progs., Nos. 149-160 of December, 1903, Curzon's
    Minute, 10 November, 1903, p. 75. Yet Lovat Fraser, Curzon's admirer and
    protagonist would have us believe that the Partition of Bengal was an un-
    premeditated move.
20. Report on Native Newspapers, Bengal, July-December, 1903.

tional Chamber of Commerce and that of the Central Muhammadan Association are typical of the protests registered. They cover the entire range of argument brought against the scheme and one could not do better than summarize their main points.[21]

The memorial of the first body tracing the history of Bengal said that from the earliest time Bengal was divided into three divisions, viz., *Banga* comprising the districts of Eastern Bengal, *Gaur* comprising the modern Central Bengal and Barindra comprising the Northern Bengal; that the seat of government during the reigns of the Kings of the Sen dynasty had always been in Bikrampur, Rampal (near Dacca) where traces and relics of the palaces of the early Kings, Adisur and Ballal Sen, were still to be found; and that during the sovereignty of the Hindu Kings extending over all the three divisions it was from Bikrampur, Rampal, that the whole of Bengal used to be governed and as such it was *Banga*, comprising East Bengal, which gave its name to the whole province of Bengal. From the point of view of Sastras Dacca and Mymensingh were the real *Banga* or Bengal. Even under Muhammadan rule the seat of government for many years remained at Dacca.

Dacca enjoyed preeminence from social and religious points of view as well. During the Hindu period Bikrampur (in Dacca district) was the home of Kulin Brāhmaṇs, Kāyasthas and Baidyas and the principal seat of Sanskrit learning. It was at Bikrampur that the five pure Brāhmaṇs accompanied by five Kāyasthas, on the invitation of King Adisur, migrated and settled, and it was here that King Ballal Sen regulated the different systems of castes. It was from here that the higher classes of Brāhmaṇas and Kāyasthas migrated to different parts of the province. Thus Dacca, Mymensingh and Chittagong were the heartland of the Bengalis and 'Government would be tearing away the most vital part' by divorcing these districts from Bengal.

Besides, Dacca and Mymensingh had always been the principal seats of Sanskrit learning; there were about 800 indigenous Sanskrit Pathshalas in the region teaching philosophy, literature, grammar, *Smṛitis*. The Pandits of Eastern Bengal exercised a predominating influence in all matters concerning religion and society.

From time immemorial the various classes of Hindus of Bengal followed the same customs and usages, practised the same rites and ceremonies and there was free social intercourse and free intermarriages between the several parts of Bengal proper. Such free intercourse with people outside Bengal was not permissible. A mar-

21. Babu Sita Nath Roy to Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal, 3 February 1904, enclosed in Home Dept., Public A, Progs., Nos. 158-167, pp. 171-184, 191-192.

riage between an Oriya or Bihar Brāhman or Kāyastha boy and a Bengal Brāhman or Kāyastha girl could never take place. In case of East Bengal being severed from the province and merged with Assam, inhabitants in that region would be looked down upon as inferior and ignored altogether and be denationalized.

The culture of the people of Eastern Bengal was likewise threatened by the scheme. Bengali was the language of the sixty million Hindus and Muslims living in Bengal proper. "Of all the Indian languages Bengali is the most complete and perfect and has a literature of its own. It is being enriched everyday. Its greatest living poet Nobin Chandra Sen, its greatest orator, Rai Kali Prasanna Ghosh, hail from Chittagong and Dacca and many eminent men of letters, besides, belong to Eastern Bengal". From a common language, a common metropolis, a common administration, a common university, common social ties and commerce and religion and several other things in common between Western and Eastern Bengal, the inhabitants of both parts, men of culture, men of light and leading, freely mix on a common platform in the metropolis, imbibe and impart thoughts, and gather ideas and information. It would consequently be nothing short of a calamity to dismember Bengal proper, to forcibly disrupt immemorial ties and to divide the Bengali speaking race into two sections, absorbing one into a backward race inhabiting Assam.'[22]

The memorial pointed out several inconsistencies in the reasoning of Government. What logic is this, it asked, to say in one place that "the criterion of territorial redistribution should be sought not in race but in language",[23] to use the formula for the unification of Oriya-speaking people and set it at naught as regards Bengal? "The salutary principle has been entirely lost sight of and ignored in the most unexpected proposal formulated of handing over the cultured and progressive people of East Bengal to the people of Assam with whom they have nothing in common, being altogether different from them in language, in religious and social rites and customs and usages, in manners and even as race." "The Bengali language the most perfect and developed in India, instead of receiving further vitality, will be stunted."

The memorial then went on to point out that the progress in education in Eastern Bengal had been accelerated on account of its close contact with the metropolitan city of Calcutta. "The Committee rightly believe that some of the most prominent men of Indian society whom East Bengal has produced, whether as poets, orators, lawyers, scientists, doctors; covenanted and statutory civi-

22. *Ibid.*
23. Risley's letter to Government of Bengal. 3 December. 1903, *op. cit.*

lians, hosts of judicial and executive officers, would not have obtained eminence in their respective sphere, if they had not been brought up and received their early training in the best educational institutions in the metropolis, which was possible by their parents being connected with Calcutta through business, government service, commerce and diverse other means." These men received not only their training in the metropolis but came under the salutary influence of great men of culture and learning. If Eastern Bengal were cut off, this would adversely affect the flow of cultural influences. The new province would have a poor educational service to start with and it would take many many years to build the facilities and traditions similar to those of the Presidency College or the Medical, Engineering colleges in Calcutta.

The people of East Bengal were freely employed in different capacities in Calcutta and the 47 districts of Bengal in Government administration as well as in private firms and estates. "The Committee apprehend that the people of the severed districts will in future be cut off from all offices in Calcutta and the rest of Bengal in view of the circulars recently issued by several provincial governments restricting employment to be given to their own people. The prospects for the people of Eastern Bengal are gloomy as this was nothing short of drying the fountain source of livelihood of several lakhs of people."

There was also the legislative difficulty. Eastern Bengal would lose its representation in the Bengal Legislative Council and "henceforth all new legislation, all modification of old statutes, would be undertaken in the Supreme Council, by members ignorant of all local laws, language and customs and usages of the Province." The Chief Commissioner of Assam who would advise the Supreme Council would be equally ignorant about conditions in the Eastern Bengal districts. "It would be a great misfortune that the people should have no voice in their legislation."

Other serious losses the districts would suffer were the control and jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue and of the High Court. Bengal land revenue system had complicated features which were best understood by the members of the Board of Revenue. It would be a hardship for Eastern Bengal people if their revenue cases were to be disposed of by the Chief Commissioners in camera. "The High Court is the bulwark of the rights and liberties of the subject people and it would be a most ill-advised step to deprive the people accustomed to the highly legalised form of procedure of the jurisdiction and consequent protection of the High Court."

The memorial went on to describe the hardships of the Zamindars and business men of the districts would suffer and prayed to Gov-

ernment not to dismember Bengal. If at all a change was necessary, "the true remedy lies in altering the machinery of Government, in creating an Executive Council for assisting the Lieutenant-Governor's burden without diminishing his responsibility."[24]

The Central National Muhammadan Association of Calcutta represented on similar lines stating that it did not approve of the scheme. "No portion of the Bengali-speaking race should be separated from Bengal without the clearest necessity", said the Secretary and "such necessity did not exist." Transferring Bengal districts to Assam would "break the prescription of many centuries." "Judged by the standards of civilization, languages, habits, past traditions, nature of revenue settlements, and a hundred other matters more or less important, the people of Dacca, Mymensigh, Tippera, Noakhali and Chittagong have infinitely more in common with Bengal than Orissa and Chota Nagpur, and if relief is needed, it ought to be in directions other than those indicated in Mr. Risley's letter. If relief was needed for the Lieutenant-Governor it should take the form of a Governorship with an Executive Council like that in Madras and Bombay. It added, "a vigilant press, a strong public opinion, a local council for making laws, with a number of non-official members, the right of interpellation, a Board of Revenue presided over by two senior members of the Civil Service thoroughly familiar with the most intricate revenue problems, are assets that no people will willingly part with."[25]

The Bengal Zamindar class had been specially created by the British Government to buttress itself against eventualities and had remained loyal to it over a century. It now came out openly against Partition. Its representatives were invited to meet the Lieutenant-Governor at Belvedere, his official residence, and given opportunities to discuss the scheme. They let Government know that they were not at all convinced that the administration of Bengal was too heavy a burden for one Lieutenant-Governor. The development of railway, steamer and postal communications had altered the situation from what it was in the past. Besides, the Lieutenant-Governor was being helped by a Legislative Council and by an active press. Despite this, if a change was thought necessary, it could be effected by organic changes in the system of government—by ap-

24. Babu Sita Nath Roy, Secretary, Bengal National Chamber of Commerce to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal, 3 February, 1904.
25. Nawab Syed Ameer Hussain's letter to Government of Bengal, of 17 February, 1904 in Home Dept., Public A, Progs., 155-167, pp. 191-192; also see the memorial of the residents of Chittagong, presented by Anwar Ali Khan, 3 February, 1904; the memorial of residents of Feni, 30 January, 1904, presented by Abdul Majid. The memorials lament the severance of the districts from the mother country—Bengal. There were also memorials sent by Khalilur Rahman Abu Zaigham Saber of Dacca, S. Allah Hafiz of Munshiganj, Abdul Kabir of Ghorsal, Maulvi Hamiduddin Ahmad of Mymensingh, Maulavi Ghulam Chandhera of Habibganj, etc. etc.

pointing a separate Governor with an Executive Council. But "to divide one race in two", said the Secretaries of the Association, "and place it under different administrations, would defeat the avowed objects of British rule in India—to create among us a national feeling and to make us fit for representative government." They warned Government against rousing mutual jealousies by breaking linguistic units and entreated it to preserve the historical unity of Bengal which was knit by common language, common traditions, common racial feelings and by common aspirations.[26]

The hostile reaction of the Press, of the various associations and the whirlwind campaign against the scheme carried on in countless meetings could not fail to perturb Government. The Home Secretary Risley, who was asked to look into the matter noted that the agitation was being fomented by the literate class, by business interests and by zamindars. This class was infinitesimally small and had no popular support whatsoever. Perhaps it would lose some of the advantages enjoyed under the present arrangements. But the political advantage Government would gain in the transaction was overriding. "Bengal united is a power, Bengal divided will pull several different ways. That is perfectly true and is one of the great merits of the scheme."[27]

· · The note of the Secretary was reviewed by Ibbetson the Home Member. He agreed that the proposals had aroused a genuine and general alarm among the educated class. But he saw no reason to believe that the uneducated masses felt any interest in the proposal. The opposition of the educated classes was based upon interested motives and the question was, should these be allowed to prevail against general administrative considerations.

About the feeling of the Bengali nationality against the partition, he felt it was purely sentimental. The British Government presumed that the idea of Bengali nation was a myth since modern Bengali language was the creation of British rule. That common bonds of geography, language, culture, economic interests and political aspirations could rouse sentiments of nationality among the people of a region was what a foreign imperial power could not understand. The Home Member, however, did not fail to press the advantage against the sentimental objection. "I think however that the agitators clearly perceive that the transfer will put an end to or at any rate greatly weaken the existing preponderance in the provincial politics of Bengal proper, which absolutely overshadows

26. Secretaries, Bengal Landholders Association to the Chief Secretary, Bengal Government, 1 March, 1904, enclosed in Progs., Nos. 155-167, Home Department, Public A, February, 1905.
27. Risley's note 7 February, 1904 in Home Dept., Public A, Progs., Nos. 155-167 of February, 1905, p. 3.

Behar, Orissa, etc. But this preponderance is an evil and it is most desirable to diminish it."

The idea of giving an executive council to Bengal was also scotched, as such a Council, it was felt, would work for disharmony, would be destructive of good administration and would by friction and distrust, infinitely increase the Lieutenant-Governor's anxieties instead of lessening them."[28] His advice to Government was to press forward with the scheme ignoring public opposition.

Lord Curzon had great faith in his powers of eloquence and persuasion and righteousness of his cause. "The row about the dismemberment of Eastern Bengal continues in every accent of agony and denunciation", he wrote to Lady Curzon, who was away in England, "but so far no argument". He now undertook a tour of Chittagong, Dacca and Mymensingh districts to explain to the people of East Bengal the solid benefits that would accrue to them from the scheme of partition and not be misled by agitators. While dwelling on the imperative need of relief to Bengal he told his Dacca audience: "When a proposal is put forward which would make Dacca the centre, and possibly the capital, of a new and self-sufficing administration, which must give to the people of these districts, by reason of their numerical strength and their superior culture, the preponderating voice in the province so created, which would invest the Mahommedans in Eastern Bengal with a unity which they have not enjoyed since the days of old Mussulman Viceroys and Kings, which must develop local interests and trade to a degree that is impossible so long as you remain the appanage of another administration—can it be that the people of these districts are to be advised by their leaders to sacrifice all these great advantages from fear? Do you mean to be so blind to your future as to repudiate the offer?"[29]

He suggested to his audience that it was possible to modify certain features of the scheme to make it acceptable to the people. "I will merely observe today that many of the objectors to the present scheme have themselves furnished the strongest reasons for a more ambitious scheme....If on examination we find such modifications leave Bengal much as it is, or does not substantially reduce its administrative burden, then it is clear that the case for a larger readjustment in the east of Bengal will be greatly enhanced....There are certain objections to the present restricted scheme, from which the larger is exempt. Such a scheme, I think, if put forward will be deserving of attentive consideration."

28. Ibbetson's Minute, 8 February, 1904, p. 7 of Home Dept., Public A, Progs., Nos. 155-167 of February, 1905.
29. Curzon's Dacca speech of 18 February, 1904.

Lord Curzon claimed to have overwhelmed his opponents with his speeches. "The native papers are knocked silly and are left gasping", he wrote to Lady Curzon. But his official biographer Ronaldshay had to admit that "his speeches in Eastern Bengal for all the felicity of their phrasing and for all the cogency of their reasoning, struck no responsive chord in the audiences to which they were addressed!"[30]

The Governor-General, in these speeches, gave an indication of how his mind was working. This was not lost on his subordinates who were working out the details of the scheme. Actually Sir Andrew Fraser, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, was present at the Council meeting on 14th February 1904 when the line of argument that the Governor General would follow in his tour of Eastern Bengal was laid down. Assam would not be of proper size and importance to have a Lieutenant-Governor, a Legislative Council, a Board of Revenue and High Court unless large transfers were effected from Bengal. The idea of partition had now become quite an obsession with Lord Curzon.

His Lordship had come to India with the avowed object of making British dominion permanent and felt great aversion to any demand for political right. For this reason, the Indian National Congress which represented the political aspirations of the educated classes was intensely disliked by him and he lost no opportunity of showing contempt for its demands and for its representatives. Bengal with it centre at Calcutta, was the stronghold of the Congress. "Calcutta", he wrote to Brodrick on 2 February 1905, "is the centre from which the Congress party is manipulated throughout the whole of Bengal and indeed the whole of India. Its best wirepullers and its most frothy orators all reside here. The perfection of their machinery is truly remarkable. They dominate public opinion in Calcutta, they affect the High Court. They frighten the local Government and they are not sometimes without serious influence upon the Government of India. The whole of their activity is directed to creating an agency so powerful that they may one day be able to force a weak government to give them what they desire." This citadel of the Congress had to be demolished to make India safe for British rule. The only way to do this according to Curzon's thinking was by dismembering Bengal and putting an apple of discord between the Hindus and Muslims. If the opportunity was now lost it might never come again. "The Bengalis", he told the State Secretary on the eve of his famous Dacca speech, "who like to think themselves a nation, and who dream of a future when the English will have been turned out and a Bengali Babu

30. Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. II. p. 325.

will be installed in Government House, Calcutta, of course bitterly resent the disruption that will be likely to interfere with the realization of this dream. If we are weak enough to yield to their clamour now we shall not be able to dismember or reduce Bengal again, and you will be cementing and solidifying on the eastern flank of India a force already formidable and certain to be a source of increasing trouble in future."[31]

So the territorial distribution was to be the panacea to save the British empire. It would divide the Bengali people, destroy the supremacy of Calcutta and the Bengali politicians and create in its place a number of rival centres—of Muslims at Dacca, of Biharis in Patna and of Oriyas in Orissa. The subordinate Government of Bengal in its reply not only accepted the scheme but suggested its enlargement.[32] It said that the proposal of Government of India amounted not to the transfer of a few districts to Assam, but to the creation of a new province to be called the "Eastern or North Eastern Provinces of India" with its capital at Dacca. Many objections had been raised against it, but most of the objections would be met if the new province was made sufficiently large to have a Lieutenant-Governor with a Legislative Council, a High Court, a Board of Revenue and an independent self-recruited service. It therefore suggested the transfer of the whole of Eastern Bengal comprising the Chittagong Division (3 districts), Dacca Division (4 districts of Dacca, Mymensingh, Faridpur and Backargunge) and the districts of Rangpur, Bogra and Pabna from northern Bengal to the new province. "In addition to these districts (of Chittagong and Dacca Divisions) the districts of Rangpur, Bogra and Pabna should also be transferred....Though technically belonging to North Bengal these three have more in common with Eastern Bengal and could be best administered from Dacca. They resemble them in the character of the population which is so largely Mohammedan and in the character of the country and of the rivers with their great chur formations."[33]

The new unit that would thus come into existence would no longer be an enlarged Assam, but an altogether new entity with an area of 93,833 square miles and a population of 26,260,562. There would be a shift in the centre of gravity of this new province. Shillong, the old capital of Assam, would serve merely as a hill-station. The glories of the historic city of Dacca would be revived. "It cannot but be", said the Bengal letter, "that if Dacca were restored to its original position as the capital of Eastern Bengal by being made

31. Curyon to Brodrick, 17 February 1904, *Curzon Papers.*
32. Home Dept., Public A. February, 1905, Progs., Nos. 155-167, Chief Secretary, Bengal, to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 6 April, 1904.
33. *Ibid.*

the capital of the new province, its interests would be greatly bene-
fitted. This which is true of the Dacca district is equally true of
the whole division and in almost equal degree of the three neigh-
bouring districts of the Rajshahi division. Faridpur, Backargunge
as well as Mymensingh ought to go with Dacca to the new province.
They have suffered with Dacca and Mymensingh from neglect in the
past. They were both carved out of the old district of Dacca. The
revenue system of the people as well as that of the Government,
is similar to that of the parent district. Their interests are inter-
laced; the Zamindars of one are the Zamindars of the other. . . .
Similarity of circumstances and community of interests bind to this
division the other three districts. . . .if the whole tract goes together
and if Dacca is made the capital, the opposition will be appeased."[34]

To the argument that Eastern and Western Bengal had taken
their stand together on social and political questions and followed
the same leaders, the Bengal Government made a disingenious re-
ply. "No doubt there is some truth in this; and it is not wholly in
the interests of the people of Eastern Bengal. Among the people
residing in the Dacca division and the three other districts there are
10,445,091 Mohammedans and 4,814,129 Hindus. Almost all Mo-
hammedans and a considerable minority of the Hindus have little
sympathy with the political life and work of Calcutta."[35] This find-
ing was of course based on the reading of the situation by Bengal's
Lieutenant-Governor Sir Andrew Fraser who never revealed his
sources.

The argument of unity of language applicable to Orissa, was
not acceptable in the case of Bengal, because of the political aspira-
tions of its people. The other arguments such as difficulties of so-
cial communion between castes divided by provincial boundaries,
lack of educational facilities, loss of employment to the educated
class, of business to Zamindars, were waived aside as being of no
account. Organic changes could not be contemplated because per-
sonal government was the best form of government for the natives
of this country and executive and legislative councils were barriers
between the rulers and their subjects, and so Bengal was to be divid-
ed and the administrative burden of its ruler was to be lightened.

The Government of India was happy that its proposals should
prove acceptable to the Government of the province which was go-
ing to be dismembered. But in its solicitude to ease the burden of
the Bengal Government, it raised the query, would the transfer
bring the much needed relief. "They observe", said their Secretary,

34. Bengal letter to Government of India, 6 April, 1904.
35. H. Risley, Secretary, Government of India, to the Chief Secretary, Bengal,
    13 September, 1904, Home Dept., Public A, February, 1905, Nos. 155-167,
    pp. 431-433.

"that the series of transfer (you suggest) will leave the province with a population of about 62½ millions, being practically the same as recorded in the census of 1872; while the area which under this scheme will continue to form part of Bengal contains those districts which attract a large proportion of immigrants from the congested tracts of the United Provinces....For this reason it has occurred to Government that the main object of the scheme of reconstruction would be more certainly attained and the scheme itself would be placed on a more permanent footing if the area transferred were to be enlarged by adding to it the districts of Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Malda, Jalpaiguri and the State of Cooch Behar."

The scheme had several advantages to recommend itself for acceptance. The effect of the extension would give substantial relief to Bengal by leaving it only 54 millions to deal with.

Under the enlarged proposals the new province would have a well-defined river boundary for almost the entire length of its western frontier. The earlier Bengal proposal severed in two the compact and characteristic tract of Northern Bengal, which would attract strong public protests. The new boundary suggested by the Government of India would obviate any unnatural dismemberment.

But the greatest advantage of the new proposal was that it would bring within the eastern province "the bulk of the characteristic Muhammedans of Bengal who form 78 per cent of the population in Rajshahi, 50 per cent in Dinajpur and 48 per cent in Malda. Not only would it give Dacca a central position in relation to the rest of new Province, but it would tend in course of time to confer on that city the special character of a provincial capital where Muhammedan interests would be strongly represented."[36]

There were other minor advantages. But the main effect would be, Bengal would thus have a manageable population of 5½ crores (crore=ten millions). The new province would be a viable unit of more than 3 crores.

The Bengal Government fell in step with the Government of India. The scheme, wrote the Chief Secretary,[37] would give the Government of Bengal substantial relief and would yet keep in the new province homogeneous areas together. "The proposals now made will tend to make the adjustment of areas more satisfactory in both these respects." "The boundary now proposed has this advantage that it really means a linguistic and ethnological as well as geographical boundary". Muslim interests would be well protected

36. *Ibid.*
37. Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal, to Secretary, Government of India, 26 September, 1904, Home Dept., Public A, February 1905, Progs. Nos. 155-167, pp. 443-445.

in the new province. "In the new province the Muhammedans will have power and influence which will enable them much more easily to attract attention to their necessities and their rights than in this province, where the Hindu population of these districts is so much more in touch with the influential Hindu elements in the other districts of Bengal." The public opposition was met with the strange argument" that the transfer of a larger area will tend to mitigate the feeling of change and to reconcile the people to the transfer."

The final proposals were hammered out in the Council of the Governor General. The Oriya speaking Ganjam and Vizagapatam tracts were left out as being too distant from Bengal and being mixed up with Telugu speaking population. Only Sambalpur and five Oriya States (Patna, Kalahandi, Sonpur, Bamra and Rairakhol) were to be added to Bengal on the west. On the eastern side it was to lose the Chittagong, Dacca and Rajshahi divisions excluding the district of Darjeeling and the Malda district. Bengal would thus be left with an area of 141,580 square miles and a population of fifty-four millions of which nine millions will be Muhammedans, (twenty-six millions Hindi-speaking Beharis and seven and a half millions Oriyos). The new province that was to rise in the east was to consist of Assam and of Eastern and Northern Bengal—comprising altogether an area of 106,540 square miles and a population of thirty one millions, of whom 18 millions would be Muhammedans. Though the new proposals differed much from the original ones, Government of India assured the State Secretary that they were a progressive advance towards the ideal which they always had in view, namely, to afford relief to the head of an overgrown province.

The formation of Chief Commissionerships for Behar and Orissa was rejected on the ground of their being too small for independent Commissions and of depriving Bengal of its best districts and of establishing a permanent obstacle to the expansion of Assam.

What hurt the Bengalis most was the proposed division of their province and the disruption of its historical, social and linguistic ties which would seriously interfere with the social, intellectual and material progress of the people. In both provinces they would be outnumbered; in the new province the division ran on communal lines giving the Muhammedans a preponderance over the Hindus with their strength of eighteen millions; in the old province of Bengal the Bengali-speaking population of seventeen millions would be overwhelmed by Hindi-speaking Beharis and Oriyas numbering thirty-seven millions. Bengal had undergone a transformation during the last century and as a result of social and economic regeneration, was beginning to show signs of political vitality. Imperial-

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ism abhors awakening among subject people and the Governor General was anxious to extinguish the spark of life Bengal was showing. "Bengal united is a power, Bengal divided will pull several different ways. That is what the Congress leaders feel; their apprehensions are perfectly correct and they form one of the great merits of the Scheme," noted the Viceroy's trusted Lieutenant Risley, "One of our main objects is to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule."[38] But the disclosure of this truth in a public despatch was undesirable. Therefore there was much prevarication and the case was argued in a round about way. "At present it is not too much to say that no public opinion in the proper sense of the term exists in Bengal. What passes for public opinion is manufactured to order by an unscrupulous organization from Calcutta. This organization is controlled by a clique of Congress wirepullers. Their constant effort (hitherto defeated mainly by the influence of the Dacca Nawab) has been to induce the leading Muhammedans to submit to their influence....From every point of view it is desirable to encourage the growth of local centres of opinion. *If the numerous preponderance of Bengali Hindus is reduced by dividing up the province,* it may be expected that such Centres will arise among the Muhammedans at Dacca, among the natives of Behar and among the Oriyas at Cuttack and that it will no longer be possible for a small knot of men at Calcutta to manipulate public opinion throughout the whole of Bengal."[39] Mere adjustment of administrative boundaries should present no obstacle to the development of healthy national sentiment.[40]

The State Secretary pointed out the inequity of the proposals.[41] "Of the speakers of Bengali who now number $41\frac{1}{2}$ millions under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, three-fifths or $24\frac{1}{2}$ millions, would be transferred to the new province, while in the reduced Bengal there would be left only two-fifths or 17 millions against 37 millions speaking other languages, chiefly Hindi and Oriya....I am disposed to think that in your discussion of the grounds for this feeling (of discontent) there is a tendency to undervalue the strength and substance of the sentiment by which it is inspired. That a large and upon the whole homogeneous community of $41\frac{1}{4}$ millions now concentrated under the Government of Calcutta should object to the transfer of three-fifths of their number to a new administration with a distant capital, involving the severance of old historical ties, and the breaking up of racial unity, appears to me in no way

38. Risley's Minute, 6 December, 1904; Home Dept., Public A, Progs. Nos. 155-167, February 1905, pp. 47-48.
39. *Ibid.,* Government of India's letter to State Secretary.
40. *Ibid.*
41. State Secretary to the Governor General, 9 June 1905, Home Dept., Public A, Progs. No. 163, of October 1905.

surprising." Thus while acknowledging the unreasonableness of the scheme put before him and suggesting other possible solutions to the problem of congested Bengal, the State Secretary gave his sanction to the partition of Bengal. Two minor changes recommended by him were, change in the name of the province and substitution of a Board of Revenue of two members for the proposed financial commissionership. Both the changes were accepted; instead of calling the reconstituted unit North-Eastern Provinces it was agreed to call it 'Eastern Bengal and Assam'.[42]

On the 19th July 1905 was issued the Resolution partitioning Bengal. "The territories now composing Bengal and Assam", said the Resolution, "will be divided into two compact and self-contained provinces, by far the largest constituents of each of which will be homogeneous in character, and which will possess clearly defined boundaries and be equipped with the complete resources of an advanced administration." Government claimed that the solution ultimately approved had not been arrived at in haste or until all other alternatives had been considered and rejected. It expressed hopes that new ties of association would grow obliterating old ones.[43]

On 1st September 1905 was issued the Proclamation to which the sanction of the King Emperor had been obtained. The Proclamation informed that the new province comprising Assam and the three divisions of old Bengal would come into existence from 16th day of October, 1905.

The issue of the Resolution of 19th July 1905 spread general consternation and gloom among the Bengali public. The original scheme of December 1903 had been severely mauled and condemned. The Indian National Congress which met at Madras in the same month condemned it in no uncertain terms. The Viceroy's speeches in East Bengal had failed to appease popular sentiment and the general meeting held at Calcutta on 18th March 1904 had informed Government that the proposed division of the Bengali nation was an immoral act stunting the progress of the people and nullifying government's declared policies.[44] Questions had been asked in the Bengal Legislative Council and the Supreme Council, which had been met with evasive replies. Sir Henry Cotton in his presidential address to the Congress in 1904 referred to the sinister aspect of the proposal which would shatter the unity and undermine the feelings of solidarity established among the members of the province of Bengal. A resolution was passed recording "emphatic protest against the proposals of the Government of India for the partition

42. Home Dept., Public A, Progs. Nos. 163-198, October 1905.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Home Dept., Public A, Progs. Nos. 155-167, February 1905, p. 525.

of Bengal in any manner whatsoever."[45]   When a Congress delega-
tion offered to meet the Viceroy in January 1905, he curtly refused
to meet the members.   Another public meeting held in Calcutta on
10th January under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Cotton denoun-
ced the idea of partition, expressed apprehension at news items ap-
pearing about partition in the *Pioneer* and the *Times*, and hoped
Government would take the public into confidence before taking
any measure on the vexed problem of realignment of the Bengal
province.   Since Government kept silent, it was presumed that the
proposals had been dropped.   Therefore when the news was flash-
ed on 7th July by Reuter that the Government proposals on the par-
tition had received the sanction of the Secretary of State for India
the public was taken by storm.   The Anglo-Indian paper, the *States-
man* of 8th July was constrained to remark: "The Government is
very serious to blame for the sustained secrecy and disingenious-
ness that has marked the progress of the affairs ever since Lord Cur-
zon's tour in East Bengal.   When the original proposals were with-
drawn no second scheme was submitted to public discussion or even
consultation among the leading men of the province.... The truth
is that the partition scheme has been matured in a manner which
suggests the processes of that "oriental diplomacy" which formed
the text of a famous discourse."[46]   It was later to add: "The objects
are briefly: first, to destroy the collective power of the Bengalee
people, secondly to overthrow the political ascendancy of Calcutta
and thirdly to foster in East Bengal the growth of a Mahommedan
power which will have the effect of keeping in check the rapidly
growing strength of the educated Hindu community."[47]

The London Times which always stood by the Government and
later became the strongest protagonist of the Partition, had in ear-
lier days the wisdom to see the problem in the right perspective.
It said, "as matters at present stand, Assam contains scarcely three
millions of Bengali-speaking population, whilst there are nearly 41
millions in Bengal who use that language.   The effect of the new
division of the province will be to split the Bengali population into
two great sections, the larger of which will be under the newly
constituted government, and to abolish the numerical preponderance
hitherto enjoyed by the race in the greatest Indian province.   The
centre of Bengali interests, prosperity and political aspirations is in
Calcutta, and it is impossible not to sympathize with the repugn-

45. *The Indian National Congress*, Part I, pp. 782-783 and Part II, p. 112 (Natesan, 1917).
46. This has reference to Lord Curzon's convocation address wherein he arraigned the Indian people with lack of truth. Cited by P.C. Ray in *The Case against the Break-up of Bengal*, (Calcutta, 1905).
47. *Ibid.*

ance of their leaders for an arrangement which thus divides them under two separate governments."[48]

Commenting on the demonstrations that followed the issue of the Resolution, the *Stanford* remarked, "Mr. Brodrick recognised, with proper frankness, the formidable character of the opposition which the measure has encountered both in Calcutta and in the region which it is proposed to sever....Much of the indignation was superficial....But below all the exaggeration was a solid core of sincere protest. Europeans joined with natives in dissenting from the scheme, and the most loyal and conservative Mahommedan noblemen condemned it as unreservedly as the least responsible editor of a vernacular broadsheet."

If the English Press was so critical of the measure, the Indian Press denounced it outright. In article after article they exposed the folly and appealed to Government to abandon it. Said the *Bengalee*, "We are in the gravest crisis in our history....The Partition of Bengal is the crowning monument of the most reactionary epoch in British rule. We believe its object is political rather than administrative. By dividing us the partition scheme threatens to break up the solidarity of our public opinion and to weaken that little influence we possess. From such a measure we can expect no good and against it we are resolved to wage a ceaseless war with the constitutional means at our disposal."[49]

A monster petition containing seventy thousand signatures was despatched to the Secretary of State requesting him to abandon the scheme.[50] In the Bengal Legislative Council on 18th August Bhupendra Nath Basu, A.C. Mazumdar and J.C. Chaudhari sought in vain to obtain information about the reasons which had prompted Government to enlarge and accept such an outrageous scheme. Meetings and processions in protest began to be held all over the province; as Government was obdurate, it was felt that retaliation in the form of boycott of British manufactures would alone bring it to heels. Daily conferences were held in the Indian Association Rooms as well as in the houses of the leading Zamindars to discuss ways and means of meeting the challenge thrown out by an unheeding Government and a programme of Boycott was approved of by the assembled members. To obtain popular sanction for the programme a public meeting was called at the Town Hall on August 7th, 1905. Delegates from the *mofussil* were invited to make the meeting as representative as possible.

The meeting was unique in the annals of the city. The historical hall had never witnessed before a gathering so vast, so represen-

48. The *Times*, August 1905.
49. The *Bengalee* of 8 July 1905.
50. P.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, Appendix. This is also mentioned in Parliamentary Debates.

tative and so enthusiastic in its existence of a hundred years. Crowds of students carrying banners began to surge in the direction of the Town Hall from early morning. So immense was the concourse of the people that instead of one, three simultaneous meetings had to be held. There were the titled men—Rajas and Maharajas and minor title-holders—big zamindars, professional men —the Barristers, pleaders from all districts of Bengal, professors, school masters, merchants, Marwaris and humble workers, men from all walks of life.

The Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandi of Cossim Bazar presided over the meeting. Said the venerable Maharaja: "The old emasculated province of which we shall be a part will suffer more than the newly formed province. Among the six divisions of the old province, there will be left only a division and a half containing a Bengali speaking population. We shall be in a hopeless minority. We shall be strangers in our own land. I dread the prospect, and the outlook fills me with anxiety as to the future of our race." Government had said that the Partition had been carried out in the interest of administrative efficiency. "Is efficiency possible under these conditions?"

Babu Ambika Charan Mazumdar exposed the reactionary nature of Government. Said he, "The trite old phrase "benevolent despotism" no longer applies to the violently reactionary policy which now governs the destinies of this country, and the "firm but respectful protests" in which we have so long indulged have served only to confirm a bureaucratic government in the disrespect for our voices, sentiments and opinions. That Government no longer makes any secret of its contempt of that "great sensation" that prevails in our public meetings and thus the most solemn protest that we could have made as a loyal subject people has been openly flouted on the present occasion....All these resources we have exhausted. What then are we to do now?—Are we now to surrender, or still to continue our opposition?" He felt that it was necessary to give a befitting reply to Government's hostile attitude, to fight reaction tooth and nail. "To surrender in the face of the present reactionary policy of an unsympathetic Government would be not only to surrender your present position, but would also be to sacrifice the hopes and aspirations of the younger generation and of the generations to come." A cry went out from his heart—"Are you prepared to live and die as hereditary outlanders in your own country? If not, you must summon all your energies and do all you can legitimately do to defend your just rights, to counteract the baneful influences that are now on the ascendant, to curb the spirit of reaction that is temporarily rampant in the counsels of the State." He then added,

"Then resolve to agitate, knock at the gate till the gate is open. We must agitate; but we must henceforth give that agitation a practical shape. We must now transfer our ideas from the sphere of thought to the sphere of action. We must practice self-respect in order to command respect from those who have learnt to treat us with contempt."

Four resolutions were passed at the meeting. The first called the Partition of the province as "unnecessary, arbitrary and unjust and being in deliberate disregard of the opinion of the entire Bengalee nation". It expressed the fear that it would interfere with the social, intellectual and industrial advancement of the Bengali people and requested the Secretary of State either to withdraw the orders or if partition be unavoidable, to modify them. The second resolution protested against the procedure adopted by Government. Government had shown utter disregard of the wishes of the people concerned about the measure it was adopting. The third resolution approved of the programme of boycott, of abstaining from the purchase of British manufactures so long as the partition resolution was not withdrawn.[51] For the first time in the political history of the country, there was talk of retaliatory action. The fourth resolution said the struggle would be continued to obtain withdrawal of the orders of Partition.

But public protests, processions, meetings, petitions and memorials were not going to deflect the government of Lord Curzon from the reckless course it was determined to adopt. On 16th October 1905 the division of Bengal was carried out and two new provinces were formed in both of which the progressive Hindu community of Bengal found itself overwhelmed and reduced to the position of a minority. The day was observed all over the province as a day of mourning. All business came to a standstill, no hearth was lit and no food was cooked. Thousands took a dip in the Ganges and tied round each other's wrist *Rakhi* to show their grim determination that Bengal would remain undivided in the hearts of its children and they would not rest until the injury done by the Government was obliterated.[52]

Nevinson pointed out the significance of this event: "When their petitions remained unanswered and their public meetings had no effect, when partition was carried out with despotic indifference to their feelings and interests, the Bengali people, and through them the vast majority of educated Indians, unwillingly became convinced that England no longer cared what happened to them or their

51. *All About Partition*, edited by P. Mukherjee (Calcutta, 1906).
52. Home Dept. Public A, Progs. June 1906, Nos. 169-186, also Banerjee, Surendra Nath, op. cit., pp. 213-214.

country provided they paid the revenue and kept quiet. It was a dangerous conviction to which they had been brought."[53]

Even Lord Morley, the State Secretary while declaring later in Parliament that "the redistribution of Bengal is now a settled fact," had to admit "that nothing was ever worse done so far as the disregard which was shown to the feeling and opinion of the people concerned. It is a fundamental principle in any Government in which Englishmen are concerned that you are bound to consult and take into consideration all the opinions and even the prejudices of those affected. When the scheme was in the first place exhibited to the people of India, it was exhibited bit by bit. The first proposal was in one direction, to take certain areas; and the second proposal was an extension and alteration of that. The final scheme, in which all these competitive efforts were summed up, was never submitted to the judgment of anybody in Bengal. The result of that was that we saw a storm raised by a plan which was never carried out, and the storm which was so raised raged with just as much violence against the final scheme when it came to be carried out. I think that is a matter which no defender of the late Government will really stand up for.[54]

As Curzon's Government went on adding one repressive measure after another to its armoury, disillusion began to dawn on the educated class which had shown childlike faith in the liberal professions of the Government. Bengal was then in the front rank of social and political advance. It had spearheaded the national movement through a number of associations and a very active press and had served as a model to other provinces. The Indian National Congress in which Bengali leaders took a prominent part had familiarized the country with the idea of the Government not only governing for the good of the subjects but also of being responsible to public opinion. Under Lord Curzon's regime all sound principles of government had been set at naught and popular wishes had been trampled upon. To weaken the national movement a dangerous experiment was being attempted of disrupting a well-knit province and of setting the Muhammedans against the Hindus. The calamity and sorrow that had befallen the people of Bengal, was shared all over India. Gokhale gave expression to it in his presidential address at Banaras in December 1905: "The question that is uppermost in the minds of us all at this moment is the Partition of Bengal A cruel wrong has been inflicted on our Bengalee brethren, and the whole country has been stirred to its deepest depths with sorrow and resentment, as had never been the case before....The fair pro-

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53. Henry W. Nevinson, *The New Spirit in India*, 1908.
54. Lord Morley's speech in Parliament on Mr. H. Robert's motion delivered on February 26, 1906.

vince has been dismembered to destroy the growing solidarity, check their national aspirations and weaken their power of cooperating for national ends, lessen the influence of their educated classes with their countrymen, and reduce the political importance of Calcutta. After this let no apologist of the late Viceroy pretend that the object of the partition was administrative convenience and not political repression!

"But even in things evil there is a soul of goodness, and the dark times, through which Bengal has passed and is passing, have not been without a message of bright hope for the future. The tremendous upheaval of popular feeling, which has taken place in Bengal in consequence of the partition, will constitute a landmark in the history of our national progress. For the first time since British rule began, all sections of the Indian community, without distinction of caste or creed, have been moved by a common impulse and without the stimulus of external pressure to act together in offering resistance to a common wrong. A wave of true national consciousness has swept over the Province, and at its touch old barriers have for the time, at any rate, been thrown down, personal jealousies have vanished, other controversies have been hushed! Bengal's heroic stand against the oppression of a harsh and uncontrolled bureaucracy has astonished and gratified all India, and her suffering have not been endured in vain, when they have helped to draw closer all parts of the country in sympathy and in aspiration. All India is at their back, and they will receive in their work that lies before them the cordial sympathy and assistance of the other Provinces."[55]

Surendranath Banerjee who was the heart and soul of the anti-partition movement in Bengal, speaking at the Calcutta Congress in 1906 warned the Government in no uncertain terms.[56] "With pain and resentment does the Bengali view the separation from himself of his kith and kin by the formation of a separate government.

The partition is in the nature of an outrage....A wrong has been committed and the Government itself has admitted it as such.

To perpetuate it and not to rectify it would be disastrous to the credit of the British rule. It will do more than anything else to shake the popular confidence—the bulwark of states and thrones —in the justice and integrity of the Government."

He told the Government that a change had come in the temper of the people:

55. Gokhale's Presidential Address, *The Indian National Congress* (Natesan, 1917), pp. 795-802.
56. *Speeches and Writings of Surendranath Banerjee* (Natesan) pp. 113-120.

"Our rulers must recognize the new spirit born of the huge blunder of the partition vibrating through our hearts, uplifting us to a higher plane of political effort.

We are no longer Orientals of the old type content to grovel under the weight of an overmastering fate. We are, orientals of the new School and we believe that nations by themselves are made."

He added, "A section of our people have lost all confidence in the utility of constitutional agitation and say they should have nothing to do with the Government." He told the gathered audience that much deeper issues than distribution of territory among two or three provinces were involved. "The question is this: whether the public opinion of a great province, expressed with singular unanimity and unequalled emphasis is to be flouted and treated with open and disguised contempt in a matter affecting the vital well-being of that province. Thus, in another form and in another garb, we have the old question of the assertion of popular opinion and the vindication of the principle of self-government. It is in this sense that the question appeals with convincing force to the heart and conscience of the whole of India."

The danger involved in the partition issue was clearly seen by Indian leaders. They saw in it an affront, a challenge to rising Indian nationhood and urged the need of following the agitation with practical action. Bipin Chandra Pal, the new leader of Bengal, told his countrymen: "It is only the growth of a mighty and moral power among the people themselves, raised up by systematic propagandist work here, among the masses, and by the organisation of the forces of the nation that will alone secure the reforms that we so surely want, and remove the grievances that we suffer under at present. To develop this inwardness in all our political and social movements has long been our supreme duty; it is the greatest need of the hour now in view of the mischievous measures that are being hatched by the Government for throttling our new-born national life in its cradle."[57]

The struggle round the Partition raged over another six years till it was annulled at the Delhi Durbar in December 1911. But the episode marks a landmark in our freedom struggle. The forces of nationalism were gathering momentum and seeking an outlet. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon sensing the danger, came out openly with

57. B.C. Pal, *Swadeshi and Swaraj*, pp. 43, 47.

the policy of divide and rule, of setting on community against the other for strengthening British imperialism. The people retaliated by forging new weapons of Swadeshi and Boycott to fight their foreign rulers. In the hands of Gandhiji these became mighty engines of a non-violent struggle. But the communal canker remained, leading to the Partition of the country when it became free.

WLADIMIR IVANOW (1886–1970)

By

A. A. A. FYZEE

In Mr. W. Ivanow, the Society has lost one of its most distinguished Fellows, a well-known Persian scholar and an internationally recognized authority on Ismailism. He was probably the last of the great European orientalists who spent the major part of their lives in our country. He died in Tehran on 19 June 1970.

Ivanow came to India in the early twenties after having served as a Persian interpreter to His Majesty's Government in Iran. He had previously studied Arabic, Persian and some Sanskrit at St. Petersburg, mainly under the Russian nobleman and Arabist Baron Victor von Rosen. Later he became Assistant Keeper of Oriental Manuscripts at the Oriental Museum of the Russian academy of Science at St. Petersburg. On the outbreak of the Revolution, he went to Central Asia looking for Islamic manuscripts; and at the end of the World War I in 1918, he entered into the service of the British Government, became a British Subject and never returned to Russia.

At about this time, Sir Ashutosh was looking for someone to catalogue the rich collection of manuscripts at the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. Ivanow applied for the job and was appointed cataloguer without the slightest fuss and in the well known dictatorial fashion of Sir Ashutosh.

One of the first publications of Ivanow in English was *Ismailitica (On the Recognition of the Imām)*, Persian text, with translation and Introduction, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. VIII, pages 1-76. Calcutta, 1922. But the work by which he will be remembered most is the *Concise Descriptive Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts at the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* 5 volumes, and one more on the Arabic manuscripts. It cannot be said that this work is without blemish; but he set a high standard and was a pioneer among Islamic cataloguers in the country. His work is truly a 'catalogue' and free from all pretentious paddings which unnecessarily 'adorn' many a similar production in India.

His life work, however, was his contribution to the study of Ismailism, both Indian and Persian. He published some 20 volumes

of texts, translations and monographs, and one invaluable *Guide to Ismaili Literature* (London, 1934), in which he surveyed the whole of the manuscript literature concerning both the branches of Ismailism, Eastern and Western in Arabic and Persian. He was the author of no less than 80 books and scientific papers till 1st September, 1952.[1] And it is very much to be regretted that I have no record of his later writings. He also wrote a characteristic, albeit pungent, pamphlet on his reminiscences as an orientalist; but as it is in Russian, it is unfortunately not available to those who cannot read that language.

Ivanow spoke and read Persian (*fārsī*) as a native; and he did much work on some of its dialects. He had also a competent reading knowledge of Arabic, and a smattering of Greek, Latin and Sanskrit. With French and German, he was perfectly familiar and could read and consult all the necessary works on Islam and his specialities.

He was a man of strong likes and dislikes, and hated pretentiousness and flattery. While he never suffered fools or pedants, he had a warm heart and a generous nature; and once he befriended a man, it was for life. For degrees, prizes, medals and academic honours, he had an inborn contempt; nevertheless he accepted a medal from His Majesty the Shah of Persia, and was a Fellow of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (as it then was). For the last ten years or so, he lived in the University Club, Tehran, as the guest of the University; and · throughout his working life after his service with the Asiatic Society, he was supported by Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah, the late Aga Khan, whose patronage resulted in the most remarkable advances in our present knowledge of early Ismailism.

Ivanow was a white Russian and had no sympathies till lately with the communist regime. He was exiled early in life, and spent most of his working life in India and Persia. He had no relatives except his mother whom he loved deeply, and who died a few years ago. He was the soul of selflessness and had an amazing capacity for hard and sustained work. Although some of his opinions may be open to doubt, Ivanow produced more solid research on Ismailism than any scholar now living, and in every branch of the subject of his choice, his work will endure and constitute the basis for further studies. Being an agnostic, his life was anguish-

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1. See the full bibliography in Farhad Daftry, "Bibliography of the publications of the Late W. Ivanow", *Islamic Culture*, 1971, XLV, 55-67 which was published after my article was written in 1970.

ed, and his heart had a strain of bitterness in it; let us hope that the peace denied to him in this life will be accorded to him by fate after his death. He came, lived his life 'like a lonely sea-bird on the wing', and went his way.

Bombay, 7-8-70.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
OF W. IVANOW

up to the 1st September 1952.

(This list contains only the titles of research works. Papers of popular character, reviews, translations, etc., are NOT included here. ASTERISK indicates that the work was published as a book, not an article in a periodical.

ABBREVIATIONS: ISS—Ismaili Society's Series of publications, Bombay; IRAS—Islamic Research Association's Series of publications, Bombay; JASB—Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta; JBBRAS—Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay; JRAS—Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London; REI—Revue des Etudes Islamiques, Paris; RMM—Revue du Monde Musulman, Paris).

1. *Ismailism.*

1. *Ismaili Manuscripts in the Asiatic Museum* (of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg.) Bulletin of the Russian Academy, 1917, pp. 359-386 (in Russian). Reviewed in *JRAS*, 1919, pp. 429-433, by Sir E. Denison Ross.
2. *Ismailitica.* Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. viii, 1922, pp. 1-76.
3. *An Ismailitic Pedigree. JASB*, 1922, pp. 403-406.
4. *Imam Ismail. JASB*, 1923, pp. 305-310.
5. *Alamut.* Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, London, 1931, pp. 38-45.
6. *An Ismailitic Work by Nasiru'd-din Tusi. JRAS*, 1931, pp. 527-654.
7. *An Ismail Interpretation of the Gulshani Raz. JBBRAS*, 1932, pp. 69-78.
8. *Notes sur l'Ummu'l-kitab* des Ismaeliens de l'Asie Centrale. *REI*, 1932, pp. 419-481 (in French).
9.* *A Guide to Ismaili Literature.* Prize Publication Fund Series of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1933, pp. xii, 138.
10.* *Diwan of Khaki Khorasani.* Pers. text with introd. *IRAS*, 1, 1933, pp. iv, 20, 128.
11.* *Two Early Ismaili Treatises.* (*Haft-babi* Baba Sayyid-na, *Matlubu'l-mu'minin* by Tusi). Pers. text, introd. *IRAS*, 2, 1933, pp. 9, 64.
12. * *True Meaning of Religion* (*Risala dar Haqiqati Din* by Shihabu'd-din Shah al-Husayni). Pers. text transl. *IRAS*, 3, 1933, pp. iii, 29, 37. Transl. into Arabic by Muhammad Ali, Lattaquie, Syria, 1935.
13.* *Kalami Pir* or *Haft Babi Sayyid Nasir.* Pers. text, transl., introd. *IRAS*, 4, 1935, pp. lxviii, 146, 117.
14. Articles in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam.* Leiden: Isma'iliya, Bohora, Khoja, Rashidu'd-din, etc.
15* *A Creed of the Fatimids.* Bombay, 1936, pp. viii, 82.
16. *Ummu'l-kitab.* Pers. text, introd. *Der Islam*, Berlin, 1936, pp. 1-32.
17. *The Sect of Imam-Shah in Gujrat. JBBRAS*, 1936, pp. 19-70.
18. *A Forgotten Branch of the Ismailis. JRAS*, 1938, pp. 57-79.
19. *Tombs of some Persian Ismaili Imaims. JBBRAS*, 1938, pp. 49-62.
20. *An Ismaili Ode in Praise of Fidawis. JBBRAS*, 1938, pp. 63-72.
21. *Some Ismaili Strongholds in Persia.* (Alamut and Girdkuh). *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad, 1938, pp. 383-396.
22. *Istitaru'l-Imam and Sirat Ja'far al-Hajib.* Arabic text. *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Egyptian University*, vol. iv (1936). Cairo, 1939, pp. 89-133.
23. *The Organisation of the Fatimid Propaganda. JBBRAS*, 1939, pp. 1-35.
24. *Early Shi'ite Movements. JBBRAS*, 1941, pp. 1-23.
25.* *The Rise of the Fatimids*, Ismaili Tradition concerning. *IRAS*, 10, 1942, pp. xxii, 340, 113 (texts).
26.* *The Alleged Founder of Ismailism. ISS* A-1, 1946, pp. xvi, 198.
27.* *Risala dar Haqiqat-i-Din*, by Shihabu'd-din Shah, Facsim. ed. of autogr. copy. *ISS* B-1, 1947, pp. xii, 3, 75. (cf. no. 12).
28.* *True Meaning of Religion.* (transl. of no. 27, cf. no. 12). *ISS* B-2, 1947, pp. xvi, 51.
29.* *Fasl dar Bayan-i Shinakht-i Imam.* Sec. ed. of no. 2 above. *ISS* B-3, 1949, pp. 26, 28.

30.* *On the Recognition of the Imam.* (transl. of no. 29, cf. no. 2). ISS B-4, 1947, pp. xii, 60.
31.* *Studies in Early Persian Ismailism.* ISS A-3, 1948, pp. xii, 202.
32. *Satpanth* (Indian Ismailism). "Collectanea I", ISS A-2, 1948, pp. 1-54.
33.* *Nasir-i Khusraw and Ismailism.* ISS B-5, 1948, pp. xii, 79.
34.* *"Six Chapters" of Nasir-i Khusraw* (Shish Fasl-i Sayyid Nasir). Pers. text and transl. ISS B-6, 1949, pp. xii, 111, 47 (text).
35. *Noms Bibliques dans la Mythologie Ismailienne. Journal Asiatique,* Paris, 1949, pp. 249-255 (in French).
36.* *Rawdatu't-Taslim* commonly called *Tasawwurat,* by Nasiru'd-din Tusi. Pers. text and transl. ISS A-4, 1950, pp. lxxxviii, 249, 160 (text).
37.* *Ismailism.* ISS B-7 (in the press).
38.* *Pandiyat-i Jawan-mardi.* ISS A-7 (in the press).

2. *Manuscripts, Persian and Arabic.*

39.* *Concise Descriptive Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the (old) Collections of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.* Calcutta, 1924 (1781 notes), pp. xxxviii, 934.
40.* *Concise Descriptive Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the Curzon Collection of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.* Calcutta, 1926 (756 notes), pp. xxviii, 582.
41.* *Concise Descriptive Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the Collections of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. First Supplement* (to both preceding Catalogues). Calcutta, 1927 (168 notes, numeration being continued from no. 40. Nos. 757-924), pp. xx, 160.
42.* *Concise Descriptive Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the Collections of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.* Second Supplement. Calcutta, 1928 (174 notes, Nos. 925-1098), pp. xxii, 138.
43.* *Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Collections of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.* Calcutta, 1939, pp. 641 (1200 notes).

3. *Philology.*

44. *Some Specimens of Persian Popular Poetry. Zapiski* of the Oriental Section of the Imp. Russian Archaeol. S-ty, vol. xxiii, 1915, pp. 33-60 (*in Russian*).
45. *Tabaqat of Ansari in the Old Language of Herat. JRAS,* 1923, pp. 1-34 and 337-382.
46. *Some Poems in the Sabzawari Dialect. JRAS,* 1927, pp. 1-41.
47. *Rustic Poetry in the Dialect of Khorasan, JASB,* 1925, pp. 233-313.
48. *Persian as spoken in Birjand. JASB,* 1928, pp. 235-351.
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RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS*

By

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Russell's contribution to the subject of, foundations of mathematics and symbolic logic alone, it is commonly accepted, would have secured him recognition as an important philosopher of the twentieth century. *The Principles of Mathematics,* published in the year 1903, allotted to Mathematical Philosophy a distinct place on the map of knowledge. The impact of the work was due as much to its content as to its style of presentation. Russell says of himself, "I had when I was younger—perhaps I still have—an almost unbelievable optimism as to the finality of my own theories".[1] Whether Russell writes on abstruse mathematical or philosophical issues or on topical questions, he easily transmits this tone of self-assurance to the readers, evoking a ready acceptance of his own way of thinking. The thesis presented in his first work that Pure logic is Pure Mathematics and Pure Mathematics is Pure Logic, to put it a bit rhetorically, won many followers forthwith. The monumental work, *Principia Mathematica* written in collaboration with Whitehead and published during the years 1910-1913, executed a programme outlined in the earlier work, of erecting the entire edifice of mathematics as a science through a logical apparatus, symbolically expressed. The short work, '*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*', published in 1919, explains the results of the greater work in a language that does not demand a mastery of logical symbolism. While in the two bigger and earlier works, Russell was concerned more with establishing his thesis, in the later work he had the leisure to explain how the inquiry begins at all.

Russell presents his principles of Mathematics in the assurance that mathematics now, "by reducing the whole of its propositions to certain fundamental notions of logic" is able to answer the philosopher's question, what do the propositions of mathematics really mean? In the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy,* Russell makes a point of distinguishing between mathematical philosophy and the philosophy of Mathematics. The distinction is made in the Kantian vein with a Hegelian touch lurking in the

* Paper read at the Seminar on 'The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell' organised by the University of Bombay in October 1970.
1. B. Russell—*My Philosophical Development* p. 41.—1959 second impression.

background. Philosophy is assumed to be speculative in character and science is considered to be an outgrowth and a turning away from the speculative, to the analytic, constructive venture. For this reason, it is suggested that problems like infinity and continuity get transferred to mathematics from the field of philosophy. Philosophy of Mathematics, though not condemned, as in the *Principles*, "as a controversial, obscure and unprogressive branch of philosophy," is held to belong to the twilight region on the frontier of knowledge, as to which comparative certainty is not yet attained".[2] Russel refuses to draw a rigid line of demarcation between mathematics and mathematical philosophy. Mathematical philosophy is, in the idiom of Ryle, a way of doing mathematics. Instead of following the usual method of constructing a system of truths of increasing complexity, "it proceeds by analysing, to greater and greater abstractness and logical simplicity;".... to asking "what more general ideas and principles can be found, in terms of which what was our starting-point can be defined or deduced."[3] "The distinction between mathematics and mathematical philosophy depends merely upon the interest inspiring the research; yet, mathematical philosophy is expected "to result in the acquisition of fresh insight, new powers, and the means of reaching whole new mathematical subjects by adopting fresh lines of advance after our backward journey".[4]

Russell reserved the name 'mathematical philosophy' for what he believed and thought under the influence of Hegel and spoke of his enlightened views on the subject under the title 'Philosophy of Mathematics'. Later thinkers who did not have to outgrow the speculative pressures of Hegel, use either name for an inquiry into the foundations of Mathematics. Russell's Mathematical Philosophy hinges on the three notions of Numbers, Descriptions and Classes.

In Mathematical Philosophy to-day, Russell's doctrine of numbers is paired off with that of Frege as the two of them agree in all essentials. However, Frege's contribution towards reducing arithmetic to logic was not known to Russell. The arithmetising of mathematics is the first stage in Mathematical Philosophy. Russell was led to take this first step after a wrong start at a very early stage on two different points. He explained the possibility of geometry on Kantian lines by presuming space to have the requisite properties. A little later he had followed Hegel in considering Quantity as only a category of measurement and reducing Number to quantity. The developments in physics due to Einstein would in any case have compelled the rejection of the first view. In Rus-

2. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Ed. 1948 (Reprint) p. 2.
3. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Ed. 1948 (Reprint) p. 2.
4. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p. 2.

sell's own case enlightenment came in the first place through his own efforts. It was an investigation into the philosophy of Dynamics that led him to realise that deduction in mathematics depends merely on hypothetical objects having certain general characteristics, which are expressible in terms of logical concepts only.

Russell's reflection on the nature of mathematical propositions were furthered by Moore's separation of propositions from the tennous sinews with judgement, i.e. the judging mind, on the one hand and by the stricter analysis of logical forms of propositions by Peano on the other. The arithemetisation of Pure Mathematics, though an important achievement, is secured for Russell by the recognition of the fact that mathematical propositions contain variables, and that in Pure Mathematics the variables are not restricted to any particular class. Numbers in arithmetic are variables with an absolutely unrestricted field.

The second step in the philosophy of Mathematics, the reducing of arithmetic to logic was Russell's own achievement, although there is a remarkable similarity between Frege's analysis and his. Basically 'Number' stands for the natural numbers 1, 2, 3.... and the untutored mind associates the meaning of number with the process of counting. The empiricist theory of numbers relies on this experience. But 'zero' and 'one' cannot be thus accounted for. In Peano's analysis, the entire theory of natural numbers is reduced to three primitive ideas and five primitive propositions, regarding them. Peano accepts 'o' and 'number' as primitive ideas in addition to 'successor'. The main drawback of Peano's theory according to Russell is, "that the primitive ideas must be understood independently of the axioms, with the result that the system remains consistent, whatever interpretation is given to the primitive notions."[5] Russell's objection to formalisation in general and to Peano's view in particular appears on first sight to be almost non-logical in character. Russell insists that "our numbers must be such as can be used for counting common objects."[6] He admits that though the application of number to empirical material forms no part of either logic or arithmetic, "a theory which makes it a priori impossible can not be right."[7] The empiricist edge of the insistence is taken off by an amplification. "It is necessary that numbers should have a definite meaning, not merely that they should have certain formal properties. In other words the axiomatic theory must provide grounds to know whether there are any sets satisfying the axioms."[8]

5. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 1948 (Reprint), p. 10.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

Russell's insistence that numbers must have a definite meaning in the sense of a definite application is logical in character and may be traced to the influence of more than one factor. Considering the shortness of the period between his Hegelian background and the publication of his *Principles of Mathematics*, it could be understood as voicing the demand of rationalist logic in general, specified however in the central line of thought running through Socrates to Aristotle, viz. A concept must determine the instances of itself, logically, deductively,—a demand underlying all metaphysics. What might have weighed with Russell more explicitly is the distinction, he learnt from Peano, that between the singular and the general proposition. The possibility of the singular proposition is the core of the analysis of the general proposition. Therefore Russell opts for a theory of numbers which makes "their connection with the actual world of countable objects intelligible." Russell's contention here is his way of insisting that truth and assertion are central notions in logic and ought to remain so in the logicising of mathematics. On this point too, Frege and Russell think alike. Frege in fact considers 'truth' as an indefinable of the system. For not realising that assertion and truth are fundamental notions, Boole's system could not deal satisfactorily with propositions. By the eighth postulate (p) $p=(p=1)$, an element p is said to be identical with an elementary proposition relating that element to another. For the building up of a logical system "an element can never be identified with a proposition involving that same element."[9] By making the notion of assertion central to his system, Russell perhaps satisfies in his own way, Kant's demand that all knowledge including mathematical knowledge must be synthetic.

The theory of cardinal numbers is Russell's characteristic contribution to the subject. For any theory of numbers it is not enough that a method be devised of symbolising the various types of numbers in order to facilitate the building up of a deductive system. The method of postulation of indefinables as followed by Peano, only avoids the problem. In both these methods, number is accepted as a specifically mathematical entity. Such a belief is associated with a further contention that number is a genus of which the various types of numbers are species. For Mathematical Philosophy Number is a notion, purely logical in character, and the various types of number are the extensions of the idea. Russell alone, with the exception of Frege, recognised that cardinals are the simple notions from which the more complex notions of numbers can be constructed.

Russell defines 'number' by employing only the logical terms. For defining 'number' Russell adopts the method of mathematical

9. *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic*—Susan Langer 1952, p. 290.

definition, which for him is nominal definition. The requirements of a nominal definition are: The definition is relative to a set of notions which in this case must be purely logical in character. The term to be defined must be defined uniquely by relation to some of these notions and this relation must itself be one of those notions. The very method of definition rules out certain views like, number is an entity or a concept of any kind; and it also rules out the philosophical definition, as well as the definiton by abstraction. For Russell the definition of number is the definition of any number, but not of the class of numbers. The definition of number must apply to any number in the sense that it must be true of an arbitrary number. In this sense it must be true of a specific cardinal number. Each cardinal number is a unique value of a variable, not just an instance of a concept.

Frege puts very explicitly what Russell describes as the grammar of the inquiry. Numbers, Frege points out, appear in language as adjectives and attributes in much the same way as do 'hard', 'heavy', 'red' etc., which denote properties of external objects. "Number", says Russell, "is what is characteristic of numbers, as man is what is characteristic of men."[10] A number is the characteristic of a plurality, not an instance of a plurality.

The concept of plurality is the first requisite for the definition of number. Hence it is that Russell considers his discarding of monism for a belief in pluralism under the influence of Moore, as an important step in his philosophical development. Russell emphasises the distinction between number and plurality whereas Frege emphasises the distinction between, 'red', 'hard' etc. and 'number' as attributes. Number is not an attribute obtained by abstraction from external objects. Number is an objective aspect of a plurality. Plurality, collection and other equivalent words, are interpreted by the notion of class. Russell established the logical character of the notion of class later on in his theory of descriptions. For the definition of number the logical character of the notion is assumed. Number is a way of characterising classes or pluralities of a specific value; all couples are characterised by 2, all trios by 3 and so on. Any particular pair is an instance of the class of couples, and any particular trio an instance of the class of trios. Each plurality or a group is itself a class and also an instance of a class. The notion of class occurs twice in considering a plurality. The relation between the different instances of a class e.g. of trios must be interpreted logically too. The relation between the instances of a class, is a relation between different classes. Russell interprets this relation by the notion of similarity, a notion rooted in the very

10. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 11, (Reprint 1948).

notion of the instances of class. Russell interprets similarity logically, as one to one correspondance, taking a cue from Cantor, thus freeing it from the empiricists' impasse. The more fundamental point is to free the notion of class from the empiricist, abstractionist view of common property. Though number is spoken of as a characteristic, it is a characteristic of classes, not of things. A thing is not an instance of a property. A property is only exemplified in a thing. Things exemplifying a property form a group only on the basis of the experience of the common property. Frege points out that the property experienced would be the same, whereas the number of a plurality would vary according as the plurality is viewed as. The name of the plurality can be changed without changing the extension of the group. The relation of the exemplifications to the common property is of approximation. Instantiation of a concept is a relation of a different order, based on predication. Hence number has nothing to do with the process of counting; rather the process depends on the notion of numbers. The notion of similarity lends itself to interpretation as common property. Peano interprets number merely as common property between similar classes. According to Russell, Peano's method fails in the important requirement of definition viz. only one object must satisfy the definition. Number thus must be defined by the notion of class, similarity serving to bring the various instances together for the same predicate. Russell makes a certain concession to Peano; "If we define number as the class concept, not the class, a number is really defined as a common property of a set of similar classes and of nothing else."[11] Mathematically, for Russell, "a number is nothing but a class of similar classes."[12] "A number is anything which is the number of same class."

This definition of Number is adequate to the definition of 'zero' and 'one', notions which uptill now had to be accepted as indefinables, and in terms of which the rest of arithmetic was explained. Russell explains the various types of numbers, like rational numbers, real numbers, complex numbers as extensions of the notion of a number by the same method of logical construction. He does away with another hurdle in arithmetical theory viz. mathematical induction, by accepting it as a definition rather than a principle. This method removes the paradoxical character of infinity, where Russell acknowledges Cantor as the pioneer. The rule of mathematical induction is used to distinguish between finite and infinite numbers.

The theory of Descriptions, rated by Morris Weitz, as "probably the most successful attempt at semantical analysis, since Plato's

11. *Principles of Maths*, 1950 (Reprint) p. 115.
12. Principles of Mathematics 1950 (Reprint) p. 116.

explication of the negative judgment in the sophist,"[13] is a further requirement for establishing the logical character of numbers. A theory of classes, on the lines of the theory of numbers is the goal of the theory of Descriptions. It begins in the *Principles of Mathematics* as the theory of 'Denoting.' Russell shifts 'denoting' from the psychological act of our pointing out or indicating things to a logical function. The notions of 'all' 'every' 'any' 'a', 'some', fundamental to the notions of variables are of vital importance to the philosophy of mathematics. Analysis of these notions was not attempted in logic so far.

Russell obtains the notion of denoting, "by a kind of logical genesis from subject-predicate propositions."[14] He assumes almost in the traditional fashion that a subject-predicate proposition is 'about' a term. A term is an object of thought which is one and has being. Terms are also spoken about as constituents entering propositions. Russell admits terms of two kinds, viz. things and concepts. Things are terms indicated by proper names, and concepts are terms indicated by all other kinds of words. Concepts are distinguished as predicates, indicated by adjectives and relations, indicated by verbs. According to Russell "descriptions are possible" means, we are able, by the employment of concepts, to designate a thing (which is not a concept). This possibility rests upon a logical relation between some concepts and some terms, in virtue of which such concepts inherently and logically denote such terms. "A concept denotes when it occurs in a proposition; the proposition is not about the concept, but about a term connected in a certain peculiar way with the concept." "I met a man" is not about the concept 'man', but about an individual with a bank account etc."[15]

The peculiar relation between the concept and the term that Russell speaks about is the subject-predicate relation which sustains every proposition, but of which no further analysis is attempted except in Idealistic logic. Russell means only to emphasise it as one of the indefinables, or intuitive notions of logic. What matters for Russell is the new interpretation he gives of the notions of 'a' 'any', 'every' 'some', 'all', 'the', which in traditional logic, were just presumed as indicating the scope of the subject. If things are accepted as the ultimate terms in propositions, as was explicitly done in the theory of atomic propositions, the use of 'all', 'every', 'some', 'any', 'a', 'the', amounts to a construction of complex terms so to speak. The complex terms cannot be denoted directly, but can only be constructed through predicates. Russell gives an elaborate ana-

13. Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Schil pp. 1946.
14. Principles of Mathematics 1950 (Reprint) p. 54.
15. Principles of Mathematics 1950 (Reprint) p. 53.

lysis in the Principles, to show how each of these is a distinct notion and the objects denoted by them are distinct.

For the theory of denoting as presented in the *Principles of Mathematics*, the notion of 'thing' is assumed as the basis of the subject-predicate relation and as defining existence. The thing is more fundamental than the logical subject-predicate relation. Russell was still under the influence of the logic of concepts, although he had advanced beyond both Meinong and Frege. The thing or the object is brought into an intrinsic relation with the concept and further the notion of proposition and truth are seen to be akin. Yet the determination of existence is not made a function of proposi-. tions. Russell naturally has to revise his earlier view, which he does in his famous article 'On Denoting' published in The *Mind* of 1905. In this article the notion of the variable is made fundamental, which means the primary emphasis is, unlike in the earlier theory, on predication. The variable is a constituent, a gap which makes a predication articulate. Predication is purely logical in character, which determines the range of its subjects by virtue of itself, rather than by virtue of the existing things. Hence the notion '(x) is always true' is taken as ultimate and indefinable where '(x)' is a propositional function. The fundamental character of predication is the idea underlying the propositional function. When this idea is applied to propositions in which there occur a proper name and a description, we get Russell's well-known theory of descriptions.

"The author of Waverley" was Scotch" means: (1) at least one person wrote Weverley, (2) at most one person wrote Waverley. (3) whoever wrote Waverley was Scotch." Further all these three propositions are implied by the original and, the three together imply it. That a descriptive phrase like 'The king of France' cannot have a meaning in isolation but is only defined in certain 'contexts' is a new insight in the matter. The theory of descriptions means that a description does not identify except through predication. Hence, it appears to me that such examples which Moore takes e.g. "The heart pumps blood into the arteries," is not of the same type as the "The author of Waverley was Scotch". No identification is involved here. Further, description, by Russell''s logic, can never be a complete symbol in spite of the fact that it may be so used. Russell's theory of descriptions, after Occam's razor, is a sure method of eliminating entities, and Quine followed it up precisely in transforming names into values of variables.

For mathematical philosophy the importance of the theory of descriptions lies in the analysis of the notion of class. Russell's theory of classes runs through the course of development similar to that of the theory of descriptions. He begins by considering classes

as entities, and distinguished between the class as many and the class as one, the former as the concept of a class and the latter as a class-concept, a distinction which Peano had not made. The class as many is a complex term defined extensionally by the class concept being used as a denoting concept. Such a view was faced with difficulties in respect of the null-class and the unit class. The unit class demands a classification of the subject-predicate relation, the class membership relation and the class-inclusion relation, besides the dissolution of a contradiction inherent in it. Russell, of necessity, modifies his earlier doctrine. Any definition of class must account for the null-class; it must also explain how a class which has only one member is not identical with that one member. Russell makes the method of propositional functions central to his definition of class. The subject-predicate and class-membership relations are brought on par in so far as both are kept distinct from the class-inclusion relation. The class-inclusion relation is reduced to implication within the same framework. Thus the concept becomes an incomplete symbol and classes themselves the values satisfying the functions. Classes are brought in line with numbers. As numbers are not Platonic archetypes, classes need not "be regarded as part of the ultimate furniture of the world".[16] They are construed by logical constructions only.

Yet right from the days of the *Principles*, Russell felt that there was something amiss in the notion of class, since he could not pin down a concept which would make us accept the notion of class as indefinable. The same dissatisfaction remains up to the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. "The theory of classes is less complete than the theory of descriptions."[17] Even in an ideal language, descriptions would not be able to dispense with names for all particulars. But classes need not be represented by undefined symbols. They can be defined by some propositional functions, but need not be identified with a propositional function. Russell himself would prefer to take only an agnostic position as regards classes. He refuses to assert that there are classes, as much as, to say dogmatically that there are not.

For, the logical analysis of classes cannot fulfil the most difficult condition: that it must be possible to make propositions about all the classes that are composed of individuals or about all the classes that are composed of objects of one logical 'type'. Such propositions are verbally assertible, yet in respect of their meaning, they lead to contradiction or paradoxical results. e.g. Normally a class is not a member of itself, as mankind is not man; yet

16. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy 1948 (Reprint) p. 182.
17. *Ibid.* p. 182.

when we speak of 'all classes, which are not members of themselves paradoxical conclusions follow. If it is said that this class is a members of itself, it implies its contradictory that it is not a member of itself; if it is said that it is not a member of itself it implies the contradictory that it is a member of itself. Such contradictions arise in respect of the greatest ordinal number, the greatest cardinal number, and some others. Russell explains the occurrence of the paradox as due to two reasons, one purely logical and the other which could be considered as epistemological.

The epistemological reason is the failure to distinguish between the truth and the significance of a proposition. Russell lays down rules for determining the significance of propositions or of the range of propositional functions as the classes of things are not things. If a class of things is spoken of as a thing it becomes an illegitimate totality, and the proposition containing such a term, a meaningless proposition. In other words there is to be a range of values for a proposition function beyond which it becomes nonsense. These considerations constitute what is called the simple theory of types, and the simple theory of types is commonly accepted.

But the matter does not end here. Problems arise for mathematical philosophy out of what appeared to begin with as improvement on traditional logic, viz. the distinction, or rather the difference in order between the singular and the general proposition. The general proposition in respect of individuals is not elementary and when the general proposition is asserted in respect of classes or properties or functions it needs the concept of order in addition to the concept of type to explain its meaning or range of significance. If it is not done, paradoxes arise. The theory of types introducing the concept of order also, goes as the ramified theory. The dilemma is: If a concept denotes, it determines the value of a variable; but the same predicative function, cannot be considered as denoting a predicative function for the reason that a concept is never a complete symbol. A function is or is not true for all values of a variable, but a thing like, "all values of a function" is an illegitimate totality. The linguistic use of such concepts becomes meaningful only by distinguishing within the proposition, the order to which the variable belongs and the higher order to which the proposition belongs.

The ramified theory of types has rather disastrous consequences for mathematics. Russell was aware of these consequences and tried to overcome them by the Axiom of Infinity and the Axiom of Reducibility. Those interested in the purely formal character of mathematics have overcome the necessity of using these non-logical axioms in different ways. From the logico-philosophical point of

view Ramsay has shown how the ramified theory can be dispensed with by using the technique of truth—functions. The method of truth-function requires that propositions are considered in respect of their truth-values only, because of which the distinction between the range of significance and truth becomes irrelevant.   Russell himself accepted the criticism of Ramsay, and gives a modified version of it in terms of symbols, instead of functions.

Yet the vicious-circle principle to which Russell traces these paradoxes cannot be explained away: Russell says, "No function can have among its values anything which presupposes the function; for, if it had, we could not regard the objects ambiguously denoted by the function as definite until the function itself was definite, while conversely, the function cannot be definite until its values are definite.   A function is what ambiguously denotes some one of a certain totality, namely the values of the function, hence this totality cannot contain any members which involve the function without leading to an illegitimate totality."

It can be conceded that the vicious circle principle is difficult to apply.   But Kneale says it is "dubious", for "it does not rule out the need for unlimited generality."   According to Kneale even for the statement of the theory of types, unlimited generality is in fact required; "for wors like; 'function', 'entity', 'type' must always remain free from type distinctions."   The point Kneale makes is central to logic, for it is presupposed in the formal or symbolic treatment of such notions.   But the distinction of type between individuals on the one hand and concepts, predicative functions, and functions of a higher order based on the elementary functions of individuals, on the other does not admit of a merely symbolic treatment. This distinction cannot be made a matter of syntax only, although syntactical function is one of the ways in which the distinction is explained.   There are hybrid forms so to speak about which common-sense makes no mistake.   To take Kneale's own   example,[19] 'Plato' and '....is wise' are syntactically different. but not 'Plato' and 'Wisdom'; yet all significant remarks about Plato are not translatable into remarks about wisdom.   Therefore a type needs to be defined in terms of something which accounts for a parallelism between ranges of significance without being reducible to it.   Kneale feels Russell assumes that the attribute belongs to a higher type than the entities which are characterised by it.   Strictly speaking Russell's vicious-circle principle assumes the contrary too. The mutual determination in respect of definiteness that Russell speaks of, between an entity and the function, would cease to appear vici-

18. Kneale—Development of Logic 1962 p. 666.
19. Ibid p. 670.
19. Kneale—Development of Logic 1962, p. 671.

ous if it is seen to turn upon the play of identity. Ordinary language except in a mischievous mood, would not assert of 'Wisdom' all the characteristics it would assert of 'Plato', for it grasps that identity marks Plato in a sense in which it does not delineate wisdom. This sense calls for the meaning of the word 'logical' in a more fundamental sense—as that which sustains the proposition. This sense can justifiably be called 'fundamental' for it is admitted all round that all significant discourse turns upon a knowledge of differences of types. The basic type differences are crystallised in the atomic propositions. Ordinary language lets the atomic propositions speak for themselves and is not bewildered by their variegated forms. The philosopher-cum-formalist forces them through a pattern and is up against paradoxes. The atomic proposition turns upon a reference to the individual. The basic problem for logic is how to render the individual logically?

Only naive empiricism would expect the individual to stand by itself as a beacon light. Rationalism turns the individual into an adjective and formalisation makes of it a variable. Yet both rationalism and formalisation require the individual to play a double role as both the identical and the identified. In the Aristotelian scheme the individual is the seat of identity in the subject-predicate form while it comes in for the subsidiary role of being identified in the class-inclusion proposition. In the formalised systems the individual as a variable is rendered definite through its function, while it lends significance to the function as an individual constant; as an existent. Aristotle did not separate the two modes of assertion. His metaphysics allows him to translate the one into the other without the intrusion of the empirical. For Russell, the individual as a variable and the individual as an existent belong to different orders, the former merely defining significance, and the latter speaking for truth. Significance is distinguished from the non-sensical only by its possible reference to truth. Hence Russell in his system postulates the two non-logical truths, the Axiom of Reducibility and the Axiom of Infinity.

For Russell these two axioms are the support for his logicism. These two axioms cannot be made to shed their empirical character by using symbolic devices, for they depend upon making the notion of 'thing' central to knowledge and to logic. All knowledge is ultimately reducible to a knowledge of things and all predication is about things. Hence Russell's contention that things must stand behind every concept. But things can be known only by acquaintance and this empirical context would haunt any and every logical construction based on it.

To avoid the dead-end to logicism it is vital to urge that things

or entities are not isolated points or sheer existents around which the logical panorama unfolds. They are part of the logical activity. Kant puts his finger on the logical in the empirical by placing the object of knowledge within the framework of judgement. He overcomes the hurdle of knowledge being 'about' the object but his analysis remains within the object-framework. After Kant, Wittgenstein for the first time links up the logical proposition with its proper counterpart, the fact. Propositions delineate facts and facts are the patterns of identity determinable within the situation concerned.

This identity is not substantive only as in the logical subject of the proposition. That syntax alone is not an adequate ground for differentiating types is the basic logical difficulty. There is the propositional identity with its counterpart in the fact. This identity belongs to the proposition and to the fact taken as a whole. The claim to truth in the logical is not by an extra-logical reference to a bare existent, but by this mutual translatibility between fact and proposition. The same allows for the translatibility of one propositional form into another, which is the very basis of formalism. Even atomic propositions are not invincible in their primitive forms. If atomic propositions are kept as static pockets of truth, they get buried under a metaphysics. If they are not to be made active parties to the truth-systems they are to be rendered by functions. As noticed already, the functional rendering of atomic propositions comes up against the problem of individuality.

The logical rendering of individuality must combine two things, the unity of thought, or expression, or meaning, that is the proposition and the claim to truth. Only the notion of propositional identity can combine these two features that mark every proposition. Every in formalisation, the claim to truth is not irrespective totally of the unity of thought. As Ramsey put it, "any analysis of judgement or proposition must explain 'how believing 'p' is the same as disbelieving 'not-p'."[20] Belief and disbelief are interpreted in the English traditions as attitudes exercised upon the proposition. But the claim to truth is a commitment involved in the very formulation of the proposition. The psychological attitudes of belief and disbelief reflect the claim but cannot express or carry the commitment. The commitment is individual and goes with every affirmation and denial uniquely. Wittgenstein's position that propositional forms can only be 'shown' and 'not be spoken of', only emphasises the irreducibility of the commitment but not its raison d'etre. This must in some way be found in the activity of thought.

Thus the logical rendering of individuality is bound up with the

20. Ramsey—Foundation p. 147.

notion of propositional identity and propositional identity demands the activity of thought as the very condition of individuality. Commonsense and ordinary language permit free scope for thought in determining the level and character of assertion. Abstract formalisation disallows the free movement and comes up against paradoxes not inherent in the situation. If logic can show how propositional identity operates in determining individuality, the paradoxes would disappear.

DYNAMICS OF THE BAKHAR LITERATURE.*

By

R. V. HERWADKAR

The main purpose of the present inquiry is to delve into the chronicles of Maratha History popularly called Bakhars for discovering, if possible, the dynamics or the operating forces that have been responsible for the production of this specific form of Marathi Literature. The student of history is familiar with the fact that the Bakhars are an important source of Maratha History, but he may not be aware at the same time of the fact that they form an important branch of literature of the period. Depicting the feelings of the time, they are an example of powerful emotive prose. The principal aim of the authors of the Bakhars was imaginative reconstruction of the historical events. This involved selection and had to be presented as communication. Thus they fulfilled the cardinal conditions of literature as an art. The present investigation is based on the accepted theories about the minds of the creative writers and, in a way, therefore, it is an analysis of the minds of the chroniclers, with reference to the four fundamental elements of literature, namely, The Outer, The Inner, Energy and Balance.[1]

THE OUTER

The Outer is the objective attitude of the mind of the individual author. This element has a wide range of meaning and application. It is closely related to the environment, or the reality, which reacts on man and is expressed in his thoughts and conduct. As it is dominant in biography, so it is dominant in history, for the latter records facts. The past is a fact. So it is interested in the past. Likewise it is interested in the present or the contemporary events, which are also facts. The Outer determines the theme of the writing and at times the tempo of a writer. Seriousness and gravity are its virtues. Being objective, it is straightforward. Prose is the natural medium of the Outer. Being the language of exact thinking, it is the language of exact description also.

Every historical writing is an artistic process of interpreting facts. While dealing with facts as an historian, the Bakhar writer examines and connects them together. In a sense, they intensely

vibrate in his mind, which is ultimately relieved in his writing. This is, of course, subject to the objective attitude of the historian which is mainly responsible for his respect for tradition and convention.

Descriptions of persons, things and events in the Bakhar literature fall under the Outer. They are the very soul of this element. The best words in common use are selected and are strung together artistically, producing good style. Nevertheless, the chroniclers have their eye on the object—the facts.

In Sabhasad the Outer is particularly marked. A contemporary of Shivaji, he bases his writing firmly on facts. He drives towards the actual incidents in the life of Shivaji as he was a knowledgeable witness to them. His work is determined by his period and the nature of his assignment. He seems to have a special affinity for facts as well as for the form he has chosen. He paints a very faithful picture of Shivaji and his times.

It would be interesting to compare how Bakhar writers approach the subject of describing persons. We may cite an example of Sabhasad's description of Shivaji. Shivaji is out to meet Afzal Khan as scheduled. This is how the Bakhar reads in translation:—

'His Majesty put on a cuirass of giltwire. He covered his head with a helmet and hid it under a turban. He put on a pajama and strongly tied his waist with a long piece of cloth. He carried a 'bichwa' i.e. a small dagger, and a 'waghnakh' i.e. a weapon closely resembling the claws of a tiger.'[2]

Sabhasad's simple but direct description of Shivaji in a realistic mode is the expression of the Outer in its exalted style and treatment. His simplicity in writing is cumulative in its effect as it imposes its own atmosphere. He writes in a plain manner, which is probably the highest he could achieve.

The Chitragupta's Bakhar, an enlargement of the Sabhasad's Bakhar, has a conventionl poetic style. The chronicler, while narrating this incident, describes Shivaji as 'Dinamani' i.e. The Sun on earth, his weapons as the Thunderbolt and his sword as the second Lightning.[3] Although his style is ornate making his prose run away with him, his metaphors are vivid in their effect and make a sharper impact on the mind. Malhar Ramrao Chitnis describes the same scene in a different way. According to him Shivaji wore an iron-cuirass on which he had a long flowing robe. He had on an armour-cap above which he wore a turban. He wore a pajama which was tied to his loins by a piece of cloth, the end of which

2. Chhatrapati Shri Shivajirnje Yanchi Bakhar, ed. S. N. Joshi, 1960, p. 14.
3. Shivaji Maharajanchi Bakhar, ed. K. N. Sane, 1888, p. 23.

was turned inside the pajama. He carried the Bhavani sword in his right hand while he had a 'bichwa' and 'waghnakh' in his left hand and a shield at his back. Chitnis says that Shivaji appeared very fierce and extraordinary to all.[4] The chronicler through his prose voice portrays perfectly Shivaji as a great warrior. Sabhasad, Chitragupta and Chitnis have their eye on the same object— Shivaji—and in their own ways describe emphatically the state of affairs leading to the next event—the liquidation of Afzal Khan. The plain and ordinary words in their hands do not degenerate into a tediously dull and heavy formalism. Here is a special affinity between the Outer for the fact and therefore, between the Outer and the established literary form of a Bakhar.

Description of action like description of people and things falls under the Outer. For example, the description in the chronicle of Bhao Sahib that Qutb Shah, the Guru of the Rohilas, took out the dagger tied to his waist and after kicking Dattaji Sindia˙so that he lay on his stomach killed him by cutting his head.[5] The minute details of an actual happening, such as this one, impregnate the style with high seriousness. It appeals not only to the eye of imagination but to the physical ear with the onomatopoetic words used therein.

The Outer thus gives a wholesome objcetivity which is essential to this type of literature as history.

THE INNER

The Inner is the attitude of the mind looking within things or the inside of things. It is more related to the feelings or the inner life with its reactions, the character or the mental make-up of man. Its appeal is to the emotions and imagination. It looks at the past dreamily and romantically and even mystically. It finds new light in the memories of the past or the far distant ages, which form the subject matter of historical writings. The retrospective glance of the Inner towards the past inspires the historian to glorify the characters and events and also to raise them to sublime heights of imagination which is a component part of the Inner. It is accompanied by sensitiveness rather than by sensual experiences. Characterization in historical writings, therefore, has a solid base in sensitiveness. Unlike the Outer which is expressed in a direct and explicit manner, the Inner seeks fulfilment through suggestion. The characterization in historical writing is, therefore, suggestive rather than forthright.

The Holkars' Kaifiyat, the family history of the Holkars, is pulsating with life, both in narration and characterization. The dra-

4. Saptaprakarnatmak Charitra, ed. R. V. Herwadkar, 1967, p. 78.
5. Bhausahebanchi Bakhar, ed. K. N. Sane, 1932, p. 82.

matic, flowing style of narration in the chronicle determines its form, its division of events, the characterization and the various details of structure and setting.   The writer says:—

'Granted that Ahilyabai was a woman after all; yet, though of the Sudra caste, in her ablutions and worship and in her conduct in society, she was like the Brahmins. She carried no mark of her (low) caste. Secondly, Malharji Holkar, who was a terror to the whole world, had implicit faith in her. He would drink not a drop of water more than she would bid—so deep was the allegiance he owed her. His son, Khanderao Holkar, was killed in action at Kumbheri and his wife would immolate herself on his funeral pyre. Nestling close to his daughter-in-law Malharji Holkar Subhedar pleaded, "Why do you want to turn the world into a desolate desert for me without you? If you back me up, I shall feel that my Khandu is (still) alive and Ahilya is no more." At this the decision to commit Sati was cancelled.'[6]

Ahilyabai Holkar and Malharrao Holkar had the deepest love and respect for each other. Nowhere in the passage of the Bakhar cited here is there a direct mention of these qualities. They seem to grow and evolve without the reader being aware of their presence, until, towards the end of the passage, they burst upon him in the pleasantest way and lead him to think he has discovered them himself. Such is the subtle suggestiveness of this passage. The suggestion of their divine qualities strikes the reader without any artificiality. The whole description makes the figures vivid. The contrast and the comparison between them spread a magic spell. which is ruled by the Inner. The style here gives strength to the narration by its deep suggestive power of words.

The same element can be observed in the Kaifiyat of Bhao Sahib. The Bakharnavis analyses the causes of the destruction of the Marathas in the Battle of Panipat (1761) as following:—

'The forces joined battle at daybreak and the fighting continued upto the evening. The earth drank blood. The Hindus had never before fought such a battle and such slaughter had never been experienced before. There will (it is hoped) never be a repetition of this in future. But God's will had to be done—people were led away (from homes) for being massacred. The Marathas were created (only to be killed). Is there any instance of such obstinate disposition of the armies before? Did they ever stay but in one place before with trenches all round? To give battle if it is to your advantage otherwise to make good your escape—this is the usual practice (strategy) of the Marathas. They conquered

6. Holkaranchi Kaifiyat, ed. Y. N. Kelkar, 1954, p. 47.

the world by dint of this. (This time) the Marathas gave up the age-old policy and embraced the alien art of war. This resulted in the annihilation of all the foot—and horse-soldiers. There is no going against God's will!'[7]

This narration is a fine example of the chronicler's objective outlook as an historian but also of his personal sensitivity, which is typical of his individual Inner. Here the Maratha army's blunder is very subtly suggested and at the same time the writer's personal sensitivity to the catastrophe is emphatically and unmistakably intimated with its profound sadness.

The Inner is so intense with the writers, as is evidenced in the illustrations given here, that they do not confine themselves only to the Outer. The sensitivity and the imaginativeness in the illustrations are combined to promote the Inner unity of the whole. Surrender to the will of God is the highest wisdom of the Inner. The suggestive depth, the organized form and the sensitivity raised to sublimity are all the outcome of that subjective attitude—the Inner—which is closely related to the human emotions and the human spirit and is the essential element in literature as well as life.

ENERGY

Energy the third element is, in fact, the principle of Intense Self-expressive Energy. It is the power of creation. It is, in other words, the intrinsic ability in any creative art such as literature. It is always present in the type of literature established in the particular age. It expresses itself through the individuality or the self which is the central source of the ideas, thoughts and feelings of the writer. At times it is so forceful that it compels him to self-assertion. Energy is mostly interested in the past for re-creating it. Faith and hope are its chief characteristics. It reaches out towards the higher good to which it aspires intensively and untiringly. In a sense it is a sublime mode of expression which gazes at eternity.

Raghunath Yadav is a typical example of Energy. His chronicle of Panipat is a forceful revelation of himself. It expresses his own ideas, prejudices and enthusiasm. He describes the battle thus:—

'The battle was no ordinary one. At that time the gods and Indra, the Lord of Heaven, arrived in the sky in their planes to watch the battle. Glory to the height of valour! Sadashivpant brought the dead body of Balvantrao in his camp after a great struggle. The Iranians were completely disillusioned. In the thick of the battle as many as 750 warriors who were perfect match one

7. Shrimant Bhausaheb Yanchi Kaifiyat, ed. K. N. Sane, 1887, p. 26.

to the other from the armies of Sadashivpant, the Iranians, the Emperor of Delhi, Shujat-ud-Daula, Mansur Ali (?) and the Resident of Hastinapur laid down their lives. The Marathas massacred the Iranians and the Duranians. It was the climax of the bravery of the heroes! There was no sign of treachery or violation of faith, although it was a fierce battle!! Therefore the Iranians and the Duranians being depressed began to say to themselves, "These Marathas from the South are a treacherous lot! They defy our swords! We too on our part shall not return without capturing the throne of Delhi! It does not matter if we are all destroyed to a man." No sooner did they advance on the Marathas than Sadashivpant, exerting to the utmost, put them to rout and beat them back into their camps."[8]

Energy in this illustration gives an inspired personal touch to the writer's narration. The general tone in it is one of vigour. His use of the words 'JIRLA' (disillusioned), 'MOHARAM KELA' (massacred) and 'DAMTUN GHATLE' (beat into) are remarkable for the effect. His hatred of the Iranians and the Duranians expressed in abusive tone is equally characteristic of his partisan spirit. The violence of his indignation and of his blazing invectives throughout is observed in a fine form here.

Energy is very striking in the chronicler of Bhao Sahib in all its vigorous, impetuous style. The writer describes the gloom in the camp of Sindias that followed Dattaji's death. He says:—

'The ladies had no idea about Dattaji Sindia's fate until Jankoji (his nephew) arrived. As soon as the news spread in the camp, Bhagirathibai (wife of Dattaji) and Kashibai (wife of Jankoji) both forgetting the Maratha etiquette (purdah) came running out. They saw Jankoji on a cot, wounded. When they uncovered Jankoji's face, he thus addressed his aunt with tears in his eyes, "Oh lady, where is Uncle?" This fully brought home to Bhagirathibai that the Patel (her husband) was killed in action. She was overwhelmed with grief. But afterwards she controlled it with the thought "The grains in the mill weep while those in the hopper laugh." He (the Patel) had met his end in the way known already and this one is wounded and is in a precarious condition. The Duranian is exerting great pressure. If under these conditions I give way to grief, whom should he (Jankoji) look up to? There is a couplet on this subject: "I propose something in my mind; the Maker proposes something quite different. Madhav says to Uddhav that the galloping of the mind is vain." So saying she gulped her grief like a glass of poison and made this reply to Jankoji Sindia "My lad, why do you weep like a (helpless) widow! Jayaji Sindia has four daugh-

8. Panipatchi Bakhar, ed. R. V. Herwadkar, 1966, p. 28.

ters. If you were also a daughter (instead of a son) to him, it would have been a gain, for he would have secured one more son-in-law. What did the Patel carry with him (to the other world)? He has left to you the whole world, his wealth, his palaces, his territory, his treasury, his elephants and his horses. You should be equal to the occasion. What can now be achieved through crying?" At these words of courage Jankoji Sindia was pacified."[9]

The writer has set the burning intensity of his philosophical faith in this narration. He suggests that cheap and nasty should be hated. He advocates that labour is life. To him duty is noble and as sacred as religion. He has the gift of eloquence which exhibits in the grand style. The style of the creative artist, with its emphaticness, power of sweeping up of forceful sentence structure and the prodigious vocabulary, is arresting in its far reaching effect. The illustration makes lively reading because of the chronicler's 'eloquence' which is a manifestation of his blazing Energy.

This element being most dynamic, inspiring and invigorating, has a special contribution to the Bakhar literature. Energy is the essence—nay, a vital part—of the Bakhars, which have survived despite of their timeliness.

BALANCE

Balance is the element of mind which is concerned with relationship of things or people. It is an essence of qualities like contrast, harmony and proportion. Unity in duality is a characteristic of Balance. Like scales of a balance it produces equilibrium either by working against or working together. It has an architectural quality of arrangement, or, in other words, a sense of structure or pattern. It aims at order which results in system and coherence. This element is particularly in evidence in dialogues, wherein all points of view are presented. Clarity is the key to Balance. Balance is concerned with the writer's way of thought and his general outlook. In its sublime state it keeps to the middle course between the visible world and the invisible one. Symmetry and proportion are its great means.

Raghunath Yadav's prose is an illuminating illustration of Balance. The chronicler narrates the events that followed the fall of Govindpant Bundele. Bhao Sahib was in great difficulty as his army starved. Even the horses could not get their fodder. In this respect the chronicler says:—

'Then a large number of sardars, great and small, including Malharji Holkar, Jankoji Sindia, Damaji Gaikwar, Yeshwantrao Pawar, Antaji Mankeshwar and Santaji Atole came to Sadashiv-

9. Bhausahebanchi Bakhar, ed. K. N. Sane, 1932, p. 88.

pant to hold consultations. At that time Sadashivpant and Vishwasrao were sitting in a small tent. They came up to the office in the large tent for discussion. Then everybody present spoke his mind in the following way:—

"We all have put up with hardships for the last month and a quarter. Men and beasts are dying of hunger and thirst. We look up to you for further directions. Our limbs have swollen for want of food. How can we wield the sword now? Your Lordship has defeated the enemy and won great success. Now, however, you have started ruining the whole kingdom. There is no other way of describing what is happening. The impending doom has perverted your mind. You will bring about the destruction of all of us along with your own. The Iranians carry away our women and children with impunity. Such is the present juncture. You don't listen to anybody for your mind is warped. Your obstinacy has borne (evil) fruit. In short, if after accepting the advice of all and making peace with the enemy we returned to our province we shall not be set down as impotent cowards. This obstinacy of yours had led to destruction all round. Whatever has been saved will also be lost. There is no telling what God wills! ...." Upon these words of frustration the Chief made answer, "Who can remedy what is already ordained by Fate? Nobody deliberately digs his own grave. Who can successfully pit his strength against Fate? The ultimate end, be it success or failure, belongs to the Chhatrapati. What lies in us is to be faithful to our swords looking upon our own physical bodies no better than blades of grass and never giving up the will to win...." '[10]

The element of Balance shapes the quick exchange of words between the Maratha sardars and Bhao Sahib through opposition and not through harmony. The depth of relationship between the sardars and Bhao Sahib in its sublime form is seen in the unanimity of the end (victory) and the diversity of the means. They are not merely harmoniously related but necessary and complimentary to each other. The logic and the argument in their expression proceeds by the weighing of pros and cons. The matching of one statement by another is worth noting. The general result is order, system and coherence.

The same element is very marked in the chronicle of Bhao Sahib. Its writer is outstanding for his use of contrast and surprise. He describes the incident that happened after the fall of Dattaji Sindia as follows:—

'Returning to the tent he (Malharrao) gave himself up to grief. His wife Gautamabai reprimanded him in these words.

10. Panipatchi Bakhar, ed. R. V. Herwadkar, 1966, p. 36.

"Subhedar, you have grown old. Compared with you the Sindias are but children—mere suckling children! Nevertheless they laid down their lives not before killing enemy. This after all is the world of mortals. Whoever is born must die. But it is rare to find one achieving fame on this side of the grave and security of life in the next world. Jankoji Sindia is just a stripling but how great is his valour! Your days are numbered. So summing up courage you should meet your death on the battlefield, putting your enemy to the sword. This lamentation is but womanly. It does no credit to the man. The urgent thing at the moment for you is to meet and console the wounded and the children who have recently been brought near here." Wounded to the quick the old man sadly replied, "You wish me to die." Upon which Gautamabai retorted, "What woman is so wretched that blessed with a husband she would aspire for widowhood? All women hope to die while still their husbands are alive and while their foreheads are adorned with kumkum-tilak. But the Law of Karma is inexorable. You have achieved great fame. Had you been weaving blankets after the accustomed occupation of shepherds, the desire to save yourself from death would have been quite natural. The life of a warrior is of your choice. Just as a woman must keep her marriage vows, so should everybody be faithful to his vows—that is what the religion ordains." At these words of his wife he mounted his horse in a fit of anger."[11]

Balance may be seen in the general design of this narrative prose. The chronicler makes two persons—Gautamabai and her husband Malharrao—hurl at each other conflicting statements. Besides this the two persons make an exactly balanced pair harmoniously related and complementary to each other. Each has a characteristic tone. The writer's general philosophy and way of thought have been finely expressed. The argument advanced in the narration is a clever one. The contrast shapes both the idea and the form. Balance in idea and feeling, transforms the narration to reflection. The writer draws a parallel between the spiritual and the material, between the sublime (high) and the low. This ability of the writer is an essential part of his genius. Among other chroniclers he is outstanding in Balance.

The element of Balance in the chroniclers of Maratha History lends to their creativity a deep appeal. the setting of which is woven into an exquisite scheme.

The elements of the Outer, the Inner, Energy and Balance have now been discussed separately in relation to their chief modes of expression. Although each element has its own sphere it is a

11. Bhausahebanchi Bakhar, ed. K. N. Sane, 1932, p. 94.

part of the whole mind. It is possible that they work in combination. They may harmoniously be related in twos, threes and fours also. The study of the chronicles of Maratha History both in themselves and in comparison with one another, with the objective of finding out how these elements are blended, should be a most interesting and rewarding pursuit.

AMUDAŇKA-NĀDAAM ONCE AGAIN

By

G. C. JHALA

Dr. Pusalkar has recently reviewed the problem of the interpretation of this word in the light of the views of different scholars and has contented himself with the remark, "In the present state of our knowledge it seems to be a reasonable conclusion to take the word अमुदङ्क णाडञ् (अमृताङ्क नाटक) in the *Cārudatta* to refer to the happy incident of the mysterious recovery of the stolen ornaments by Vasantasenā from Sajjalaka as related by her to her maid."[1] It will be noticed that Pusalkar interprets *amudaṅka* as equivalent to Sk. *amṛtāṅka:* in doing so he is meticulously correct because, as everyone knows, a Prakrit *K* cannot stand for a Sanskrit *G*. If the Prakrit reading is *amudaṅka*, its Sk. rendering can never be *amṛdaṅga*. This is, however, exactly what many scholars have done in order to unlock the enigma of this unusual expression *amudaṅka-ṇāḍaam*. These scholars were aware of the existence of the expression *amṛdaṅgo nāṭakāṅkaḥ saṁvṛttaḥ* in the *Padmaprābhṛtakam* (*Caturbhāṇī*, Patna edition (1922) p. 14) and '*aviṇam-amṛdaṅgam-eka-naṭa-nāṭakam nāṭyate*' in the *Pādatāḍitakam* (ibid. p. 15). On the strength of the apparently parallel expressions *amṛdaṅga* employed in these plays along with the word *nāṭaka*, they proceeded to read the Prakrit *amudaṅka* as equivalent to Sk. *amṛdaṅga*, totally ignoring the phonetic difficulty: a Prakrit *K* can never be a mutant for Sk. *G;* not only this, but a Sk. *K* too, generally changes to *g* in Prakrit. Devadhar was perhaps all too conscious of this phenomenon and went to the other extreme of emending the Sk. *amṛdaṅgo nāṭakāṅkaḥ* of the *Padmaprābhṛtakam* into *amṛtāṅko nāṭakāṅkaḥ* and thus sought to establish a parallel with *amudaṅka* which is equivalent to *amṛtāṅka* in Sk. And as *amṛtāṅka* was the only conceivable equivalent of *amudaṅka* (with a k in Prakrit), scholars were faced with the question of the interpretation of *amṛtāṅkaḥ*.

A good deal of 'ambrosial speculation', as Dr. A. N. Upadhye has called it. apparently in a semi-serious vein, followed. Woolner and Sarup translated it as 'the Ambrosial Act'.[2] Devadhar gives the

1. *H. D. Velankar Commemoration Volume* (1965), (VCV), p. 111. In the second revised edition of his *Bhāsa—A Study* (1968), he has no comment of his own to offer on the meaning of this word. Cf. p. 487.
2. *Thirteen Trivandrum Plays attributed to Bhāsa*, Vol. I (London. 1930), p. 102.

same translation but wonders what its denotation could be.[3] Paranjpe thought that *amṛtāṅka* was 'apparently a well-known scene from a popular play.... The *Cārudatta* is likened to an *Amṛtāṅka* as a joyous scene'.[4] Sivaram Sastri thinks that *amudaṅkaṇāḍaam saṁvuttaṁ* is 'probably some idiom which is not so alive now as it was in Bhāsa's time, and suggests that it may be the name of the act of the Cārudatta like the Mantrāṅka of the *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa.*[5] Jagirdar interprets the word as a drama having no death scene or association with death.[6] Pusalkar translates the speech of the Ceṭī (पिअं मे, अमुदंकणाडअं संवृत्तं ।) as "I am happy. Indeed, it (i.e. the incident describing the miraculous recovery of ornaments) has been a drama with an Ambrosial Act."[7] However, as stated earlier, he is not able to explain what 'the Ambrosial Act' means.

Pusalkar has also noticed the quotations from the *Padma-prābhṛtaka* and the *Pādatāḍitaka.* In the *Padmaprābhṛtaka,* the speech of the Viṭa contains the words 'साधु भो:, अमृदङ्गो नाटकाङ्क:' संवृत्त: । Moti Chandra and Agrawala who have recently edited the *Catur-bhāṇī*[8] suggest the interpretation of *amṛdaṅgaḥ* as 'without the beating of drum; without any intimation at an inopportune moment; prematurely'; and the sentence would mean 'the act of the drama has ended without the beating of the drum.'[9] Pusalkar broadly agrees with this interpretation of Moti Chandra and Agrawala.[10]

That this expression is some popular idiom is beyond question. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* tells us that song, dance and music constituted the essential elements of a dramatic performance. When a rather difficult or complex matter is successfully solved or accomplished without much trouble or noise it could, as the popular vogue must have been, be compared with a drama or an act of a drama performed and completed without the laborious accompaniments of the drums i.e. without publicity. The context in the *Padmaprābhṛtaka* supports this interpretation. The Viṭa is listening, of course through the device of *Ākāśabhāṣita,* to Śaiṣilaka who, under pressure describes how a Buddhist nun who had come to his residence as a go-between initially resisted his forcible advances but yielded in the end. Whereupon the Viṭa exclaims in a congratulatory vein, 'साधु भो: अमृदङ्गो नाटकाङ्क: संवृत्त: । He means that a pleasant matter was finish-

3. *Cārudatta* (Poona, 1939), p. 40.
4. *Mṛcchakaṭika* (Poona, 1937), Introd., pp. XI f.
5. Proceedings, Oriental Conference IX, p. 469. Cf. Pusalkar in VCV., p. 109.
6. *Drama in Sanskrit Literature* (1947). p. 163.
7. Op. Cit., p. 110.
8. *Caturbhāṇī or Guptakālīna Śṛṅgāra-hāṭ* (Bombay, 1959).
9. Ibid., p. 283. English translation is Pusalkar's.
10. Cf. VCV, p. 111.
11. Ibid., p. 111.

ed on the quiet—without fuss or noise. Manifestly, there is no question of 'an inopportune moment' or prematureness here as Moti Chandra and Agrawala would understand; nor does the expression warrant the view that "the drum was beaten at the conclusion of a play."

Neither does the expression अवीणममृदङ्गमेकनटनाटकं नाट्यते (st. 38) occurring in the *Pādatāḍitaka* imply that the beating of the drum was associated with the *commencement* of a play, as Pusalkar seems to suggest.[12] The context will speak better. The Viṭa calls at the residence of Bhaṭṭi Maghavarman and waits for the latter to come out. Maghavarman comes out walks with slow, light steps and the Viṭa is all admiration for his gracefulness! He then proceeds to describe him in detail: 'By him entering the royal palace with slow steps, moving with his hands tossing, with chest and shoulders lovely and broad, with eyes lovely through gracefulness and casting sidelong glances now and then—by him a single-actor drama i.e. a Bhāṇa, is being performed without (the accompaniment of) the lute and the drum.'[13] Unlike the *Padmaprābhṛtaka*, here no popular idiom is involved: it is a downright description of the movements of Maghavarman which would be proper on the stage. Maghavarman is described as acting in a single-actor drama without its usual accompaniment of music. Apart from this implication—of the association of instrumental music with a one-actor dramatic performance—this reference has hardly any relevance to the problem under discussion.

Dr. A. N. Upadhye is the latest in the field to attempt an explanation of the term *amudaṅka ṇāḍaam*....He states: "This expression has become mysterious and its interpretations are invested with a good deal of 'ambrosial' speculation, because every one is interpreting it from the Sanskrit *chhāyā*; and somehow, rather quite naturally, the word *amṛta* has loomed large in our perspective. It is necessary, therefore, that one takes up the Prakrit expression *amudaṅka-ṇāḍaam*. When viewed in the context of similar phrases *amṛdaṅgo nāṭakāṅkaḥ samvṛttaḥ* in *Padmaprābhṛtaka* and *avīnam amṛdaṅgam ... nāṭakam* in *Pādatāḍitaka*, one suspects that the original Prakrit passage in the Cārudatta must have been *amudaṅgam ṇāḍaam samvuttam*."[14] Even in his attempt to solve the 'mystery'

12. Ibid., p. 111.
13. Cf.

13. (विट:—'इत इतो भवान् । एष खलु पुलिनावतीर्णवृषभपदोद्धरणपदविन्यासैर्भवनकक्ष्यामलंकुर्वन्निन एषा-
भिवर्तते भट्टो । अहो न खल्वस्य विलासेप्वम्याम: । वेशो विलास इत्युपपन्नमेतत् ॥ अपि च—
विलोलभुजगामिना रुचिरपीवरांसोरसा विलासचतुरभ्रुवा मुहुरपाङ्गविप्रेक्षिणा ।
अनेन हि नरेन्द्रसद् विशता पदैर्मन्थरैरवीणममृदङ्गमेकनटनाटकं नाट्यते ॥

14. *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda XV 2 (1965), p. 118.

of the expression, Upadhye has to fall back upon the analogy of two Sanskrit passages, only one of which—the one from the *Padma-prābhṛtaka*—is really helpful and relevant because of its idiomatic character, the other (from the *Pādatāḍitaka*) having nothing more to say than that a drama was usually accompanied by instrumental music. Even then, Upadhye has no smooth course to steer because Prakrit *amudaṅka* can never be equivalent to Sanskrit *amṛdaṅga,* as has been pointed out earlier in this article. Upadhye tries to justify his emendation of the reading *amudaṅka* to *amudaṅga* by saying "The change of *g* to *k* is either an intelligent improvement on what appeared to be a *lectio difficilior*; or it has arisen from orthographical confusion or defective hearing while copying."[15]

The suggestion that the reading *amudaṅga* was a *lectio difici-lior* and therefore changed to *amudaṅka* is palpably unjustified: it is more transparent than *amudaṅka* which has been such a head-ache to scholars. The other possibility of orthographical confusion or defective hearing on the part of the copyist is the last resort in such difficult situations and implies that Upadhye envisages only two possibilities of Sanskrit *chhāyā* viz. *amṛdaṅga* or *amṛtāṅka.* Why can there not be a legitimate third possibility *amṛdāṅka*? But there's the rub: it lands us into the high controversy in regard to the relation of the *Cārudatta* with the *Mṛcchakaṭika.* However, we are not concerned with that problem at the present moment.

That the expression *amudaṅkaṇāḍaam saṁvuttam* in the *Cāru-datta* is a popular idiomatic expression is clear enough. Like its parallel in the *Padmaprābhṛtaka,* it, too, refers to a happy turn of events which is rather sudden and quick. The Prakrit expression for the idiomatic *amṛdaṅga-nāṭakam* in Sanskrit should have been *amudaṅga* and not *amudaṅka.* Upadhye perhaps is not aware that his conjecture that the change of *amudaṅga* to *amudaṅka* was neces-sitated by the intention of the author to convey something more than the satisfaction at a happy turn of a situation; he wanted to convey that the play without *mṛd* as an element (aṅga) in it is end-ed. *Amudaṅga* in Prakrit can stand for (i) amṛdaṅga (without the drum) (ii) a-mṛd-aṅga (without clay as an element). If the author has this dual interpretation in mind, the Prakrit *amudaṅga* would indeed be a *lectio difficilior* as Upadhye surmises because the Pra-krit *amudaṅga* will quite naturally be understood as Sanskrit amṛdaṅga (without the drum) and the matter would end there. The author seems to have chosen the enigmatic Prakrit *amudaṅka* which can stand for Sanskrit amṛdaṅka i.e. without the mark of clay in it. The expression however is so near amudaṅga that by

15. Ibid., p. 18.

force of habit one would be reminded of the play being without the drum (amṛdaṅga). The reading amudaṅka thus is 'an intelligent improvement on what appeared to be a *lectio difficilior*' as Upadhye conjectures but in a sense very different from what he had in mind. It is a reading which must have been incorporated by the author himself for putting his intention to refer to the 'absence of clay' beyond all doubt. If on the other hand, *g* is changed to *k* by some later copyist, it would imply that upto his time at least the original intention of the author was quite familiar; but he changed *amu-daṅga* to *amudaṅka* with a view to put the author's intention beyond all doubt.

Involved in the interpretation of this enigmatic expression is the remark of the Gaṇikā, *Mā hu vaḍḍhāvehi*, in reply to her maid's observation that, 'rain clouds which are the supporters of *abhisārikās* have appeared'. Pusalkar says, 'The natural interpretation, how-ever, appears to be "do not lengthen", i.e. "do not spin a long yarn" which in effect means "do not delay (my proposed visit to Cāru-datta)".'[16] One wonders how the question of any delay in the speech of the maid arises at all, when her expression '*abhisārikā-sahāa-bhūdam duddiṇam* (rain clouds which help the love-stricken women proceeding to meet their lovers) actually means that the time is also propitious for the Gaṇikā to venture out to meet Cāru-datta. The Gaṇikā understands the maid's remark correctly and snaps back, 'You wretch, do not increase i.e. excite (my longing for Cārudatta).

Secondly, this speech of the Gaṇikā is significant from the point of view of the author's intention to end the play 'without the mark of clay'. The maid referred to the *duddiṇam* which as everyone knows is the name of the fifth Act of the *Mṛcchakaṭika*. The Gaṇikā cuts her short and says that the play is not to extend further.

This evidence therefore shows that the *Cārudatta* is an abridg-ment (abstracting the theme of love) of a longer drama in which a clay-motif played an important part. Whether this requirement would be satisfied by a sequel in five more Acts which Pusalkar hopes will be found sometime or whether it would be satisfied by an earlier version of the extant text of the *Mṛcchakaṭika* is difficult to say; in any case, it is quite a different problem.*

RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

By

R. N. KARANI

In this paper I shall examine Russell's analysis of the semantical notions of *meaning, reference* and *truth* as expounded by him in his celebrated theory of Descriptions. The outline of the paper is as follows. Part I: The theory of language presupposed by traditional Aristotlean Logic. Part II: The riddles and problems generated by the traditional theory of language. Part III: Solutions to these problems based on Meinong's theory of modes of existence. Part IV: Russell's Theory Of Descriptions.

I

The following represent the basic postulates of the theory of language presupposed by traditional Aristotlean Logic.

POSTULATE I: The meaning of a complex sign is the function of the meaning of its constituent signs. Hence, the meaning of a proposition (which is a complex sign) is a function of the meaning of its constituent signs (or terms).

POSTULATE II: The constituent signs of a proposition are *unit-signs* or complete signs. A complete or unit-sign may be defined as a sign which has meaning in isolation from the context of any proposition. (It is a sign which, in the words of Ryle, has "unitary" meaning.)

POSTULATE III: Meaning is denoting or naming. A sign has meaning if and only if it denotes or names something other than itself. Thus, the meaning of every unit-sign is identical with its objective correlate or denotation. That is: every unit-sign is a name. Conversly, if a unit-sign lacks denotation, the sign is meaningless.

POSTULATE IV: The trichotomous classification of propositions into true/false/meaningless. That is: a proposition either is meaningless or it has a definite truth-value.

POSTULATE V: The truth-value of a proposition falls under the absolute scope of the Laws Of Thought. Thus, according to the

Law Of the Excluded-Middle. of two contradictory propositions at least one must be true.

These postulates form the background and presupposition of the traditional Aristotlean Logic which involves the following essential doctrines:

(a) Basically, a proposition is a Categorical Proposition consisting of two and only two terms: the subject and predicate term. 'Now,' writes Russell, 'the traditional logic holds that every proposition ascribes a predicate to a subject'. (OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD).

(b) There are four classes of Subject-Predicate propositions, which includes singular propositions.

The theory of meaning expressed in the postulates has exerted a powerful influence on traditional logic and philosophy. According to Ryle, this philosophy of language with all its consequences haunted in their earlier days twentieth century philosophers like, Meinong, Frege, Russell and Wittgensteine. One pillar of this theory is the equation of meaning with denoting or naming, and the consequence of this doctrine, the confusion between naming and saying. To quote Ryle: 'The assumption of the truth of this equation has been responsible for a large number of radical absurdities in philosophy in general and the philosophy of logic in particular. It was a fetter round the ankles of Meinong, from which he never freed himself. It was a fetter round the ankles of Frege, Moore and Russell, who all sooner or later saw that without some big amendations, the assumption led to fatal impasses. It was as he himself says in his new book, a fetter round the ankles of Wittgensteine in the Tractatus, though in the same book he had found not only the need but the way to cut himself partially loose from it' ("*The Theory Of Meaning*": British Philosophy In the Mid-Century). The other doctrine embedded in the traditional philosophy of language is what Ryle describes as the *atomistic* as distinguished from the *functionalist* view of words. The atomistic view is the view that word-meanings are prior to and independent of sentence-meanings, and that the sentence-meaning is constructed from and is the function of word-meanings. This joint assumption finds formulation in the first two postulates listed by me. The functionalist view inverts this priority, and rightly, according to Ryle.

Now, as the next stage in the understanding of the traditional doctrines, we must take note of a thesis, which though not explicitly stated, pervades and informs philosophical thought. The thesis is indeed a deduction from the application of the postulates of

the theory of language to the foundation of the Aristotlean logical theory. The thesis may be stated as follows: A necessary condition of the meaning of the Categorical proposition is reference to a real individual: the subject-term of a meaningful proposition refers to a real individual. This I shall call the Reference-Thesis. The deduction of this thesis from the application of the postulates to Aristotlean Logic may be reconstructed as follows·

1. The proposition "S is P" lacks reference to the real world, i.e. the constituent sign. "S" lacks reference to any individual. (ASSUMPTION).

2. Sign "S" is a unit-sign. (1, POSTULATE II).

3. Sign "S" is meaningless. (1 & 2, POSTULATE III).

4. Proposition "S is P" is meaningless. (3, POSTULATE I).

Hence, it has been demonstrated that the assumption that the proposition "S is P" lacks reference to the world, entails, according to the postulates of the theory of meaning, that the proposition is meaningless. From this we can derive the Reference-Thesis which is the contrapositive of the above entailment: A necessary condition of the meaning of the proposition "S is P" is that the proposition has reference to a real individual.

II

The Reference-Thesis generates the following three problems. First, is the problem of Affirmative Existentials, which may be stated as follows. It follows from the Reference-Thesis that all affirmative existential propositions of the form "S exists" must be true analytically and trivially. "S exists" by assumption would have meaning, and therefore the sign "S" refers to a real or existing individual. To assert of an individual that exists, that it exists is analytic and non-informative. But there must be something wrong with this conclusion because the proposition "White tigers exist" though true, is neither analytic nor trivial; and the proposition "A woman president of the United States exists" is false.

Then, there is the problem of Negative Existentials. It follows from the Reference-Thesis that all negative existential propositions of the form "S does not exist" are analytically false, i.e. self-contradictory. "S does not exist" by assumption is meaningful. Therefore, the individual referred to by the sign "S" exists. To assert of an individual that exists, that it does not exist is necessarily false: it involves a self contradiction. Again, there seems to be something odd about the conclusion. The proposition "White tigers do

not exist" is false, but not necessarily; the proposition "A woman president of the United States does not exist" is true.

The third problem is: It follows from the Reference-Thesis that regarding the non-existent no meaningful assertion can be made. In the Theaetetus, Plato raises this problem: 'In judging', Plato writes 'one judges something; in judging something, one judges something real; so in judging something unreal one judges nothing but judging nothing, one is not judging at all.' Now, this view seems definitely false if not paradoxical. The proposition "The King of France is wise" is perfectly meaningful, even though the sign, "The King of France" denotes no existing individual. What is more, the proposition, "The King of France does not exist" is true, and hence, according to the logical trichotomy, meaningful.

III

Before we turn to Russell's Theory of Descriptions which offers us solutions to these problems, it is worth considering, briefly, an alternative theory: the theory of the modes of existence. In fact, one of Russell's motive in propounding his own theory was to offer an alternative to the theory of Modes of existence developed by the Austrian philosopher, Alexius Meinong. I must hasten to add that I have merely used the basic principles of Meinong's philosophy which in its full content is replete with subtle distinctions and arguments. An interesting feature of the theory of Modes is that it does not entail the rejection of the postulates of traditional logic.

The theory of Modes questioning the "prejudice in favour of the actual" argues that there is a systematic ambiguity concealed in the word "existence". Hence, we must distinguish between the modes of being or the modes of existence. While all individuals have being, not all have existence. Linsky has the following comment to make on this principle underlying Meinong's philosophy: 'We have here the idea,' Linsky writes 'which is at the roots of one of the principal problems of reference....Whatever we can talk about must in some sense *be* something, for the alternative is to talk about nothing' (Leonard Linsky: REFERRING).

Let us see what is the application of this doctrine of Modes to the problems at hand. If the existential proposition ("S is P" or "S is not P") involves different modes of existence in subject and predicate, the existential proposition would not have to be analytic, and the affirmative proposition need not be true, the negative need not be false. This theory shows, therefore, that the postulates of the traditional theory of meaning do not entail the two invalid theses

we were confronted in the two problems (the problem of Affirmative Existentials and the problem of Negative Existentials.)

The third problem, to recall, is that it follows from the postulates that all empty subject-predicate propositions must be meaningless—which is surely false. According to the theory of Modes the false conclusion can be avoided in the following way. Strictly speaking, there are no empty subject-predicate propositions, i.e. a subject-predicate proposition in which the sign "S" does not have denotation. The subject "S" may lack denotation only in the sense that the individual ostensibly referred to does not have actual existence; but, it is only the "prejudice in favour of the actual", it would be argued by the exponent of this view, which would lead one to infer that lack of actual existence implies the lack of *being*. The object referred to by "S" in the so called empty subject-predicate proposition possesses *being* though not *existence*. Again the doctrine of Modes has come to the rescue of the postulates by showing that the thesis involved in the third problem does not follow from the postulates, so that the invalidity of the thesis does not disturb the status of the postulates.

<div align="center">IV</div>

Russell's rejection of the Meinongian solution is grounded on three considerations, at least one of which is based on an incorrect interpretation of Meinong.

1. The theory of Modes of being offends against what Russell calls "a robust sense of reality", since it assigns being not only to actual individuals which can be located in the spatio-temporal order, but also to possible individuals and individuals in the discourse of fiction and legend. In a well known passage in INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY, Russell, referring to Meinong, remarks: "In such theories, it seems to me, there is a failure of that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies. Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features". A little later he writes: "The sense of reality is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending that Hamlet has another kind of reality is doing a disservice to thought. A robust sense of reality is very necessary in framing a correct analysis of propositions about unicorns, golden mountains, round squares, and other pseudo-objects".

2. Though not explicitly stated, another objection to the doctrine of Modes would be inherent in the principle of metaphysical

economy, or, Occham's Razor, which forms an important element of Russell's method. Judged in terms of this principle the overpopulated world of Meinong is the result of an inflated ontology.

3. Russell charged that the theory of Modes assigned truth to contradictory propositions, "S exists" and "S does not exist". Thus, in his essay "On Denoting", alluding to Meinong's views Russell declares: "but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent King of France exists, and also does not exist that the round square is round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred.' (LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE).

The last criticism is not fair. The Meinongian system does not countenance the breakdown of the Law of Contradiction. In that system, if the term, "existence" signifies the same mode in both the affirmative and negative propositions, there would be a contradiction. However, this is not necessarily, so, since the ambiguity of "exists" may result in the predication of diverse modes, in which case the propositions may well both be true, but are not, then, contradictories.

Russell, dissatisfied with Meinong's theory, offers as an alternative his theory of Descriptions, which I shall now examine.

The traditional theory of Subject-predicate propositions involves two assumptions: (a) The subject sign "S" is a unit-sign (in the sense explained in POSTULATE II), and (b) The subject sign "S" can be either a *simple* or a *complex* sign.

A *simple* sign is a sign whose parts are not signs. Thus, a Proper Name like, "Scott" is classified as a simple sign. A *complex* sign is a sign whose parts are also signs. "The author of Waverly" would come under this classification.

Russell's Theory of Descriptions is based on an attack against the second of the two assumptions listed above. According to Russell a proposition "S is P" in which the sign "S" is a complex sign is not in its *logical* form a subject-predicate proposition; a necessary condition of a genuine subject-predicate proposition is that sign "S" is a simple sign. It follows from this condition that if the sign "S" in a given proposition is either a definite or indefinite description, descriptions being complex signs, the proposition cannot be (in its logical form) a subject-predicate proposition. Conversely to obtain a subject-predicate proposition the sign "S" in the proposition must be a Proper Name. I must point out that my concern in this paper is pri-

marily with the logical aspects of Russell's theory; I shall not, there-
fore, go into the distinction between *ordinary* and *logical* proper
names which plays an important role in Russell's epistemology.   Or-
dinary proper names will serve as a model for a Proper Name.   In
this stipulation I am merely following Russell's approach in the
logical part of his theory.

Russell's distinction between a Proper Name and a Description
should be understood as following from a more general distinction
between a simple and a complex sign.   A complex sign, in Russell's
view, is not a unit-sign (the labels "Unit-sign" or "Complete-sign"
are not Russell's).   A complex sign, in Russell's view, is not a sign
having a complete or unified meaning in isolation from the context
of the proposition in which it is used.   A sign which is not a unit-
sign Russell calls an *Incomplete Symbol.*

The plausibility of Russell's notion of Incomplete Symbols de-
pends on our understanding that Russell is not using the notion of
meaning in terms of connotation or intention—or what corresponds
in Frege's theory of language to the *sense* of a symbol.   Russell
means by "meaning", naming.   Indeed on this point regarding the
meaning of "meaning" Russell's views are in coincidence
with POSTULATE III of the traditional philosophy of language.
Thus, when Russell states that a complex sign is an Incomplete
Symbol in the sense that it does not as a whole have a unified mean-
ing in isolation from the context of a proposition, this amounts to the
view that the function of a complex-sign is not that of naming.   In
short, an Incomplete Symbol is not a name.

If the sign "S" in the proposition "S is P" is an Incomplete
Symbol the proposition, according to the Theory of Descriptions, is
not logically a subject-predicate proposition.   What deceives us in
believing that it is, and indeed what had deceived philosophers from
Plato downwards, is the grammatical form of the proposition.   But,
argues Russell, grammatical form is not logical form, and does not
always coincide with it.   What functions as the grammatical sub-
ject of a sentence is not always the logical subject.   From the fact
that a complex sign, like a Description, occupies the subject place,
all that we may conclude is that the Description is a grammatical
subject.   The further inference that it is logically functioning as
a name is unwarranted—the illicit inference resting on the question-
able assumption of the identity of grammatical and logical structure.
Thus Russell comments in his sixth lecture on·*"The Philosophy Of
Logical Atomism":* "There are a great many sorts of incomplete
symbols in logic, and they are sources of a great deal of confusion
and false philosophy, because people get mislead by grammar".

(LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE) Russell is stressing the same point when he writes: "The question of 'unreality' which confronts us at this point, is a very important one.   Mislead by grammar, the great majority of the logicians who have dealt with this question have dealt with it on mistaken lines.   They have regarded grammatical form as a surer guide in analysis than, in fact, it is.   And they have not known what differences in grammatical form are important.'   (INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY).

Now it might seem that by introducing the notion of Incomplete Symbol, Russell has abandoned his theory of meaning, namely the equation of meaning with naming.   The argument may be presented as follows.   In the proposition "S is P" what is it that follows from the supposition that sign "S" is an Incomplete Symbol?   What follows, according to Russell, is that "S" is not functioning as a name and that the proposition, despite its grammatical resemblance to a logically subject-predicate proposition, is not really so.   But, now, it might be argued that, if sign "S" is not functioning as a name, it would follow from the postulate of the denotative theory of meaning (POSTULATE III) that the Incomplete Symbol, "S" is meaningless. From the meaningless character of the sign "S" we could derive the further consequence that the proposition "S is P" in which "S" is a constituent, is meaningless.   This consequence would follow from POSTULATE I: the meaning of a proposition is the function of the meaning of its constituent signs.   That this postulate is acceptable to Russell is evident from the doctrine expounded by him in his *Lectures On Logical Atomism*.   For instance, in Lecture III, in a passing attack on Monism, Russell stresses one of the essential doctrines of Logical Atomism: "The acquaintence with the simpler," Russell declares is presupposed in the understanding of the more complex (LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE).   This view one also finds in Wittgensteine's analysis in the *Tractatus* of an elementary proposition as a concatenation of names.   Thus, it would seem, at first sight, that the proposition containing an Incomplete Symbol must be meaningless. But the Theory of Descriptions does not argue for this thesis.   On the contrary, an Incomplete Symbol, according to Russell, though it has no unified meaning in isolation, the proposition of which it is a part is meaningful.   Hence, it would follow from the first postulate (namely, that the meaning of a proposition is the function of the meaning of its constituent signs) that the constituent sign, the Incomplete Symbol "S", is not meaningless.   But, the sign "S" being an Incomplete Symbol, by definition, is not functioning as a name; hence, "S" to be meaningful must have meaning in some way other than naming.   Ergo, the notion of an Incomplete Symbol entails the

departure from the Denotative theory of meaning which equates meaning with naming.

But this is not a correct representation of Russell's position. And, to see where the argument involves a questionable assumption takes us to the next part of the Theory of Descriptions: the analytic method of Logical Constructions, and Russell's theory of Contextual Definitions.

The questionable assumption which invalidates the argument presented above is the assumption that the Incomplete Symbol is a *real constituent* of the proposition in which it occurs. But, in terms of the Theory of Descriptions this assumption is erroneous, the diagnosis being that the grammatical form has generated the misleading assumption. Despite all appearances of its grammatical structure, the Incomplete symbol is not a constituent of the proposition in which it occurs. The uniquely descriptive phrase, "The King of France" is not a real constituent of the proposition "The King of France is bald", though it appears to be. The proof of the thesis that the Incomplete Symbol is not a real constituent is, according to Russell, the fact that by a process of logical analysis the Incomplete Symbol can be eliminated from the proposition. Russell's argument being: if it is possible to logically translate proposition *A* containing the Incomplete Symbol into proposition *B* from which the Incomplete Symbol has disappeared, the Incomplete Symbol cannot be the real constituent of proposition *A* *if* proposition *B* is logically equivalent to proposition *A,* i.e. if proposition *B* entails and is entailed by proposition A. If the Incomplete Symbol were indeed the constituent of proposition A, logical translation would not yield logical equivalence with proposition *B.*

This constitutes Russell's method of logical analysis or the method of Logical Constructions, which in its most general form is described as the method for the resolution of Incomplete Symbols, i.e. a method whereby an Incomplete Symbol is eliminated from discourse without loss of meaning. The method may also be viewed as providing contextual definitions (or definitions in use) of an Incomplete Symbol. An Incomplete Symbol though it has no meaning in isolation, is not to be construed as altogether meaningless since it contributes to the meaning of a proposition when it is used in a context.

Russell applies the method of Logical Constructions to Definite Descriptions. Though it is true that the process of logical analysis eliminates the Description, this must be understood along with a qualification. The Descriptive phrase is a complex sign, a sign

constructed out of constituent signs. Essentially, and ultimately, the signs constituting the Description are simple signs, i.e. names, which may include besides Predicates (i.e. names of universals), also Proper Names (names of individuals). And these constituent simple signs or names contribute to whatever meaning is possessed by the Description when it is used in a proposition. So, when we speak of the elimination of the Description from proposition B (the definiens) in logical analysis, it must be understood, that what is eliminated from proposition B is the complex structure; the atomic signs or names present in the Description in proposition A — which are mainly predicates — are preserved in the translation into B. In fact, the preservation of the simple elements of the Description in the definiens is a necessary condition of the translation without which equivalence between A and B could not be secured. This account of the mechanism of Logical Construction shows plainly that Russell has not compromised his fundamental theory of meaning: the Denotative or the Naming theory of meaning. The Description has been shown not to be a constituent; and in the definiens all constituents are names, and thus denotative signs.

The value of logical analysis may also be joined from the following. Translation reveals an important fact about the real logical form of a proposition with a Definite Description. If we go by the grammatical structure of the proposition about a Description it is easy to be mislead into the supposition that the proposition is logically an elementary (or, atomic proposition), i.e. a proposition free from logical constants, variables and quantifiers. But a look at the definiens in the translation reveals the true form of a quantified proposition.

Let us take actual analysis of propositions containing Definite Descriptions. First the existential proposition:

(1)   The author of Waverly exists.
This has the symbolic form:

$\Sigma! \, (?x) \, (\phi x)$

This proposition by the method of logical translation is equivalent to the *conjunction* of the following two quantified propositions.

(2)   There is an x for which the propositional function 'x authored Waverly' is true.
Symbolic form:

$(\exists x) \, (\phi x)$

(3)   For all values of x and for all values of y, the complex propositional function, 'x authored Waverly *and* y authored Waverly' is true if and only if x is identical with y.

Symbolic form:

(x) (y) [(φx·φy) ≡ (x=y)]

These two statements (2 and 3 which are the definiens in the translation) are compressed by Russell into the following portmanteau condition:

(4) There is an object c such that for all values of x, the propositional function, 'x authored Waverly' is true if and only if x is identical with c.

Symbolic form:

(Ǝc) (x) [(φx) ≡ (x=c)]

The negative existential proposition,

(5) The author of Waverly does not exist.

Symbolic form:

~E ! (?x) (φx)

This is interpreted by Russell as the denial of the existential proposition (4)

~ (Ǝc) (x) [(φx) ≡ (x=c)]

This amounts to a denial of the conjunction of (2) and (3). Thus, the Negative Existential is true *either* if no object satisfies the propositional function *or* more than one object satisfies it.

Next, a proposition in which there is predication about a Description:

(7) The author of Waverly is a poet.

Symbolic form:

ψ [(?x) (φx)]

Tnis in translation is equivalent to the conjunction of the following three propositions, (stated informally): (a) At least one person authored Waverly, (b) At most one person authored Waverly, (c) Whoever authored Waverly is a poet. Stated more precisely, (7) by translation is equivalent to:

(8) There is an object c such that for all values of x the propositional function 'x authored Waverly' is true if and only if x is identical with c, *and* c is a poet.

Symbolic form:

(Ǝc) { (x) [(φx) ≡ x = c] . ψc }

A significant fact brought out by this analysis is that any predication regarding a Definite Description entails a proposition asserting the existence of the unique object described. Hence, proposition (7) entails proposition (1), since the definiens of proposition

(7) which is proposition (8) entails the definiens of proposition (1), namely proposition (4). However, Russell makes an important qualification to this thesis by introducing a distinction between the *primary* and the *secondary* occurrences of a Definite Description in a proposition. A Description has a primary occurrence in a proposition if the proposition in which it occurs is not a part of a wider proposition. If the proposition in which the Definite Description occurs is a part of a wider proposition, the Definite Description is said to have a secondary occurrence in that proposition. Now the thesis regarding the entailment of the existential proposition by the predicative proposition may be restated with the following qualification. A proposition making a predication regarding a Definite Description entails a proposition asserting the existence of the unique described object if and only if the Definite Description has a primary occurrence in the predicative proposition. A secondary occurrence of the Definite Description does not entail the existence of the uniquely described object.

In terms of tne Theory of Descriptions the problems we started out with obtain the following explanations. First, the problem of existential propositions, affirmative and negative. According to Russell's theory the existential propositions of the form "S exists" and "S does not exist" are analytic only if the grammatical subject "S" is a Proper Name. If it is a Description, definite or indefinite, the proposition is a synthetic, quantified statement whose form is that of an existential general proposition; and whether the proposition is true or false depends on the relevant facts in the world.

To take, next, the problem of the empty subject-predicate proposition:

(9)   The King of France is bald.
Symbolic form:

$\psi\,[\,(?x)\,(\phi x)\,]$

By logical translation (9) is equivalent to:

(9.1)   There is an object c such that for all values of x the propositional function 'x rules over France' is true if and only if x is identical with c, *and* c is bald.
Symbolic form:

$(\exists c)\{\,(x)\,[\,(\phi x)\,\equiv\,(x=c)\,]\,.\,\psi c\}$

Thus, (9) entails as a part of the conjunction, the existence uniquely of the King of France. The entailed existential proposition, in point of fact, is false, and hence the original proposition (9) which is the definiendum of the analysis is also false.

Furthermore we must tackle the problem about the possible violation of the Law of Excluded-Middle. What truth-value is properly to be assigned to the contradictory of (9):

(10) The King of France is not bald.
Symbolic form:

$\sim \psi \, [\, (?x) \, (\phi x) \,]$

Does this proposition not also entail the existential proposition? In which case, since the entailed existential proposition is false, proposition (10) is also false. But (9) and (10) are contradictories, and if both are false, this amounts to a break down of the Excluded-Middle Law. Russell's way out is as follows. He argues that the negative proposition (10) is ambiguous, the ambiguity being regarding the interpretation of what is the proper scope of negation in proposition (10).

On one interpretation the scope of the negation in proposition (10) is the predicate "bald", in which case the Definite Description has a primary occurrence and the proposition means:

(11) The King of France is such that he is not bald.
Symbolic form:

$[\, (\, ?x \,) \, (\, \phi x \,) \,] \, [\sim \psi \, (?x) \, (\phi x) \,]$

By translation (11) is equivalent to:

(12) There is an object c such that for all values of x the propositional function 'x rules over France' is true if and only if x is identical with c. *and* c is *not* bald.
Symbolic form:

$(\exists c) \, \{ \, (x) \, [\, (\phi x) \equiv (x{=}c) \,] \, . \, \sim \psi c \, \}$

Since the occurrence of the Definite Description in (11) is primary it entails the proposition asserting the existence of the King of France, and is therefore false. But, alternatively, the scope of the negation could be the affirmative proposition, "The King of France is bald". In which case (10) means:

(13) It is not the case that the King of France is bald.

$\sim \{ \, [\, (?x) \, (\phi x) \,] \, [\, \psi \, (?x) \, (\phi x) \,] \, \}$

By translation (13) is equivalent to:

(14) It is not the case that there is an object c such that for all values of x the propositional function 'x rules over France' is true if and only if x is identical with c, *and* c is bald.
Symbolic form:

$\sim [\, (\exists c) \, \{ \, (x) \, [\, (\phi x) \equiv (x{=}c) \,] \, . \, \psi c \, \}$

Now, in proposition (13) the Definite Description occurs in a proposition which is a part of a wider (negative) proposition —

hence, the Description has a secondary occurrence. As such, pro-
position (13) does not entail any proposition asserting the existence
of the King of France. And since there is no King of France propo-
sition (14) is true since its first conjunct is false; and since (13) is
equivalent to (14), Proposition (13) is also true.

Now, proposition (9) is a false proposition. Proposition (10)
is also false if it is interpreted as (11). But this does not amount
to the failure of the Law of Excluded-Middle, because (9) and (11)
are not contradictories, which becomes apparent if we compare the
respective translations of (9) and (11), namely, (9.1) and (12).
Only if proposition (10) is interpreted as (13) is it the genuine con-
tradictory of proposition (9) — this becomes apparent if we com-
pare the respective translations of (9) and (13), namely, (9.1) and
(14). But, on this interpretation proposition (10) comes out as
true; and, thus, the Excluded-Middle Law is preserved.

V

Lastly, by way of assessment, let us ask the question: what is
the contribution made to philosophy by the Theory of Descriptions?
In part, the answer depends on the answer to another and more spe-
cific question: what is Russell's position in respect of the postulates
of the traditional theory of meaning. Here I believe, a scrutiny of
the postulates reveals that each postulate in one way or another
finds acceptance with Russell. What is more, whereas in traditional
philosophy the postulates are pervasive and lurking assumptions
which receive no explicit and systematic formulation, Russell arti-
culates these principles and provides for most of them a formal enun-
ciation. To this extent, at least, there is no radical departure in
Russell's theory from the traditional assumptions. And Strawson is
thus right when he comments upon the extent to which Russell con-
cedes the more important of the principles of traditional philosophy,
while rejecting its conclusions.

The contribution of the Theory of Descriptions lies in its cate-
gorical refutation of the Reference-Thesis of traditional Logic; the
thesis which states that reference to an individual is the necessary
condition of the meaning of a proposition. It is of some importance
to understand how Russell comes to this refutation. It will be re-
called that the origin of the Reference-Thesis lies in its deduction
from the application of the postulates to the essential doctrines of
traditional Aristotlean Logic, viz., the four fold classification of cate-
gorical propositions. Now, as we have already seen, Russell does

not reject the postulates of the traditional theory of meaning. Hence, the significant question now is: what is the basis of his rejection of the deduction to the Reference-Thesis? And the answer, evidently, is his rejection of the basic doctrines of traditional Aristotlean Logic.

In his essay, 'Logic As The Essence Of Philosophy', Russell states as one of the two aims of Logic the investigation of what propositions are and what forms they may have". In terms of this aim Russell's chief criticism is against "the traditional belief in the universality of the subject-predicate form. This belief, being traditional, scarcely self-conscious, and not supposed to be important, operates underground".

There must be a caution against the conclusion that Russell's critique implies the denial of the subject-predicate form; that would be a grave misunderstanding of Russell's view. This is evident from Russell's doctrine of the scheme of atomic propositions which are truly and essentially of the subject-predicate form, the modification from the traditional scheme being that according to Russell a genuine subject-predicate proposition admits of being ordered as monadic, dyadic, etc., depending upon the number of Proper Names or logical subjects occurring within it. In fact the basic similarity to the traditional scheme is stressed by Russell when he drops hints at the metaphysical implication of his scheme of atomic propositions. Thus, in both the second and third lectures on the 'Philosophy Of Logical Atomism,' Russell suggests that the particulars named in the atomic propositions are comparable to the traditional notion of substance, both being in the nature of self-subsistent entities, though the particulars lack the feature of persistence through time which marks the traditional substance. And, even epistemologically, the atomic proposition is often supposed by Russell as representing the foundation of knowledge as arising from sense-experience.

It is evident then that it is not the subject-predicate form of proposition which is under attack in traditional Logic. The attack against traditional Logic is against its failure to understand the rich diversity of propositional forms. The criticism stems from the view that not all propositions are of the subject-predicate form. The reform of Logic can be traced to the insight shared by Peano and Frege, beside Russell, that the proposition "Socrates is mortal" is basically of a different logical form from the proposition "All men are mortal". Russell comments: "Peano and Frege, who pointed out the error, did so for technical reasons, and applied their logic mainly to technical developments but the philosophical importance of the ad-

vance which they made is impossible to exaggerate" ("*Logic As The Essence Of Philosophy*" from OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EX- TERNAL WORLD). It was Russell's genius to show the philoso- phical implications of this insight when in the Theory of Descrip- tions he be severed the traditional connection between the reference to an individual and propositional meaning. The development of the Quantification theory by Russell and by Frege, with its appartus of variables, propositional functions and quantifiers, enabled Russell to free philosophy from the assumption of the Reference-Thesis question- ed by traditional logic. The notion of the variable in contrast to Proper Names makes it possible to understand that quantified propositions, though lacking reference to any specified individual, are neverthe- less meaningful, since every constituent sign in the proposition is the name of a function or concept.

Another original development in the philosophy of language, which stems from an insight of Russell, is the distinction between grammatical and logical form. This development also can be trac- ed back to a reform in traditional logic: to the correction of the deep- seated illusion regarding the universality of the subject-predicate form, a correction which helps to release philosophy from some of its fetters. Russell's views regarding the relation of language to philosophy are ambivalent. On the one hand, the importance of the study of language is not only conceived as a preliminary to ontology, but there is also the ambition that "the properties of language may help us to understand the structure of the world" (AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH). The classification of propositions and the analysis of their constituents would reveal to the philosopher the structure of facts and the basic and ultimate entities which are the stuff of the world. But immediately the caution is sounded by Russell: one may very easily be mislead by the form of the propo- sition into invalid ontology if one does not understand the true logi- cal form of the proposition, which form does not always appear on the surface of its grammatical structure. Hence, the great philoso- phical value of linguistic and logical analysis, especially the method of Logical Constructions. Analysis is indispensable to philosophy. In other words, Russell's conclusion about language seems to be: if language is to be followed as a reliable guide to the metaphysical structure of the world, it is a purified or ideal language with its philosophical or logical grammar. And that is the genesis of a controversy.

NOTE ON THE IMĀM SHĀHĪ MS AT THE DECCAN COLLEGE, POONA

by

GULSHAN KHAKEE

Introduction

The following work is a brief descriptive review, not necessarily a critical analysis, of the Imām Shāhī MS which belongs to Pirzada Sayyid Muhammad Noor Ali Shah (Burhanpur M.P.), who is the present *pīr* and *sajjāda-nishīn* of the Imām Shāhī sect of Gujarat. He lent the MS to Professor A.A.A. Fyzee, who lent it to the Deccan College, where I had the opportunity of studying it, with the kind permission of Professor Fyzee.

The Imām Shāhī or *Satpanths,* so called because they believe their way to be the *sat panth* i.e. true path, were converted from Hinduism by Sayyid Imām Shāh, to the Nīzāri or Eastern form of Ismailism, whose offshoot they really are. In the first quarter of the XVIth century, Muḥammad, the son of Imām Shāh, broke off his connection with the parent sect. At present they are concentrated mainly in Gujarat, with their head-quarters at Pirānā. Their religious beliefs are a result of the symbiosis and admixture of Hinduism and Islam, a prenomenon which is not unusual in India. The review of the works included in the MS., represented below, will adequately illustrate this point. For further details on the historical, sociological, etc. aspects, one could very profitably refer to the following works:

W. Ivanow: *The Sect of Imām Shāh in Gujarat.* *Journal of the Bombay Branch, Royal Asiatic Society,* N.S. Vol. 12. 1936:

Collectanea E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1948.

S. C. Misra: *Muslim Communities in Gujarat,* Baroda, 1964.

A.A.A. Fyzee: *Encyclopedia of Islam.* Revised Edition. Article Imām Shāh.

The MS is a collection of Ismaili-Imām Shāhī works, some complete, others in fragments, dealing with questions of creation, punishment, etc. mostly of a syncretic nature. There is an index on

p. 424 which is fairly faithfully followed. Two dates are mentioned: on p. 145 (b), the 6th lunar day of the month of *vaiśākha* of the *Śake* year 1737 called Yuvā (=1815 A.D.) and again on p. 536(b) where the date is given is 1880 *Saṁvat,* or 1745 *Śake,* both of these later, work out to 1823 A.D.

There are 595 folios, after which the pages are 1/2 broken and of no value. The back cover is gone, in the front there is a leather cover and leather binding.

The size of the folios is 9.2″×5.6″ approximately; the number of lines on a page vary between 14-17. Yellowish country made paper is used, with black ink, or sometimes red ink for figures or writing names of deities. Writing on each page is enclosed in *jadwals*.

Some unnumbered pages have been inserted, e.g. between folio 368; some of these are blank, some have drawings in red, yellow, black ink, and some have fragments of writings which are not referred to in the index.

The script used in Devanāgarī, mixed with some Khojki characters, but the language used is Cutchi-Gujarati mixture (a form of Prākrit). For works with a more purely Islamic basis, e.g. the *Vafāt Nāma,* Urdu is used.

Writing varies between certain sections, but I think one can safely say that the major portion of the sections was copied by one copyist.

A more detailed description of the contents of the various sections follows:

I   *Khaṭ¹ Darasana.* pp. 4a-7(b). षट् दरसन

The work is also called *Brahma Darsan.*
It begins with: *Srī Satgor Brahma ho vācā,²* also *Sri Satgora Sahdev ho vācā* which seem to be the usual invocational phrases for beginning a work, except in some works later on, where the Islamic *Basmala* is also used.

The work deals with different *yugas,* but concentrates on the first *Kartā yuga.* In *Kartā,* the author says, the *guru* is *Brahmā,* the *Veda* is *Rug* (Sanskrit *Ṛk*). In the *Rug Veda* there are 9 *vidyās* (knowledges), by performing which various people are supposed to have attained *mokṣa* (salvation), e.g. *Janaka,* the

1. The Darshana is a school of philosophy in Hinduism. There are 6 orthodox and 6 heretical darshanas. Orthodox: mimāṁsā, vedānta, sāṅkhya, yoga, nyāya, vaiśeṣika. Heretical: 4 schools within Buddhism, Jaina, Carvaka.
2. Vācā is a literary genre in Old Gujarati, Rajasthani and Middle Gujarati literature.

hearer, who did *sravan*, *Vyās*, the speaker, who performed *kīrtan*. In *Kartā yuga* there were 4 *avatāras: mach* (fish), *kūrma* (tortoise), (the middle letter in the MS. is eaten up), *varāha* (boar), *narasinh* (man-lion).

In *Tretā yuga* the guru is *Guptahava* or *Vachishava* (the author is not quite clear), and the *Veda* is *Jujur* (Sanskrit: *Yajur*). There were 3 *avatāras: Vāvan* (Sanskrit: *Vāman*), *Srī Parsrmām, Srī* rām. The author says there were nine knowledges but does not elaborate them.

In Dvāpara *yuga*, the *Veda* was Sāma. Brahma had 2 *avatārās: Kṛiṣna and Srī Bodh.*

According to the author, only when one meets *Satgor Brahma* and accepts him as true, that his soul becomes free and he attains salvation. Otherwise there is death.

II *Naīka* (Sanskrit: *Nyāya*) *Darsan.* pp. 7(b)-18(b). नांईक दरसन

The index considers this as a part of the *khaṭ Darasan* and does not list it separately.

This is a somewhat confused story of the meeting of Brahma, Visnu, Mahesvara in *Tretā yuga* and their telling a triumvirate of female deties Pārvatī, Sāvitrī and Lakṣmī that not they, but one Anasūya in *mryutyaloka* (earth) is the real *sati* and *pativratā* (true and faithful woman). The 3 goddesses do not agree, so they put the matter to test. Anasūyā is successful in the test, and is granted a boon by the gods, so she asks for a *deva*-like son. So Srī Dat is born to her, and he helped 1 1/2 *krore sanyāsis* to salvation. Interposed in this is the story of Rām and Sītā, giving a boon to Manādeva.

III *Jain Darasan.* p. 18(b)-25(a). जैन दरसन

Briefly, this is a story of how the Yādavas cut up a cow and ate it, Sri Krusnāth (Kṛṣṇā) told them to observe *jīvāhansā* (Sanskrit: *ahimsa*) and *jīvadayā* (pity); and for expiation, to go to 24 *tīrthas*, (places of pilgrimage) and to make *japa* of *arihant* (he was a Jain teacher). The author adds that if one has pity for *jīvas*, then sin is washed away.

On p. 25(a) the author says: here *Bodh Darsan* ends. From p. 25(a)-30(a) follows *Sarvāvak Darsan* which appears to me as rather unintelligible collection of wholly Hindu names. On p. 30(a) he says: here *Jain Darasan* ends. It would therefore appear that the various darasan stories are confused.

IV *Jog Darasan* (Sanskrit: *yoga*) pp. 30(a)-38(a). जोग दरसन

The author calls this the story of *Kaliyuga.* He tries to identify Hindu deities with Islamic prophets, personalities etc. e.g.

Krusnāth has taken the form of Srī Nakalanki, Muslims call him
Murtaza Ali (Arabic, *Murtaḍā'Alī*). His other names are Abhanga-
nath and Kudrati Allah. Rukmani is Bībī Fātima, her other names
are Visva Kuvari, Lakṣmī, etc. Srī Satgor Brahma's name is
Sahdev, as well as Muḥammad. Sāvitrī is identified with Bibi Asa
(Arabic: 'Ā'isha), and Mahādev (or Mahadeo) is Bābā Adam. The
author goes on to add that these names are according to Athurnved
(Sanskrit: *Atharva veda*).

Then follows the story in which *Parmesvara* (also called
Khudā) sends Visvan (Ādam) to bihist (heaven), where Ejajil
(Arabic: 'Azāzil. One of the names of Iblīs prior to his fall) per-
suades him and Hawā to eat the forbidden *kunikdāna* (the conversa-
tion between Azāzīl and Hawā is in Urdu, later the author lapses
into Urdu for narration also, which usually is in Cutchi-Gujarati
mixture). Then Adam and Hawā are thrown on to the earth, into
Lanka (Ceylon). Here Adam began to make *tapas*.

The author switches over to the creation of Machindranāth and
Gorakhnāth. The former tells the latter, his *chelā* (disciple), that
the true *guru* is *Sri Satgor Brahma*, and that in *Kaliyuga* he has
taken the form of Muḥammad. So they both go to Muḥammad in
Mecca-Medina to ask for *probooh* (enlightenment). Muḥammad told
Gorakhnāth to return and uplift 5 lakh *jīvas*. So Gorakhnāth re-
turned to *Javup* (Sanskrit: *Jambu*=India). Whosoever followed this
jogi attained salvation, while the rest became stones. The author
says that there were 12 *jogi-panths* and gives their names.

V   *Siv Darsan.* pp. 38(a)-54(a). शिव दरसन

This seems to be a continuation and expansion of the previous
story.

Visvan (Adam) made *tapas* until Parmesvara was pleased. One
Viśvarāj failed to recognize that Visvan was Adam, so he came to
earth and made *bhakti* of the 4 *ligas* (Sanskrit: *liṅga*): *Thāvar, Siv
lig, Jagam lig, Achad lig.* But he failed to attain Siva. Then the
avatāra of *Srī Nūr Satgor Brahma* in Navasari, *des* Gujarat, took
pity on Viśvarāj. He sought Viśvrāj out, but he was in such a form
that people were frightened and ran away, so the guru went to
Chya *dhobi's* house. But then everyone forgot *Siv* and started say-
ing Allah, Allah. They all ran away from the *Jagam lig* and came to
Swāmi and asked for *dīdār* (vision). The *guru* said that the time
for *dīdār* was over, but if they still insisted, they should go to *Delam*
(*Dailam* in Iran?). Then Alamprabhu[3] (the world god) and

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3. Guru Paramapara i.e. spiritual heredity of Mahanubhāva, Nāth, Lingāyat
   (Vīrasaiva) religious sects is traced back to Alamprabhu.

Viśvaraj disappeared and went to establish themselves in Delam *Des*. Four people went there for *dīdār* and attained salvation. This was due to the fact that they recognised the true *rupa* (form).

VI   *Khat Darsan* pp. 54(b)-60(b).   खट् दरसन

In the index this section is called *Malecadarasan*.   म्लेंछ दरसन

The section begins with some *mantra* like material, followed by a most confused syncretic type story. The *puruṣa* has 8 mouths. The fitfh *nāv* is Muḥammad mouth, 7th is Islamic abd al Sitab, 8th is abd al Jamal, 9th is abd al Karim, 10th is abd al Rahim. Such is the 10 mouthed Brahma!

Then he mentions that 4 books came to 4 *pirs*: *Furqan* to Muḥammad, *Ajir* (Arabic: Injīl) to Musa Karimullah (Kalim Allāh), According to the *Qu'rān*, the book was revealed to Jesus), *tawrāt* to Ibrāhīm Khalilullah, *Zabūr* to 'Isā Rūḥullāh. (in the Qu'ran sing. *Zabūr* is used in connection with Dāwūd). Also 4 stages were established: *sharī'a, tarīḳa, ma'rifa, ḥaḳiḳa*. Muḥammad went to all *asmāns* (heavens) and brought 9 *lakh* tales. He brought *namāz*-and fasting and came to earth and broke *kufr* (disbelief), and killed 1 1/4 *lakh* kings. In *Kalīyuga* 1 *lakh* 80 thousand *paygambars* (messengers) and *jivas* obtained salvation, as well as 70 thousand *āle Husainī*.

Then follow the names of the *Panj-tan-pāk* and the 12 Ithna-Ashari imāms. The author says: here *Panj-tan-pāk* ends.

VII   *Anīlpurān*. p. 62(a)-83(a).   अनील पुरान

This section contains *mantra*-like material which is quite unintelligible to me. The numbering goes upto 124.

VIII   *Das nām sanyas*. p. 83a-91(b).   दस नाम सन्यास

This is *mantra*-type of prose. On p. 91 the author says: this *sūgita* ends. p. 91-97(b) the *Dasnāmasanyas*.   दसनाम संन्यास is incomprehensible to me.

IX   *Datātrī*. pp. 98(a)-101(b).   दतार्त्री

This is rather a cryptic sounding discussion of what *man* (mind), *pavan* (wind), *śabda* (word), *prāṇa* (spirit) etc. are. The author goes on to ask what was their abode, where were they before that, and what was their *jiv* (spirit) etc.

X   *Gorakhbodh*. pp. 101(b)-108(a).   गोरखबोध

This is a dialogue between Machendranāth and Gorakhnāth, the latter being the disciple. In fact it seems a repetition of the previous section, the pair discusses what the mind, wind etc. are.

XI *Khaṭ Darasan.* pp. 108(a)-140(a). खट् दरसन

The work is in 222 verses, This is rather a bad copy, quite difficult to read in places.   Nazārī Ismā'īlīs have a similar work attributed to Pīr Ṣadr al Dīn.

In verses 1-23 *guru* Sahdev denies what a true *svāmi*, a true servant, a true *bairāgi*, a true Brāmin, a true Musalman, a true Sufi etc. etc. are.   But, the author goes on to say, without *darshan,* there is no crossing over (salvation), even though one may make *pujā,* go on pilgrimages etc.   Then there is a mention of some *darashanas* and an exhortation to think of the *vedas.*

Then follows a section on creation.   The *alakh nirinjan* (spotless) who is formless, has no father, no mother, no brothers, knows no day, no night, no stars, no earth, no sky, no *meru,* no *kailāsa* etc. he concentrated in *dhandukar* (corruption of andhakar-darkness?) and so *svāmi* created love.   Then there was *nūr* (light) and the sun, moon etc. were created.   Before this there was no *māyā,* no *karma, yugas* etc.

Then the author comes to the creation of *kalpas* (regions of heaven in Jainism), and then of *yugas.*   The first was *Sāt,* or *Kartā yuga* in which Visnu assumed 4 *avatāras* and King Pehlaj (Prahlad) helped 5 *krore jīvas* to *mokṣa.*   In the second *Tretā yuga,* there were 3 *avatāras:* Vaman, Parsurām, Rām.   A brief account of Rām at Ayodhya is given.   The veda was *jujar* and 7 *krore jīvas* attained heaven.   In the *Dvāpara yuga* there were 2 *avatāras* of Hari.   The *veda* was *Sāma.*   One of the *avatāras* was Gopāl, son of Vasudeva in Mathura.   Then follows the Pāṇḍava-kaurava story, the battle and a discussion of how to get rid of the accretion of *karma.*   Pundits suggest *yagna* for expiation.   *Pāṇḍvas* go to heaven, but get no *darshan,* so they return to earth.   Places such as Kashmir, Mālva, Ujjain are mentioned.

But the 10th *avatāra* is in Delam in the form of a man.   Verse 216 is an exhortation to look for him.   He has come to give *varadān* (boon) to *anant krores* (countless).   So *Satgor* says, *Dev* sits in Bharat, Jambudip and he fulfils the desire of all.   The fourth *Kaliyuga* and *Satgor.*

XII *Ratnāvalī.* pp. 141(b)-145(b). रत्नावली

This appears to be a work on creation, again of a syncretic nature.   Harī's 10th *avatāra* is in the western direction, the country is Dailam, and the town is Kekjuri.   This *patra Nakalaki* appears on a Saturday.

4. If this 1500 Saṁvat, then probably it is nearer the correct date, since Ivanow's version has Saṁvat 1575, which he says is too late.

XIII   *Bodh Avatāra.* pp. 146(a)-179(a) 180 verses. बोध अवतार

The work begins with Budha coming to the Pāṇḍavas, who were making an expiatory *yagna*, and he told them that one *dīdār* was equal to countless *yagnas*. Then Budha goes on to describe what *chandāl* (bad people) were like and what good people were like. Budha says that in *Kaliyuga* people would be very sinful and it was of utmost importance to recognize the *nūr* of the true *guru*.

Then a cow descended from heaven, Buddha ordered the Pāṇḍavas to kill it and make *yagna*. The Pāṇḍavas wondered how possibly could they live in a sinful *Kaliyuga*, since *Dvāpara* was at an end, so Budha told them that in the west, he was going to assume the 10th *avatāra* and that all should come to pilgrimage there.

The author goes on to say that now in Jambudip, in the city of Imāmpuri the guru was sitting openly. The 10th *avatāra* was *Nakalaki*, he was the powerful Ali. *Guru* Brahma was *nabi* Muhammad and he lived in Hempuri city. The Mahdi would come and kill the demon *Kāligo* in *Chin* (China) towards the east. *Hari* will take the 3-edged sword and kill the demon. So says *Satgar Sahdev.* (the Ismail printed version claims authorship of imām Shāh). pp. 179(b)-180(b) the writing has no title. There is a list of Hindu names and at the end of the page, the name of Sri Islām Shāh. Then follow more Hindu names and then *qaim, māhdi,* etc.

XIV   *Vis Tola* (20 groups?) p. 181(a)-199(b). वीस तोला

There is no Hindu invocation, the work begins with *Basmala.* Someone asked *nabi* Muhmmad about *qiyāmā·* The prophet wept and said that on that day there will be 20 *tolas.* Gabriel will present each to the *Saheb* (Lord).

Then follows a description of 19 groups who have committed various sins such as cheating, taking usury, being unkind to neighbours, disbelieving or ignoring *Vedic* teachings etc. Rather gruesome punishments for the various sins are described, like a half open stomach with part of the intestines handing out, beard like a burning lamp etc.

The 20th group is in heaven, wearing gold and diamond rings, their faces like the full moon. These will be the true *mu mins,* who controlled their 5 senses, gave money to orphans, gave *dasondh* (tithe) gave money to *pirs,* and followed the teachings of the *guru.*

XV   *Forty Tales.* pp. 199(b)·215(a). चालीस वातों

These are supposed to be advices by Prophet Muhmmad. Actually there is a description of hell, and what type of people will go to it people who take usury, who ignore the teachings of *pirs* etc.

There are some positive Islamic teachings at the end. The section is quite easily readable, even without a second copy.

XVI *Dasamo Avatāra.* pp. 215(a)-262(b). 493 verses. दसमो अवतार

In this *Kalīyuga* the demon *Kāligo* has been incarnated in *Chin* (China?). The *guru Brahma* is nabi Muḥmmad, Isvara is Adam. Harī is *Desamo Avatāra.* This is *Nakalaki avatāra* and sits in Arabia. *Dev* in *Kaliyuga* is hidden but guru Brahma is Pir Shams.

This Pir Shams assuming the form of a parrot, goes to *Surajā Rāni,* the consort of demon *Kāligo.* He tells her about *Kartā, Tretā, Dvāpara* and *Kaliyuga.* He tells her how bad *Kalīyuga* would be, and how *mahādīn* (day of *qiyāmā*) would be. So *Surajā Rāni* is both grateful and frightened and asks the parrot the way to *mokṣa,* and how to escape *mahādīn.* Shams thereupon says that the only way of escape is *Satpanth* and worshipping the *Satpanth.* This would be to believe the *Atharva Veda,* to make japa or *Pir Shāh,* and to give dasondh (tithe) etc.

Then Pir Shams left *Surajā Rāni* and came to *Jambudip* (India). But the guru in *Kalīyuga* is supposed to be Sadr Din (Sadr al Dīn) who would cause the salvation of *bhaktas.* He gave his word (*bol*) to 36 *krores* but out of this only 12 *krores* prove to be true.

There is the rather confusing incident of Sadr Din's going to a *dargah* with 12 *krores* and with Kabīr Din, (Kabīr al Dīn) who was still child. There Sadr Din made *tapas* for 6 months and was somehow miraculously brought to the presence of the *Shāh,* to whom Kabīr Din presented a *pag* (headgear) of 500 yards with the *saphayet* of Shāh written on every yard. So the Shāh appointed Kabīr Dīn to be the *pir* after Sadr Din and said he would cause the salvation of *anant krores* (countless). Kabīr Din objected saying that the *Kalīyuga* was too sinful and difficult, so the *Shāh* promised to remain with him, all he (Kabīr Din) would have to do was to precede him and show people the way to the *Shāh.* So Kabīr Din returned to Jambudip and taught the *japa* or *Pir Shāh.* Whoever makes this *japa* will be saved, whoever makes any other *japa* will be in the camp of the demon *Kaliga.* After Kabīr Din (also called *Ḥasan Shāh,* because the full name is Ḥasan Kabīr Dīn), the *pīr* Imām Shāh (the printed Nizāī Ismāʻīlī version differs in this).

Then the author reverts to the original story of killing demons. Surajā Rāni takes the *Shāh's* side, at which the demon *Kālīga* is very angry, so she kills Kālīga, her own husband. Then there is a fight between the side of *Kālīga* and the *Shāh* and the demons are killed.

Then *Shāh* orders *Ajarael* (Arabic: Izrāʻīl) to take the souls of 84 lakhs, but who ever has followed *Satpanth* truly, is saved. For

these people there is no *qiyāmā*, they will go to heaven. There follows a description of heaven. Whoever believes in *Dasamo Avatāra*, as given by Imām Shāh will be freed from his *pāpa* (sins), will not be reincarnated, and will be saved from *mahādīn* etc.

XVII   *Mach Avatāra* and other 9 *avatāras*. pp. 263(a)-264(b).   मच अवतार

Whether this is an abridged version of *Imām Shāh's Das Avatāras* or Pir Sadr Din's original (*nano*) short *Das Avatāras*, I have not so far determined. It is probably the latter. The paper is coarser, half the pages are unnumbered, and it is not listed in the index.

XVIII   *Jaḍbadhaṁna*. pp. 265(a)-299(a).   जड बंधन

The section begins with an invocation of Hindu deities. Then follows an account of the creation of time, *kalpas*, and *yugas*. At the end there are the names of Ali, Abu Talib etc. pp. 300(a)-308(b) are not intelligible to me, they are not enclosed in jadwals as throughout the ms.

XIX   *Khāk Namo*. pp. 309(a)-312(a).   खाक नामों

The *Khāk Nama* is in 25 verses, with black space at the end, suggesting that it is probably incomplete. The name of the composer is not given. It is generally on the futility of things, with the refrain, *ākhar khāk ho jānā hae*.

XX   *Vafāt Nāmo*. pp. 312(a)-368(b) (b & v are interchangeable).   वफात नामों

It begins with the *basmala*; is in Urdu, unlike the ms. so far; there are 800 one line verses.

After some general advice to remember god etc. there is a brief mention of the Prophet Muḥammad's ancestry and the fact that there is no prophet after him.

The major portion of the work is an imaginary conversational account of the time of the death of Muḥammad. The Prophet is worried about what would happen to his *umma* after his death. So Gabriel reassures him that Allah will have mercy on the *umma* of the Prophet, and that even if someone is sinful, if he made *tawbā* (repentence) at the time of death, his *tawbā* will be accepted.

Line 797 says the *Vafāt nāma* is from the Qu'ran. Then there is the name of Pir Indra Imam Shah. (the work sounds very much like the *Wiṣāl Nāma* listed by S. C. Misra op. cit. p. 63 and attributed to Pir Mashaikh 17th century).

After some blank pages, there is a text called *Palna*.   पालना   on unnumbered pages, which is not listed in the index. After more blank pages, here is a list of the names of *pirs*, then Hindu deities

and *avatāras*. Then there are 3 pages of pictures, then a page with names of Imāms upto Muḥammad bin Ismail.

XXI *Moto Nūr Nama.* pp. 368(a)-416(a). मोटो नूरनामा

Gabriel complains when Bībī Fāṭima calls him uncle, so the Prophet asks Gabriel how old he is. Gabriel says he is as old as *kutb* star, so the Prophet says that *kutb* was created out of *nur-e-Muḥammad*.

Prophet Muḥammad asks for the signs of *kutb*, Gabriel says it had in its ears, so Muḥammad says these were Hasan and Husayn, the *madhli* in its throat was Bībī Fatīma, the ring in its finger was Hazrat Ali, the actual star on its head was *nur-e-Muḥammad*. There are the *Panj-tan-pak*.

Then follows an account of all the things which were created from *nūr-e-Muḥammad*, such as *'ilm*, *'aql*, *ṣabr*, *'ishq*, hope; mercy; etc. The other *nabis* and angels, as well as the 7 *zamīns* and *āsmāns* were all created from that nūr.

There is no *mokṣa* without *kalmā*, the sound of the *kalmā* reaches heaven. Then there is an account of the Prophet Muḥammad, mounted on the *burāq*, visiting the wind, water, fire: earth etc. and how each of them said the kalmā.

XXII pp: 417-418b.

There is a short section, with the first stanza *Friend, seldom does anyone know the story of maha pad (high status) whoever has embraced the Satgor, he only knows.*

Again there is a list of names of *pīrs*, *avatāras* etc., followed by some material that seems unintelligible to me. On p. 424 is the index.

XXIII *Vairāṭsarup.* pp. 428(a)-470(b). वेराट सरुप

This section is on creation generally, and on the creation of patals (lower regions) specifically. On p. 456 there is an account of *Indra raja* ruling in *Indrapuri*.

XXIV *Mu'min Chītvarnī.* pp. 470(c)-536(b). मोमन चीतवरनी

This work, attributed to Imām Shāh, is in 323 verses, and is accepted by the Nizari Ismailis as well. It contains some didactic teachings, among other things, and is summarized below as far as possible.

Imām Shāh says, in serving *guru* one should have no doubt, only then can prāṇa (soul) become eternal. That *guru* today is

Imām Shāh. (verse 3.,The Ismāʿīlī edition differs. True *guru* is Sahdev).

Life flows like a river, so one should not have pride. *Māyā* is a lie, whoever gets involved in it is foolish, because then when he dies, his soul goes into 84 *lakh* cycles (of reincarnation). One should not be concerned with worldly happiness and misery, since the world is a play of 4 days. Then follows a whole lot of imagery from tilling fields, e.g. one should sow the seed of *dasondh* etc. One must drink *paval* in *Kalīyuga* with true intent.

The author says there are too many *panths* in *Kalīyuga* but they will all be cancelled. This is the time to work for *mokṣa*. One should keep one's *īmān* whole, the true ascetic is one who keeps his love for *hari* completely. That *guru* is in Jambudip. His name is *nūr-e-Muḥammad*. One should know the name of that *guru* from the family of *Ḥusany*. He is truly *guru Imām Shāh*. If one remembers him constantly, then one attains the eternal abode.

Gold and copper are two different things, the world is like copper, whoever mistakes it for gold, goes into the cycle of reincarnation.

The time of the 6 *darshanas* and the 3 former *vedas* is over. All the world worships stone and *devas* made out of stone, but nobody thinks of who created the stone itself. One always reaps the fruits of the seed one sows. There was no merit in making *puja* to water, cow or *pipal* (tree).

Pāpa is like poison, its antedotes are giving *dasondh,* drinking *pāval* and making *japa* of *pīr Shāh*. When there is *pāpa* in the heart, it is as if a person is in a faint, only when *pāpa* goes, then consciousness arises.

Brahmans today are liars, they wash from *outside* but are internally impure. One should wash the *dhoti* of the *dil* (heart) and in the heart, read the book of love and wear the sacred thread. Soul is eternal, only the body dies, but as long as *māyā* is not given up, the soul is reincarnated. *Satgor's ginan* is like light, one should put it in the heart, then the darkness will vanish.

Life is like a deep sea, *Satpanth* is a boat, in which the saintly ones sit, so one should sit in this boat without doubting it, for the hypocritic will sink. The other boats are false and their captains are blind, so one should sit in the boat of *Satgor*.

God is near one, just like the pupil of the eye, so one should not look after for him. One should give up *māyā* and then realize that the Lord is in one, just as scent is in flowers.

Hindus have forgotten Brahma, and the Muslims have no *imān*
in Muḥmmad. Today in *Kaliyuga* is the *dasamo avatāra*. He is
the creator of all, he was there when there was no *zat of Adam*
(mankind).

A true Muslim is one who has circumcised his 5 senses, so he
does not speak evil to anyone, sees no evil, does not deceive, hears
no evil, and does not do evil things or go to evil places.

The author mentions the 4 *yugas* and that the *pīr* of *Kaliyuga*
is Sadr Din.

XXV   *Jataṁnamo*. pp. 537(a)-557(b) 140 verses. जतं नामो

Professor Ivanow has analysed this work in his *Collectanea*
op. cit. p. 122 and translated the Nizari Ismaili version called
Janatnamo.

The work opens with the death of Pir Hasan Kabir Din in
Saṁvat 1500, (?)   पञरवो   on the 17th day of *Kārtik* month, in
Uchh Mūlasthān. Imām Shāh comes to the bier and asks for his
share. A hand comes out of the bier and gives him a *tasbīh*
(rosary) and a piece of sugar.

But later the *jamā'at* rejects Imām Shāh, except one Premji
Khojā who gives his food.

Imām Shāh insists on having *dīdār* (the Imām must be in Iran,
but there is no mention of any journey etc.) so he is somehow miracu-
lously transported into the presence of Nūr Shāh, in whose attend-
ance there was one *mukhi* Ghulām. Imām Shāh requests Nūr Shāh
that he be allowed to see heaven; and the major portion of the rest
of the work is taken up with descriptions of his imaginery visit to,
and wanderings in, heaven and hell. He meets his ancestors, and
the names Islām   Dīn, Shams Dīn   Nāṣīr Dīn, Ṣāheb   Dīn, Ṣadr
Dīn, Kabīr Dīn,[5] are mentioned.

Then there is a reference to Pir Sadr Din building the first
khānā at Kotdi, and his converting *Lohanas* to *Khojas*. Imām Shāh
claims that he is descended from Ali through Ja'far al Sadiq.[5]

Imām Shāh returns to Jambudip, where his seat is.

XXVI   *Jirebhai*. 557(a)-557(b), जिरेमइ

This is a short work of 8 verses.

5. This can be compared with the genealogies of the pīrs dealt with in S. C. Misra,
and in Ivanow's works. Another version, engraved on Pir Ali Akbar's mazar
at Suraj Miyani, near Multan, is given in an article entitled *Mazars of Some
Ismiali Pirs in 'Africa Iamaili* Jan. 1970.

It is curious to note the Imām Shāh only mentions the line of pirs between
himself and Pir Shams (same in the *Dasamo Avatāra*) and not beyond, though
he claims descent from 'Ali, through Imām Ja'far al Ṣādiq.

XXVII *Vivekvanjāro.* pp. 557(b)-576(a). विवकवनजारो

Almost entirely Hindu sounding, with exhortations to serve Sri Rām, mention of Yama instead of the Islamic equivalent, etc. this work is in 163 verses. It has a refrain *Samaj man mār re-* (='understand, control mind).

XXVIII *Harichandrapuri.* pp. 576(a)- हरिचंद्रपुरी

Only 23 verses of 6-17 lines each remain, the rest is destroyed. It looks to be a discussion between the king and a Brahman in Ayodhyā *nagar*.

In the index several more works are mentioned, but these are not in the MS. and must have been destroyed.

I intend to edit, transliterate, translate and analyse the section *Dasamo Avatāara* pp. 215(a)-262(b), as well as the shorter version of the 10 *avatāras* which follow pp. 263(a)-264(b). I hope that this will be a valuable addition to our knowledge of Eastern Ismā'īlism.

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S EPISTEMOLOGY*

By

S. K. OOKERJEE

Under the influence of Wittgenstein, Russell came to believe 'that the truths of logic and mathematics are tautologies,... different ways of saying the same thing'.[1] His theory of knowledge, therefore, mainly concerns real or empirical knowledge—the kind of knowledge claimed by science and common sense. The goal of his inquiries has always been to discover if such knowledge is at all certain; if so, how is it certain? and if not, what are the degrees of certainty possible? In trying to answer these problems in his various writings, he usually discusses the 'key concepts of belief, truth, and knowledge,' on which he 'differentiates his own position from other contemporary and historical points of view'.[2] My paper will be chiefly concerned with these 'key concepts'.

It is well-known that Russell propounds different theories at different times, and the question whether this implies internal contradictions in his epistemology or are to be regarded as stages in his philosophical development is controversial. Into this controversy I do not wish to be involved, although I incline towards the former alternative because he hardly ever explicitly repudiates an earlier view when he comes to proclaim a new and contrary one. I shall simply state and examine some of the most important positions which he has held during his career.

Russell holds, fairly consistently, that 'the things that are true or false... are statements or beliefs', but that 'the truth of statements is a notion derived from that of beliefs', which are 'the vehicles of truth or falsehood'. 'A sentence may be called "true" or "false" even if no one believes it, provided that if it were believed, the belief would be true or false'. 'A world of mere matter,' says Russell, would contain only 'facts' and 'would not contain any truths'. He uses 'the words "belief" and "judgment" as synonyms'. (AM 231, PE 172-3, PP. 120 & HK 148).[3]

1. E. R. Eames, *Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge* (1969), p. 175.
2. Ibid., p. 140.
3 AM=*The Analysis of Mind* (5th Imp., 1949); PP=*The Problems of Philosophy* (1946); PE=*Philosophical Essays* (1910 ed); HK=*Human Knowledge* 1962 ed.).

While at one stage Russell holds that 'believing seems the most "mental" thing we do' (AM 231), twenty-seven years later he holds that beliefs can also be bodily. He moves here between two contrary views: (i) that ' "belief" ...denotes a state of mind or body, or both', and (ii) that belief is a reaction, as when, on hearing "Fire!", a man leaps from his bed or when 'the compresence of two kinds of circumstances, A and B, if it has been frequent and emotionally interesting, is apt to have the result that when A is sensibly present the animal reacts as it formerly reacted to B', 'owing to a conditioned reflex'. 'We may say that the animal "believes" B to be in the environment'. These two contrary views occur on the same page. (HK 112-3, 145, 148-9).

Expounding view (i), Russell writes, "A purely bodily state may deserve to be called a "belief". For example, if you walk into your room in the dark and someone has put a chair in an unusual place, you bump into it, because your body believed there was no chair there'. Again, 'Your belief consists in a certain state of the muscles, sense-organs, and emotions, together perhaps with certain visual images'. 'All this,' continues Russell, 'could, in theory, be fully described by a psychologist and a physiologist working together, without ever having to mention anything outside your mind and body'. He gives a psychological description:

> What is happening to me when I have the belief which I express by the sentence S? ...All that can be said definitely is that I am in a state such as, if certain further things happen, will give me a feeling which might be expressed by the words "quite so"...

This is 'the essence of what might be called "static" belief'. (HK 145 & 148) 'Truth is a property of beliefs', and 'when we say that a sentence is "true", we mean to say something about the state of mind of a person'. (Ibid., 148 & 112).

Of course Russell does not really believe that a psychologist and a physiologist could fully describe a belief without mentioning anything outside the mind or body, because in the same paragraph he writes that 'one element of belief is that it has external reference', and that 'although your total state will not be the same' under different circumstances in which you believe that a car is coming, 'there will be something common... which makes them all instances of the belief', and that is that they all have 'the same external reference'. (Ibid., 145)

Russell does not seem to realise that if a belief is a 'state of an organism', it cannot be true or false, for a *state* of anything is a fact, and facts simply exist or do not exist. According to Russell

himself, a world which contains only facts 'would not contain any truths'.

I shall examine view (ii) later, but even here Russell's statements are ambiguous. The words quoted above suggest that the reaction itself is a belief, but at other places (HK 113) he says that an 'action expresses a belief'. ' "Belief" may be shown as merely a characteristic of bodily movements', but 'when action is suspended... belief becomes a definite state of mind'. (This is ambiguous.) We are also, however, told that 'preparations for... delayed reactions' may 'in all cases be called "beliefs" ' (HK 94).

Apart from the theory that believing is something 'mental' and the theory that it is a bodily reaction, there is a third theory which I shall also consider at a suitable place. I now examine the first theory, which may be called Imagism.

Russell, for all the unorthodox views he displays from time to time, is, as a recent writer calls him, 'the foremost modern exemplar of British empiricism' (Eames, Op. Cit., 222) in the tradition of Locke and Hume. Imagism is the standard Empiricist theory of thinking or believing, and involves the Correspondence theory of truth. There could not be correspondence or comparison between facts and ideas unless ideas are images or replicas of facts.

Russell's Imagism clearly emerges in his discussions of Memory. 'Whatever counts as memory consists of images or words which are felt as referring to some earlier experience,' he writes, and asks, 'What is involved in saying that A is an "image" or "idea" of B?' He answers; among other things, 'there must be resemblance'. (HK 108-9)

A full criticism of Imagism is neither necessary nor possible here. I shall examine only Russell's own account. In 1921 he writes, 'In the simplest kind of memory, we are not aware of the difference between an image and the sensation which it copies'. The memory belief is "This occurred", but Russell admits that if 'this' means the present image, to say it 'occurred' would be false, for it occurs now. Russell's solution is that for people who prize precision the belief would be "Something like this image occurred", but 'unsophisticated people' and confused Hegelians do not distinguish between identity and similarity. However, the question is, How, in the absence of this 'something' which the present image resembles, can one think of it, recognise that the image resembles it and that *it* and not the image occurred? What is one's *idea* of this 'something'? Surely not another image, for this would have to proceed indefinitely. Russell mistakenly thinks that a judgment consists of, and can only be about, present images. Granting that

the image *is* like the past sensation, how can one ever know this if the latter is no longer 'before the mind'? Only an omniscient observer could know that the image is like the sensation, but for the person who has the memory belief it would not be the idea of the sensation. Russell, perhaps realising the difficulty throws the burden of 'objective reference' on the feeling of familiarity. (AM 179-80). As Ayer says, even 'if one tricks the image out with feelings of familiarity', unless these 'are taken as comprising a judgment... that something like this occurred', they 'merely put an aura round the image', an 'extra piece of decoration' (*Prob. of Know.*, 141-2).

In 1948 Russell is still grappling with the problem. In memory, A, the 'image' or 'prototype' of B, a past sensation, is 'felt to be pointing to something other than itself, and this something is, in fact, B. We should *like* to say that A is felt to be pointing to B, but this we have no right to say, since B is not itself present;... what is present is only A, as B's representative'. We can only say, ' "A is related to *something* as idea to prototype" ', and the 'idea is vaguely felt to point beyond itself' (HK 109). But this 'something' to which the idea points, however vaguely it is felt to do so, must be present to the person as at least a something, and it seems somewhat bizarre that when I recall, say, that the accident happened, my idea is related to something I know not what.

The shortcomings of Imagism are also revealed in Russell's discussions of correspondence as a criterion of true beliefs.

Temporal relations, says Russell (LK[4] 318-9), 'allow the simplest type of correspondence', for a 'belief in a succession' may be 'itself a succession'. Someone says, "Your roof has fallen in, and the rain is pouring down into the rooms, ruining all your furniture", and images of my house, its roof, its falling, etc. arise respectively in my mind. Russell asks, rather oddly, 'Is it certain that we cannot have an image of A followed by an image of B'—who said we cannot?—'and proceed to believe this sequence? And cannot this *be* the belief that A precedes B?' This description of belief is, firstly, circular, and, secondly, very confused. (i) The sentence may have run: "The rain poured down because your roof fell, and it ruined your furniture", or "Your furniture was ruined because..." Whichever way the sentence might have run, the meaning would have been the same, in spite of the fact that the images would have arisen in a different order and might have been different images. Hence, the succession could not *be* the belief—that is, *what* I believed. (ii) To correspond exactly with the factual series

4. *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956.

of events, the sentence should take as long to utter and the images take as long to arise as it took the rain to pour, the roof to fall and the furniture to be ruined. Russell himself grants elsewhere (AM 277) that 'we cannot allow 2,000 years to elapse' while we judge "Caesar was 2,000 years before Foch". (iii) To believe the sequence of the images of A and B could, at best, amount to the belief that 'the image of A precedes the image of B', which is quite different from 'A precedes B'. (iv) Even in believing "My house is in Bombay" there might be a succession of images, hence the correspondence between mental and factual processes is an accidental feature of belief and does not establish the Correspondence theory.

An alternative version of the above view is that 'there is often a *structural* resemblance between a sentence and what it asserts... "The fox ate the goose." The original occurrence was a relation between a fox and a goose, while the sentence creates a relation between the word "fox" and the word "goose", namely, that the word "ate" comes between them.' (HK 115) Is there even a structural resemblance? Did some act of eating (and whose?) come between the fox and the goose? In any case, Russell now admits that this resemblance 'has a certain importance, but not... an importance which is fundamental' (Ibid.).

The difficulties regarding beliefs about the past (including memory beliefs) are obvious in Imagism. Either the past fact cannot be bodily present for comparison with a present image, so that I can only compare an image of it with another image of it, and so continue endlessly without ever getting at the original, or the past fact can somehow be resurrected, in which case it can be directly inspected and does not have to be compared with a superfluous image. Russell naively says that when judging, "Socrates precedes Plato", 'the objective which would verify it' is obtained by 'replacing the word "Socrates" by Socrates, the word "Plato" by Plato, and the word "precedes" by the relation of preceding', and 'if the result of this process is a fact, the proposition is true' (AM 278). He nowhere explains how this miracle can be performed.

Beliefs about the future seem to be in a better case. Russell considers it 'one of the plainest cases of verification', 'perhaps ultimately the only case'. 'You go to the station believing that there will be a train at a certain time; you find the train, you get into it, and it starts at the expected time. This constitutes verification, and is a perfectly definite experience.' (AM 269-70) How does verification actually work here?

I say, "If I go to Victoria Terminus tomorrow at 5 P.M., I shall be able to get into the Deccan Queen and leave for Poona".

I have a number of images. Suppose I go to the station tomorrow, and get, as expected, sensations which I interpret as a train at a platform as the clock shows 5 o'clock. I may, in spite of sensations corresponding to images, be mistaken in thinking that this is the Deccan Queen, for it may well be the delayed Junta Express. If a doubt arises in my mind, it would be futile to go on looking at the train and comparing it with my image, for a doubt has arisen in spite of the correspondence. Perhaps I would ask the other passengers or the conductor, or look for the name-plate on the train. Even if you say that in each of these cases I compare my sensations with images I might have progressively entertained just earlier, it still remains that the procedure is no longer a comparison of my original images of the previous day with present sensations. How did the doubt generate new and relevant images for further verification? What dictates to me the steps I should take to resolve my doubt?

Varying the instance, suppose that on reaching the platform very early, and finding no train, I fall asleep on a bench and dream that I have boarded the Deccan Queen and am on my way to Poona. Suppose, further, that I wake up at 5.30 after the train has left. How would I realise what had happened? How would I know that the verifying 'facts' were themselves dream-images? Not, surely, by verifying *them* or (since they are no more) images of them by the correspondence test. I would probably argue that if I had left by the train I would not now be seeing what I do see, and conclude that my boarding the train and proceeding to Poona was a dream, because otherwise there would be—not a lack of correspondence—but a contradiction in my experience. If I still persist in believing that I did board the train and am on my way to Poona, but am dreaming that I am still at the station, then, to make sure, I would undertake a series of steps. I would try to go and read the name of the station, or board a bus and, passing all the familiar sights, reach home, see my wife having her usual cup of tea, and so on. It would be perverse of me to think that this orderly set of experiences constituted a dream and that the fleeting vision of boarding the train and being carried away by it (though it corresponded with the previous day's images) was the reality. The test throughout is to see if the doubtful experience can find a place without jarring *in my* whole system of knowledge and experience. Russell writes that 'if the expectation... enabled us to act in a way which proves appropriate to the occurrence, that must be held... the maximum of verification' (Ibid., 270). But what determines the appropriateness of the actions and the relevance of the experiences that are to constitute the 'verification' is the *meaning* of the original belief. The meaning has in some way to correspond with reality, and the

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meaning is not the images, for, as we saw, the images may correspond with later experiences and yet the judgment may be false. In holding the belief, images might be *used,* but in testing the truth of the belief I do not look for the exactly similar originals of those images but for perceptions which would bear out and verify the meaning of my belief, and what these perceptions will be would get progressively determined as I make the investigation. Russell himself finds some difficulties in applying the correspondence test: 'Does the image persist in presence of the sensation? ...And even if *some* image does persist, how do I know that it is the previous image unchanged?' These are, however, minor difficulties, for it does not matter whether the image persists or is the same or not, since it is not the specific images that are important or are verified. What is verified is the meaning.

Russell often admits that 'the correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to... disjunctive and hypothetical propositions', where the 'simplest type of correspondence' (which he thinks worked so well in temporal relations) 'becomes impossible'. However, we are assured, the principle remains the same' (LK 319 & MPD[5] 188-9). Disjunctive judgments can be true, but it 'does not look plausible,' says Russell, 'that in the actual objective world there are facts going about which you could describe as "p or q" '. He suggests, therefore, that the judgment "p or q" does not correspond to a 'single objective fact' but to 'two facts' one corresponding to "p" and the other to "q" (LK 209). In that case, when I say, "Beethoven was born on the 16th or the 18th", there must have been a fact corresponding to "born on the 16th" and another to "born on the 18th"—someone must have been born on the 16th and someone else on the 18th—and so the judgment does, after all, correspond to facts. But neither the births on the 16th nor those on the 18th, howsoever many they might have been, have anything to do with Beethoven's birth, whose correct date is in question. If the judgment, "Bethoven was born on the 16th or the 18th" is true (as it could well be) and if the Correspondence theory is true (as the Empiricists believe it is), then there must have been the dual occurrence of Beethoven being born on the 16th or the 18th. That there are ps and qs cannot amount to "p or q" but to "p and q", which Russell should have known.

His alternative explanation is that disjunction 'expresses partial knowledge combined with hesitation' (HK 126-7). This will not do, because (i) a particular disjunctive judgment may not express hesitation at all: Beethoven's biographers feel quite sure, on

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5. MPD=*My Philosophical Development* (1959).

the available evidence, that he was born on the 16th or the 18th of December, 1770; and (ii) a disjunctive judgment may express knowledge, as in "Either there is petrol in the car, or it won't move". Such propositions are used in science.[6] If a disjunctive judgment always expresses a feeling of hesitation, then no such judgment could ever be false; but some disjunctive judgments are known to be false, and this is not so because the speaker is not hesitating. One may hesitatingly say that Beethoven was born in 1790 or 1792, and he would be wrong.

Russell is troubled by Negative judgments (AM 275-6). We can, he thinks, only form positive images, so that to believe that the window is not to the left of the door is to have an image of the window to the left of the door and 'disbelieve the image-proposition' or, alternatively, to have an image of the window to the right of the door. But if to believe is to have an image, what is it to disbelieve an image-proposition? And if I have an image of the window to the right of the door, the corresponding belief will be "The window is to the right of the door". Russell has 'reluctance to admit negative facts' and 'there is no "not" in the image-proposition'. Hence, says Russell, the content of affirmative and negative judgments is the same—something positive—and 'the "not" belongs to the feeling towards' it. At other times he simply declares that 'where the fact is negative, the correspondence necessarily becomes more complicated' (LK 318). At times he recognises that the possibility of negative facts raises difficulties, but concludes that 'these niceties... are largely linguistic' (HK 143).

We have seen that the Correspondence theory fails with regard to beliefs about both the past and the future. Russell openly admits that 'verification' by comparing sensations and images is 'entirely inapplicable' to 'judgments of perception' (IMT* 308). In judging, in the presence of two colours, "This is brighter than that", nothing is achieved in forming two images one brighter than the other, for, as Russell sees,[1] 'the act of comparison, implied in our judgment, is something more than the mere co-existence of two images' (AM 277). There is nothing which the images can do which the sensation themselves could not have done.

The case of present perception shows a very grave defect in the Correspondence theory. Even in the presence of an object or a situa-

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6. In HK Russell says, 'There is.... a difference between the standpoint of logic and that of psychology. In logic, we are only interested in what makes a sentence true or false; in psychology, ... in the state of mind of the person uttering the sentence.... In logic "p" implies "p or q", but in psychology the state of mind of a person asserting "p" is different from that of a person asserting "p or q"' (127). All this is a red herring, for the question remains as to how from the standpoint of logic "p or q" could be true if truth must correspond to fact.

* Inquiry into Meaning & Truth.

tion we may meaningfully ask what the truth about it is, because if truth is a value worth seeking (which, surely, it is), then to attain the truth about anything is to understand or interpret what is seen or thought of, and, on this consideration, the making of a mental duplicate achieves nothing, for, at best, it will show only what the original showed. Getting bits of 'truth' accidentally, as it were, without understanding them or knowing the correct reasons for them, is not worth doing. The Correspondence theory is for ever making the dangerous separation between truth and knowledge. Russell says,

> "Knowledge" is sometimes defined as "true belief," but this definition is too wide. If you look at a clock which you believe to be going, but which in fact has stopped, and you happen to look at it at a moment when it is right, you will acquire a true belief as to the time of day, but you cannot be correctly said to have knowledge. (HK 98)

Would we even be prepared to call it true belief?

The view that Belief is simply a state of mind and consists of a group of images, coupled with the (almost admitted) breakdown of the Correspondence theory, leads Russell to suggest that the meaning of a belief or judgment is the actual fact to which it refers. However, he has always found one great difficulty in accepting it —that false propositions would be devoid of meaning.

The 'actual event' corresponding to a judgment is sometimes called by Russell the 'objective'. False judgments have no 'objectives' (PE 175-6). We 'feel' that 'some entity "corresponding" in some way to our judgment is to be found' when we judge truly; must there not, then, be one when we judge falsely? The 'objective' of the judgment "Charles I died in bed" cannot be Charles-dying-in-bed (since there was no such event). Russell says it may be 'that Charles died in bed'. This comes to admitting something other than the fact, on the one hand, and the judgment or belief, on the other. Due to his 'vivid sense of reality', he says 'it is difficult to believe that there are such objects', these 'curious shadowy things', 'in addition to facts'. (PE 177 & LK 223-5). The solution suggested is that true and false beliefs have 'the same objective', or fact, but a true belief 'points *towards* the fact' whereas a false one 'points *away* from' it. Russell admits he is speaking 'metaphorically' (AM 272).[7]

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7. 'Words that *mean* objects may be called "indicative" words' (Italics mine), and ideas are indicative when they 'indicate features of a sensible experience'. But 'an indicative idea sometimes indicates, and sometimes does not:... if there is not a fire, "fire-here-now" indicates nothing' (HK, 105).

These shifts are a result of ignoring the fact of 'meaning' as something other than the facts referred to in believing, on the one hand, and, on the other, the psychical fact of believing along with its psychical paraphernalia such as images. Indeed, in *The Analysis of Mind*, Russell insists that 'we must distinguish between believing and what is believed', and between these and the 'objective', that is, the 'particular fact that makes a given belief true or false' (AM 232-5). What is believed is called the 'content'. Explaining 'content', he writes, 'What is believed, and the believing, must both consist of present occurrences in the believer'; 'what I am believing is something now in my mind, ...related to the event, but obviously not to be confused with the event'. It may resemble the event, but, says he, 'sometimes a very wide gulf' separates the two, giving us the 'feeling that we cannot really "know" anything about the outer world' but only about 'what is now in our thoughts'. Though he says such a feeling is mistaken, he still says that 'it is not correct to say that I am believing the actual event'. We are back to Imagism and the Representative theory of knowledge. H. H. Joachim comments that on this theory when one says, "Anthony loved Cleopatra", he 'describes the unholy passion of one event inside his [the speaker's, not Anthony's] skin for 'another' ('The Meaning of Meaning', 'Mind', NS XXIX, 1920, p. 412). Russell sometimes abandons the problem of meaning by saying that 'the notion of meaning is always more or less psychological, that it is not possible to get a pure logical theory of meaning', and that 'it is not at all easy to say exactly what constitutes the meaning of an image' (LK 186 & AM 207).

Dissatisfied with his analysis of false judgments (which we have seen above), Russell decides to 'abandon the view that judgments consist in a relation to a single object', and takes refuge in a strange theory (PP. Ch. XII). 'When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, he must not have before his mind a single object, "Desdemona's love for Cassio" ', for such a fact or 'objective falsehood' does not exist.[8] Therefore, the 'relation involved in *judging* and *believing* must... be taken to be a relation between several terms'. Othello, Desdemona, Cassio and loving are 'various objects', and Othello has a relation to Desdemona, Cassio and loving—not to each separately but to '*all* of them together'. This relation is belief. Belief is 'nothing but this relation of believing

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8. In these discussions the reader is never clear which judgment is being considered, "Desdemona loves Cassio" or "Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio". E. G., Russell writes, ' "Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio." There you have a false belief.' (LK 225, where the same theory is discussed). Where? Surely, the whole proposition is *not* false, for Othello really believes "Desdemona loves Cassio", which is false. However, even if this confusion were cleared up it would not save the theory.

or judging, which relates a mind to several things', not severally but as 'one complex whole' made up—strange to relate!—of 'four terms' (including Othello himself).

Belief of Othello that Desdemona loves Cassio:

$$Othello—belief—\begin{cases} Desdemona \\ loving \\ Cassio \end{cases}$$

I shall make a few comments:

(1)   Belief is a relation of believing which O has to D, L and C. The explanation is thus circular.

(2)   If there is no such single thing as 'Desdemona's-love-for-Cassio' (since Desdemona does not love Cassio), how can Othello be related to them, not severally, but *'all* together'?

(3)   The inclusion of Othello himself as a fourth term in the 'complex whole' is confusing. *What* Othello believes, the 'content' of his false belief, is that Desdemona loves Cassio; he is not him-self part of this belief.[9]

(4)   Is belief a relation? Russell himself writes elsewhere, 'A belief... is a state of an organism involving no very direct re-lation to the fact or facts which make the belief true or false' (MPD 183).

(5)   Even if he were to say that Othello is related to Desde-mona, Cassio and loving separately, the difficulty of false belief re-mains. A false belief would mean that though there *are* entities like 'loving' in the world, there is no such thing *between* Desde-mona and Cassio. But, then, such 'lovings' are irrelevant, for we are here concerned with Desdemona's loving and that too her loving of Cassio; even her love for Othello would be beside the point. (This is similar to Russell's solution of the problem of dis-junctive judgments.) Russell himself grants that the relation 'loves' must 'not be abstractly before the mind', for "A loves B" is 'not the same as' "B loves A". The specific love of Desdemona for Cassio must be before the mind of Othello to constitute the belief "Desdemona loves Cassio". Even if Cassio loved Desdemona and Othello believed it, that would be quite a different belief. But, *ex hypothesi,* Desdemona's love for Cassio cannot be before Othello's mind, for if it existed the belief would not be false. Thus, Othello cannot be related to the content of his false belief; a false belief therefore has no content and so is not a belief; all beliefs must *ipso facto* be true!

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9. See previous note.

The matter does not end here. Russell proceeds to explain further, and uses metaphor. 'Loving', Othello, Desdemona and Cassio are the 'constituents' or 'bricks' of the 'complex whole' of belief, and 'believing' is the 'cement'. If the belief is true, 'there is another complex unity' in which 'loving' acts as the 'cement' between Desdemona and Cassio. If the belief is false, 'there is no such complex unity'—the second one; the first one of course remains.

On this account true beliefs are as difficult to understand as false ones, for in true belief there are two Othellos, two Desdemonas, and so on, and poor Othello—never very clear-headed—would never know which complex he meant. And which Othello, since there would be two of them? In false belief there must be only one such complex, but since even one does not exist, there can be no false belief. We return to the same conclusion: all beliefs are true!

If, as Russell says, ' "loving" as it occurs in the act of believing' is a 'brick' and, out of that act, it is 'cement', or (to drop the metaphor) if it is a term and a relation respectively, Othello could never verify his belief, for the complex inside the belief is a different complex from the one outside the belief. Against the Coherence theory Russell makes the usual and irrelevant criticism that a consistent fairy-tale is possible. The Russellian fairy-tale is not even consistent.[10]

We come now to the theory that believing or thinking is a bodily reaction to stimulus. Apparently such a Behaviourist theory is at the furthest remove from Imagism; but when the only realities that are admitted are images, external facts and behaviour, and when difficulties are seen both in the view that the meaning of a judgment is the mental images and the view that it is the facts referred to, then, apart from the fairy-tale just considered, the only alternative left open is Behaviourism.

In his Behaviourist moods, Russell insists that people speak quite wrongly of 'understanding the universe' *et cetera,* for 'the only thing you can really understand... is a symbol' (LK 204). We can only understand language. 'We may say a person understands a word,' he writes, 'when (a) suitable circumstances make him use it, (b) the hearing of it causes suitable behaviour in him'. 'The relation of a word to its meaning is of the nature of a causal law... There is no more reason why a person who uses a word correctly should be able to tell what it means than there is why a planet... should know Kepler's laws.' (AM 197-8).

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10. These relations are 'ignored by philosophers', 'though familiar to mathematicians'. (PE 178).

My criticisms are as follows:

(1) What, for such a theory, does 'suitable' mean? What *is* the suitable behaviour on hearing "suitable"? Russell illustrates: if on hearing "Look out, there's a motor-car", a man jumps aside, 'he "understands" the words, because he does the right thing'. But this is considered the right thing because certain purposes are assumed and life is valued. If the man was tired of life, jumping aside would have been the wrong thing to do. There is no such thing as a suitable or appropriate response in the abstract.

(2) The analogy of the planet is irrelevant. A planet cannot help moving according to Kepler's laws, hence it cannot move incorrectly. A man can use words incorrectly. The very sentence, 'There is no more reason... why a planet... should know Kepler's laws...' implies the distinction between knowing or understanding the laws (as astronomers do) and moving according to them (which only planets do).

Russell admits that 'the narrative and imaginative uses' of language are 'much more difficult to account for on Behaviourist lines', but he thinks it can be done by falling back on images and 'appropriate emotions'. This would be open to objections similar to those against 'suitable' behaviour.

As said earlier, Russell's epistemology is motivated by the question of certainty in empirical knowledge. He comes to hold that knowledge by direct acquaintance is the least uncertain. In the case of such knowledge Russell confesses that correspondence cannot be applied as a test at all. Not only sensation, but even 'immediate expectation' and 'immediate memory', 'give knowledge', which, according to Russell, is 'independent of extraneous evidence'—i.e., knowledge which requires no tests but is (to use the words of an Indian philosopher) 'self-luminous'. Such experiences Russell calls 'intuitive judgments' or 'self-evident truths', and maintains that they are the material from which the whole of scientific or common-sense knowledge can be constructed. Drastic pruning of a judgment is required to get to such truths. For example, "There is a triangle" will not do, says Russell, for it 'makes reference to something public', and one might be having a hallucination. "A triangle is being seen" refers to seeing with the eyes, which may be false. "A visual triangle exists" is better but, says Russell, ' "exists" has all sorts of metaphysical connotations that I wish to avoid'. He settles for "A visual triangle occurs". (*An Outline of Philosophy*, 6th imp. 1951, 215-6).

An intuitive judgment must simply record present experience, and so words with even the least amount of general meaning

would have to be avoided because the risk of misapplication would at once arise. Logically proper names are wanted, where there is only a one-one relation between the name and its object (which is a sensation). A 'logically perfect language' improves on ordinary language. A logically proper name 'seldom means the same thing two moments running and does not mean the same thing to the speaker and to the hearer'. It is 'ambiguous' (LK 201). However, just a few pages earlier (195-8) he says that even in ordinary language a man 'does not mean' by a word 'the same thing as another person means by it'. Yet, far from being a 'misfortune', as one might have supposed, Russell tells us that if a word did mean the same thing to different people, language would be 'the most hopeless and useless thing imaginable' and would render 'intercourse impossible' (Ibid., 201). (It is difficult to discover what could make Russell write in so irresponsible a manner, but perhaps he has words as token symbols in mind, forgetting that there are, in addition, type symbols and meanings.[11]) People often talk at cross purposes, but now a great philosopher assures us that it is always so and the only sensible thing to do.

Coming back to present sensations. They may be incorrigible, but they are so 'radically different,' says Russell, 'from the things that are true or false' that they 'cannot properly be said to be true' (PP. 113). When, in trying to reach certainty, all the possibilities of likely error are whittled away from a judgment, what we are left with is 'knowledge by acquaintance', which is really not knowledge at all in the sense of belief or judgment. It is simply a fact which occurs. By one of those tricks of fate, though by a different route, we have come to the Bradleyian view that truth, in trying to be absolutely true, commits suicide and becomes reality. Such is 'the meeting of extremes in philosophy'!

11. In HK, however, even 'egocentric particulars' such as 'I', 'this', 'here' and 'now', whose 'meaning varies with the speaker and his position in time and space', have a 'constant meaning' in 'some sense', 'which is the reason for the use' of such words. Further, 'one of the aims of both science and common sense is to replace the shifting subjectivity of egocentric particulars by public terms' (84-5). This would be a retrograde step according to the view in the text above about the beneficial 'ambiguity' of words.

A MAKER OF MODERN MAHARASHTRA DADOBA PANDURANG*

(1814-1882)

By

VASANT D. RAO

Bombay has been the craddle of social and political movements in Maharashtra. Yet, perhaps because of the cosmopolitan nature of modern Bombay quite a few people do not take Bombay into consideration while writing the history of Modern Maharashtra.[1] Bombay, being under the British, much before the British conquered the Maratha seat at Poona, the people of Bombay learnt English language and thus got themselves acquainted with the liberal ideas of the West much earlier. After the fall of the Peshwas, Bombay became the capital of the newly created province called the 'Bombay Presidency'. The people of Bombay came directly in contact with the British ruling class and were influenced by them to a great extent. Bombay was fortunate in having Mount Stuart Elphinstone as its first Governor. Together with Jagannath alias Nana Sunkersett (1803-1865)[2] Elphinstone laid the foundation of a new pattern of life in modern Maharashtra.

Sunkersett was ably assisted by Bal Shastri Jambhekar (1812-1846)[3] in the social reform movement. Soon another young man

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1. M. R. Jaykar—In his 'Ashirvad and Dhanyavad' to A. K. Priyolkar, Editor and Author Rao Bahadur Dadoba Pandurang—Purvardh: Atmacharitra, Uttarrardha-Charitra, Bombay, Keshav Bhikaji Dhavale, 1947, p. 40 "I have had to read the work of some historians who have become eminent in Maharashtra. But, to my regret, I found their comments full of secret prejudice against those who built up Bombay in the early days. Those who are at present on the literary front of Maharashtra are apt to suffer from the conceit that Bombay could not have done much for the literary, political or social growth of the Maharashtrian people. In fact, Bombay very rarely enters into their conception of Maharashtra except in connection with political questions like Samyukta Maharashtra. On all other occasions arising out of literary or political history, they safely ignore Bombay and regard it as city known for its promiscuity. But this notion is entirely mistaken both historically and politically."
2. Rao V. D.— A Maker of Modern Maharashtra. Hon'ble Shri Jagannath Sunkersett, Journal of Indian History Vol. XLIII, Part I, No. 127, April; 1965,
3. Bal Gangadhar Shastri Jambhekar 1812-1846. He worked as assistant to the Native Secretary of the Native Education Society after the retirement of Sadashiv Kashinath Chhatre. In 1832 he was appointed private tutor to the Raja of Akkalkot. He was appointed Assistant Professor at the Elphinstone College in

joined this batch of pioneers.   He was Rao Bahadur Dadoba Pandu-
rang (Tarkhadkar).

Dadoba was born at Bombay on May 9, 1814 in a Hindu middle
class family.[4]   As per the then existing custom, he was admitted to
an indigenous school where he studied for about four years and was
then sent to a private high school.   The next year he joined the
Bombay Native School and Book Society.   During his school days
he learnt a number of languages viz.   Portuguese, English, Persian
and Sanskrit.   He seems to be a good student, as he received a few
prizes for proficiency in his studies.   Moroba Canoba,[5] Bal Shastri
Jambhekar, Janardan Vasudevji.[6]   Narayan Dinanathaji,[7] Nana
Moroji[8] and Vinayāk Vasudeo[9] were with him in the school.   During
his school days he was West Scholar.[10]   As a West Scholar, Dadoba
worked in the school, the name of which was changed by that time
to Elphinstone Institution.   After this period he was appointed as

1834. A leading social reformer, Balshastri started *"Darpan"* the first Marathi
    weekly on January 6, 1832. Through the columns of this weekly and his maga-
    zine *"Digdarshan"* he made a strong propaganda for widow remrriage and for the
    re-conversion to Hindiusm of those who or whose forefathers were forcibly con-
    verted to Christianity or Islam. He was one of the first J.P.s appointed in 1840.
4. Dadoba has written his autobiography in which we have a fine reflection of the
    social and political life in Bombay in the first half of the 19th century. Un-
    fortunately his autobiography is not complete. It covers a period from 1814
    to 1848, cf. Priyolkar *op. cit.,* pp. 1:200.
5. Moroba Canoba Vijaykar, 1813-1871. He worked as the Head Translator in the
    Secretariat in 1834. From 1837 to 1840 he was the Native Agent at Satara.
    From 1841 till his retirement in 1869 he worked as Sadar Amin and on a number
    of higher judicial posts of Baroch, Thana, Ahmednagar and Bombay. A lead-
    ing social reformer of the time, he married a widow who was hardly 20 years'
    old on March 13, 1870 (Native Opinion 20-3-1870). Within a year he and his
    newly wedded wife were found dead in a well in the compound of his house
    at Gawalia tank (Wacha, R.F., Mumbaino Bahar pp. 171-175). He was the
    author of *"Ghashiram Kotwal",* a novel.
6. Janardan Vasudevji (Agaskar) 1804-1894. He started his career as the Persian
    Translator and then worked as the Head Prabhu in the Secretariat. For some
    time in 1834, he worked as an editor of the *Darpan.* He held a number of
    judicial posts and was the first Indian to be appointed as a acting Judge of
    the Bombay High Court (1864).
7. Narayan Dinanathji (Velkar) 1818-1870. He was the Marathi Translator at
    Bombay High Court.   He was one of the Secretaries of the Bombay Asso-
    ciation and took great interest in the social reform movement, especially in
    female education.
8. Nana Moroji (Trilokekar) 1822-1895. He worked for some time as the Head
    Master of the Government School at Thana, then served as a translator in
    Sadar Adalat and was raised to be a Magistrate in Bombay. He was one of
    those who played a prominent part in social reform movement.   See G. H.
    Bhide, *Nana Morojinche Charitra,* 1896.
9. Vinayak Vasudeo (Agaskar), brother of Janardan Vasudevji. He was the Head
    Translator in the Persian department of the Bombay High Court. Because of
    his influence with the Government Officers, he was known as *Kala* Governor.
10. Sir Edward West (1782-1828), was the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
    at Bombay. Dadoba has mentioned him as a very impartial person and one
    who was very kind to the Indians. After his death the people from Bombay
    collected a fund and handed it over to the Bombay Native Education Society
    for instituting a scholarship in his name. Dadoba was one of the earliest
    to receive this scholarship, *Darpan May 11, 1832.*

an assistant teacher in the same school (1830) on twenty rupees per month. Though he was an assistant teacher, he was also a student in the higher classes of the same school.

Within a short time, his teachers recommended him as a private tutor to the Nawab of Jawra (near Ratlam). He was at Jawra for about three years and returned to Bombay. On his return, he was appointed as an assistant teacher at the Elphinstone Institution on eight rupees per month. At this time the Native Education Society was looking after education in Bombay Presidency and supervising the working of the government schools. In its place the Government created a Board of Education in 1840. The Board was to consist of six members besides a President. Three out of the six were to be elected by the Native Education Society from amongst its native members. "They were to represent the feelings and wishes of the Native Communities". The remaining three members were to be appointed by the Government to represent the will of the Government.[11] The first three Indian members were Jagannath Sunkersett, Mahomed Ibrahim Muckba and Jamshetjee Jijeebhoy.[12] The Board of Education established the first school in Gujarat at Surat. Dadoba was appointed there as an assistant teacher in 1840 on hundred and fifty rupees per month.

In his autobiography, Dadoba has given a very interesting account of his travel from Bombay to Jawra and also Bombay to Surat. He travelled on foot from his house at Kumbhartukada (near Modern Vitthalbhai Patel road) to Bandra. From Bandra he went to Bassein in a ferry, and from there to Agashi in a bullock cart, again used the ferry from Agashi to Dantora.and then travelled in a bullock cart from Dantora to Surat. His total expenditure was thirty rupees and nine annas.

He was at Surat for about six years. During this period he came in contact with Durgaram Mancharam, the famous Gujarati social reformer. In company with Durgaram and others he started taking interest in social and religious reforms. Green, the Head Master of the Government school at Surat helped him to a great extent. At Green's suggestion Sir Robert Keith Arbuthnot, the Collector of Surat, asked Dadoba to give him private tuition in Gujarati. In 1846 Sir Robert was appointed as the Resident of Baroda. Because of his old acquaintance with Dadoba he recommended Dadoba's name to the Maharaja for a job at Baroda.

11. *G. D.* Vol. 13 of 1840 p. 89.
12. *G. D.* Vol. 32 of 1842 p. 10.

Bal Gangadhar Shastree Jambhekar died on May 17, 1846 and Dadoba was appointed in his place on May 21, 1846 as the acting Superintendent of the Vernacular Schools and the acting Director of the Normal class.[13]   As the Superintendent, he had to tour Poona, Ahmednagar, Solapur and Khandesh districts.   In his report he has made the following observations about the condition of education in our country: "The people of this country are not yet prepared to appreciate the sort of education which is afforded by our schools to their children; their idea of school learning amounting to no more than mere reading, and writing the current hand in which business is transacted, and a little of cyphering, the rest being considered by them as a mere waster of time. They are consequently not very punctual in sending their children to the schools.   This ignorance added to their poverty makes the parents over anxious to remove their children from the schools as soon as they can read and write a little of **Modi** character ... The lower we descend in the scale of caste, the less is the desire or aptitude for our school learning.   Under these desponding circumstances the position of the schoolmaster may easily be imagined, even granting him to be a man of talents and industrious habits.   And, moreover, if the school happens to be in a town where there is an English Government School, his position is still worse, the quarterly egress of the best of the scholars to feed the English school cannot but have the effect of detracting considerably from the merits of his own."[14]

During his career he has referred to the growth of education in a report.   He says: "I have a strong reason to believe that a true knowledge is surely making its way, though slowly, but steadily".[15] While he was moving from district to district inspecting government schools he made valuable notes and submitted a detailed memorandum to the Government about the state of education in the presidency.[16]   He would have been an asset to the education department, but in 1852 he was selected by the Government for one of the then newly created posts of Deputy Collector and Magistrate.[17]

Since 1835, the Government wanted to appoint in the Revenue Department persons who had completed their education in the Native Education Society.   As such persons were appointed as teachers in government schools, the Native Education Society could not comply with the request of the Government.[18]   Yet the society

13. *G. D.* Vol. 28 of 1846 p.29.
14. *The Report of Board of Education*, 1849, p. 21.
15. *Ibid*, p. 22.
16. *Ibid*, 1850-51, p. 143.
17. *Ibid*, 1851-52, p. 63.
18. *Ibid*, 1835, p. 12.

had inquired of its students about their willingness to join the Revenue Department. Six students had offered their names. Dadoba was one of them.[19] The Government was keen to have young educated Indians to serve in the unconvented Civil Service. On March 20, 1852, the Secretary to the Governor wrote to the Secretary of the Board of Education: "It may be gratifying to the Board to know that Vinayak Vasudeo, Dadoba Pandurang, Nana Moroji and Naorojee Byramjee, pupils of the Elphinstone Institute have been selected for the newly created appointments of Deputy Collectors and Magistrates in the consideration of their Educational attainments and good characters."

Though he was appointed in March, 1852 he could not join till May. In a letter dated 11-5-1852 the Government has asked him about the possible time of his joining the new post.[20] Some time there after he took up his duty at Ahmednagar. He was there from 1852 to 1856. During this period, in addition to his duties, he took a great part in the public life of the city. His services were so valuable that in his obituary note a paper observed: "There (at Ahmednagar) he made himself so popular that even to this day, his name is a house-hold word in that part of the presidency."[21] For about a year, he was appointed as a Hujur Deputy Collector at Thana.[22] He was at Thana hardly for a year. But during that short time he made his mark by impartial judgements. He returned to Ahmednagar in 1857. In the 1858 he was retransferred to Thana. After three years of service he retired prematurely on August 27, 1861.[23]

In his book about Swedenborg he has given the cause of this step. He says that he retired because of his liking for a secluded life and his desire to spend time in intellectual persuits. This is certainly true but there was another reason which prompted him to quit the government service. A few years after his death his daughter published his Shishubodh. In it he has frankly explained the reasons for his decision to retire prematurely. He states that in the beginning of his career he was fortunate in having noble souls as his supervisors, but later on he had to work under wicked officers, who were incapable of understanding and who always took pleasure in reprimanding their subordinates. He, therefore, thought it pru-

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19. *G. D.* Vol. 10 of 1836, p. 40.
20. *R. D.* Vol. 97 of 1852, p. 189.
21. *The Times of India,* October 20, 1882.
22. *R. D.* Vol. 34 of 1856, p. 221.
23. *Abstract of the proceedings of the Government of Bombay in the Finance Department, August 1861, Pension Resolution No. 721.*

dent to retire on a small pension and be free from the tutelage of evil minded persons."[24]

After his retirement, Dadoba thought of earning his livelihood by the strength of his pen.   He had a small pension, which he hoped to supplement by his writing.   Perhaps he would have succeeded in his attempt.   Unfortunately for him this was exactly the book period in Bombay.   Because of the American Civil war cotton from the Southern States could not go to England.   There was a sudden demand for the Indian cotton from the British textile industry resulting in an upsurge in the cotton market.   Side by side with cotton a number of other articles were also in heavy demand.   A number of banks and other joint stock companies sprang up in a short time. The people indulged in speculation on a vast scale.   As ill luck would have it, Dadoba too was caught in the vortex of this speculative activity.   Together wih other leading persons of his time, like Jagannath Sunkersett, Bhau Daji, Dadabhai Naorojee, Dadoba lost heavily in this period.   Dadoba had a high regard for Premchand Roychand.[25]   Because of his influence Dadoba invested his life's savings in the share market.   As he has recorded in his *Shishubodh* he lost almost everything.[26]

Dadoba tried for a job in a number of Gujrat States.   Wherever he went, he was well received.   Some rulers presented him with shawls and robes of honour.[27]   The condition in the Princely States was so volatile that Dadoba was advised by his friends not to accept a permanent job.   At the instance of Green, Dadoba had once been to Baroda.   The then heir apparent, had by this time become the ruler of Baroda as Khanderao Maharaj Gaikawad. He gave him some assistance.[28]

In the last days of Dadoba's life, Sir Erskine Perry who knew him as a scholar, wrote to Sir James Fergusson requesting the latter to provide Dadoba with some remunerative work.   Sir James obliged, and Dadoba was appointed the Marathi translator on October 29, 1880.   There was also a suggestion to recognise his "great respectability" by giving him the Shrievalty for the next year.[29]   His brother Dr. Atmaram Pandurang was the Sheriff of Bombay for the

24. Dadoba Pandurang, *Shishubodh*, p. 26.
25. The person whose donation gave The Premchand Roychend Scholarship at the University of Calcutta, and who built the Rajabai Tower at the University of Bombay in memory of his mother.
26. Dadoba Pandurang, *Shishubodh*, p. 14-15.
27. *Subodh Patrika*, October 25, 1882.
28. *Jnanaprakash*, December 9, 1867.
29. Letters dated 15-8-1880 and 21-8-1880 from Chief Secretary, Conne to Hart, the private secretary to the Governor, cited in Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 345, 346.

year 1878-79. It was a practice to give the Shrievalty alternately
to an Indian and a European. So in 1879-80 William Maitland was
the Sheriff. If Dadoba were to be appointed to the post in 1880-81,
he would have succeeded his brother as the Indian Sheriff, hence
Sorabjee Shapurjee Bangalee was appointed to the post. The next
year it being a turn of a European, Major-General W. S. Hawett was
given the Shrievalty. Perhaps Dadoba would have succeeded him,
but destiny willed otherwise. Dadoba died on October 17, 1882.[30]

The Times of India paid him a glowing tribute and requested
the government to look to the maintenance of his family.[31] Writing
in The Indian Spectator, Behramjee Malbari paid him the following
compliments: "As the head of an enlightened family, pioneer of
popular education, an enthusiastic student, a faithful and intrepid
officer and for a Hindu, a singularly bold and outspoken citizen,
Dadoba Pandurang made his mark years ago."[32] The Subodh
Patrika called him a Prince amongst scholars.[33] There was no refe-
rence in the Kesari about his death. But this could be easily ex-
plained. Vishnu Shastri Chiplunkar the editor of the Kesari had
died seven months earlier on March 17, 1882. Agarkar and Tilak,
the leading lights of the Kesari were in the Dongri jail at the time of
Dadoba's death. They were released from jail on October 26, 1882.[34]
Hence the Kesari forgot to mention about his death.

The Pāṇini of Marathi

Dadoba has immortalised his name by preparing a grammar of
Marathi. He wrote this work when he was only twentyfour years
old. Before he published his book in 1836, a few Marathi gram-
mars were already in the field. In the beginning of the nineteenth
century, William Carey and Mohamad Ibrahim Muckba had publish-
ed their Marathi grammars in English. Bal Shastri Jambhekar had
composed his 'Bal Vyakaraṇ in Marathi. Gangadhar Shastri Phadke
had also written in Marathi his 'Maharashtra Bhasheche Vyakaraṇ'
Both these had appeared before Dadoba came in the field. In spite
of this, Dadoba is hailed as the Pāṇini of Marathi. This is because
he was the first to prepare a scientific grammar, based on definite
rules. He had requested the government to accept his work and
publish it. The government referred the matter to Bal Shastri Jam-
bhekar for opinion. Bal Shastri gave the following report[35]:

30. The Times of India, October 22, 1882.
31. Ibid.
32. The Indian Spectator, October 29, 1882.
33. Subodh Patrika, October 22, 1882.
34. Kesari, October 31, 1882.
35. G. D. Vol. 22 of 1836 p. 88.

"I have examined this Grammar with great attention and I am happy in being able to recommend it to the favourable notice of the Committee.   It is clear, well arranged and short, and explains many anomalous points in a satisfactory manner. . . . I recommend therefore that the grammar now offered be accepted and *immediately* published".

In spite of this the Bombay Native Education Society did not undertake the publication.   The government, however, promised to sanction the book for use in their schools.   Dadoba got the book printed in Ganpat Krishnaji's press and published it himself.   He gave fifty copies thereof to the government.   The government again referred the book to Major Candy, the Superintendent of Poona College and Bal Shastri Jambhekar.   About the book Major Candy in his letter dated March 15, 1838 says:[36]

"I beg to report very favourably of the work upon the whole. I think that it does the author great credit, and that it is deserving of the patronage of Government.   It would be a useful work for the senior classes of the Government Marathee Schools and would be a suitable present to deserving scholars at the annual examination."[37]

In his review dated November 11, 1838 Bal Shastri says:

"It is much superior in point of arrangement to another work that has been published by Gangadhar Shastree, on Marathee Grammar, and its definitions are much more clear and precise.   As a first attempt we must make allowance for its few imperfections, which are far from being such as to outweigh its merits.   *It seems in many points to enter into the philosophy of Grammar which has not yet been done in any Grammatical treatise in Marathee."*

Yet Dadoba did not get the expected support immediately. Ultimately in 1840 the government purchased two hundred fifty copies at the rate of one and half rupees per copy, though the price of the book was two and half rupees per copy.

Dadoba revised and enlarged his book and published the second edition in 1850.   A few people jealous of his fame, tried to spread a rumour that Dadoba had copied from Bal Shastri's papers.   He, therefore, quoted in his book the following opinion about him given by Bal Shastri on April 30, 1840.[38]

"In the knowledge of the English language, general literature and science, I consider him equal to the best educated natives of

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36. *G. D.* 1840, Vol. 540, p. 136.
37. *G. D.* 1840, Vol. 540, p. 139.
38. Dadoba Pandurang, *Marathi Bhasheche Vyakaran,* 7th ed. 1879, introduction.

Bombay, while no one among them that I know of is so well acquaint-
ed with the grammatical structure of the Marathi language. He is
the author of a grammar of that language which is deservedly
esteemed as the best work on the subject."

The second edition was prefixed by a detailed introduction.
The next four (1857, 1866, 1869, 1872) were merely reprints. He
once again revised and enlarged it and published the seventh edition
in 1879. This was the last edition published during his life time.

In 1881 he published a supplement of his great *Vyakaraṇ*. To
this he prefixed an English and a Marathi introduction. In his Eng-
lish introduction he has mentioned that his 'philological and etymo-
logical treatise on the structure of the Marathi language' was near-
ing completion. He further wrote that it was "perhaps the last
work on the subject by me". Unfortunately Dadobâ died before the
proposed work could see the light of the day. He completed the
introduction on September 20, 1881 and died on October 17, 1882.

His grammar was a little difficult for the school-children, while
Bal Shastri's grammar was too small. Hence Gangadhar Ram-
chandra Tilak (father of Lokmanya Tilak) prepared in 1858 a small
grammar based on Dadoba's great work.[39]

Yet there was a demand for a book which would cover the sub-
ject adequately and at the same time be within the reach of the
school going students. Hence Dadoba abridged his work and pub-
lished his *Laghu-Vyakaraṇ* in 1865. In his introduction to this book
he has stated that as his bigger work was too difficult for the teachers
to explain to their students, he had brought out an abridged edition
thereof. As soon as the book was published it was recommended
by the government for being used in the schools.[40] This grammar
has so far gone into thirty-three editions and has held the field for
the last hundred years.

For this grammar Dadoba was hailed as the 'Pāṇini' of Marathi
by a large number of scholars. Sardar Gopal Hari Deshmukh
(*Lokhitwadi*) stated that Dadoba framed rules of Marathi grammar
by his own research and therefore should be called the 'Pāṇini' of
Marathi.[41] Vishnu Shastri Chiplunkar who claimed to be "The
Shivaji of Marathi" wrote that there were limitations of grammar to
Sanskrit but Marathi had no such restrictions till the 'Modern
Pāṇini did the work.[42] Scholars like Krishna Shastri Chiplun-

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39. *Marathi Shalapatrak*, Vol. v. No. 1 May 1, 1865, P. 19.
40. *Ibid*, Vol. V, No. 6, October, 1865.
41. *Lokhitwadi*, Nibandh-sangrah, p. 734.
42. Chiplunkar, *Nibandh Mala*, October 1874, p. 6.

kar,[43] Moro Keshav Damle,[44] have praised Dadoba to the skies for his Grammar.

In about 1860 he translated in Marathi 'Rudimentary English Grammar' by Edward Howard. This book was immediately sanctioned by the government for use in the schools. In his introduction to this book he has stated that he had prepared *"The Laghu Kaumudi* with the original *Sūtras* of Pāṇini, translated and explained in Marathi with notes and observations." It seems that this work was not published. In the twentieth edition of the *Lāghu Vyakaraṇ* he has mentioned "An Elementary Grammar of the Persian Language with numerous examples". This too was not published.

A Litterateur

Dadoba wrote the following books—

(1) *Yashoda Pandurangi* (1865)—This is a commentary on Moropant's *Kekavali*. He has used the names of his parents as the title of the book. In this book he has given an interpretation of the Kekavali from a vedantic point of view.

(2) *Dharma Vivechan* (1868)—Under the pen-name *Ek Jagadvasi Arya,* he wrote a small book for the use of the *Manav Dharma Sabha.* In the book he has discussed the real nature of religion. This book was used as a guide by the Paramhamsa Sabha.

(3) *Paramhamsik Bramhadharma* (1880)—This is a booklet containing twenty *Abhangas.* Perhaps these were composed for the use of the Paramhamsa Sabha.

(4) *A Hindu Gentleman's Reflections respecting the works Emanuel Swedenberg* (London, 1878)—For comment see para p. 19.

(5) *The Absurdity of the Holi Festival as it is now practised by the Hindus (Bombay 1829)*—As the title of the book denotes, Dadoba brought to the notice of his compatriots the absurdities practised by them.

(6) Shishubodh (1884)—This book was published by his daughter after his death. In it he has given practical advice to the children based on his experience.

(7) Mabaichya Ovya—Dadoba has himself called it 'a Marathi Poem descriptive and didactic'. The poem was in four parts. Dadoba did not or could not publish it. Unfortunately the original

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43. *Marathi Shalapatrak,* Vol. V, No. 1, p. 18.
44. Damle, M. K. *Shastriya Marathi Vyakaraṇ,* p. 1.

full poem is lost. A part of it has been published by Professor Priyolkar in his book mentioned earlier.

(8) *Vidhavasrumarjan* (1857)—Baba Padmanjee wrote his novel *Yamuna Paryatan* to support the cause of widow re-marriage. At his request Dadoba wrote a paper in Sanskrit making a case in favour of re-marriage. It was written in Sanskrit in order to bring to the notice of the Shastris the real import of our sacred books. The paper was published with the novel and also in a separate book form.

(9) A Prize Essay on the Native Female Education—This essay propounding the cause of female education was published in the Oriental Christian Spectator, August 1841.

(10) *A Marathi translation of Shakuntala*—In his auto-biography he mentions that he had translated Shākuntal in Marathi. But this was not published. Even the manuscript is not traceable. This was the first attempt to translate Shākuntal in Marathi.

In a report submitted to the Board of Education, Bal Shastri Jambhekar has referred to a lexicon in English-Marathi-Gujarati-Hindustani, prepared by Dadoba.[45] Writing an obituary after his death, the **Subodh Patrika** mentions that he had compiled a Marathi-English-Persian-Telagu dictionary.[46]

The Government recognised his place in the world of scholarship by appointing him to the Senate of the University of Bombay in 1864-65. He was also a member of the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Law.

Because of his mastery over Sanskrit, he was appointed to teach that subject at the Sir Jamshetjee Jeejeebhoy Zarthosti Madresa in 1871. He taught there for about three years.

The *Upayukta Jnanprasārak Sabha* was started on September 1, 1848 as a Marathi branch of the Students' Literary and Scientific Society. Dadoba was its first President. The **Sabha** used to have fortnightly meetings. On alternate Thursdays either there was a lecture or a paper reading on some important topic.

He was also a member of the Government Book Committee which was appointed to judge the books submitted for government grants.

45. *G. D.* Vol. 24 A of 1843, p. 650.
46. *Subodh Patrika,* October 22, 1882.

A Religious Reformer

Since the beginning of the ninteenth century, the young educated class was becoming more and more introspective and was doubting the usefulness of the age long religious practices. The missionaries came to India and painted an exaggerated picture of the Hindu beliefs. The real mission work was begun when the Scottish missionaries came to Bombay in 1822. John Wilson who came to Bombay in 1829 soon became a spear head of the missionary activity in Bombay. Robert Cotton Money, the Secretary of the Native Education Society, was also of the same type. He was on the editorial board of the Oriental Christian Spectator. Professor Henderson, the teacher of Dadoba in Elphinstone Institution, writes to John Wilson on October 31, 1842:[47] "I myself thought more solemnly on the truth of christianity and made them the subject of conversation with educated natives".

Dadoba used to ponder over religious practices. In a letter to Professor Henderson dated March 20, 1837 Dadoba writes:[48] "I am unspeakably sorry to say I have not a single book with me ... Some best works on the immortality of the soul, futurity etc., etc., will also be exceedingly welcome· to me ... If either you or Dr. Wilson favour me with the loan of some of these essays, it will be a great obligation conferred upon me." This was a period when educated young men were feeling aghast about the Hindu systems like sati, infanticide, self immolation under the wheels of Jagannāth, etc. The western education made them ponder over the caste system, idolatry, re-marriage etc. Not that christianity did not have similar superstitious but christianity taught in India was of a refined aspect. Hence quite a few people were attracted towards Christianity. Yet, they did not dare to accept Christian faith because of their love for their family and friends. They were just in a delicate mental position. They had practically lost their faith in the Hindu religious beliefs. Yet they did not or could not accept Christianity. On the other hand authors like Tom Paine who wrote:[49] "Christian theory is little else than the idolatry of the ancient mythologists accommodated to the purposes of power and revenue; and it yet remains to reason and philosophy to abolish the amphibious fraud" were directed towards Hindu Renaissance.

While Dadoba was at Surat he was highly impressed by Durgaram Manchharam. About Durgaram, Green writes:[50] "I do not for

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47. *O. C. S.* July 1850, p. 270.
48. *O. C. S.* October 1837, p. 463.
49. Thomas Paine, *Age of Reason*, pp. 4-5.
50. *Report of the Board of Education*, 1846, p. 53.

a moment hesitate to place (him) above all the natives of India. whom I have yet had any opportunity of observing. Without knowing a syllable of English or of any other European language, his manner of thinking and feeling, the energy and fearlessness of his character, his high notions of duty and his perfect freedom from all the Natives prejudices make him much more European than any of even the most thoroughly English taught natives." Durgaram found in Dadoba a person who was devoted yet free from dogmas. In his diary, Durgaram has mentioned Dadoba as a reformer—devotee.[51]

Another person with whom Dadoba used to discuss religious subjects was Green, the Head Master of the Government School at Surat. Green was an agnostic. He used to talk frankly about the weak points of the Christian faith. Upto that time Dadoba had from the missionaries only the bright side of Christianity. From Green he knew the other side too. He was thus in a position to weigh the relative merits and drawbacks of Hinduism and Christianity. After patient reading and discussion, he was convinced that every religion had its strong and weak points. He thought of culling together the good principles of all the religions. With this end in view he wrote a book entitled Dharma Vivechan under the pen-name *Ek Jagadwasi Arya*. In the book he has given the following seven principles—

(1) There is only one God who should be worshipped.

(2) The real religion is devotion to God based on love and morality.

(3) The spiritual religion of all the people is the same.

(4) Every man must have freedom of thought.

(5) Our every day work should be well thought of.

(6) All men belong to the same caste.

(7) Everyone must have the right of education.

(The book was published much later in 1868).

The Mānav Dharma Sabhā

Dadoba was a philosopher and not a man of action. Durgaram, on the other hand, was eager to give some concrete shape to his thoughts. In Dalpatram Bhagubhai and Dinanishankar he had two friends who were of the same opinion. They were highly elated at the presence of Dadoba in their midst. The four 'D's used to meet regularly for religious discourses. In one of their meetings they

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51. Mahipatram Rupram, *Durgaram Charitra*, p. 18.

thought of expounding to the people the true nature of religion. For this purpose they decided to establish an association, where people of similar views could meet and exchange their thoughts. Thus came into being the *Mānav Dharma Sabhā* at Surat on June 22, 1844. The following were the tenets of the *Mānav Dharma Sabhā*:

(1)   There is only one God.

(2)   All people belong to the same caste.

(3)   There is only one religion but because of false sense of pride people think that they belong to different religions.

(4)   The position of men should be based on merit and not on birth.

(5)   One should act in a thoughtful manner.

(6)   One should devote himself to God for His favours.

(7)   The people should be trained to know the good path of life.

Dadoba and Durgaram were the President and the Secretary respectively of the *Sabhā*. From the biography of Durgaram, we have an account of the working of the Sabhā till 1844. The Sabhā launched a successful agitation against magician and jugglers. It played an important part in enlightening public opinion about the correct attitude towards religion. Perhaps the time was not yet propitious enough for such a move. We have no measure to gauge the achievements of the *Sabhā*.

In the beginning of 1846, Dadoba was transferred to Bombay. With his transfer, his association with the *Sabhā* came to an end. In 1852, Durgaram was appointed as Deputy Education Inspector at Rajkot. Perhaps, the *Sabhā* stopped functioning, sometime thereafter.

The Paramahamsa Sabhā

There is a dispute about the exact year of the establishment of the *Paramahamsa Sabhā*. But as has been stated by Narayan Raghunath who later on became a Christian, it must have been founded in 1850.[52]   This is also corroborated by Shivanath Shastri who writes:[53] "As early as 1849 a number of young men formed themselves into something like a secret association called Paramahamsa Sabhā." The main aim of the Sabhā was to break the caste system, which according to it was anti-national. As a practical step towards this, every member had to undergo a ritual. At every meeting of the Sabhā,

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52. Baba Padmanjee, *Arunodaya*, p. 408.
53. Sivanath Sastri, *History of the Brahmo Samaj*, Vol. II, 1812, p. 411.

the members present took a piece of bread baked by a Christian.[54]
A similar ceremony was performed at the *Mānav Dharmā Sabhā*
also.[55]   Baba Padmanjee states that after eating the piece of bread
every member had to sip milk from the same glass.[56]   He also men-
tions that when a member stole the list of the names of the members
and threatened to publish it, the members were frightened and the
Sabhā was broken. Neither of these are supported by any evidence.
The *Sabhā* had a fairly large membership. Ordinarily the members
met secretly. Some of them felt like working in an open manner.
After the death in 1866 of Ram Balkrishna Jaykar the founder pre-
sident of the *Sabhā*, Sabhā slowly disintegrated. Those who believ-
ed in working openly, started the *Prārthanā Samāj* in 1867 with
Dr. Atmaram Pandurang, the brother of Dadoba, as its first presi-
dent.

Though the members of the *Paramahamsa Sabhā* partook of a
piece of bread baked by a Christian (the story about sipping milk
from the same glass is given by Baba Padmanji, but is not corrobo-
rated by anyone else), they were not licentious in matters of food
and drink. The partaking of bread was a symbolic ritual. In a
book about their practices, they make it very clear that those who
wished to eat fish and meat may do so, but should not force others
to follow them.[57]

The prayers composed by Dadoba were sung before and after
every meeting of the *Sabhā*. This brings out very clearly the theis-
tic nature of the Sabhā. Dadoba in his book on religions discourse
states that nothing given in the book was his, but that everything
was taken from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads.[58] In the same book
he expounds at length on the importance of morality in public life.
He maintains that knowledge divorced from morality is just like
soot and must be discarded. The ethical bias of his views need not
be elaborated further.

A few years after the death of Dadoba, Sir Narayan Chanda-
varkar, writing under the pen name 'Rajakīya Rishi' made the
following observation:

"Social reform in Bombay commenced fifteen years later than
in Calcutta under almost similar circumstances and shared in the
end nearly the same fate. The two movements were not of-course
alike in all points. For instance, the practical Mahratta was less

54. Chandavarkar, N. G., *Prārthanā Samājachā Itihas*, p. 18.
55. Mahipatram Rupram, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
56. Baba Padmanjee, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
57. Dadoba Pandurang, *Paramhamsik Bramhadharma*, p. 7.
58. Ek Jagadwasi Arya, *Dharma Vivechan*, p. 47.

impulsive than the imaginative Babu and unlike the latter worked secretly to put down the caste, nor did he go in, like the latter, for steaks of beef to herald the change that he wished to bring in. Yet .in the case of both, the principle of action was the same—viz. the demolition of caste distinctions. As in Bengal they had Mr. K. M. Banerjee for their leader. so in Bombay the movement was led by Mr. Dadoba Pandurang—two men who might be said to have been ¡cast almost in the same mould. Both were Sanskrit scholars of re- pute in their days, and were widely acquainted with Christian teachings and philosophy. The spiritual element was active in both, with this difference, though, that while Mr. Bannerjee became a convert to Christianity Mr. Dadoba passed through life with strong Christian leanings at times, often wavering and doubting, as his mind had a speculative turn, which the more he thought and felt on religious questions, loved the more to roam, rather than rest in question of religious truth. But it was in the capacity to lead that they resembled each other most and the strong point of the one—his ardour, his burning sense of indignation against every form of social wrong and his infusive spirit—enabled him in Bombay as it had enabled the other in Calcutta to become the centre of a group of ready followers."[59]

Sir Narayan wrote these lines a quarter of a century after the *Paramahamsa Sabhā* had ceased to exist. From his writing it is evi- dent that he was very much misinformed about the activities of the *Sabhā*. It may also not be wrong to surmise that a *Savant* like Chandavarkar did not collect sufficient information about Krishna Mohan Banerjee, with whom he bracketed Dadoba. If he were to get himself acquainted with the events leading to the conversion of K. M. Banerjee, he would not have written that Banerjee and Dadoba were "cast almost in the same mould".

Let me now examine Sir Narayan's charge that Dadoba "passed through life with strong Christian leanings". Right since the days of his youth, Dadoba was very inquisitive about religion. He was always in an introspective mood about the Hindu belief and prac- tices. While in pursuit of religious truths Dadoba came across Ema- nuel Swedenborg's *'Heaven and its wonders and Hell'*. He was so much impressed by the book that he wrote to his friend Ram Bal- krishna Jayakar who was then (1863) in England and asked for translation of Swedenborg's other works. After digesting Sweden- borg he wrote a paper entitled "A Hindu Gentleman's Reflections respecting the Works of Emanuel Swedenborg". This paper was

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59. *Indu Prakash,* May 25, 1885.

published by the Swedenborg Society in London in 1878. In the
paper Dadoba has referred to his deep study of the doctrines of
Christianity. He compared Swedenborg's theory with Hindu philo-
sophy and has very cleverly pointed to the superiority of the latter.
Of course, he was highly impressed by the humanitarian appeal of
Christianity, but that does not mean that he had "Christian lean-
ings". He was essentially a humanist.[60] He was hurt by the in-
human practices pervading in the Hindu Society and, therefore, he
attempted to raise a standard of revolt. It may be remembered that
this charge of having "Christian leanings" was made against other
social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Jotirao Phooley.
For some time it was a fashion to label all those who tried to cleanse
the augean stables of Hindu orthodoxy as anti-Hindu and pro-Chris-
tian. Of course Sir Narayan was not one of those who would make
such a charge against any one in a light vein. Yet he said so because
of his failure to collect proper and correct information about
Dadoba's religious views.

Krishna Mohan Bannerjee with whom Sir Narayan has com-
pared Dadoba was a follower of Henry Derozio, a professor at the
Hindu College, Calcutta. Derozio had formed a small discussion
group of young Indians with whom he used to discuss religious and
philosophical subjects. In their meetings "Hindu religion was de-
nounced as vile and corrupt and unworthy of the regard of rational
beings."[61] On a complaint being lodged against him, Derozio resign-
ed in order to avoid dismissal.

K. M. Banerjee and his friends went to the extent of throwing
beef in the houses of the neighbouring Brahmins. Upon this the
Brahmins threatened his father with social boycott. The father had
to show door to his son. Banerjee left his father's house and went
to live with his friend Daxina Ranjan Mukerjee. He confessed that
he "was perfectly regardless of God."[62] Ultimately he embraced
Christianity on October 17, 1832.

The account given above amply proves that it is most unfair to
say that Dadoba and K. M. Banerjee were "cast almost in the same
mould".

While reviewing Dadoba's paper on Emanuel Swedenborg's
works, Justice Ranade writes:[63] "R. B. Dadoba Pandurang deserved-

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60. When he was a child of about five or six years old, he used to have profound
    sympathy for any beggar coming to his house. Even at that tender age he
    used to ponder over the melancholy condition of the beggars. He used to
    insist on his parents giving some alms to them. Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
61. Edwards Thomas, *Henry Dorozio*, p. 121.
62. Smith, Dr. George, *Life of Dr. A. Duff*, Vol. I, p. 155.
63. *Quarterly of the Sarvajanik Sabha*, Poona Vol. I, No. 3, January 1879, p. 42.

ly occupies a foremost place in the ranks of thoughtful inquirers after religious truth, and the fact that his letter to the Swedenborgian or New Church has been published by that body in London is a great compliment. It is a great relief to us to find that, as the result of fifty years' study, Dadoba though he reveres the Holy Bible and had made Christianity the favourite study of his life, has failed to accept the current doctrines of the Christian religion as a satisfactory solution of the problems of life and death."

It may not be wrong to compare Dadoba with Raja Ram Mohan Roy. Like Ram Mohan, Dadoba was a deep student of comparative religions. He was one of the first to feel the necessity of a Hindu Renaissance. For this purpose, he established the *Mānav Dharma Sabhā* in 1844. Though he did not formally join the *Paramahamsa Sabhā*, it is well known that he was the philosopher behind it. His brother Dr. Atmaram Pandurang was an active member of the *Sabhā*. In the share mania of 1865, Dadoba sustained a heavy loss. This explains his absence in the list of those who founded the *Prārthanā Samāj* in 1867. It may however be noted that his brother Atmaram was the founder president of the Prārthanā Sāmaj.

A Social Reformer

Dadoba turned towards religious reforms because of his exasperation at certain Hindu beliefs and practices. It is, therefore, needless to say that he belonged to the front rank of the social reformers of the nineteenth century. In his auto-biography he hits hard against superstitions. At Nasik the local priests urged upon him to take a ceremonial bath in the river. He refused to do so and told the priests that he did not believe in the claim that a dip in the Godavari secures a place in heaven.[64] At another place he deprecates the food taboos observed amongst different castes. He also deplores the system of tonsuring widows.[65] He expresses utter disdain for the false beliefs and orthodox rituals. He observes that many a man feels that his family practices constitute the essence of Hindu religion. He was feeling very uneasy for such beliefs and was eager to bring about a desirable change.

He did not believe in unnecessary rigours in life. Not only this, but he also says that people who enjoy life are generally liberal in their outlook and have a sympathetic attitude towards the poor and the needy.[66] In the same mood he has a word of appreciation for the Marathi *Lavaṇīs* (love ballads), which at that time were look-

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64. Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
65. *Ibid*, p. 135, 136.
66. *Ibid*, pp. 94 and 108.

ed upon as rather low (if not indecent) because of their amorous contents.[67]

He championed the cause of female education in a thoughtful manner. He wants women to be well educated, because on them depends to a large extent the upbringing of children. How can a mother make finer impressions on the tender mind of a child if she has not received the blessings of good education?[68] For this purpose, he wants women to be well trained. In his essay on the Native Female Education, he describes the hopeless position of the women in India, and then states the advantages of educating them. He mentions that he and his friends made successful experiments in their respective families in this respect.[69]

The *Punarvivāhottejak Mandaḷī* was established in Bombay on December 14, 1865, to encourage widow re-marriage. Dadoba was one of its founder members.[70] He was present at the re-marriage of Venubai with Pandurang V. Karmarkar.[71] He pronounces a eulogy on Durgaram for the latters' propaganda for widow re-marriage.[72] It will thus be seen that he was keenly interested in the social reform movement and that his sympathy with the cause was quite active.

The caste system made an adverse effect on him when he was yet to enter his teens. While he was in the Marathi school; one day his teacher received an order to oust the Maratha, Koli, Kunabi and Bhandari boys. As Dadoba remarks some of these boys were very well up in their studies. The so-called advanced caste Hindus led by Dhackji Dadaji,[73] the Pathare Prabhu leader of the re-actionaries, insisted upon their removal on the ground that they would not like these boys to sit side by side with their children. It seems that Dhackji felt that if the children of the lower castes were well educated, they would break the monopoly in the government jobs enjoyed

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67. *Ibid*, pp. 118 and 173.
68. *Ibid*, p. 11.
69. *Ibid*, p. 336.
70. Havaldar, G. R., *Rao Saheb Vishwanath Narayan Mandlik Yanche Charitra,* p. 303.
71. Moroba Canoba, *Marriage of Hindu Widows.*
72. Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, p.154.
73. Dhackji Dadaji took a prominent part in the public life of Bombay. He built the Dhackleshwar temple at Mahalaxmi, Bombay. He was one of the first thirteen justices of Peace (*G. D.* Vol. 12, of 1834, p.   ). The Pathare Prabhus, being the earliest to learn English, were known for their liberal views in matters social. Yet, when one of them, Rao Bahadur Moroba Canoba formed a society for encouraging widow remarriage, Dhackji Dadaji stoutly opposed them (Rao V. D.. *Ideas Motivating Political and Social Evolution in Maharashtra During the Nineteenth Century,* Journal of the University of Bombay Vol. XXXII, Parts 1 and 4, July 1963, January 1964, p. 7, 8). He also stood against Balshastri Jambhekar in the latter's efforts to give a '*Prayaschitta*' to Shripat Sheshadri (Ibid, p. 16). He was for some time a . Diwan of the Gaikwad of Baroda. (Wachcha, R.F., *Mumbaino Bahar,* p.   )

by the higher castes.   Quite a large number of people shared his views and appreciated his foresight.   This incident happened in 1828.   Referring to it in his auto-biography written in 1870, Dadoba states that he did not feel like blaming old Dhackji, because even then (i.e. in 1870) quite a few educated people had such a 'knot' in their minds.   His tone is one of deep regret for such a state of affairs.[74]

In 1836, his friend Nana Narayan wrote to Wilson suggesting that the non-bramhins should be admitted to the Poona College.[75]

With a sense of sorrow he refers to the distinctions between castes and sub-castes amongst the Gujaratis of Surat.   He also deplores their ways of slighting the so called lower castes.[76]

While discussing the causes of the debacle of the Indians in the *Mānav Dharma Sabhā* (8-9-1844), he attributed it to the caste system. He argued that because of this system only one (the Kshatriyas) among four could wield a weapon, hence a large section of the populace was denied the privilege of defending their country against the aggressors.[77]

Though he deprecated the system, he cannot be dubbed as an anti-brahmin.   He accepted the intellectual superiority of the Brahmins.[78]   It is because of this frame of mind, he did not shine as an anti-caste crusader.   We do not find Jotiba's vehemence or Lokahitwadi's fervour in Dadoba's denunciation of the caste system.   The difference dould be easily explained.   While Jotiba and Lokahitwadi were propagandists, Dadoba was a philosopher.

A glowing tribute to his contribution to the cause of social reform was paid by Mahipatram Ruparam who dedicated his biography of Durgaram to Dadoba in the following words: Dedicated to Rao Bahadur Dadoba Pandurang—Leader of the band of Reformers who so boldly and nobly attempted, 35 years ago, to dispel ignorance and superstition from their fellow-citizens at Surat."

Politics

Dadoba did not take part in politics in the usual sense of the term.   He was not a member of the Bombay Association when that

74. Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-47.
75. *Oriental Christian Spectator*, 1836, p. 117 of "The youth of certain castes, however well a washed and clothed, dare not enter the Elphinstone Institution. The vernacular pantojis drive the children of certain tribes altogether from their schools.   None but Brahmins, 'the Gods upon earth' are admissible to the Sanskrit College, Poona".   (Wilson, *Evangelization of India*, 1849, p. 338).
76. Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, p. 192, 193.
77. Mahipatram Rupram, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
78. Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

institution was established in 1852. His name, however, was on the
list of its members when it was re-vitalised by Vishwanath Narayan
Mandlik in 1867.[79] Yet it cannot be said that he took an active
interest in the political activities of his time. From his auto-biog-
raphy we can have an inkling of his inclinations.

In his early life he had a warm admiration for the British
people and their administration in India. While crossing the Sin-
dhwa Ghat in the Satpura range, he noted with pleasure that the
Bhils, who a few years earlier were looked upon as robbers, were
guarding the Ghat. He compares the British system with the
Peshwa's administration and has encomium for the former.[80] He
expresses pleasent surprise when he saw Major Borthwick, the
political agent of Mahidpore taking part in the folk dance of the
Bhils. He feels that if the Marathas and the Rajputs had shown
similar attitude towards the wild people, there would have been
peace in the area.[81] He also mentions the treatment meted out to
him by his students and by one Ardeshir Dhanji Shah of Surat whom
he helped to come out of a difficult position, and compares the same
with the generous outlook of the British officers.[82]

Unfortunately, he could not hold this opinion for a long time.
As has been already narrated earlier, he had a very bad experience
of the English officers, so much so that he had to take a decision
to retire when he was barely forty-seven years old.

While he was a Deputy Magistrate at Ahmadnagar, Northern
India was rocked by the great upheaval of 1857. The faint echoes
of the rising were heard in Maharashtra at Satara, Kolhapur, Bom-
bay and such other places. About the same time there was a riot
organised by a large number of Bhils under Bhagoji and Pathaji
Naik in the Northern part of Ahmadnagar. This was in no way
related to the uprising of 1857, yet by way of precaution the Col-
lector thought it necessary to remove the treasury to the fort. On
being consulted, Dadoba opined that such a step would create panic
in the city. He personally undertook the work of patrolling the
city. He thus succeeded in maintaining peace in the city.

After the Arms Act of 1857, he was entrusted with the thank-
less task of unarming the Bhils. This onerous duty was carried on
by him to the satisfaction of both the parties.[83]

79. Havaldar, G. R., *Rao Saheb Mandlik Yanche Charitra*, Vol. I, p. 241.
80. Priyolkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 95, 96.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 159, 175.
83. *The Times of India*, 10-11-1857.

We have a glimpse of his political philosophy from an incident mentioned in a report of the Manav Dharma Sabha:

On Thursday, August 29, 1844, a serious riot broke out in Surat. This was the outcome of the popular indignation against the salt tax. It was quietened only after the local officers promised to make a representation to the higher authorities. The matter was discussed in one of the meetings of the Sabha. When a member condemned the action of the rioteers, Dadoba disagreed with him. He said that when the people are persecuted by the rulers, they have every right to rise in rebellian. He even advocated a change of rulers under such circumstances. He thought it proper for all good people to help such a cause, because their duty lies in protecting people from a tyrant. Going a step further he argued that one should resist an evil government even at the cost of one's life. If a ruler looked to the economic prosperity of his subjects in one country and impoverished those who were under him in another remove him, and place another well meaning ruler on the throne. He maintained that a ruler must govern in the interest of the governed.[84]

The poignancy of these words becomes more acute when we remember that they were uttered in 1844. A hundred years later, anyone would have used a much stronger language, but to do so in 1844 clearly brings out the courage of conviction of the speaker. Though his feelings were so sharp, it is a matter of doubt whether he would ever have thought of translating the same in action, yet we cannot blame him. The first two generations of educated Indians did a yeoman's service by awakening the people and making them understand the true nature of matters political and social.

Letters of Bhāskar Pāndurang

Dadoba's younger brother Bhāskar (1816-1847) published eight letters under the pen-name "A Hindoo" in the Bombay Gazette. The first one appeared in the issue of July 30, 1941. The eighth and the last was in the issue of October 27, 1841. The letters were wonderfully outspoken. He told the Englishmen that their trading system "more effectively emptied our purses in a few years than the predatory excursions of" Ramoshis and Pendharis. He further writes: "I admit you do not exercise open tyranny such as the Mahomedans and other barbarians did but why should you do so, when all kinds of aggressions could be committed under the garb of law and jus-

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84. Mahipatram Rupram, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-105.

tice." (His letters cannot be fully dealt with in the present paper. They must be edited and reprinted elsewhere.)

Dadoba highly appreciated the style and the contents of his brother's letters. He says that his brother wrote these letters after realising the selfish nature of the British rule, and that their main topic was the welfare of the people.

Perhaps Dadoba was a true representative of a class which had understood the true nature of the British rule, but who, not withstanding that, were trying to take their people further by educating them.

ANTHROPOLOGY AND IMPERIAL RULE : SIR ALFRED LYALL AND THE USE OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE DEVELOPED IN INDIA AFTER 1857

By

ROGER OWEN

For the British in India the Revolt of 1857 was a disconcerting reminder that the process of trying to westernise an Asian country was a difficult and dangerous experiment. Inevitably it led to a prolonged debate, begun even before the fighting was over, about what had gone wrong and why it was that a part of the sepoy army and numerous civilians had risen up in revolt. It also led to a considerable change in government policies in the years which followed. All this has been described many times. But there is one aspect of the impact of the rebellion about which a great deal less has been written: the incentive it gave a number of British officials to look more closely at Indian society in an effort to discover how it was being changed by British rule. As a result much that was new was learned about Indian religious and social organisation. In some cases the knowledge was put to direct use in framing government policy. More rarely it was employed in an attempt to construct a theory of Indian social development based on the methods to be found in the works of the early anthropologists. It was no accident that it was the decade which saw the publication of Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law* (1861) and J. F. McLennan's *Primitive Marriage* (1865), as well as the founding of the Anthropological Association in London in 1863, which also saw the first efforts at a "scientific" examination of Indian society.

A central figure in this two-fold process of using a study of Indian society both as a guide to imperial policy and as the raw material for the development of theory was Sir Alfred Lyall (1835-1911). His importance lies in three related directions. First, not only was Lyall a close friend of Maine but he was also the first man to employ many of the ideas to be found in the *Ancient Law* in an Indian context. In addition, he was acquainted with Herbert Spencer, Frederic Harrison and others who were leading exponents of these Positivist ideas which had such a fundamental influence on early anthropological thought. Second, Lyall was the author of a series

of articles, later incorporated in one work, *Asiatic Studies—Reli-gious and Social* (1st ser. 1882), which were a serious, although it must be admitted, a not very well-sustained, effort to analyse the basic elements within Indian society. Third, as a result of his views in the *Asiatic Studies,* and also of the important posts he came to hold at the end of his Indian career Lyall became one of the most influential men in India, someone whose advice was sought on al-most every major issue. He was thus in a position to make sure that his ideas did not go unregarded.

The purpose of this article is to provide an account of some of Lyall's most important ideas, as well as to look at their effect on his thinking about British imperial rule. An attempt will also be made to assess the impact of his thought on certain aspects of gov-ernment policy. It will begin with a description of his investiga-tions into Indian religious and social organisation while on service in the Central Provinces (1865-73) and in the Rajput States (1874-8). There will then be a brief account of certain works written by Lyall after his retirement in 1888 when he returned to his early study of Indian society. Finally, the article will conclude with an assessment of the influence of Lyall's thought on the policies pur-sued by the British in India and elsewhere.

Alfred Lyall was born in 1835, the son of a well-to-do clergy-man.[1] He was educated at Eton and then at Haileybury, from where he set out for Calcutta in November 1855. Once in India he asked to be sent to the North West Provinces. He was posted to a town not far from Meerut and within little more than a year found himself in the thick of the fighting which marked the first stage of the Revolt. It was the events of this period which first seem to have aroused his interest in questions relating to the Bri-tish government of India. As he wrote home in 1859:

> I always find myself diverging into Indian politics, for I am interested heart and soul in the affairs of the country, and am always thinking of the probable future of our Empire and trying to conceive it possible to civilise an enormous nation by the mechanical process of the present times by establishing schools and missionary societies. Also, having civilised them, and taught them the advantages of liberty and the use of Euro-pean sciences, how are we going to keep them under us, and to persuade them that it is for their own good that we keep all the high offices of government.[2]

Such preoccupations were to continue for the rest of his life.

1. For details of Lyall's life, see Sir H.M. Durand, *Life of Sir A. C. Lyall* (London, 1913).
2. *Ibid.,* p. 89.

After writing this letter Lyall spent another six years in the North West Provinces before being transferred to a district in the Central Provinces in 1865. It was here that his interest in the effects of British rule on Indian society took a more constructive form, for it was while serving in a number of posts under the energetic Chief Commissioner, Sir Richard Temple, that he was forced to pursue his habitual observation of Indian social and religious organisation in a more disciplined way by the need to contribute to, and later to edit, the first gazetteers, those vast compendia of information about the geography and the economy and the population of each particular district under British control which were, it seems, the particular brain-children of Temple himself.[3] Lyall spent some years under Temple editing the Gazetteer of the Central Provinces, sifting through the large amounts of data provided by the magistrates, collectors and others and trying to reduce it to manageable proportions. Later, he was the sole editor of the Gazetteer for West Berar, or the so-called Hydrabad Assigned Districts, which first appeared in 1870.

It was the information collected and edited during these years which formed the basis for much of Lyall's thinking about the development of Indian society. But before giving a brief analysis of the major tenets of his thought, it would be useful to say something about the influence of Maine, McLennan and [the] other early anthropologists on his whole approach to the subject. As he freely acknowledged, it was they who provided him with the methods by which random observations could be ordered and by which different social groups could be analysed.

To begin with, Lyall, like Maine and McLennan, was a firm believer in the utility of what was then known as the "comparative method", the basis of which consisted in the recognition of certain similarities between the political and social institutions of contemporary "primitive" peoples and those of the communities which had existed in Europe many centuries before.[4] Given the prevailing assumption that human progress could be seen as a linear movement from "barbarism" to civilisation, it was then supposed that it was possible to undertake the systematic classification of different societies with the object of constructing a hypothetical sequence illustrating the historical development of mankind. Two implications followed. *One*, just as Maine and McLennan regarded it as legitimate to assume that you could learn much about Europe's past

3. J. H. Rivett-Carnac, *Many Memories* (London, 1910), p. 13.
4. For the use of the comparative method at this time, see G. Lienhardt, *Social Anthropology* (London, 1964), ch. 1 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Essays in Social Anthropology* (London, 1962), ch. 1; and T. K. Penniman, *A Hundred Years of Anthropology*, 2nd edn. (London, 1952), pp. 152-4.

by looking at Asia's present, Lyall believed that you could also use
this process in reverse and fill in certain gaps in India's recent
history by studying developments in Europe many centuries before.
Two, the comparative method provided a means, not only of classi-
fying different societies in different parts of the world, but it also
suggested that it was possible to "rank" different social groups
within India itself, according to the level of development they had
reached.

Lyall's second debt to the early anthropologists can be seen in
the way in which he used McLennan's theories about the central
role played in a 'primitive' society by the rules governing the
choice of marriage partner. For Lyall, the analysis of such rules
was basic to his efforts to understand the role of caste and clan in
Indian life and also to his attempts to explain the way in which
these institutions had developed.[5]

Finally, Lyall seems to have been greatly influenced by the
ideas of Maine and other Positivist thinkers that the belief system
of a particular society was moulded by its communal needs, and
thus that, as needs changed, so too did beliefs. In Main's words:

> ...the usages which a particular society are found to have
> adopted in its infancy and its primitive seats are generally
> those which are best suited to promote its physical and moral
> well-being; and if they are retained in their integrity until new
> social wants have taught new practices, the upward march of
> society is certain.[6]

Lyall also followed Maine in his assertion that, though men were
led to match beliefs with needs, they often did this without pro-
perly knowing what they were doing.[7] Hence, although they ob-
served customs of obvious social utility they were incapable of
understanding why they did so, with the result that they were left
to invent false, superstitious reasons for their activity. In the
words of J. W. Burrow, Maine regarded man as "an incompetent
sociologist".[8] Lyall, on the other hand, whose interest was mainly
with Indian religions and with the "superstitions" with which they
were so intimately connected, sometimes changed the emphasis a
little and was more ready to regard man as "an incompetent
scientist".[9] As he saw it Man's efforts to come to terms with his

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5. Lyall's debt to McLennan can be seen clearly in his section of the *Berar
   Gazetteer* devoted to the study of local marriage in terms of McLennan's con-
   cept of "exogamy", *Gazetteer for the Hydrabad Assigned Districts, commonly
   called Berar* (Bombay, 1870), pp. 187-9.
6. *Ancient Law* (London, 1861), p. 15.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
8. *Evolution and Society* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 167.
9. This is also Burrow's phrase, *Ibid.*

horrible fears of a dark, capricious universe led him to personify or to deify natural forces and thus, of course, to a completely "unscientific" approach to what was actually taking place in nature. "Here in India. more than any other part of the world", he wrote in that section of the *Berar Gazetteer* devoted to "Religion and Castes",

> do men worship what they understand least. Not only do they adore strange phenomena and incomprehensible forces—being driven by incessant awe of the invisible power to propitiate every unusual shape or striking natural object—but their pantheistic piety leads them to invest with a mysterious potentiality the animals which are most useful to man, and even the implements of his profitable trade.[10]

It is now possible to return to Lyall's own theories about Indian society, based on the observations he made in the Central Provinces.[11] One is of particular importance and lies at the root of almost all he was to write about India in the years which followed: his belief that Indian society had built in divisive tendencies. Of these by far the most important was religion, acting through the agency of caste. Uusing Max Müller's three-fold classification of the formation of Indian castes—ethnological, political, and professional—he went on to add a fourth, the sectarian, "meaning the castes which are produced by differences of religion, by new gods, new rites, new views, and new dogmas".[12] It was castes organized on this last, religious basis with strict rules forbidding marriage or even the sharing of food with outsiders which, according to Lyall, acting constantly as a wedge upon Indian society, subjecting it to "perpetual morcellement" by splitting existing groups into smaller sub-groups and by creating more and more new divisions. Some of the ways in which this process took place are described in the *Berar Gazetteer* and in his article "Religion of an Indian Province". One which he mentions is that a man might break the matrimonial rules of his caste and be forced to leave it. Later, in the course of time, he, or perhaps his children, might draw together with others in a similar position and a new sub-caste would be formed. Alternatively, the excommunicated man might seek to vindicate himself by preaching a new doctrine and so, by this method, gather a group of followers around him. Another way in

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10. *Gazetteer of the Hydrabad Assigned Districts,* pp. 189-90.
11. Lyall's principle theories based on his Central Provinces experiences can be found in three articles first published in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1872 and then republished in the *Asiatic Studies,* 1st ser. (London, 1882) as "Religion of an Indian Province" (ch. 1), "Our Religious Policy in India" (ch. 8) and "The Religious Situation in India" (ch. 9).
12. "Religion of an Indian Province", p. 5. For Mueller's analysis of the origins of caste, cf. his *Chips from a German Workshop* (London. 1867), ii. pp. 319-46.

which, according to Lyall, new castes were formed stemmed from
the Hindu practice of setting up tutelary deities without number
who watched over the interests of special classes and callings, and
who were served by special rites peculiar to their shrines. New
deities of this type were constantly being recruited from the ranks
of hermits, ascetics, and even men who had been known for one
particular virtue in a wordly career. After death a shrine would
be established at their grave—they were not cremated as other
men—and, gradually, a group of people would collect round it,
eventually forming a new caste of its own.

One of the most important effects of British rule, however, was
to diminish the vitality by which fresh sectarian divisions were
constantly being created: and, according to Lyall, this tendency was
certain to increase as the years went by. As evidence for this he
was later to cite the introduction of new laws, for example the
Native Marriage Act as it had existed before amendment by Maine
in the 1860s, which made illegitimate the children of people expel-
led from their caste. By increasing the penalties for leaving a
particular caste, the law automatically increased the hold which it
possessed over its members and inhibited the formation of new sub-
groups.[13] Again, more importantly, the British were engaged in the
task of transforming the whole Indian environment: with their
trains which reduced journeys to a fraction of their former length,
their schools where children could obtain a European education,
their public works, and with their emphasis on law and order.
This, in turn, was bound to have far-reaching effects on Indian re-
ligious beliefs and social organization. It was not merely a ques-
tion of the rational, sceptical, questioning attitude of mind which
the British had brought to India and which, as Lyall asserted, had
produced among the Indians "an advanced party of those who are
easily inculcated with the Voltairian spirit, with contempt for irra-
tional beliefs and for institutions which seem absurd on the face
of them".[14] But, as a country's religion was always so intimately
connected with its political organization, its system of laws, and its
material condition, any radical change in this latter would, in-
evitably, involve the former. Thus, he wrote:

> The beliefs of the multitude are the reflections of their
> social and political history through many generations. Now
> that the Hindus have been rescued by the English out of a
> chronic state of anarchy, insecurity, lawlessness and preca-
> rious exposure to the caprice of despots, they will surely intro-
> duce, at least, some ideas of our rule, organized purpose, and

13. "Sir Henry Maine", *Law Quarterly Review*, iv, 14, (April, 1888), p. 133.
14. "The Religious Situation in India", p. 302.

moral law, into their popular conceptions of the ways of their gods towards man. It seems certain at any rate, that wider experience, nearer and more frequent inter-course with the outside world, and the general education of modern life, must soon raise even the masses above the mental level that can credit contemporary miracles and incarnations, however they may still hold to the prodigies of older tradition. And this will be enough to sever the tap-root of a religion which now, like the banyan tree which it venerates, strikes fresh roots from every branch, discovers a new god under every mystery and wonder.[15]

What was to replace the old beliefs? Here Lyall's answer is less certain. Although he was sure that the small group of western-educated Indians would give up religion altogether, there could be no question of the great majority of the people abandoning their traditional faiths. Just as he believed that higher education could lead only to atheism,[16] he was also convinced that the harsh nature of the Indian environment would always demand some kind of spiritual response from those who continued to live outside the large towns.[17] One possibility he sometimes seems to have put forward was that there might be a move up the religious scale, that is away from 'naturalism' towards 'supernaturalism'. Evidence for this comes from his assertion that British rule was leading to the end of "simple paganism" and idolatry.[18] On the other hand, his account of the religious situation in Berar, in which he attempts to classify the beliefs of different groups in an ascending order from the worship of sticks and stones to that of "the supreme gods of Hinduism",[19] leaves the reader in doubt as to whether he supposed that all people could be expected to progress naturally from the "lower" to the "higher". Indeed, there is one passage in which he seems to be suggesting that any movement up the religious scale was, inevitably, followed by a counter movement downwards. Describing the founder of a sect called the Manshaus, he wrote:

> Men of this temperament have constantly come forth in India, who, by their creative intellectual originality, joined to a spiritual kind of life, have stirred up great movements and aspirations in Hinduism, and have founded sects which endure to this day: but it has almost invariably happened that the later followers of such a teacher have undone his work of moral reform. They have fallen back on evidences of miraculous birth,

15. "Religion of an Indian Province", pp. 28-9.
16. Cf. his letter to his Mother, 22 February 1856, *Lyall Papers* (Indian Office Library), MSS. Eur. F. 132/2.
17. Cf. his review article, "Christianity and the Brāhma Samāja" (n. d. 1873?), a copy of which is in *Lyall Papers* MSS. Eur. F. 132/49.
18. "Religion of an Indian Province", p. 29.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-27.

upon signs and wonders, and a superhuman translation from the world: so that gradually the founder's history becomes prodigious and extra-natural, until his real doctrines sink into mystical secrets known only to the initiated disciples, while the vulgar turn the iconoclast into a new idol.[20]

What is more certain is that Lyall was convinced that any new religious movement would spread very much more widely than in the past. Previously, before the coming of the British, the political confusion, the division of the sub-continent into separate states, the difficulty of getting from one part of India to another, had prevented the growth and expansion of the numerous sects which had kept springing up. Now, however, all that had changed, and the barriers which had previously prevented such a movement from gaining adherents from over a large area had almost totally disappeared.[21] Thus, once again, the effect of British rule was to unify, to break down divisions, and perhaps, ultimately, to produce the very thing which it had most to fear—a religious movement incorporating the vast majority of the Hindu peoples.[22]

Lyall left the Central Provinces on leave in March 1873. Soon after his return, 18 months later, he was made Home Secretary of the Government of India, promotion which he felt he owed in part to his articles on Indian religion.[23] However, his stay in Calcutta was of only short duration for in 1874 he was posted to the Rajput States as Agent to the Governor General, a kind of British Resident. It was during his service in Rajputana that Lyall continued his examination of Indian political and social development. The result of his thinking can be found in two articles, "The Rajput States of India"[24] and "On the Formation of some Clans and Castes in India"[25] which do much to provide an historical context for his earlier theories about the role of religion in shaping the structure of Indian society.

The article on the Rajput States provides a brief sketch of India's political development during the previous two or three centuries. According to Lyall the Mughals had destroyed all the centres of existing political power in those areas of North India which fell under their direct control. Only Rajputana and one or two other states had been able to resist Muslim pressure. Hence the British had come upon a land without long-seated ruling dynasties

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.
21. "The Religious Situation in India", p. 301.
22. Cf. Lyall to Morley, 1873, in Durand, *Life of Lyall*, pp. 164-5.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
24. First published in the *Edinburgh Review* (July, 1876). Republished in the Asiatic Studies, 1st ser., ch. 8.
25. First published in the *Fortnightly Review* (January, 1877). Republished in the *Asiatic Studies*, 1st ser., ch. 7.

or an ancient aristocracy, and this was one of the reasons why they had been able to conquer it without difficulty. Again, with the exception of the Rajput States, all the dynasties and principalities which existed in India in the 1870s had been established during the chaotic conditions of the 18th century. The majority of them owed their preservation to British rule without which they would certainly have disappeared being unfitted by their primitive institutions to resist the professional armies of peoples like the Marattas and the Pathans.

Lyall was anxious, for political reasons, that the British continue their protection of these states. But in the case of Rajputana there was also an additional reason: the fact that it provided a window onto a system of political and social organization which had been superseded almost everywhere else in India. It is a description of this system which forms the subject matter of "On the Formation of some Clans and Castes". According to Lyall, there was a period in the history of all peoples, whether European or Asiatic, when the dominant institution was that of the tribe. In India this period had not yet come to an end in areas like the Rajput States which were never subject to strong government from outside. It followed that an examination of the social institutions of Rajputana would reveal "the roots from which society has grown up all over India". What were these institutions? Lyall believed that, in general, they ranged themselves along two lines: those of kinship (clans) and those of religion (caste). Both had much in common. In particular they were each defined by certain basic rules about whom their members could and could not marry. These marriage rules were to be seen most clearly in an institution Lyall calls the "pure clan". All its members believed themselves to be descended from one common ancestor, all were subject to a tight system of rules which forbade marriage either to certain members of their own family or to those outside the clan. In McLennan's phrase, they formed a large "circle of affinity".

Such clans, so Lyall believed, owed their origin to the success of some chieftain in using his power to form a kinship group out of some of the "irregular tribes" inhabiting Central India which, lacking a well-formulated system of rules or a common ancestor, were neither "pure clans" of descent nor castes. There was thus in tribal society a tendency for some groups to move 'upwards', based both on success in war and also on the influence of Hindu laws which imposed more and more rigid rules on any group which managed to maintain its social cohesion and its political power over a certain period of time. But, as in the case of castes, "downward" movement was also possible. In Lyall's view, the very strict rules which

distinguished the "pure clan" of descent were too rigid for a "good working institution", while the tendency for the leaders of such groups to become an aristocracy, soon "shackled by luxurious vices", led to a decline in their warlike capacities. Hence, such clans might find themselves pushed aside by "impure" clans pressing upward from below. Then, later, as time went on, the newcomers would also become more particular and more orthodox in their turn, as they were exposed to "the increasing pressure of the Brahmanical atmosphere" with its heavy emphasis on social regulation.

Castes, like clans, were also formed as the result of developments within tribal society. In the more settled areas, where the hold of tribes over their members tended to dissolve, the separate family groups would begin to take different occupations and to inhibit different places.

> Then the trade, or the profession, or the common ritual becomes the bond of union instead of descent or political association; and thus the mixed population of India may have rearranged itself into castes, propelled into those grooves of the archaic and inveterate exclusiveness of primitive Asiatics regarding marriage and food.[26]

Once again, the role of religion was all important, the result of the influence of the Brahmins over the marriage law which, according to Lyall, lay at the "foundation of society". Yet, powerful though it was, Brahmanism had never attempted any reform of tribal customs; it had not acted to crush out the innumerable sects of heathendom, as had Christianity in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire, or Islam in North India. Its role was not that of an agent of change, rather it "registered and confirmed" changes which had already taken place. Thus, when Lyall speaks of religion as being the "cement" of Indian society, he does not mean that it imposed a straightjacket on Indian social evolution; what he means is that it provided the framework inside which that evolution could take place. Once tribal groupings began to break down, it was the institutions of clans and castes, their structure determined by certain religiously-sanctioned rules, which served as an alternative form of social organization. Again, so persuasive was the influence of Brahmanism that, as a group began to develop, its customs and sentiments, which may originally have been formed according to "practical needs and experiments", inevitably tended to harden into laws. However you might chose to look at it, religion was the key to the understanding of Indain society.

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26. "On the Formation of some Clans and Castes in India", p. 177.

Lyall left the Rajput States in 1878 to take up the post of Foreign Secretary of the Government of India. This was followed, in 1882, by six years as Lieutenant-Governor of the North West Provinces, and it was only after his retirement in 1888 that he seems to have found time to continue his early studies of Indian social development. In particular he returned to the problem, raised over and over again in the *Asiatic Studies,* of trying to explain how India had come to be in what he believed was "an arrested state of development".[27] Why had the tribal groups of which it had once been composed not gradually amalgamated and fused into larger political entities inhabiting well-defined territories, as they had in Europe? What had kept Indian society as a "mere loose conglomeration of tribes, races, and castes"? Lyall's provisional answer to these questions is to be found in a number of articles and in two works of history, *Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India* (London, 1894) and the chapter on "The Moghul Empire" which he wrote for the *Cambridge Modern History,* vol. vi. In brief, what he believed was that India's "backwardness" was due to its failure to develop the political institutions which, in Europe, had paved the way for the emergence of a strong, stable nation-state by acting as a counter-balancing force to the powerful centralising tendencies of the monarchy. As he described the process:

> In Asia a new kingdom is almost always founded by some able leader with a genius for military organisation, who can raise and command an effective army, which he employs not only to beat rivals in the field but also to deal with all minor chiefships, to disarm every kind of possible opposition within his borders, and generally to level every barrier that might limit his personal authority. But he who thus sweeps away all means of resistance leaves himself no supports, for support implies capacity to resist; and the very strength and keenness of the military instrument that he has forged renders it doubly dangerous for his successor. If the next ruler's heart and hand fail him, there is no longer any counterpoise to the over-powering weight of the sword in the political balance, and the state of the dynasty is upset.[28]

The Mughal Empire was a good illustration of this thesis. Founded by soldiers of genius it lasted only so long as there were men strong and skilful enough to rule its wide dominions. Meanwhile, no alternative centres of political power could be allowed to

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27. My attention was drawn to this point by E.T. Stokes. Cf. his "The Administrators and Historical Writing on India" in C.H. Philips ed. *Historians of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon* (London, 1961).
28. *Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India,* 5th edn. (London, 1910), pp. 321-2.

develop. The great towns of India never achieved any municipal autonomy. Most of the nobles owed their position to the Emperor and could be removed at will. The religious corps had little independent influence of their own. Finally, the army was not a locally-recruited force as in Europe, with men of all religions in its ranks, but consisted almost entirely of Muslims, many of them foreign mercenaries whose loyalty could not always be relied on. In such a situation there was nothing to prevent a collapse when the supreme authority passed into "feeble hands".[29]

Without political stability there could be no religious or social stability either. Long dominion by foreigners arrested intellectual development. It also kept the Hindus in a dislocated and disorganised condition, for their priesthood was never able to achieve any great degree of mastery of the constant movement and change in ritual and belief.[30] But it was not just a question of the Muslims disorganising Hinduism without substituting any strong religious edifice of their own; the basic factor in the situation was the way in which their presence had inhibited the development of strong nation-states in the sub-continent. As Lyall had written in 1872, the formation of nations "aids powerfully the concentration of religious beliefs", by providing a framework inside which the stronger sects gradually absorb the others.[31] Again, it assisted the formation of a formal ecclesiastical organization with a well-defined theology.[32] Other aspects of India's "arrested development" could also be explained in this way. Lacking the protection which a stable state afforded, people were forced to create a system of social cohesion for themselves out of caste and clan.[33] Kinship ties refused to narrow down to encompass simply the restricted family. Polytheism persisted. Only with the coming of the British was progress possible.

The various articles in the *Asiatic Studies* (First Series), as well as those written after his retirement contain a number of hints as to the policy implications of Lyall's analysis of Indian social development. It goes without saying that for him, as for every other Englishman, India's numerous political and religious divisions were a source of British strength. If the mutiny had taught them one lesson it was that anything which allowed the Indians to combine was dangerous, while anything which kept them apart was to Britain's benefit. But, in Lyall's case, his anxiety about the speed at which the old barriers between different sections of society were

29. "The Moghul Empire", *Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge, 1909). vi, pp. 525-6.
30. "Natural Religion in India", (*Rede Lecture*, 17 June 1891) (Cambridge, 1891), p. 12.
31. "The Religious Situation in India', p. 292.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 292.
33. "Sir Henry Maine", p. 132.

crumbling was accentuated by the conclusions he had drawn from his reading of De Tocqueville's *Ancien Régime* and from his study of the causes of the break-up of the Mughal Empire. In each instance a great state had prepared the way for its own downfall by its passion for uniformity, which had led it to level out all smaller centres of local power upon which, in other circumstances, it might have relied for support.[34] Lyall was too much of a realist to imagine that the processes set in train by the British in India could be reversed. But he did urge that nothing be done to accelerate the amalgamation of India's many different political and religious groups. In the case of the Rajput States, for instance, the British might well be about to destroy a central feature of their political arrangements — the method by which the power of their chief was balanced by that of "turbulent and reactionary nobles" — in the interest of helping the former to create a uniform institution over his whole territory. This would be to begin the decay of an institution which had existed for many hundreds of years. It would be a pity to see it destroyed before understanding how the void it would leave was to be filled.[35] He was equally anxious about any policies which might put an end to religious division. "Caste", he observed, might look "unnecessary and burdensome"

> ...but these things will tumble quite fast enough without our knocking out their keystone by premature legislation. It is hardly in our interest to bring them down with a crash. We have ourselves to overcome the rather superficial contempt which a European naturally conceives for societies and habits of thought different from those within the range of his ordinary experience; but also to avoid distilling too much of the destructive spirit into the minds of Young India, remembering that for English and natives the object is how to preserve social continuity.[36]

This, in an Indian context was a classic statement of the conservative position, with its concern lest old social institutions be swept away before new ones were created, with its accent on the need to maintain difference rather than to attempt to create uniformity. As such, it was a point of view which carried great weight, and its influence on official opinion was considerable. In the first place, in the 1870s, it was used to counter the arguments of a number of powerful administrators who maintained that concern for the fate of traditional ways should never be allowed to provide an excuse for holding up the introduction of necessary reforms. One important exponent of this latter view was James Fitzjames Stephen (Law

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34. Cf. the letter to his Mother, 11 July 1859, *Lyall Papers*, MSS. Eur. F. 132/13.
35. "The Rajput States of India", pp. 225-7.
36. "The Religious Situation in India", pp. 302-3.

Member of the Government of India, 1869-72) whose writings contain a closely-reasoned defence of his efforts to create a new code of law, regardless of the disruption it might cause within the Indian society. Indeed, so long as it was not politically explosive he seems to have welcomed such disruption, for it was only by destroying the old ways, so he believed, that moral and material progress along European lines could take place.[37] A good example of this is his attack on those who sought the preservation of the traditional Indian village community. Such a community, he argued, might well have existed for may centuries, but this only showed that India had long been in a stagnant position, "unfavourable to the growth of wealth, intelligence, political experience, and the moral and intellectual changes which are implied in these processes". And he fent on :

> The condition of India for centuries past shows what village communities are really worth. Nothing that deserves the name of political institution at all can be ruder and less satisfactory in its results. They are, in fact, a crude form of socialism, paralysing the growth of individual energy and all its consequences. The continuation of such a state of society is radically inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our rule both in theory and practice.[38]

Lyall, for his part, while agreeing with many of Stephen's assumptions about the long term necessity of introducing such European values as belief in law and order and unrestrained competition was always ready to stress the dangers this posed to the British position in the short run. All policies had to be judged in terms of their possible effect on Indian society. Measures which had worked well in Europe might have opposite effects in Asia. It was arguments of this type which Lyall's writings provided for those who wished to oppose the influence of latter-day Benthamites like Stephen.

Secondly, in the early 1880's, Lyall used his theory of Indian social development as the basis for a strategy by which the British could maintain political security while, at the same time, introducing a number of much-needed concessions to local opinion. His ideas on the subject are spelled out in detail in an anonymous article, "Government of the Indian Empire", published in 1884.[39] After an opening section in which he outlined the main elements in the changing situation which then faced the British in India as a result of such factors as the spread of western education, the emergence of a new

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37. Cf. Stephen's chapter on law in Sir W.W. Hunter, *Life of the Earl of Mayo*, (London, 1875), 11.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-6.
39. *Edinburgh Review*, clix. 325, January 1884. Attributed to Lyall by Durand, *Life, of Lyall*, p. 477.

middle class in the cities and the activities of a hostile press, he went on to state that the problem was one of steering a middle course between "innovation" and "conservatism". While it as impossible for the government to stand still, while it was necessary to make some concessions to the demands of western-educated Indians for a greater share in administration, it was vital that this be accompanied by a policy designed to strengthen the main pillars upon which British rule was based. Of these, much the most important was the multiplicity of India's divisions. "At present the 240 millions of India are separated into social compartments by differences of blood, caste, and religion; and they are also politically intersected, to a material degree, by the native states". However, "as the old social prejudices decay, there is a tendency, already perceptible among the leading classes, to a kind of political fusion, to that gradual subsidence of gentile and religious distinctions that ultimately produces the level of modern society".

> In these circumstances and with these prospects, it is clear that the Viceroy's present policy of decentralisation and of discarding class privileges is an appropriate adaption of administrative measures to change that must be recognised. The old inequality and variety of laws, customs, and personal status parcelled men out into groups, and did thus provide some sort of local self-government, some distribution of authority. Now that these sub-divisions are vanishing, it is in accordance with natural expediency to substitute other administrative and territorial groupings, and to prevent authority from being fixed and concentrated in aristocratic bureaux as in Russia. Otherwise the English dominion in India may drift towards that condition of over-centralised isolation, with shallow foundations and inadequate support which renders an Empire as top-heavy as an over-built tower, and which is unquestionably an element of political instability.

Other recommendations followed. It was important that men of local influence were associated with British rule wherever possible. Great care should be taken when it came to efforts to reform institutions which "no foreigners can be expected to understand accurately or exhaustively". Finally, it should always be remembered that it was in "the content and confidence of the land owning class" that the government found its essential element of stability.

> As for the practical application of this strategy it is first necessary to look at Lyall's own approach to the drafting of the three most important bills passed during his term as Lieutenant-Governor of the North West Provinces; the local-government bill, the Oudh

rent bill, and the bill to establish a provincial Legislative Council.
Let us consider them in turn.

The local-government bill owed its passage to an initiative by
the viceroy, Lord Ripon, whose general aim was to provide a politi-
cal outlet for the ambitions of the growing number of western-edu-
cated Indians. One method by which he hoped to do this was to
breathe fresh life into the existing machinery of local administration.
In two resolutions (30 September 1881 and 18 May 1882) he invited
the provincial governments to examine ways and means of raising
the numbers of non-official members on municipal and local boards
until they comprised at least two-thirds of the total membership. It
was also proposed that non-official members be elected wherever
possible. Lyall, for his part, was quite content to carry out these
proposals as they stood where they applied to the municipal boards
in the North-West Provinces; but when it came to changes in the
composition of the boards in districts and sub-districts he made
strenuous efforts to limit their effect. In his first scheme all new
members of such boards were to be nominated rather than elected,
and it was only after pressure from the Viceroy that he suggested
a compromise by which an electoral body of government nominees
was to chose who was to sit on the sub-district boards from among
their own number.[40] A second dispute involved the question of
whether the district boards should have an official chairman, as
Lyall thought necessary, or a non-official one, as Ripon believed was
vital to his whole policy. Once again a compromise was reached,
by which the non-official members were to be allowed to elect a
chairman of their own choosing, provided at least three-quarters
of the board were present at that particular meeting. This was
something to which the viceroy agreed with the greatest reluct-
ance. As he wrote to Lyall on 8 May 1883, the official members
could always prevent such a move by staying away en bloc. Fur-
ther more:

> I must say that the introduction of such a provision ren-
> ders the whole proceeding little better than a sham. If the
> proposal emanated from a person in whom I had less confi-
> dence than you, I should say that it was an elaborately-pre-
> pared device for taking away with one hand what was seeming-
> ly given with the other.[41]

It has been pointed out that Lyall's cautious approach to the
Viceroy's proposals was, in some measure, justified by the disturb-
ed conditions in parts of his vast province, particularly in Oudh.[42]

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40. Lyall to Ripon, 10 November, 12 December 1882. *Lyall Papers*, MSS. Eur.
    F. 132/42.
41. *Ibid.*
42. S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon 1880–1884* (London, 1953), p. 103.

But it is also clear from the long correspondence between the two men that they were in fundamental disagreement about the whole purpose of the reform. Whereas, for Ripon, local self-government was to be an instrument of political and popular education and a means by which educated Indians were to be allowed to take a great step forward in the management of their own affairs,[43] for Lyall it appeared very much more as a useful instrument of administrative devolution and, as he wrote to the viceroy, a way of bringing men of "position, influence, and character" into district administration. One aimed at a limited enfranchisement of the new middle class, the other at associating the landed aristocracy with British rule. What Ripon attempted to effect in accordance with his liberal principles and his experience in Ireland, Lyall tried to modify in terms of his conservative approach to problems of Indian social change.

The influence of Lyall's analysis of developments in Indian society can also be seen at work during the preparation of a bill aimed at reforming the conditions of tenancy in Oudh. While he was as convinced as Ripon that some measure was necessary to protect the peasants of this over-crowded area from what was often an annual demand for increased rent and from the summary eviction which might so easily follow, he was also anxious to ensure that nothing was done to alienate the local land-owners, the talukdars. For this reason great care was taken to ensure the agreement of the talukdars at every stage and on a number of occasions Lyall attempted to modify provisions in the draft bill in their interests.[44] As a result the protection afforded the peasants was less than it would otherwise have been. But this was justified by the fact that there were "important political considerations" involved.[45] As Lyall wrote to Lord Dufferin, Ripon's successor as viceroy:

> There is no doubt at this moment that the talukdars, as a body, still adhere to the old-fashioned notion that it is their duty and their interest to submit to the clearly declared wishes of the government so long as they can rely upon the Government treating them well and considering their interests. And it is, of course, very expedient politically to give them no reasonable grounds for abandoning this notion, especially since even in Lucknow a good many persons are already anxious to convince the talukdars that their ideas are obsolete, and that the only way of meeting the Government is by opposing it.[46]

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43. *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 93.
44. Cf. Lyall to Dufferin, 8 May 1886, *Dufferin Papers* (India Office Library), MSS. Eur. F. 130/42A.
45. Lyall to Dufferin, 2 September 1886, *Dufferin Papers* Eur. MSS. F. 130/42E.
46. *Ibid.*, 8 May 1886, *Dufferin Papers*, Eur. MSS. F. 130/42A.

The third, and last, important measure passed in the North West Provinces during Lyall's governorship was the introduction of a Legislative Council.   Unlike the local-government reform and the tenancy bill this was the result of his own initiative.   But, like them, he was ready to justify it in the most direct political terms:

> What is wanted in these provinces is to bring forward our leading native gentlemen and to encourage them to take some responsible share in the higher administration. They have been rather kept in the background since the Mutiny.   The events of 1857-59 left a lasting impression on the generation that saw and suffered by them; and the higher classes became little accustomed to come forward in public affairs, or to show an independent interest in politics as may be noticed (for example) among some of the prominent men in the Punjab. Any step towards drawing out these classes and enlisting them in support of local administration will to my mind be a measure of conservative policy.[47]

But Lyall's strategy for strengthening the British position during the process of reform was not applied in the North West Provinces alone.   Elements of it are to be found in many of Lord Dufferin's policies, especially those aimed at encouraging the Princes and at a further decentralisation of the financial administration.[48] Its influence can also be seen outside India in much of what Lord Cromer attempted to do in Egypt. It was Cromer's opinion that, "every European who occupies a high position in the East should study Sir Alfred Lyall's work",[49] and there is considerable evidence that he, himself, often took Lyall as his guide. Like the author of the *Asiatic Studies* he was concerned to strengthen British rule by stressing Egypt's many internal divisions.   Like him too he was anxious to incorporate the conservative classes, notably the rural landowners, into the machinery of government.   Finally, strategy apart, it is likely that Cromer's awareness of the dangers of popular discontent arising from ignorant assaults on local traditions came from his friendship with Lyall and his reading of Lyall's works. As he wrote of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior in 1895, there is no department in which "the zeal of the earnest reformer is more to be deprecated.   The habits and customs of an oriental people must not be trifled with lightly".[50]   This was, perhaps, Lyall's most important legacy.

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47. *Ibid.*, 12 July 1885, *Lyall Papers*, MSS. Eur. F. 132/46.
48. Cf. S. Gopal, *British Policy in India 1858-1905* (Cambridge, 1965), p. 156 and Sir A.C. Lyall, *The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava* (London, 1905), ii, p. 154.
49. Cf. my "The Influence of Lord Cromer's Indian Experience on British Policy in Egypt 1883-1907", *St. Antony's Papers No. 17* (London, 1965).
50. "Annual Report for 1894", *Parl. Papers* 1895, cix, p. 12.

Lyall's whole working life is yet another illustration of the close links which have always existed between anthropology and imperial government. Several of these links have been described in what has gone before. When the Revolt of 1857 first drew attention to the urgent need to study the changes which were being produced in Indian society by British rule, it was the early anthropologists who seemed to provide a method by which these changes could be analysed. However, second, it was not merely a question of men like Lyall borrowing ideas from academic writers like Maine and McLennan; the process also worked the other way round. In the days before "field" work the anthropologist in England had to rely almost exclusively on British officials for his information about Asian Societies. In Lyall's own case, as he once pointed out in a letter, Maine's 1875 Rede lecture (on "The Effects of Observation of India on Modern European Thought") contained one or two "leading" ideas taken from his own "Religion of an Indian Province".[51] This was just one of a large number of borrowings of a similar kind. Third, in the hands of a man like Lyall a study of Indian socitey could be used to make a powerful justification for Britain's imperial role. It is no surprise to find him arguing that it was only the coming of the British which allowed India to emerge from the state of "arrested development" in which it had been trapped.

Lastly, there is the whole question of the influence of Lyall's thought on British imperial policy. Reference has been made to the way in which his analysis of Indian social change could be made to yield a political strategy for dealing with the major problems faced by the Government in the 1880's. But beyond this, Lyall was also influential in the way in which his writings affected the whole climate of official thought. As Lucky Mair has recently pointed out, the anthropological approach to the study of society tends to produce conservative policy recommendations.[52] Lyall regarded himself as a Liberal in English political terms, at least until his disenchantment with Gladstone in the early 1880's. But in India, his detailed knowledge of the social institutions to be found in the Central Provinces and in the Rajput States led him, continually, to lay greater emphasis on the disruptive nature of British-induced change and on the need to preserve old forms than he would otherwise have done. At a time when the reformers like Stephen seemed likely to carry all before them, Lyall was one of the most important men who pointed to the danger of applying, wholesale, measures that could only be justified because they had worked well

51. Lyall to Barbara Lyall, 31 August 1875, *Lyall Papers*, MSS Eur. F. 132/16.
52. *Anthropology and Social Change (London. 1969)*, p. 2.

in Europe. Legislation had also to be judged in terms of its pro-
bable effect on India, and this could only be done by trying to look
at Indian social institutions without the prejudices that Britons usual-
ly brought to their study. It was Lyall's great strength that he
saw that Indian society ought to be analysed in its own terms, that
it was governed by more than a mere collection of outworn, obs-
curantist social ordinances; that it was not static and immutable
as many had supposed, but subject to its own laws of development
like any other. Administrators as well as anthropologists took this
lesson seriously to heart.

EARLY STONE AGE AND DOLERITE DYKES IN THE CENTRAL TAPI BASIN

By

S. A. SALI

1. INTRODUCTORY

Until the discovery of the first Early Stone Age site by Sankalia in 1951 at Gangapur[1] on the Godavari near Nasik it was believed that being heavily forested and because of the absence of good raw material, like quartzite the Deccan plateau was never penetrated by Early Man.[2] Sankalia's above discovery was followed by that of similar sites by Deshpande and this author at Sangamner and Ghargaon, both in Ahmednagar district, respectively on the Pravara and Mula.[3] During the last 20 years or so quite a number of Early Stone Age sites have been discovered in the Deccan Trap region of Maharashtra of which those at Bhadne and Yesar on the Kan in the Central Tapi basin,[4] Gangapur on the Godavari and Nevasa[5] and Chirki[6] on the Pravara received considerable attention and thus became more familiar. From the avilable evidence it has been found that the Early Stone Age man in Maharashtra selected as a raw material varieties of basalt, besides that available in the dykes, viz., dolerite, for preparing tools required to meet his daily needs. On the whole raw material from dykes seems to have utilised by him on a large scale for this purpose. This evidence goes on to show that the dykes in the Deccan Trap region of Maharashtra fulfilled one of his necessities. In the Central Tapi basin in Dhulia district of Maharashtra State, however, the dykes seem to have played much more important a role in the life of the Early Stone man than merely serving him as a source of raw material for his tools. In this region

1. Sankalia, H.D., (*The Godavari Palaeolithic Industry*, Poona, 1952).
2. Foote, R.B. *The Foote Collection of Indian Prehistoric and Protohistoric Antiquities*, Notes on their Ages and Distribution, (Madras, 1916), p. 41.
3. Sankalia, op cit., fn. 16, p. 6.
4. Sali, S. A. "Quaternary Stratigraphy in the Kan Basin at Bhadne and Yesar —Results of Recent Preliminary Explorations", *Journal of the Asiatic Society Bombay*, vols. 39-40, (1967), pp. 157-167.
5. Sankalia, H. D., "Animal-Fossils and Palaeolithic Industries from the Pravara Basin at Nevasa, District Ahmednagar", *Ancient India*, No. 12, (1956), pp. 35-52.
6. Corvinus, Gudrun, "The Acheulian Workshop at Chirki on the Pravara River, Maharashtra", Indian Antiquary, vol. IV, Studies in Indian Archaeology, Prof. Sankalia Felicitation Volume, Eds., Deo, S. B., and Dhavalikar, M. K., (1970), pp. 13-22.

these lithologic formations running like gigantic walls across the country have produced peculiar topographic features (Pl. I). A study of the locations of a number of Early Stone Age sites discovered by this author in this region in the course of his explorations suggests that the Early Stone Age man in this region took an advantage of the features produced by the dykes for making his hazardous life as comfortable as possible. It is proposed to present in this paper information revealed by this study and the importance of dykes occurring in the Deccan Trap region of Maharashtra in the study of the Early Stone man.

2. ROLE PLAYED BY DYKES

The region under consideration is cut up by numerous dykes, a swarm of them being in Nandurbar taluka of the district. They run east-west and north-east-south-west as also north-south. The dykes in the examined part of the region vary in width from 30 cm to over 3 m. The so far known lengthiest example is over 50 km in Nandurbar taluka. They rise above the adjoining ground about 5 m to over 30 m. In the dyke-region of Nandurbar quite a number of these run parallel to and about 100 m or more apart from each other thus forming long narrow compartments. At some places the dykes intersect each other and form a valley on either side of the intersection. That these dykes served as a main source of raw material to the Early Stone Age man for fashioning his tools is quite evident from the fact that, barring a few sites, all the so far discovered Early Stone sites, both stratified and "open-air" or open camp sites, are situated close to them.

Some of the sites, as at Nandurbar, Chakla, etc., are located in the long narrow compartments formed by parallel running dykes. It is quite likely that such places were advantageous to the Early Stone Age man, the flanking high dyke walls perhaps serving as natural fortifications for protecting him from enemies, besides gusty winds and cold. Probably because of these advantages the valleys formed by intersection of dykes at Kokni Pada, a hamlet of village Nimboni, were occupied by the Early Stone Age man.

The highest points of the high dyke hills which command a view of the surrounding region probably served as "watch-towers" for spotting out not only the enemies but also the desired game.

At a number of places the dykes traversed the streams causing pounding of water and consequent formation of lakes. The margins of the lakes so formed, as at Bhadvad Khurd, Nandarkha, Umaj, Pechribari Pada, Kokni Pada, etc., were probably considered as

ideal camping grounds by the Early Stone Age man. This was done perhaps because, firstly, the raw material necessary for preparing his tools was handy here in a dyke; secondly, water needed by him was readily available in the lake; thirdly, the game which must have frequented such places for quenching their thurst, the fish and fowl, the roots and fruits in the adjoining forest, in short, all that was necessary for his subsistence, were probably available at such places.

It will be seen from the above that, as in other parts of the Deccan Trap region of Maharashtra, the dykes in the Central Tapi basin, was a source of raw material for preparing tools to the Early Stone Age man. But apart from this the peculiar topographic features produced by them in this region seem to have helped ease to some extent his hazardous life.

3.   CONCLUSION

From the present study emerge the following broad points which reveal importance of dykes in the study of the Early Stone Age man.

(1)   Almost all the so far discovered Early Stone Age sites in the Central Tapi basin are located nearby the dykes.

(2)   Besides providing raw material for preparing tools, the gigantic wall-like high dyke hills probably also protected the Early Stone Age man from gusty winds and cold.

(3)   Where the dykes traversed the streams and consequently lakes were formed,[7] the margins of such lakes were occupied by the Early Stone Age man.

Dykes are not found as abunduntly as in the Central Tapi basin in all parts of the Deccan Trap region of Maharashtra. In some parts they are not even seen. For example, in the area of the Upper Nira valley near Shirgaon where this author picked up a few Early Stone Age tools, of fine-grained compact basalt, no dyke was observed. However, where dykes are present it would be interesting to find out if the Early Stone Age sites are located nearby them. Of the so far known sites, the site at Gangapur is situated near a dyke which traverses the river. The north-east-south-west running dyke near Sangamner is not very far from the Early Stone

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7. Sali, S. A., "Some Geomorphic and Tectonic Observations in the Central Tapti Basin in Dhulia District", *Indian Antiquary*, vol. IV, Studies in Indian Archaeology, Prof. Sankalia Felicitation Volume, Eds. Deo, S. B., and Dhavalikar, M. K., (1970), pp. 206-7.

Age site there. A few dyke outcrops, a few miles away from Chirki, were the source of material at the Acheulian workship at this place.[8]

From what has been observed by this author in the Central Tapi basin and elsewhere in not only Maharashtra but also the districts of Surat, Bulsar and Dangs of Gujarat this author feels that the sites associated with dykes may help archaeologists obtain considerable information with regard to the various aspects of the life of the Early Stone Age man. Particularly those sites where the dykes traversed the streams and caused pounding of water and consequent formation of lakes during the Early Stone Age times may prove to be of great importance in this regard. Because, as in the Central Tapi basin, it is quite likely that the Early Stone Age man might have occupied the margins of such lakes. Moreover in the Deccan Trap region of Maharashtra no rock-shelters or caves which could have been occupied by the Early Stone Age man have so far been found and as such we will have to find out some other type/s of site/s which would compensate the absence of such living sites. Perhaps the above mentioned lacustrine-type site may represent one of these types. Because, it is not unlikely, detailed investigations at such sites may reveal not only the details of cultural development of the Early Stone Age man environmental conditions prevailing then but also, per chance, his skeletal remains which we have not been able to obtain so far in India.

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8. It should be mentioned that there is also evidence to suggest that in some parts of the region, for example, in the Kan Basin at Dahivel, Bhondgaon, Amoda, Bhadne, Yesar, etc., some other favourable topographic features prevailing during the Early Stone Age times produced semi-lacustrine or lacustrine conditions.

9. Corvinus, op. cit., p. 15.

Plate I
General view of a dyke traversing the river Shivnad at Bhiladi,
District Dhulia.

RUSSELL'S MORAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY*

By

M. B. VANMALI

This paper contains a brief presentation of and some reflections on the moral theory of Russell. The limitations of time and space make it almost impossible for me to discuss or even to refer to his views on the moral and social issues, which are too well-known. I have, therefore, tried to restrict myself to his moral philosophy in so far as it enables us to trace the continuity of his thoughts which were, in course of time, modified, and shows us how he tried to find a philosophical basis for some of the views he expressed and defended. I believe that the understanding of Russell's moral philo sophy could provide a basis for the explanation of his unorthodox views on social and political matters, and though I have not made any attempts to provide such an explanation, the students of Russell's social and political philosophy would not, I am sure, find it difficult to obtain it. This much, then, is for saying almost nothing about his social philosophy in this paper.

Russell is often described as a moralist than a moral philosopher. There is no doubt that his fearless expression of the unorthodox beliefs, views and ideals had, for quite some time, influenced the modern mind, and, in this sense, he was a Moralist. He usually addressed his writings to the general public and wrote in a style which appealed to them, though the philosophers were critical of him for a certain amount of looseness in the use of philosophical idiom. In his "Reply to Criticisms" he says—

> "I did not write 'Social Reconstruction' in my capacity as a 'philosopher', I wrote it as a human being who suffered from the state of the world, wished to find some way of improving it, and was anxious to speak in plain terms to others who had similar feelings..... If I were a mountaineer and wrote a book on the subject, I might mention the sunrise, and I should not expect to be reminded that, according to the Copernican theory, the sun does not rise. Some criticisms of my books on social and political questions seem to me something like such a reminder."[1]

This is a caution worth keeping in mind while criticizing Russell's moral philosophy as well. This passage, however, raises an interesting problem about the relation of moral theory to practice. Leaving aside the issue of avoiding the philosophical jargon in one's dialogue with the general public, the relevant question is whether a moralist—who wishes to improve the world— could do without a moral philosophy. Does he need to think about the implications of his preachings, at cooler moments when the feelings, passions and sufferings created by the state of our world are subdued? Does he need to bring about a consistency in not merely what he preaches and what he practices, but also in the various elements of his preachings? I believe that when Russell gave a justification for paying less attention to and even consciously avoiding the philosophical jargon, he also seemed to imply that once this so called defect is ignored, there is no inconsistency in his preachings and in the philosophy underlying them. But, perhaps, I am reading too much in this passage.

It is, however, certain that Russell was not merely a moralist. He has repeatedly taken up questions about the status of moral principles; about the meaning of moral propositions; about the nature of moral disagreement, and about what is now known as the practical reasoning. Discussions of these problems surely pertain to moral philosophy. Russell did try to find a philosophical basis for his moral and political beliefs, and never abdicated reason to make room for pleasant illusions and cheerful fantasies. He may not have been quite successful in finding out a satisfactory solution to this problem but it would be illuminating to see how these attempts resulted in a moral theory, whose defects more than its merits were known to Russell himself.

I

Russell's earliest moral theory is to be found in his essay, "The Elements of Ethics" published in 1910, in 'The New Quarterly'. In this essay, he accepts Moore's account of morality without qualifications. For this reason, he does not arouse as much interest in us as he does when he tries to formulate his own theory to suit the needs of his own avowed beliefs and views. I would, therefore, be brief in spelling out his earlier moral philosophy, though one or two points of general interest to students of philosophy would be mentioned.

Following Moore, the procedure which he follows is—"......
...... after the preliminary analysis of complex data we proceed again to build up complex things from their simple consti-

tuents, starting from ideas which we understand, and from the premises which we know, though we cannot prove them."[2]

There are thus ideas and premises which we know, though we cannot prove them. 'Good' and 'Bad' are such ideas which almost everybody possesses. These ideas are the simplest and they are the constituents of our complex ideas. In this sense they are *unanalysable*. Further, they are *indefinable*. No verbal definition of 'good' is possible.

> "When people ask. 'What do you mean by Good?" the answer must consist, not in a verbal definition . . . . but in such a characterisation as shall call up the appropriate idea to the mind of the questioner."[3]

In explaining why the word 'good' is to be regarded as indefinable, Russell invites our attention to the fact many definitions of 'good' have been attempted; for instance, the definition that 'good' means 'desired', or that 'good' means 'pleasure' or that 'good' means 'conformity to Nature'. But he argues that this very fact that so many and incompatible definitions have been offered is itself an evidence against any of them being really definitions.

Another reason for regarding these definitions as suspect is that they can be shown to be so by applying the following test:

> "Whenever a proposed definition sets us thinking whether it is true in fact, and not whether that is how the word is used, there is reason to suspect that we are not dealing with a definition, but with a significant proposition, in which the word professedly defined has a meaning already known to us, either as simple, or as defined in some other way."[4]

Application of his test should easily convince us that all so called suggested definitions do not give us the meaning of the word 'good'. These are all to be understood "as substantial affirmations concerning the things that are good". But once we accept that 'good' is indefinable, those affirmations will easily seem to be unjustified. One very important consequence of the indefinability of 'good', is that we can infer nothing as to what things are good or bad, from the fact that the existent world is of such and such a nature. If 'good' is a simple, undefinable notion, then the conclusion containing this notion cannot be inferred from the premises which do not

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2. 'Elements of Ethics' reprinted in 'Philosophical Essays'—1966, pp. 15.
3. Ibid. pp 16.
4. Ibid. pp. 19.

contain it. Russell uses this consequence to argue against evolutionary ethics.

But if 'good' is indefinable, how could we know what things are good? Russell's answer is that we know immediately that certain things are good. 'Good' itself is a non-natural quality apprehended directly just as natural qualities are. Knowing what 'good' is, we can explain 'right' in terms of 'good'. The right action is that which produces the most good. But then, if good is apprehended directly, how could one explain the fact that there is a wide divergence of opinion on moral questions? Why is it that people do not agree as to what is 'good' and 'right'? Against the Moral Sense school and against Emotivism, Russell himself has insisted that the disagreement in morals is genuine, and cannot be brushed aside as being a difference in tastes or emotional experiences. He must, therefore, explain this disagreement in morals. His only answer to this is: "Difficulties in discovering truth does not prove that there no truth to be discovered."[5] But in that case, the difficulties may be such as to make it impossible for us to discover which one of the conflicting judgements are true — in which case the 'good' becomes *unknowable,* in addition to being simple, and indefinable, — or he must convince us that the difficulties could be overcome, that there is a way of deciding between the rival moral judgements. Russell, however does not pursue this question any further.

II

Not long after publishing this essay, Russell came to disagree with the moral theory advocated in it. The "Elements of Ethics" was written before the World War of 1914-18. In the midst of this world war, he found it difficult to remain unconcerned about what happened in the human world around him. He became more concerned with practice than theory.

What can we do for the world while we live? is the question which he raises at the end of his "Principles of Social Reconstruction". His answer is: "So long as we think of the immediate future, it seems that what we can do is not much . . . . Our expectations must not be for tomorrow . . . . For this reason, the first thing we have to do is to be clear in our own minds as to the kind of life we think good, and the kind of change we desire in the world."[6]

Well, then, what kind of life we ought to think good? In his preface to the 'Principles of Social Reconstruction' he specifically says:

5. Ibid. pp. 20.
6. 'Principles of Social Reconstruction' pp. 224-25.

"I consider the best life that which is most built on creative im-
pulses, and worst that which is most inspired by the love of
possession."[7]

Russell regards creative impulses as those which aim at "bring-
ing into the world some valuable thing such as knowledge or art or
goodwill;" and the possessive impulses as those which aim at a
acquiring or retaining something which cannot be shared".
But why is knowledge, art or goodwill valuable? It is no longer
enough to say that they have the non-natural property of goodness.
So far Russell was with Moore. Some impulses are just good, and
others bad. The list of things that are good viz. Knowledge, art,
goodwill, is also taken from Moore. But now he parts company with
Moore. He does not accept that 'goodness' is a non-natural property,
out-there, to be immediately known, independently of any subjec-
tive factor. Nor does he now accept that moral intuition can provide
us with "atomic propositions" on which a satisfactory moral theory
can be built up without difficulty. The subjective considerations
become more and more relevant and important as Russell proceeds
to construct his own moral theory. The first important step in this
direction is to connect the notion of moral value with desire.

"Primarily we call something 'good' when we desire it, and 'bad'
when we have aversion from it."[8]

In "Reply to Criticisms" he explains this further.

"....What I mean by saying that the good is *primarily* the de-
sired ..... is that it is to be defined in terms of desire, and
that to define it as the desired is a first step towards a correct
definition."[9]

It appears quite plausible that a satisfactory moral theory should
attempt to associate moral values with desires. Since it is psycho-
logically true that behaviour originates with some desire, and logi-
cally the predicate "good" ultimately applies to behaviour, it cannot
be considered in total independence from desires. In this sense,
perhaps, it forms an essential part of the definition of 'good'. But,
as Russell himself recognises, desires govern only a part of human
activity, and this part is not the most important one but "only the
more conscious, explicit and civilized part". The important part of
our nature is the instinctive one, and here our behaviour is not gov-
erned by the desires for certain ends, but it is dominated by certain
kinds of activity. Ordinarily, we would expect Russell to emphasize

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7. Ibid. pp. 5.
8. 'An Outline of Philosophy'—1927, pp. 242.
9. 'The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell'—pp. 722.

this distinction between impulses on the one hand, and the desires, will, purpose on the other, and to make use of it for drawing the conclusion that will, as a consistent and predominant universe of desires, should be preferred to impulses, because the satisfaction derived from the former is greater and more lasting than that from the latter. This would be very much like Hedonism with its calculus for working out the greatest satisfaction. But Russell maintains something quite different from this.

> "The complete control of impulses by will, which is sometimes preached by moralists, and often enforced by economic neces-sity, is not really desirable. A life governed by purposes and desires, to the exclusion of impulse, is a boring life; it exhausts vitality, and leaves a man, in the end, indifferent to the very purposes that he is trying to achieve."[10]

Russell accepts from the popular Freudianism of his day the belief that the exclusion, control and repression of impulses are tir-ing, destructive of vitality, and a source of new impulses of cruelty and destruction. This is the reason why the life completely governed by will or settled purpose is not be preferred. Yet it is also true that not all impulses could be satisfied. So a distinction has to be made between those which could be — or shall we say, should be — satisfied and those which could not be. The Freudians themselves had made a distinction between the "natural" impulses or desires and the 'socially acquired' ones, and they suggested that the repression of the former, and not the latter, was harmful. But even when we take only those of the first kind, it is yet possible that the satisfaction of some impulses might mean the repression of others. But for Russell this difficulty does not arise. For he maintains that human beings have "a central principle of growth, an instinctive urgency leading them in a certain direction, as trees seek the light."[11] In postulat-ing this central principle of growth, very much in the manner of Idealists, Russell is aware of the fact that though instincts and im-pulses are the source of vitality, they themselves "leave us power-less to control the forces of nature either in ourselves or in our physi-cal environment, and keep us in bondage to the same unthinking im-pulse by which the trees grow."[12] Therefore, the best life is not a life led merely on impulses, pure and natural, but of impulses which are freed from the tyranny of will and purpose and yet regulated in such a way that it achieves maximum satisfaction of desires, reduces the conflict of impulses and the repression of impulses to the mini-mum. The duality that we find here is similar to the one we find

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10. 'Principles of Social Reconstruction'—pp. 17-18.
11. Ibid. pp. 24.
12. Ibid. pp. 229.

in the Idealist theory—'the true or real self' and 'the empirical self'. But the difference lies in the interpretation of the 'real' self. Against the Idealist, Russell would accept the Freudian view that the instinctive or impulsive part of our nature is the real self which is corrupted by social institutions. He would, therefore, advocate the free growth of the 'natural' impulses. This view has important consequences for Russell's theory of Education.

Now if the instinctive part of our nature keeps us in bondage in some unthinking impulses, how are we to liberate ourselves from this bondage? Russell's answer is —

> "Mind can liberate us from this bondage by the power of impersonal thought, which enables us to judge critically the purely biological purposes towards which instinct more or less blindly tends. But mind, in its dealings with instincts is merely critical: so far as instinct is concerned, the unchecked activity of the mind is apt to be destructive and generate cynicism."[13]

We are, therefore, in a dilemma. If we allow ourselves to be led by the blind impulses of our instinctive nature to believe that the girl next door is the most beautiful in the world, we shall be certainly happy but under a delusion. But if we follow the impersonal thoughts and critical judgements of our mind, our eyes are opened to reality, but there is nothing much worth looking at. We shall be left without the passion, without the impulse. The critical activity of the mind has completely destroyed it. The result would be so devastating if we follow the dictates of the mind that we would be cynical about finding beauty anywhere in the world at any time.

To rescue us from this dilemma, Russell brings in 'spirit'. "Spirit" he says "is an antidote to cynicism of mind". It preserves the emotions which spring from impulses, and at the same time saves them from discredit by the destructive criticism of the mind. How does the spirit save the impulses from the criticism of the mind? The simple answer is: by "universalizing" them.

> "The life of spirit centres round impersonal feeling, as the life of mind centres around impersonal thought".[14]

and

> "The man who has the life of spirit within him views the love of man and woman, both in himself and in others quite differently ...... He sees in his moments of insight that in *all*

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13. Ibid. pp. 209-10.
14. Ibid. pp. 207.

human beings there is something deserving of love, something mysterious."[15]

In other words, we are saved from the predicament by the intervention of the spirit as follows: The blind impulse led us to believe that the girl next door is the most beautiful person in the world. The mind tells us that she is not. The spirit then says that even if it be so, she is yet worthy of love, because in all human beings there is something deserving of love, and if she is not worthy of love then no other girl would be, who is no more beautiful, intelligent etc. than the girl next door. But would our mind accept this? It would only if it is objectively a more rational argument or consideration than the mind itself has earlier produced. But what reasons do we have for saying that the view presented by the spirit is more rational or true than that of the mind? On Russell's own theory there are none unless he accepts that the happiness of others is desirable for its own sake. Even granting this, the mind must recognise the intrinsic value of such impersonal feeling. This recognition, when expressed in propositions would be — "such-and such emotion is proper", "such-and-such attitude is good" or "This end is good". This would imply that a morally good life is a life governed by dictates of reason and not of impulses, and it may imply repression and control of impulses not in accordance with impersonal thoughts and feelings.

This view of human nature as consisting of impulses, mind and spirit, and their respective roles in determining the nature and character of human activity presents a particular moral theory which can be briefly stated as follows:

There are certain ends good-in-themselves, particularly the pursuit of happiness or well-being. There *are* certain physical, mental and social conditions or some ways of life which suit human nature in such a way as to produce maximum happiness or well being. Russell maintains that human nature contains a principle of growth within itself from which our natural impulses proceed. But mind and spirit also have to play their part in the life of the individual so as to produce the maximum happiness not merly for himself but also for the others. In so far as Russell maintained that these are the objective facts of our moral life, and that the ends are recommended by Reason on impersonal considerations, he had not accepted subjectivism.

15. Ibid. pp. 219.

III

When, in 1935, Russell published "Religion and Science", he had made a further departure from his original theory. With this change, his ethics could be characterised as subjectivism, and he has said that he has no objection to its being so characterised. This new position can be stated as follows:

Moral beliefs are essentially expressions of desires. Desires are of two kinds: purely personal ones, and the impersonal. The point about impersonal desires is that we want something for others as well as for ourselves; moreover we want others to want it. That is the reason why these impersonal desires are to be designated as "moral". Apart from this, however, there is no important difference between the personal and impersonal desires, and there can be no objective reason for prefering one rather than the other. For instance, there is no objective reason for prefering a personal desire for a glass of wine over a personal desire for a glass of beer. Similarly there is no objective reason for prefering a pacifist impersonal desire to another opposite impersonal desire. But we do regard one desire as a morally better or worse than the other. How could one explain this fact? Russell's answer would be that having preferred one desire for oneself, we judge others in relation to that desire. But our original preference is not based on any rational grounds. So when we say that this is a moral desire, or a morally good desire, or a desire which we ought to have, this would, on this view, mean nothing more than an impersonal desire for something which we want for others as well as ourselves, and we want others to want it.

This position implies that there is nothing which is intrinsically good or good-in-itself. This is the major shift from Russell's earlier position. And this has important consequences. Consider the question of moral disagreements. If one person affirms and another denies that pleasure is good-in-itself, what is the difference between them? Russell's answer is:

> "My contention is that the two men differ as to what they desire, but not as to what they assert, since they assert nothing. I maintain that neither asserts anything except derivatively, in the sense in which everything we say may be taken as affirming something about ourselves."[16]

Now, if ethical judgements are not assertions, they are neither true nor false. They do not refer to facts because there are no facts of ethics. Having thus relegated facts to the domain of science, what remains for ethics is the expression of emotions and desires.

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16. 'Reply to Criticisms'—pp. 721.

Russell provides the reason for adopting this view in 'Religion and Science' where he compares the disagreement in ethics with disagreement about facts. If, in case of disagreement about facts, one of the parties is a colour blind man, then it is true that we cannot *prove* to him that the grass is green and not red. But there are various ways of proving to him that he lacks the power of discrimination which most persons possess. In case of disagreement about moral values — whether, for instance, pleasure is intrinsically good — there is no way of referring to any ethical fact, for there are no ethical facts. But presuming that there are ethical facts, and that the disagreement is due to one of the two person's failure to perceive this fact, how could we prove him that he lacks the power of moral discrimination? "Since no way can even be *imagined* for deciding a difference as to values, the conclusion is forced upon us that the difference is one of taste, not one as to any objective truth."[17]

Russell admits that this puts ethics in a different category from science. But he feels that this difference is overemphasized. What is often overlooked is that the advocate of scientific methods must base himself on the ethical principle that it is better to believe truth that falsehood. This, on his interpretation would mean that the advocate of scientific methods wishes that men believed truely, and wishes that other shared this wish.

Coming again to the analysis of ethical judgement, Russell makes a distinction between expressing a desire and stating that one feels the desire. An ethical judgement expresses a desire but only inferentially implies that one feels the desire. But is this all that is the content of an ethical judgement? Russell agrees with Kant that an ethical judgement must also have an element of universality. But for Russell, the universality of moral principles is not due to any a priori character or logical necessity. Nor is this universal element one which makes ethical judgements universally applicable, like a universal command or law or imperative. Russell does not conceal his distaste for an ethics based on compulsion or imperative.

> "Ethics is a social force which helps a society to cohere, and everyone who utters an ethical judgement feels himself in some sense a legislator or a judge according to the degree of generality of the judgement in question. It would be easy to develop a political theory of ethics starting from the definition: 'the good is the satisfaction of the desires of the holders of

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17. 'Religion and Science' 1935, pp. 238.

power' ... I do not, however, adopt this ethics, because I dislike the white man's burden, the inequalities of economic power, and other manifestations of governing cliques."[18]

But philosophers are not concerned with universal applicability in this sense. In most cases, universality is based on "objectivity" —the same kind of objectivity which a judgement of fact is said to have. But Russell denies this kind of objectivity to ethical judgements. Then, what is this universal element? It is the *object* of the desire, expressed by a moral judgement. "The wish as an occurrence is personal, but what it desires is universal. .... It is this curious interlocking of the particular and the universal which has caused so much confusion in ethics."[19]

18. 'Reply to Criticisms'—pp. 722-23.
19. 'Religion and Science' pp. 236.

THE GAUD SĀRASWAT BRĀHMAŅAS OF WEST COAST OF' INDIA: A STUDY OF THEIR MAŢHA INSTITUTION AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS (1870-1900)

BY

NARENDRA WAGLE

The Gauḍ Sāraswat brāhmaṇas (GSB), who are referred to as *Sheṇavis* in Mahārāṣtra, according to Bhattacharya, are believed to be a branch of the Sāraswat brāhmaṇas of Punjab.[1] In the 1881 census they are described as "curiously isolatcd Gaud Colony located along the West Coast".[2] The GSB themselves assume that they have come in the remote past from their northern home to the south in the areas of the West Coast. In order to distinguish them from the Draviḍa brāhmaṇa group (South Indian including Mahārāṣtrians), the Sāraswats seem to have been called Gauḍ Sāraswat. In point of fact, the 18th century Maratha official documents list them as Sāraswat Gauḍ.[3]

The GSB caste historians cite the Sahyādri Khaṇḍa of Skanda Purāṇa which gives an often quoted story of migration of the GSB from Trihotrapura, the modern Tirhut, to Goa. According to that Purāṇa, it was Paraśurāma, the sixth incarnation of Viṣṇu, who brought these brāhmaṇas from Tirhut from among the *Pañca Gau-ḍas* (Northern brāhmaṇas), to help him perform śrāddhas and yaj-ñās.[4] Moraes doubts this tradition and speaks of the 'myth of the Northern descent' and proposes that the local priests (non-aryan) just converted themselves into brāhmaṇas, assuming a northern origin to cover up their usurpation.[5] Refuting Moraes' suggestion with on elaborate argument, Kosambi, on the other hand, states that the tradition of the brāhmaṇas (GSB) coming in the remote past from the North and settling in Goa is authentic.[6]

1. J. N. Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, Calcutta, Tacker Spink, 1896, p. 89.
2. *Imperial Census of India* (Report), 1881, Vol. 10, Calcutta, 1883, p. 128.
3. G. R. Sharma, *Sāraswata Bhusana* (Marathi), Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1952, p. 528.
4. *Skanda Purāṇa* (Ed. J. Garson Decunha, Bombay, 1877), Sahyādri Khaṇḍa Uttara Rahasya, Adhyaya 5.
5. G. Moraes, "Notes on the Pre-Kadamba History of Goa", *Transactions 5th Indian Historical Congress*, pp. 164-174.
6. D. D. Kosambi, *Myth and Reality*, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1962, p. 166.

The claim of the GSB, whether real or imagined, of a north Indian origin is not an obscure historical problem; it is a relevant problem which has been of constant interest to the GSB. Many GSB leaders in the 1870's and 1880's referred to this northern origin to indicate the solidarity of the GSB in contrast with other brāhmaṇas of Mahārāṣtra, Karnāṭaka and Kerala. In the late 19th cen-'tury the GSB spokesmen wrote books and articles, gave public speeches, cited documentary evidence in the Native Indian as well as English court of law to prove that they belonged to the Northern stock of brāhmaṇas. In this, their claim was in line with their efforts to be recognized as brāhmaṇas, a right which was challenged by the Chitpāvans, Deshasthas, and Karādhes, among others.

Almost all the brāhmaṇas of South India and Mahārāṣtra do not partake of fish, whereas the GSB do. The GSB quote their northern brethren as for example, the brāhmaṇas of Kashmir and Bengal, in support of their fish eating habits. The GSB caste-history writers of the 19th century like Kanvinde (1870) and Gunjikar (1884) make it a point to mention this affinity with the northern brāhmaṇas. The writers also refer to the story of the vedic sage Sāraswata, their professed ancestor, and how he preserved the vedas by eating fish. Besides justifying the GSBs' fish eating. the writers seem to demonstrate, through the myth, the cultural superiority of the GSB over the Mahārāṣtrian brāhmaṇas by claiming descent from the sage.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE GSB

The GSB are mainly found in Konkana, North and South Kanara and certain parts of Kochin, Travancore and Mysore (former princely states). Goa was the original centre of the GSB from whence they dispersed along the coast to the north up to Bombay and south to Malabar. For centuries, this coastal area was exposed to contacts from outside India. Sopara in Bombay, Bhatkala, Karwar, Calicut, Cochin used to have active trade relationships with the Romans. Regular trade routes were established by Arabs, Syrians and Turks, and from the 16th century onwards, by the Portuguese, Dutch and English. From the coastal areas during several centuries, the GSB emigrated to the hinterland areas such as Poona, Satara, Nasik, Kolhapur. We also find the GSB families in Baroda, Indore, Nagpur, Harda, Dhara, Gwalior.

Table number 1 indicates that on the coastal as opposed to the hinterland areas the GSB are a sizable brāhmaṇa community when compared with the other brāhmaṇa groups. They are a majority

ports of Goa and the area surrounding it would most likely indicate
that the GSB in 1910's and 1920's were in the majority among the
amongst the local brāhmaṇa groups of Savantwadi. The census re-
brāhmaṇas in Goa and in areas immediately adjacent to Goa, such
as upper North Kanara and the areas situated north of Goa. But
as we go northwards and southwards, the number decreases gradu-
ally. But in Bombay, again, the GSB form the majority among the
brāhmaṇa population.

KONKANI AND THE GSB

Goa is the home of the GSB, and their language, which is also
spoken by other people in the area, is Konkani. Father Stephens
who wrote a grammar of Konkani in 1614, spoke of the language as
a *brāhmaṇāci bhāṣā* (language of the brāhmaṇas). There has been
much controversy concerning the recognition of Konkani either as
a language or a dialect of Marathi. Grierson, in his lin-
guistic survey, considers Konkani as a dialect of Marathi, while
Konkana, Dekkan and Berar (other Marathi forms) are treated as
mere varieties of Marathi.[7] Saldanha suggests that Konkani was
the peculiar heritage of the GSB, 'formed by the importation of a
northern prakrit variety and the super-imposition of a konkan
Marathi variety."[8]   Priyolkar shows that the literary Konkani is
nearer the Kristapuran, a Marathi version of the Bible written in
the 17th century.[9] While Katre, from the modern linguist's stand-
point, regards it as separate language. According to Katre, there
seems to be very little structural variation in Konkani used in diffe-
rent parts and spoken with a different accent.[10]

The GSB writers of the 1870's and 1880's, such as Kanwinde
and Gunjikar, took great pains in their writings to indicate the soli-
darity of the GSB of the west coast by stressing their 'Konkani'
heritage. In other words, the GSB writers liked to cherish Kon-
kani as a unique GSB heritage, giving them a sense of distinct iden-
tity vis-a-vis the Marathi speaking Chitpavan and Deshashta brāh-
maṇa of Mahārāṣtra. Gunjikar, a grammarian, was especially
forceful in pointing out that Konkani and Marathi had parallel but

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7. G. A. Grierson (Ed.), *Linguistic Survey of India*, Calcutta, Central Publica-
   tion Branch, Government of India, VoL I, Part 1, 1927, pp. 144-45.
8. J. Saldanha, "Kanarin Konkani Caste and Communities in Bombay", *Journal
   of Anthropological Society of Bombay*, Vol. 10, pp. 508 ff.
9. A. K. Priyolkar, *Printing Press in India*, Bombay, Marathi Samshodhan Mandal,
   1958, pp. 152-153.
10. S. M. Katre, *The Formation of the Konkani*, Bombay, Karnatak Publishing
    House, 1942.

simultaneous developments, both deriving their origin from pra-krit.[11]

THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS OF THE GSB CASTE (JÑĀTI)
The GSB gods and lineage

The GSB have not forgotten their 'original' home in Goa from whence they dispersed along the west coast towards the north and south. Many GSB families consider Goa as the centre of their religious activities, and retain their links with Goa by periodically worshipping their family gods (Kuladaivata) there. In fact, there exists a close interrelationship between the GSB's temples in Goa and their lineage groups.[12] Temple worship is observed by the members of the 'original' families known as vāṅgaḍa, with their respective surnames (upanāma) which are further classified into gotras. The Mangesh temple of Goa, for example, claims 24 'original' families with their surnames, subdivided into Vatsa and Kaudinya gotras. The temple of Shāntā·Durgā has 12 'original' families, with their surnames, and three gotras: Vatsa, Kauśika and Bhāradvāja. The vāṅgaḍas have precedence over others in respect of the actual management and upkeep of the temple and also an extra obligation to maintain it.

Through the centuries, the 'original' families, population-wise and region-wise, became too diversified, and one doubts whether an average GSB family finds identification with them useful in terms of an actual and potential network of kinship. Although the temples are commonly shared by the 'original' families, the families themselves are broken up into many GSB endogamous groups. Often one finds two or three endogamous groups such as Seṇavis, Chitrāpur Sāraswats and Kuḍāldeshkars having a common purohita (hereditary family priest) for the worship of the god Mangesh. We notice, on the one hand, the GSB seemingly indicating their solidarity of lineage groups by worshipping the same god as their compariots in a Goa temple. Their network of kinship, on the other hand, in most cases, is tied down to their specific quasi-endogamous or endogamous groups with a limited membership.

The GSB quasi—endogamous and endogamous groups:

To a caste-conscious person living in Bombay city and elsewhere in Mahārāṣṭra, the GSB represent a homogeneous caste who claim to be the brāhmaṇas and yet eat fish which is an unusual thing for

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11. R. G. Gunjikar, *Saraswati Mandala* (Marathi) Bombay, Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1884, pp. 58-71.
12. *Sāraswata Bhusana*, pp. 98-108; See also B. Saraswali, "Temple Organization in Goa", *Man in India*, Vol. 43, pt. 2, pp. 131-140.

the brāhmaṇas of Mahārāṣtra to do. There are in fact endogamous
and quasi-endogamous divisions within the larger community of the
GSB. Enthoven observes 13 subdivisions among the GSB,[13] many
of them quasi-endogamous and infers from this that the Sheṇavis
are the most numerous, the Sāraswats and Kuḍāldeshkars stand
next, while each of the rest number only a few hundred. Some of
them, Enthoven states, are local in origin, while others are due to
caste disputes and fission. Enthoven does not seem to feel the sec-
tarian division as being an important cause of the subdivision of the
GSB. Enthoven's category of the Sāraswats is not clear; so also his
statement saying that kuḍāldeshkars constitute the second lar-
gest group among the GSB; he does not give statistics. Never-
theless, Enthoven and other census writers, compiling their
data at the turn of the century, are aware, although not quite so
clearly, of these internal divisons of the GSB. Saldanha evidently
is better informed of the GSB subdivisions, and he discusses in his
paper, *Kanarin-Konkani castes,* the local legends concerning the
origin of some of the GSB endogamous subdivisions.[14] We must
stress at this juncture that the GSB caste writers Kanvinde (1870)
and Gunjikar (1880) and presumable many GSBs, were very well
informed of endogamous and quasi-endogamous subdivisions of the
GSB Jñāti.[15]

In classifying the internal divisions of the GSB in Table num-
ber 2, I have used the terms 'endogamous' and 'quasi-endogamous'
groups. The term quasi-endogamous is used to indicate a further
bifurcation of the GSB endogamous groups. Theoretically, the
members of the same endogamous groups provided they do not vio-
late exogamous rules, can marry each other, but they do not always
do so in practice. A Sheṇavi of Goa, for instance, sometimes marries,
a Sheṇavi from Savantwadi. But generally speaking, the strictures
imposed on these groups perhaps due to regional differences, are
fairly effective to allow this to happen. In the cities there have been
marriages and intermingling of various kinds among the different en-
dogamous groups, the process which began at the turn of the century.
In the 1960's barriers concerning marriage are rapidly crumbling,
but the feelings and attachments of belonging to a group are effica-
cious in these endogamous and quasi-endogamous groups.

In Marathi and in Konkani, there is a term called *poṭavibhāga*
which explains, perhaps more effectively, the endogamous subdivi-

13. R. E. Enthovan, *Tribes and Caste of Bombay.* Bombay, Government Central
    Press, 1920, Vol. 1, pp. 251-252.
14. Saldanha, *Op. Cit.,* pp. 535 ff.
15. *Saraswati Mandala,* pp. 2-58.

sions of the GSB as well as the other brāhmaṇa group. Differences within the endogamous groups are called *varga* (section) or *taṭa* (segment, sometimes meaning faction). At times *taṭa* and *varga* are both used to indicate the subdivisions or what I have called quasi-endogamous groups. In this connection we may cite an example from the table number 2. Sheṇavi, Chitrāpur Sāraswats, Kūḍāl-deshkar groups are *poṭavibhāga* of the GSB community. Mumbai-kar, Karwarkar, Sawantwadikar may be taken as *varga* or *taṭa* of the Sheṇavi group. In a city like Bombay where there exists a conglomeration of the GSB community, these differences and group affiliations are not forgotten. Some of the GSB have been residents of Bombay city for seven to eight generations; others came to Bombay two or three generations back. They consider themselves GSB when in interaction with other brāhmaṇa groups of Mahārāṣtra. But vis-a-vis each other, the endogamous and quasi-endogamous feelings of the GSB come to the forefront. Events in late 19th century Bombay, as we shall discuss later on in the present paper, clearly indicate this trend.

In table number 2 it is quite clear that there exists a close relationship between the sects and the endogamous groups of the GSB. The earlier efforts to classify the GSB *jñāti* did not seem to consider this link as being the focal point of the organization in the functioning of the GSB community as a whole, especially in the context of late 19th century west coast of India. Muzumdar (1963), a GSB himself, writes: "The maṭha saṁsthāna (institution of maṭha) of the GSB of the Konkan is different from the generality of Hindu matha, in that they have a specific closed shop following. Every GSB from Konkan is born with allegiance to one specific maṭha and to one specific kula-deva temple, and he may no more disown his allegiance to them than they may disown him. The allegiance to the maṭha is not transferable. Each maṭha has thus its specific shishyavarga, that is the families attached to it. Traditionally, members of each Shishyavarga regard their own swami with the utmost reverence and they show the same reverence in the presence of other swamis."[16]

The Maṭha institution of the GSB:

The sectarian organizations of the GSB, with their respective sectarian heads (swamis), have been mentioned in the Bombay Presidency Gazetteer written in 1880's.[17] The Bombay Presidency

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16. V. D. Muzumdar, *Mainly for Sheṇavis* (Privately printed pamphlet), July, 1963, Bombay, p. 6.
17. J. M. Campbell (Ed.), *Bombay Presidency Gazetteer*, Bombay, Government Central Press, 1883, Vol. XV, pt. 1, pp. 140-170.

Gazetteer (BPG) refers mainly to the *smārta* section of the GSB community, giving details as to how a swami is chosen and installed from among the GSB. According to the BPG, the swami, or teacher, is a *sanyāsi* (an ascetic) but is styled as rāja *sanyāsi,* a prince among ascetics. He is the symbolic head, at times in the past the actual head, of the GSB community. The swami is guided by elders (mahā-janas) selected from among the GSB community. Social (caste) dis-putes are discussed at the meetings of adult males, the proceedings are recorded and reported to the swami who passes his decision, which is, at least in theory, final, and is enforced on pain of loss of caste. Succession to the office, the BPG adds, is by selection. The retiring swami, before his death by *samādhi,* chooses a suitable male, preferably in his childhood, and trains him to be his successor. The male child must belong to the GSB family. The status of the swami in the GSB community and his material well-being, depended on his shishyavarga's contributions and on permanent endowments. The same BPG is also aware of the 'large income' of the swamis. It is also admitted that the swamis, though more powerful in the south than elsewhere, recognize that their authority is waning. We may reiterate that the above observations of the BPG were restricted to the smārta GSB sectarian heads, as for example, swamis of Sheṇavis and Chitrāpur Sāraswats. But these observations too, are largely applicable in respect of the vaiṣṇava sectarian heads (*swamis*) of the GSB.

We shall now give an outline of the four important mathas of the GSB.

(A) *Smārta GSB Sectarian institutions:*

(1) Kavale maṭha: The GSB, smārta or Shaivites, belonging to this maṭha, claim that their maṭha is one of the earliest ones in India, with a founder guru, Gauḍapādācārya, who was the teacher of Shankarāchārya.[18] The maṭha at Kavale in Goa is continuing the tradition of the Guru, also called swami, who is selected from the family of the shishyavarga. The present swami is the 77th in the line. There are no records at Kavale maṭha for the line from the 3rd to the 57th guru. This is attributed to the Portuguese onslaught, for they, it seems, sacked the monastery and burnt all the papers. From the 58th swami onwards the records are complete and could be cross-checked with the help of the datable inscriptions found on the samādhis of the gurus. The important maṭha centres, besides Kavale, are at Khanapur, Sadashivgad (Karwar), Bombay.

18. *Saraswati Mandala,* pp. 20-24.

(2)   Shirali maṭha (Chitrāpur maṭha):   There is another maṭha of the GSB smārta at Chitrāpur, North Kanara, which adheres to the same tenets of Shankarāchārya as in the Kavale maṭha traditions. In the beginning of the 18th century, there was some dispute with the Kavale maṭha swami over religious matters, and one section of the GSB smarta community, living in North and South Kanara, decided upon electing a new guru.   Accordingly, a new guru was installed in Gokarna, North Kanara, in the year 1708.[19]   The present Shirali maṭha came to be established in 1775.   The present swami is 10th in the line.

The procedure of the maṭha in regard to succession, rituals. duties of the swamis, etc. is based on that found in Kavale maṭha. The only difference is that Shirali swamis add an honorific *āśrama*, while those in Kavale have *sarasvatī* added to their names, viz. Pāṇḍurangāśrama, Ānandāśrama; Rāmānanda Saraswati, Shivānanda Saraswati, Purnānanda Saraswati.   The important maṭha centres, besides Chitrāpur, are at Mallapur, Gokarna, Mangalore.   The GSB followers of this maṭha are known as Sheṇavipaiki (one of the Sheṇavis), Chitrāpur Sāraswats, Kanara Sāraswats.

(B)   *Vaiṣṇava GSB sectarian institutions:*

(1) Gokarna—Partagali maṭha: The records available at the Gokarna maṭha are precise and clear as to its origin.[20]   They say that Madhvāchārya established 8 mathas at Udipi.   Rāmachandratirtha, head of the Phalahara maṭha, fell ill on his way to Badrinath. He suffered from rheumatic pains and thought that he was nearing his end.   The only qualified man whom he could elevate as his successor at that time was his follower Mādhav, belonging to the GSB. He made him his chief successor (*adhikārashishya*) in Śake 1378 (1456 A.D.) and renamed him shri Nārāyaṇatirtha.   Rāmachandratirtha, however, recovering from his illness, went back and died in 1476 A.D. His original move to make Nārāyaṇatirtha his successor was opposed by the Draviḍa brāhmaṇas.   Hence he appointed another *adhikārashishya* and helped Nārāyaṇatirtha to establish a matha at Bhatkal, North Kanara.   From Bhatkal, the Vaiṣṇava movement spread southwards to Cochin and northwards to Goa. In 1570 the third swami Jivottamatirtha established the maṭha at Partagali, Goa.   The present swami is the 23rd in the line.

(2) Cochin-Kashimaṭha: The 9th swami of the Gokarna maṭha, Lakṣminārāyaṇatirtha, had two prominent candidates for the succes-

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19. *The Chitrāpur Sāraswats Census Reports and Directory 1956*, Bombay, Kanara Saraswat Association, 1956, p. 124.
20. See *Sāraswata Bhusana*, pp. 218-222; 237.

sion, Saymendratirtha and Vyāsatirtha. There was some dispute, and
Saymendratirtha established a matha at Cochin which is known as
Kashimaṭha. The distinction, however, is in the way the followers
of each matha put the sacred marks on their chest. Kashimaṭha
followers apply the mark (on the ritual occasion) above the right
breast, while Partagali followers do so just below it. Partagali
swamis have the honorific Sripāda Waḍera, which Kashimatha swamis
do not have. The present swami is 17th in the line of the Kashimaṭha
swamis.

THE ROLE OF THE MAṬHA HEADS AND THE GSB:

The maṭhas are vital to the history of the GSB. Their signifi-
cance in the internal organization of the GSB has been noted earlier
in this paper. The maṭhas have traditions particularly enriched by
the personalities of the swamis. The swami or the maṭha head had
important roles to play in the changing social conditions of the GSB
community in the late 19th century. Details are available of the
activities of at least three generations of swamis of different maṭhas.
Problems such as the remarriage of widows, foreign travel, the unifi-
cation of the internal divisions of the GSB, were among those which
a GSB swami had to encounter at the turn of this century, and later
for two more decades. I am giving below some of the significant
events from the lives of three gurus. of Kavale maṭha, Chitrāpur
maṭha and Gokarna—Partagali maṭha respectively.

(A) *Shri Ātmānanda Saraswati: Kavale maṭha* (1870-1898 A.D.
from the year of consecration as guru to his final samadhi).[21] Swami
Ātmānanda Saraswati's 28 years in office were significant. His activi-
ties covered many aspects of social life. (1) Relations with other brāh-
maṇas: On his way to Rameshwar a Kashmir Sāraswat brāhmaṇa,
one Ghanashyām Śāstri (GS) met Shri Ātmānanda Saraswati (AS)
at Ankola in North Kanara. As was impressed by the scholarship
of GS and asked him to stay at Kavale maṭha as one of his assistants.
There was no precedent in the matha of interdining and intermarriage
between the southern and northern Sāraswat brāhmaṇas. As broke
the taboo by allowing GS to eat with him in the same line (*pankti*).
GS became one of the managers of the maṭha. AS got him married
to a girl from a well known GSB family from Goa. He even gave
Rs. 1000 in cash to GS so that he might not be in any financial strees
after his death.

(2) Unification of internal divisions of the GSB: As toured the
Konkana region to establish an active liason between himself and

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21. *Ibid.*, pp. 190-207.

his followers, gave public lectures and was in favour of unifying the GSB subdivisions. The following is the gist of one of the speeches he gave: The GSB are divided into groups (*samprdāya*) and there is enmity amongst them. In smārths, there are *ādya* smārth or Sheṇavi Shirali or Sheṇavipaiki, Kudālkar, Peḍnekar, Bhālvalkar Loṭlikar, Mumbaikar. Amongst Vaiṣṇavas there are Sāstikar, Bardeshkar. Each considers the other low. This is detrimental to the GSB community. They do not interdine (*pankti bheda*) nor do they intermary. There should be unity amongst these groups.

(3) On foreign travel: He said, "Considering the present trend in society, one should reconsider the rules regarding foreign travel. Simpler processes should be observed, such as fasting for a day etc. Śāstras should be reinterpreted." His statements are significant as the person who travelled abroad had to perform a sacrifice to wash his sin away, go on pilgrimages to sacred places, shave his head and drink cow's urine and cow dung as a *prāyaścitta*.

(4) Widow remarriage: In 1891, the widowed daughter of Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar (GSB—Sheṇavi) was married to one GSB Panandikar, who himself was a widower. The people who witnessed this ceremony included leading GSB personalities such as Justice K. T. Telang, Atmaram Bapu Dalvi, Balaji Vitthal Gavaskar and Sadanand Trimbak Bhandari. The orthodox amongst the GSB complained to the swami who in turn enjoined Bhandarkar to give an explanation of his conduct. The swami actually gave him fifteen day's grace within which he had to offer a full explanation for his conduct either by meeting him in person or by writing to him. Bhandarkar complied by writing a letter in Sanskrit within 15 days justifying his action, quoting freely from the ancient works on Hindu law such as Manu and Yājñavalkya, who sanctioned such a widow marriage. It must be pointed out that Bhandarkar's daughter was a child widow, whose marriage was not consummated. The swami, by remaining, silent, did not pursue the matter further.

(5) Meeting with sectarian heads: In 1884 AS invited the swami of Kashimaṭha, who happened to reside in Belgam, when AS was at his Khanapur maṭha (which is very near Belgam). This was the first meeting of the two sectarian heads and it had a significant impact on the followers. Since this event, the occasional visit to each other has been considered a fruitful duty to be observed by the descendants of the swamis.

(6) The acceptance of a Śivalinga sent from London: A significant event in the life of AS was his acceptance of a Śivalinga

from London, which he thought he would install in his lifetime,
but could not do so because of his untimely death.   There was an
international exhibition in Philadelphia some   time in the 1880's
and a beautifully executed Śivalinga was sent from Calcutta as one
of the exhibits.   It was considered too indecent to be exhibited.   It
finally got to London and was at Kensington in 1886.   The keepers
of the Kensington museum did not want it for the same reason as
the Americans.   It caught the eye of Sir George Birdwood, an ex-
civil servant of the British raj.   He kept it at his home.   One of the
GSB lawyers, one Nadkarni corresponded with AS and with AS's
permission shipped it to India in 1896.   AS saw it in 1897 at his
Khanapur maṭha.   After his death, it was ceremonially installed at
Gokarna maṭha by his successor Rāmānanda Saraswati in 1920.

AS thus had to face the major social problems then prevalent.
Many GSB were going to foreign countries and coming back to be-
come the elite leaders of the community, introducing Western ideas
to a certain extent.   It was more advantageous to conciliate these
elements than to antagonize them.   Widow remarriage was a new
innovation in 1890, but was backed up by progressive elements in
the GSB community such as Justice Telang and Bhandarkar who knew
more about the Dharma Śāstras than perhaps the swami himself.
The unification of the subcastes of the GSB was a necessity ever
present in the minds of the new urban GSB.   In many ways, the
swami, operating within the traditional structure of the caste, was
himself a progressive type, seemingly   adjusting himself to the
changing norms of his times.

(B) *Chitrāpura maṭha, Guru Shri Pāṇḍurangāśrama* (1858-1915):

This eighth guru of Chitrāpura maṭha, ordained at the age of
12, held office for 57 years.[22]   He was known for his rigid code of
orthodoxy and would urge his followers to abide strictly by the
Dharma Śāstra regulations.   It is said of his orthodoxy that when-
ever he found a follower (*shishya*) entering the maṭha with a cap
with a leather lining, he would at once administer a *prāyaścitta*
(expiation) to him for polluting the sacred place (on account of
the leather).   Only after expiating the offence, which meant, among
other acts, donning a new sacred thread (*yajñopavīta*), would the
shishya be allowed to see him.[23]   He had a strong aversion to foreign
travel, would excommunicate those (*bahishkara*) of his shishyas
coming from foreign countries.   Because of this stand, it is told, he
alienated himself from the "progressive element" of the Chitrāpura

22. *Chitrāpur Sāraswata Census*. pp. 124-125.
23. *Sāraswata Bhusana*, p. 215.

Sāraswat community. He was, however, a notable administrator. He renovated a number of temples and monuments (*samādhis*) of previous gurus. He acquired new lands for the maṭha. Besides building a multistoried house, an artificial tank, a vegetable market, a school for boys and girls, he had a post office built with quarters for the postmaster. In 1910 there was a movement to unite the subsection of the GSB, known as *ekikaraṇa pariṣada* towards which the guru voiced his opposition.

The guru's orthodoxy appears to be intended for strengthening the internal solidarity of the Chitrāpur Sāraswat group. Perhaps the swami was motivaetd by fears that foreign-returned Shishya vargas, most of them with modern ideas and presumably, with secular ideals, might disrupt caste solidarity. This might explain his hostile attitude towards them. It may be of interest to know that Justice Chandavarkar of Bombay, an illustrious Prarthanasamajist belonging to Chitrāpura Sāraswat, came under active displeasure of the swami.

(C) *Swami of Gokarna-Partagali maṭha: Shri Mandirakanta Tīrtha (1892-1942).*

The swami held office for 50 years.[24]   Initially, the swami began his career by consolidating his hold over his vaiṣṇava shishyavarga. He admonished them to wear vaiṣṇava bodily marks such as vertical clay marks on the foreheads, to observe vaiṣṇava fasts etc. He asked his followers to give newly born babes the names of Viṣṇu and Mahālakṣmi. Because of his teaching of vaiṣṇava philosophy some smārta families, it seems, came around to his fold by accepting vaiṣṇava tenets. In his travel to south India the guru noticed that the GSB were not allowed to enter the inner sanctum (*garbhagriha*) of the Draviḍa temples. He retaliated by appointing as many GSB priests as possible in the vaiṣṇava temples which came under his jurisdiction, thereby removing the Draviḍa brāhmaṇas from their posts. He attempted the unification of the two endogamous groups within the GSB, Sastikars and Bardeshkars, by asking them to interdine and intermarry. He allowed an England returned barrister, one Mr. Pandit, to reenter the caste-fold by giving him a *prāyaścitta,* an action disapproved of by more orthodox sections of his shishyas. In 1910 (as we mentioned before) there was an attempt to amalgamate all the existing internal differences, sectarian or otherwise, of the GSB community, making it into a single community or caste. All the gurus of the GSB were uniformly

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24. *Ibid.,* pp. 223-230.

against this move. Gokarna swami too opposed this move. At the
end of his career in the late 1930's he seems to have reversed his
previous stand on the question of GSB unity and in public speeches
he expressed his desire for unity. He met with Kashimaṭha swami
and discussed with him the problems of the "changing times".

Voluntary Association of the GSB (Bombay 1870-1900):

That there was an active rivalry between the GSB and the
brahmanas of Mahārāṣṭra, particularly Chitpāvans, can not be doubt-
ed. The British writers at the turn of the century also noticed this
rivalry and felt that the GSB were regarded with extreme jealousy
and dislike by other brāhmaṇas. On the other hand, the English
authors agree that the Sheṇavis (GSB) in Bombay held a leading
position and engaged in every profession and occupation in which
wealth and distinction can be obtained.[25] "They are not acknowledg-
ed as brahmins by Chitpāvans but are certainly higher in general
estimation   than some that   are' '   Sinclair suggests that   because
"they are held in low esteem by other brāhmaṇs, the Sheṇavis as
a body have shown a considerable tendency towards European
science and literature, the practice of law, and the more Anglicized
branches of the public service."[26] Sinclair also observes that the
Sheṇavis" stoutly assert their equality with other brāhmaṇas and
actually assume all the privileges considered sacred to the priestly
order". Crawford is eulogistic about the Sheṇavis and says. "Dur-
ing the present century, despite the jealousy and virulent opposition
of the brahmins, they have steadily risen in all branches of public
life".[27]

Events in the second half of the 19th century, too, indicate the
increasing tempo of conflict between the GSB and the other Mahārā-
ṣṭrian brāhmaṇas of Bombay. B. V. Kanvinde (1870) in fact wrote
a book *Konkane Brāhmaṇas,* "defending" the GSB status as brāh-
maṇas. Kanvinde notably discusses a case fought in the Bombay
police court on June 29, 1869 between a Chitpāvan brahmana Ganesh
Bapaji Malvankar and Bal Mangesh Wagle, the defendant.[28] The
accusation was that the Sheṇavis or Gauḍ Sāraswats were not brāh-
maṇas, and Wagle, an uninvited guest at an all brāhmaṇa meeting

25. G. C. Whitworth, *An Anglo-Indian Dictionary,* London, K. Paul, Trench, 1885,
    sv. Seṇavi; see also J. Wilson, Indian Castes, Bombay, Times of India Office,
    1897, Vol. II, pp. 29-30.
26. W. F. Sinclair, "Notes on Castes in the Deccan", *Indian Antiquary* (1874),
    Vol. III, p. 64.
27. A. Crawford, *Our troubles in Poona and the Deccan,* Westminister, Archibald
    Constable and Co., 1897, pp. 135-136.
28. B. V. Kanvinde, *Sāraswata Brahmana Urfa Sheṇavi Kimva Konkane Brāh-
    maṇa* (Marathi), Bombay, Sāraswata Brahma Samuha, 1870, pp. 4-18.

created disorder when the meeting was in progress. Witnesses were cross-examined and the verdict was in favour of Wagle. The magistrate said: By attending the so-called brāhmaṇa meeting, Mr. Wagle did not act unlawfully because he himself is a brāhmaṇa. The plaintiff did not produce evidence of disorder. The case is therefore dismissed.

Kanvinde, at length, also writes about the insult given to a GSB vedic scholar Narayana Bhatta Karnataki who had come to Bombay on a visit.[29] He was dubbed a *trikarmi*[30] and chief Chitpāvana and Karhāde brāhmaṇas refused to have any conversation with him. There was an uproar in the GSB community of Bombay. Public meetings were held to discuss this "insult" to the GSB community.

Up-shot of all these disputes (wherein the GSB status was being compromised by other brāhmaṇas) was the establishment of the first recorded caste association of the GSB in Bombay on July 1, 1870, appropriately called the *Sāraswat Brāhmasamuha*. Interestingly enough *Bombay Guardian*, a Bombay weekly of 16th April 1870 talks of this event in advance:[31] "The fact that Mr. Ganesh Bapu a Chitpāvan brahmin, said during the trial of the charge which had been instituted in Police Court against Mr. Bala Mangesh Wagle, that the Sheṇavis were three *karmi* brahmins, has given rise to an Association composed of a few Sheṇavis. The object of the Association is to dismiss all the Chitpāvans and the Karāde brahmins, who are employed by the Sheṇavis and their head priests in the worship of their household gods etc.; to establish a vedic school to teach the vedas to the boys of their own caste with a view to make them get for the profession of Bhuts, and to prove that the Sheṇavis are *Shad-karmi* brahmins..."

The first annual meeting of the Brāhmasamuha was held in 1872, April 28, 5.00 P.M., under the chairmanship of B.V. Kanvinde The secretary, S.J. Sanzgiri, read the report.[32] The report speaks of the opening of a Vedic *pāṭhaśālā* for young GSB students, and gives details of the curriculum taught in the school which included the study of the various branches of early vedic literature, Pāṇinian grammar, the Chhandas etc. The chairman, the report continues, visited Karwar as an invitee for the inauguration ceremony of the

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29. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-145.
30. The Brāhmaṇas' six duties are (*satkarma*) studying the vedas and teaching them, performing rites for himself and for others, giving and accepting gifts. *Trikarmi* means that one can study the vedas, perform rites for himself and give gifts but is not entitled for the other three prerogatives of a Brāhmaṇa.
31. Quoted in *Konkane Brāhmaṇa, Op. Cit.,* p. 116.
32. *Sāraswata Bhusana,* pp. 307-310.

GSB maṭha there.   On that occasion chairman Kanvinde had a dis-
cussion with the Kavale maṭha swami concerning the Bombay GSB
Brāhmasamuha.   The Kavale maṭha swami was impressed with the
efforts of the Bombay GSB, and as a result of this conversation and
the subsequent talks by Kanvinde before the Karwar audience, a
branch of the Brāhmasamuha was started there under his patronage.
The report gives information on donations made to the Bombay Brāh-
masamuha by the Bombay GSB on such occasions as marriage and
upanayana.   The talks delivered by GSB scholars are mentioned in
the report.   Among the diverse topics referred to are: "On mora-
lity (*dharma*)".   "Meaning of health (*ārogyatā*)," "The conditions
of Sāraswats (caste) in the ancient and modern period", and "The
reason for the migration of the Sāraswat brāhmaṇas from Bengal".
The annual report ends with the balance deposited in the Bank,
Rs. 1086.11.5, checked and certified by the GSB auditors, Messrs.
Panandikar and Borker.

All the members of the managing committee, it may be noted,
were from the Sheṇavi group, evidently cutting across its quasi-
endogamous lines.   Non-Sheṇavis were conspicuously absent.   The
backing of the Kavale maṭha swami, the spiritual head of the She-
ṇavis, reinforces the Sheṇavi nature of this samuha.   The parapher-
nalia and procedure of the committee is anglicized with its append-
ages such as chairman, vice-chairman, secretary treasure, auditors.
reading of the minutes and the reports.   The Sāraswat Brāhmasa-
muha lasted for 20 years and was dissolved around 1890.

We   may give here the transactions   concerning the Karwar
Branch of the Bombay Brāhmasamuha.   The Karwar branch unani-
mously passed four resolutions in its first meeting held in 1871, April
30:   (1) We shall not let anyone other than *dashavidha* brāhmaṇas
among us perform our rituals.   If ever we allow anyone else to do
so, we shall be considered guilty of offending our guru, our god
(*shrideva*) and our *jñāti;* (2) We shall not accept food and water
from other brāhmaṇs (3) The Sāraswat Brāhmasamuha with an
executive committee should be established for increasing the pres-
tige of our *jñāti*, to teach our boys to attain proficiency in vedic
studies, and for many such good purposes; (4) We shall abide by
the rules concerning rituals which are laid down by our swami.
Incidentally, the meeting was held in the maṭha of Kavale maṭha
swami and eventually fifty prominent citizens signed the resolution.
A committee too was set up to conduct the aotivities of the Karwar
Brāhmasamuha.   It is obvious from the resolutions of the Karwar
Brāhmasamuha that the objective of maintaining caste solidarity,
which was implicit in the Bombay Brāhmasamuha is now openly

stated. The principal stated purpose of the Bombay Brāhmasamuha was to organize the educational activities of its youth. In the Karwar branch, educational activities, though of importance, were one among many activities designed to promote caste solidarity.

Arya Brahma Samsad (1888 A.D.)

As stated in the annual report of Arya Brahma Samsad (Bombay)[33] published in 1890, the association was an offshoot of the Brāhmasamuha. An open letter was sent to many Bombay GSB by one Balaji Vitthal Gavaskar, urging them to form an association. He said that the time had came to realize that both knowledge and money was essential to the material and spiritual welfare of the GSB. Subsequently, the Samsad was formed. According to its annual report of 1890-91, the Samsad endeavoured to put into practice its stated aims, which we give below: (1) To promote among the GSB the much needed unity and spirit of understanding (aikya āni premavardhana). Accordingly, reciprocal invitations to functions such as marriages were sent out to each other by the members of the Samsad. Membership was extended to GSB outside Bombay in such places as Nagpur, Kolhapur, Satara, Karwar, and the members pledged themselves to correspond with each other. (2) To establish a library for members. Many Marathi, Sanskrit and English books were donated for the library which came into existence in Bombay. (3) To organize learned talks on such subjects as the unity of the GSB, medicine, civics, etc. Many talks were in fact given by GSB physicians and men of literature. (4) To sponsor essay competitions for the youth among the GSB. Seven selected essays were read in 1889, and prizes were distributed to the winners. (5) To acquaint persons with Vedic knowledge. However, it seems that the response of the Bombay GSB concerning this move was poor. But the GSB living in Karwar, Cochin, Kolhapur, Sayantwadi, Nagpur, Harda indicated interest in such activities. (6) To establish pāthaśālas. Overwhelming response was noticeable in this move. A Committee was set up for giving financial aid to promising GSB boys learning in the pāthaśālā which soon came into existence, and where the teachers were GSB. GSB from outside Bombay paid occasional visits to the pāthaśālā and gave donations. (7) To establish branches outside Bombay. In this direction, a branch was opened in Nagpur which had twelve members, including a president, treasurer and secretary.

The samsad, though outwardly meant for promoting unity among the GSB, was primarily meant for the GSB belonging to the

33. Ibid., pp. 310-318.

34. Saldanha, Op. Cit., p. 541.

Sheṇavi subgroup. That the Sheṇavi group is involved in this as-
sociation is clear from the list of its executive members who, almost
to a man, belonged to that group. Like the Brāhmasamuha, the
samsad included in its fold the Sheṇavi quasi-endogamous divisions.
It seems, however, that while in the Brāhmasamuha we find many
"old GSB Bombay families," the samsad contained hardly one or two
among its members. GSB activities in Bombay were increasingly
being dominated by "newly" domiciled GSB from out side Bombay, a
fact resented by the "old" GSB in Bombay. The education of GSB
boys seems to have had an important place in the minds of both
the samuha and samsad organizers.

1891-1896: "Pagḍivāle" vs. "Pheṭevāle"

There was a dispute beginning in 1891 and lasting five years,
among the Bombay GSB over the rights to manage endowments of
their Bombay temples. The earlier GSB settlers in Bombay, known
as "Bārāghare" (the twelve families), distinguished themselves
from the newly domiciled GSB on account of their long residence
there. The mahājans (elders), elected from among the Bārāghare
managed the Bombay temples as Bārāghare's exclusive properties,
which right was challenged by the newly domiciled Bombay GSB
in a court of law. The Bārāghare argued that, though the new-
comers belonged to the GSB, they could not participate in the temple
trust created by their forefathers. However, Saldanha observes,"[34]
the question for the decision narrowed itself to whether the new-
comers formed part of the Gauḍ Sāraswat brāhmaṇa or Sheṇavi
community of Bombay and entitled to vote at the caste meeting".
The court decision of the Bombay High Court (1896) said that sub-
sections of the GSB community denoted not religious but territorial
divisions, hence the newcomers, having belonging to the GSB, were
entitled to participate in the management of their Bombay GSB
temples. In other words, the British Indian courts were not pre-
pared to recognize and legitimize the quasi-endogamous divisions
of the GSB.

It is interesting to note that the two factions of the Bombay
GSB Sheṇavi community, the old and new, were known as pagaḍi-
vāle and pheṭevāle respectively. The pagaḍi is a turban commonly
used in those days by the Mahārāṣtrian brāhmaṇas of Poona, etc.,
and the pheṭā, a long cloth wrapped around the head like turban,
and worn by the brāhmaṇas on the west coast from the south of
Ratnagiri. While the Bārāghare adopted as their symbol the Mahā-

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34. Saldanha, Op. Cit., p. 541.

rāṣṭrian brāhmaṇas' pagaḍi, the other GSB group adopted the status symbol of the southern brāhmaṇas.

Sāraswat Brāhmaṇa Samaja 1896:

The decision of the Bombay High Court in favour of the newly domiciled GSB embittered the feelings of the Bārāghare and those GSB who sympathized with them. An attempt to reconcile the differences between the pagaḍivāle and pheṭevāle ended in the establishment of the Sāraswat Brāhmaṇa Samāja. In its defined scope it was indicated that the association would include all the subsections of the GSB, including non-Sheṇavi divisions. The Sāraswat Brāhmaṇa Samāja celebrated its golden anniversary in 1947 and has been active in various charitable and educational activities of the GSB.

Summary (GSB maṭhas and voluntary associations)

Evidently, the last decade of the 19th century and the beginning of this one seem to have been a trying period for the GSB gurus. The gurus, the caste heads of the community, excercised considerable control over the GSB at least in the late 19th century. They also expanded their religious activities by opening more maṭha centres. The power of the gurus, however, can not be arbitrary as there are checks and balances imposed by the elders of the GSB (*mahājanas*) whose duty is to act as their advisers. The periodical assemblies (*mahāsabhas*) are held to maintain the communication of the guru with his followers.

Each of the three gurus, discussed earlier, reacted differently to the events of the 19th century. Kavale maṭha swami could accept a Śhivalinga from London, but Chitrāpur maṭha swami would give a *prāyaścitta* to his followers who merely entered the precincts of the maṭha building with a cap with a leather lining. Chitrāpur wanted to abide strictly by the *dharmaśāstra* rules. Kavale was willing to overlook the book as in the case of a child widow remarriage if sanction could be found for it in the *smṛitis*. Kavale broken the taboo of not eating with the northern brāhmaṇas. Partagali maṭha swami was a proselytiser, converting shaivities to the vaishnava fold. Kavale was talking of co-existence and mutual respect between the sects. Partagali accepted the London returned Mr. Pandit by administering a *prāyaścitta*. Chitrāpur believed in firm *bahiśkāra* (outcasting) of all foreign returned.

The GSB in Bombay in the 1870s are found organizing their caste association. Kanvinde a GSB "activist" who had openly con-

fronted anti GSB sentiments by writing a counter offensive book (Konkane Brāhmaṇa) was also responsible for the founding of the Sāraswat Brāhmasamuha. The book significantly came out in 1870, the same year that samuha was started. The emphasis of the samuha was to educate the GSB youth in the vedic rituals and sanskrit studies, and to carry on the other caste activities. One may note that many GSB intellectuals such as Bandarkar, Telang, Chandavarkar, without however giving up their caste affiliations, had chosen to join the newly formed Prārthana Samaja of Bombay. One of the aims of the Brāhmasamuha seems to have been to hold in check such activities as were considered disruptive to the promotion of caste solidarity. The samuha under its auspices tried unsuccessfully to sanction a *bahiṣkāra* on a few progressive elements including some Prārthanasamajists in the GSB community. This move split the samuha in half and eventually led to its demise.

Arya Samsad too was interested in educating the GSB youth in traditional lore, but was considerably less orthodox. The samuha had in its executive committee of four two practicing priests; samsad had none. Unlike the samuha, samsad had no blessing from the swami. In fact the founder member of the samsad, Gavaskar, by attending the wedding of the widowed daughter of Bhandarkar, incurred the wrath of the more orthodox amongst the GSB. Interestingly samsad had a better response than the samuha and had the backing of many GSB from outside Bombay.

1891-1895 Phetevale vs. Pagadivale dispute seems to indicate the growing presence of the GSB "New-comers" from outside Bombay to settle there, a fact resented by the "old-timers". Solicitor Dabholkar, who had fought the case on behalf of the pheteyāles, was responsible for the founding of the Sāraswat Samāja (1896). Although the pagadivāles shunned this samaja initially, they later began to sponsor its activities and the samaja continues to survive today.

TABLE I

Bombay Presidency Census :   Selected Areas 1911

Brāhmaṇa Groups: GSB, Chitpāvans, Deshasthas, Havigs

Bombay City	GSB	CHIT	DESH	HAV.
	9,091	8,104	4,876	—
	11,593	10,511	6,874	—
	(1922 Census)	(1922 Census)	(1922 Census)	—
Kanara	24,470	480	2,085	30,878
Savantwadi	9,638	1,054	—	—
Ratnagiri	14,959	30,081	1,987	—
Kolaba	935	1,108	3,652	—
Thana	2,082	5,284	5,958	—
Belgaum	8,689	1,439	23,069	—
Dharwad	1,571	1,722	18,516	—
Kolhapur	2,001	3,049	16,624	—
Poona	491	15,242	32,003	—
Satara	491	5,056	27,319	—
Nasik ...	341	3,810	18,659	—

TABLE 2

Jñāti Organization of the GSB :

Endogamous and Quasi-Endogamous Groups

Names by which they are known and their regional affiliations	Sect affiliation	Temple worship (Kula devas)		Remarks

1. Shenavi or GSB or Sāraswatas
  (a) Mumbaikars or Bāraghare (12 families) — Bombay
  (b) Wadkar - Savantwadi
  (c) Ghatwal - Ghats (hinterland as opposed to coastal areas). Places such as Belgaum, Khanapura, Kolhapur, Shapur, Satara, Hubli, Dharwad, etc.
  (d) Govekar — Goa
  (e) Karwarkar-Karwar
	Smārths.
	Acknowledge the swami of Kavale Maṭha who belongs to the same group.
	Advaita tenets of śaṅkarāchārya.
	Swami considered caste head.
		Mangesh Shatadurga, etc. in Goa.		Numerically the largest group among the GSB. Geographically spread as far north as former princely states of Gwalior Indore, Harda, Baroda, etc., and south of North Kanara. Quasi-endogamous groups based on the regions.

2. Chitrāpur Sāraswatas, or Kanara Sāraswats, Shenavipaiki or Bhanup or Kushasthalis. Clustered in North and South Kanara. In the cities : Bombay Bangalore and Madras.	Smārths. Acknowledge the swami of Shirali Maṭha who belongs to the same group. Advaita tenets of śaṅkarāchārya. Swami considered caste head.	,,	,,	Quasi-endogamous groups not observed. A compact group. Admit of belong to larger GSB groups. Prefer being called Sāraswatas.
3. Kudāladeshkaras — Savantwadi, Arnala, Malvana Vengurla, etc.	Smārths. Acknowledge the śaṅkarāchārya of Shringeri Maṭha who does not belong to their group. Swami not considered caste head. Advaita tenets of śankara.			Call themselves ādya gaudas Do not like being classified as GSB. Historical enmity with Shenavi groups.
1. Divadkars — Ratnagiri 5. Naravanakars — Ratnagiri 6. Bhavalekars — Goa 7. Lotalikars — Goa 8. Kharpekars — Goa Dangis	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,		Groups 4 - 9 are small groups and derive their names from the regions from where they originated. All these groups considered fallen from the main Shenavi group (by Shenavis).

TABLE 2 *(Contd.)*

Jnati Organization of the GSB :

Endogamous and Qunsi—Endogmous Groups

Names by which they are known and their regional affiliations	Sect affiliation	Temple worship (Kula deves)	Remarks
9. Pednekars — Goa	Advaito tenets of śaṅkara.	Mangesh Shantadurga etc. in Goa.	
10. Sastikaras — Goa, North and South Kanara	Vaisnavas. Acknowledge the swami of Partgala, Gokarna, who belongs to the same group. Madhva-dvaita tenets.	Goa : Nagesh Ramnath, Mahalaxmi, etc.	Groups 10 - 12 tend to follow commercial occupations. All the groups prefer to be identified as GSB.
11. Bardeshkarars —· Goa, North Kanara			
12. (a) Manglurkars - Manglur South Kanara (b) Cochinkars — Cochin and nearby areas	Vaisnavas. Acknowledge the swami of Kashimatha, Cochin, who belongs to the same group. Madhva-dvaita tenets.	Tirumalla Dewaswam in Cochin, Mangeshwara and Goa.	

BOOK REVIEWS

H. G. SCHULTE NORDHOLT, *The Political System of Atoni of Timor*, Koninklijk Institute Voor Taal-Land-En Volken Kunde. Leiden 1971, pp. xv, 511, Photos 33, Map 1, Price not given.

This is a publication of the world-famous Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology of Leiden. The original Dutch version was much shorter—about half the size of the present English one —and was submitted as a doctoral thesis at Driebergen. The author followed the glorious tradition of the band of civil service men who spent their spare time usefully in the field of scholarship. They made a thorough study of the flora and the fauna, topography, ethnography and such aspects of the colonial territory under their charge. Dr. Nordholt was a government official in North Central Timor, that part of the island which was under the Dutch rule now forming part of the Republic of Indonesia. So little is still known of the social mores, languages, religious practices of the multitude of tribal people in the outer islands of the Moluccas that it becomes difficult for the government to plan for the betterment of the people or to predict their reactions to the various governmental measures. During the Dutch period, local studies were made in the same pragmatic context in which the gazeteers were compiled in India by British officials. More recently, retired Dutch officials and others who have been repatriated to the Netherlands have found an academic outlet to their nostalgia for the Dutch East Indies where they had spent the best years of their early life. The result has been a spate of monographs of all kinds: linguistic, anthropological, sociological and economic. Of late, Indonesian and Australian scholars have also taken a keen interest in the study of the Melanesian, and Polynesian in their vicinity. The present study concerns a tribe called the Atoni, who constitute 75% of the population of about 800,000 of Indonesian Timor.

Dr. Nordholt spent two different periods in Timor, first from November, 1939 to May, 1942 and again from September, 1945 to July, 1947. He had learnt the Timorese language enough to be able to check on his translators. Most of the chiefs, however, knew Bhasa Indonesia, the lingua franca among the roughly seven to ten thousand islands that constitute Indonesia. He was able to hold long interviews with these chiefs. It is based on such diverse sources that Dr. Nordholt has thrown light on the political organization of

the Atoni, of which in all likelihood the latter were themselves largely unaware. Also the author puts it:

> Every social anthropological study brings to light structures of which the informants have up to that point been more or less unconscious. This is especially so, in the case of political structures. As a result of my investigations, the Atoni of Insana, Beboki, and Miomafo, have learnt to see their own political system more consciously (p. 7).

The focus of the present study is the question of succession to the throne among a people where frequent insurrections and assassinations, "through witchcraft", were not uncommon and had endangered the customary procedures of succession, if there were any. Dr. Nordholt has carefully compiled lists of aristocratic families, their lineages, their social positions and their place at the various rites and ceremonies. He has attempted to manifest a link between the rites, myths and the political system of the Atoni.

Such micro-studies can by their nature only interest the specialist. Yet it is only through the conclusions of many such micro studies that a major, comprehensive work on the people inhabiting an entire region can come up. In the last two decades itself, half-a-dozen studies of the Melanesian and Polynesian people have appeared some of them because of Australian scholarship. It is to be hoped that many such painstaking studies will be carried out, if not for short-term recognition, for the eventual contribution to the emergence of a larger and clearer picture of a sizable society.

<div align="right">D.R.S.</div>

S. B. DEO, *Archaeological Congress and Seminar Papers*, Nagpur University, Nagpur, 1972, pp. xxv, 296, Plates XXVI, Figures 28. Price Rs. 75/-.

Sixteen papers for the Congress, 7 for Seminar "New Trends in Archaeology" and 13 for Seminar "Material Life as depicted in the Plastic Arts upto 3rd Century A.D." makes this volume a good reference for students of archaeology. Most of the papers of the Congress deal with pre-and proto-history; more than a third relate to the Harappan scene.

Surveying the work done in Kutch, J. P. Joshi surmises that the migrations of the Harappans also took the land route, so essential to the transfer of a large number of people and their belongings. A. K. Sharma throws new light on the disposal of the dead by the Harappans. He suggests that, in addition to burial, throw-

ing the body into the Saraswati and cremation are likely to have been used, particularly by the rich. Study of burials at Bagor in Rajasthan has also provided V. N. Misra with valuable information on the pre-history of that region. R. Chauhan's paper deals with Harappan ornaments. H. D. Sankalia reviews the Chalcolithic cultures in India leading to important suggestions for future work. Based on pollen data and food plant remains of Rajasthan and the Indus Valley, Vishnu-Mittre concludes that the dry climate of western India has remained unchanged for 4,000 years.

I. Karthikeya Sarma's "South-East Asia, India and West Asia" is a study on the beginnings of the 'Food Producing Stage', a major landmark in the progress of man. During recent years, great discoveries have been made in South-East Asia, indicating that conditions necessary for the major change in human economy (from food gathering and hunting to food producing) existed quite early in that part of the world: Ground stone axes have been found in North Australia in deposits dated to 20,000 B.C. Traces of agriculture have been found in Formosa dated at 10,000 B.C.

The claims of Thailand are impressive. During 1970, crude stone tools and remains of ancient seeds have been found in the North-east. Findings of animal domestication and the earliest cultivated seeds are dated around 9,500 B.C., whereas the earliest available data for farming in West Asia is not earlier than 7,500 B.C.

The conjecture that the pre-literate period in South-east Asia may be older than in West Asia is strengthened by recent findings. Pottery found in North-east Thailand is placed about 5,000-7,000 years old and shows nearly 1,000 different designs. That of Egypt and India of 5,000 years ago shows relatively simple designs.

The late Professor Subbarao had remarked in 1962 that "archaeological field work in India is more oriented towards the West. We have not adequately looked for the eastern influences which our anthropologists and linguists point out...." Sarma examines archaeological evidence of India in the light of the new findings. Based on the influences of both Western and South-east Asia on India, Sarma divides India broadly into two provinces: Province A comprises of Eastern, Central and Peninsular India; Province B consists of North-Western India upto Saurashtra. The lower Neolithic communities of Province A had, according to Sarma, "the double advantage of being geographically away from the dominating Harappans of Province B, yet being in contact with them due to commercial rather than cultural intercourse. They had

a vast open coast land as well as the north-eastern hill terrain con-
necting South-east Asia and China." However, Sarma cautions that
"we have got to gather more facts, understand them and articulate
them in a proper cultural-chronological perspective before looking
for Eastern or Western impulses."

In his Presidential address, Dr. S. B. Deo suggests that, to avoid
being smothered under a huge mass of data which is neither properly
interpreted nor published. haphazard individual archaeological
efforts should be replaced by work jointly planned by research in-
stitutes, universities and government departments. His plea for the
effective co-operation of scientists in a broad-based, inter-disciplinary
team work gains support from B. K. Thapar's examination of the
scientific aids available to archaeologists in 'Methodology in Arch-
aeology'. The remarks of some participants give substance to Dr.
Deo's pained reference to the existence of "some sort of mutual pre-
judices and a supposed feeling of academic encroachment." But the
main task is the preparation of a long-term plan of work, with crisply
defined phases, geographical areas, and the functions of institutions
and individuals. The Central Government should initiate such a
plan in consultation with the State authorities and universities.

Dr. Deo deserves compliments not only for editing the volume
so carefully, yet unobstrusively. but also for producing it with ex-
emplary speed.

H.N.

S. B. DEO AND J. P. JOSHI, *Pauni Excavation* (*1969-70*), Nagpur
    University, Nagpur, 1972, pp. iv, ii, 119, ii. Plates LXXI;
    Figures 31, Price Rs. 105/-.

This report on the excavations at Pauni is divided into four
parts, namely:

    Part I   : Jagannātha Tekḍī
    Part II : Chaṇḍakāpur Tekḍī
    Part III : Hardolālā Tekḍī
    Part IV   : Epilogue: General assessment and evaluation of
                        evidence.

Prof. Shantaram Bhalachandra Deo, Head of the Department
of Ancient Indian History and Culture is an archaeologist of repute
who has the experience of excavating prehistoric and historic sites
for over two decades. He has also published a number of mono-
graphs and excavation reports. Sri Jagatpati Joshi, Superintendent
of the Excavations Branch of the Archaeological Survey of India at

Nagpur, has brought to light the existence of a Harappan settlement at Surkotda in Kutch.

The present report embodies the results of the excavations at Pauni conducted jointly by the Archaeological Survey of India and Nagpur University.

Pauni, a small town situated 3 kms. southwest of the sacred Wainaganga river in Bhandara district of Maharashtra is known for its imposing medieval fortifications. To archaeologists the copperplate grant of Pravarasena II of the Vakāṭaka dynasty and the inscribed pillar of Kshatrapa Rupiamma found some years ago at Pauni, which provided a clue to its earlier history, are of greater significance. It is late G. C. Chandra who realised the importance of the ancient mounds outside Pauni fort and insisted on protecting them. The authors of the report under review have done well to mention the previous exploratory work done by others including the present reviewer. It is in 1968 that Pauni shot into prominence when an inscribed coping stone (pl. XXXIII) and a pillar of the outer railing (pls. XIX to XXIII) exquisitely carved in Barhut style was brought to the notice of the public in the course of quarrying operations by local brick-makers. The site was explored by the reviewer and certain archaeological potentialities of the mounds were assessed. A report on the significance of the inscriptions, sculptures and other finds was published in *Archaeologia*, a French journal of Paris (No. 32, 1970), wherein the need for excavating the mounds for exposing the Buddhist stupas was stressed.

It should be said to the credit of the excavators that they have not only laid bare two stupas, one each in the Jagannātha and Chaṇḍakāpur Tekḍī, but also excavated the Hardolālā Tekḍī. The salient features of the two stupas are mentioned briefly here.

(i) *Jagannātha Tekḍī stupa complex*:

In the first phase, the box-type construction of the Stupa is an interesting feature brought to light by careful excavation. In the second phase, it was further encased by brick-work to ensure better preservation. A *pradakshiṇapatha* (circumambulatory passage) with a wooden railing was also added in the second phase, while in the third, another encasement was provided. In course of time the wooden railing was replaced by a beautifully carved stone-railing. The alignment of the inner and outer rings of the latter have been traced. Though very few in numbr, the stone pillars, carved with figures of devotees and Buddhist motifs

establish beyond doubt the high artistic tradition of Bārhut which reached Pauni and had some local touch given to it.

Unfortunately, all traces of the gateways have been removed during quarrying operations of the brick-makers.

According to the excavators the massive brick stupa was surmounted by a *Harmika* and *Chhattra*.

They have assigned the third phase of the stupa complex to Kshatrapa—Late Śātavāhana period on numismatic and ceramic evidence.

Chaṇḍakāpur Tekḍī:

This stupa stands on a basal platform of kiln-fired bricks over which alternate tiers of baked and unbaked bricks rise to form the *aṇḍa*. The plano-convex outline of the *aṇḍa* was produced by providing a veneer of kiln-fired bricks, but unfortunately the upper portion of the stupa has been damaged. The extant diameter of the stupa is 41.60 metres.

A crushed pot of Kushana fabric found in the centre of the stupa is said to have contained bones and is, therefore, considered to be the reliquary. This is, no doubt, an important discovery.

Date:

For dating early historic sites such as *Pauni,* one has to depend on numismatic and palaeographical evidence, and corroborate it with ceramic evidence for establishing the chronology. This is what has been done by the excavators. In the earliest level, the occurrence of painted Northern Black Polishd Ware in association with punch marked coins fixes the date of the first phase as the third, rather than 4th, Cent. B.C. For the next phase there is sufficiently reliable palaeographice evidence in the form of early Brahmi inscriptions which are supported Śunga-Maurya art motifs. The date 3rd-1st Cent. B.C. assigned to the eleborate *pradakshiṇapatha* of the stupa in the Jagannātha Tekḍī is reasonable.

The Red Polished Ware which now serves as a firmly datable object occurs in the Kshatrapa period throughout India and continues upto the end of the 4th Cent. A.D.

Sculptures:

A word may be said about the art objects from a close study of the human figures and floral patterns carved on stone railing pillars. It appears the Pauni was one of the links between Bārhut on the

one hand and Amarāvatī, and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa on the other. The hair style, dress and ornamentation suggest a closer affinity with Bārhut.

The excavators have rightly observed that it is more due to the patronage extended by the common man than the royal houses that Pauni flourished.

The excavators deserve to be congratulated for bringing to light Hīnayāna Buddhist Stupas in such an unsuspected region as Vidarbha and giving Pauni a place of honour among early centres of Buddhism.

The drawings are highly instructive and the get up of the report is excellent.

This book is a must for all serious students of Indian history and Culture.

S. R. Rao

MOHAN LAL MEHTA, *Jain Philosophy*, P. V. Research Institute, Jainashram Hindu University, Varanasi, 1971, pp. ii, iii, iv, 234, Price Rs. 10/-.

Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta, one of the foremost present scholars of Jainism has already given us some valuable works on Jainism such as 'Outlines of Jaina Philosophy,' 'Outlines of karma in Jainism,' 'Jaina Psychology', etc., along with his other works both in Hindi and English.

This volume 'Jaina Philosophy' is rather an enlarged and revised edition of his popular work named 'Outline of Jaina Philosophy' published in 1954 by the Jain Mission Society of Bangalore.

The author of this volume is a profound scholar of Jainism who has read and studied the original texts in Prakrit and Sanskrit on Jainism, which is not only a religion, but is one of the most significant systems of Indian Philosophy.

This volume is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter the author has given a very brief account of the history of Jainism. As the author rightly states, "Jainism is one of the oldest religions of the world. It is an independent and most ancient religion of India;." The author commences this account from the times of Lord Pārśvanāth and Lord Mahāvir, with a reference to Lord Nemināth also. However, it would have been more proper if the author had

made a reference to the some of the previous twenty one Tirthankaras of the Jainas, particularly to Lord Ādināth, the first Tirthankara of the Jainas.

The second chapter deals with the religious and philosophical literature of the Jainas. In this chapter the author gives a brief account of the basic texts of the Jaina Philosophy, with the prominent works of Kundakunda, Siddhasena, Samanta Bhadra, Haribhadra, Hemchandra, Yashovijayaji etc.

The third chapter deals with the topic of 'Reality'. Here the author has given a comparative study of Reality according to Jaina Philosophy and according to the other branches of Indian Philosophy and has clearly brought out how and where the Jaina Philosophy differs with the other Philosophies.

The next three chapters deal with the subjects of 'Soul', 'Matter' and 'Knowledge'. These chapters give some technical information in detail on various aspects of these subjects according to the Jaina Philosophy.

The seventh chapter on 'Judgment' deals with the special contribution which the Jaina Philosophy has to make, particularly regarding Anekantvada and Syadvada. The last chapter on 'Karma' deals with the different types of karmas and their causes. It also describes the Gunasthanaka, the stages of spiritual development and shows how a soul rises from the first stage to the fourteenth stages and attains Mokṣa.

Thus the author in this volume authentically deals with the basic principles of the Jaina Philosophy, with all its vital topics. The Jaina Philosophy is later on divided into two branches, namely the Śvetāmbara and the Dēgambara and we must congratulate the author for putting the matter in a balanced style regarding both these branches.

Works of this kind have always to deal with much technicalities, yet the author has tried to make it as intelligible and lucid as possible. Therefore this work, full of authentic technical information, will be much helpful to one who would like acquaint himself with the history and canons of the Jaina Philosophy.

Ramanlal Shah

E. R. SREEKRISHNA SARMA, Ed., *Gītā Samīkṣā*, Sri Venkateśwara University, Tirupati, 1971, pp. iv, 174, Price Rs. 7.50/-.

It is a well-known fact that the Upaniṣadic Philosophy is meant for the choicest few but the Gītā is a valuable treasure for the masses. For more than twenty centuries since Gītā came into being, many a human being finds himself overpowered by the same anguish as that of Arjuna. The philosophy of action, free from greed, passion, fear, anger, hatred and lust, preached by Gītā has a universal appeal. The Upaniṣadic Philosophy of Brahman and Ātman, the Sānkhya Yoga Philosophy, the Vedic Karma-Mārga, the doctrine of Avatāra, the teachings of Lord Buddha, all these resources have been very tactfully handled by the author of Gītā. This accounts for its popularity. The hold of Gītā on the common man's mind compelled the Savants of different schools of thought to interpret Gītā to suit their needs.

2. Gītā Samīskṣā is a collection of fifteen papers presented to the seminar on the Gītā which took place at Tirupati on 7th, 8th and 9th March 1970.

3. It is but natural that the volume should represent five well-known schools of philosophy—that of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha. It was not possible to present all the details of their philosophy in a small paper. But the salient features of their philosophy as represented in the Gītā are submitted in these pages.

e.g. (a) Śaṅkara alone among the commentators explicitly raises the issue of the exact status of Jīva, the practitioner of religious life. Māyā is a reality for the mind that knows nothing of God. But the statements like Śaṅkara does not unfairly inflate Jñāna at the expense of Karma and Bhakti or vice versa" may not be acceptable to the followers of the other schools of thought. The mathematical analogy given at the end to explain Advaita is quite interesting. The author could have also incorporated some of the important verses and their tactful interpretation as given by Śaṅkara.

(b) Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita). The author while presenting the view of point of Rāmānuja has dealt with only two constituents (i) metaphysical thesis of the text and (ii) the formation of the ideal pathway of life.

(c) Madhva (Dvaitāvāda) The paper has dealt with only those aspects which form a distinct contribution by Madhva to the interpretation of Gītā as revealed from his two commentaries Gītā bhāṣya and Gītātātparya. The elaboration of Jayatīrtha helps to make the essay reach a sort of perfection Karmacaturaṅga, the four

aspects of Karmayoga are given an elaborate treatment. Of course a statement like, "On a number of verses Madhva's interpretations are far better and could be accepted without clash of doctrine" can be a matter of controversy.

(d) *Nimbārka* (Dvaitādvaita) Like Vallabha and Rāmānuja he claims to fill the lacuna left in the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara. The Gītā according to him endorses the view that consecration and devotion are the final means of release. Prapatti is the principle tenet of his philosophy and that according to him is the central teaching of Gītā—and it is expounded only in the first two chapters of the Gītā while the rest is only its elaboration.

(e) *Vallabha* (Śuddhādvaita): His philosophy contains the germs of the later Vaiṣṇava movement propagated by Caitanya and others. The nature of God, soul and the world in his system form the concept of Puṣṭi—the keynote of his philosophy.

He did not write any commentary on Gītā. The spirit of tolerance found in the Gītā is echoed in his philosophy. These last four dualistic interpretations is a kind of naturalistic theology.

There are two other great Āchāryas represented in these papers viz. (1) Bhāskara a contemporary of Śaṅkara, an advocate of Bhedābheda-vāda. He was the upholder of the Jñāna Karmasamuccaya theory. The different textual readings adopted by Bhāskara is a matter of great interest. His criticism of his predecessors is presented in a lucid manner. (2) Abhinavagupta—the great savant of esthetics considers Gītā as one of the basic texts of Śaivism. The interpretations of terms like—māmakā, Pāṇḍava, ananya, yoga, etc. are not only intelligent but also helpful in explaining the transcendental and innocent aspects of the Ultimate Reality.

Among the moderners (1) Radhasoami's faith, (2) Aurobindo. (3) Mahātmā Gāndhi and (4) Vinoba Bhawe rightly find a place in this volume.

(1) This faith lays emphasis on the search for a living Sadguru and Gītā according to this faith teaches that man should seek the Lord in human form and should act according to his orders. The concluding section of Chapter XV according to this faith is the cream of Gītā.

(2) According to Aurobindo a clear and deep understanding of the supraethical structure of the life of the Infinite is essential. He need not be labelled with any school. He improved slightly on Tilak's point of view by saying that the Gītā teaches a supra ethical Karma-

yoga—an integral yoga doing justice to the triad of karma, *jñāna* and *bhakti*.

(3) It was Mahātmā Gandhi who obliterated the dichotomy between profession and practice. The doctrines of Ahimsā, Truth and Anāsakti are mainly implied in Gītā. Bhakta of Gādhiji is in no way different from Sthitaprajña. Gandhi's interpretation of II 13 is again a matter of controversy. His views about Aparigraph, Amanitva, etc. appear to be very much stretched in its import. But Gandhi firmly believed that Gītā lays down broad principles and leaves you to find the application for yourself. In fact Gandhi tried to verify his own experiences in the light of the message of the Gītā.

(4) The essence of Gītā according to Vinoba Bhawe is the description of the state of Sthitaprajña. Out of the six criteria of verbal syntactics four can be successfully applied to establish this fact (Upapatti, Apūrvatā, Upakrama, Upasaṃhāra and Phala). Perhaps the Mīmāṁsist may agree to differ on this statement.

There are four more papers of general interest presented in this volume.

(a) The Gītā and Viraśaivism, (b) The Gītā, (c) The Gītā and the Quran (d) The problem of the text (a) Several points of agreement and disagreement between Gītā and Viraśaivism are compared and contrasted in this essay. Karmayoga of the Gītā has its counterpart in Śaivism viz., Kāyak which looks upon work as worship.

(b) The essay on the Bhagavadgītā discusses the theistic and monastic elements in Gītā—how these two diverse elements are synthesised here. Katha and Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads form the basis for this discussion. It is a fact that the theism of the Gītā never became the dominating religious philosophy of India.

(c) The essay on the Gītā and the Quran is certainly of a great general interest even for a common man. Both speak of the ultimate reality. In a modern pluralistic society religion is based on faith and action. Man and God relationship has been presented by comparative passages from both the texts. God is one while man is the vice regent of God on earth.

(d) The problem of the text could have been studied and presented in an elaborate manner. This is a controversial problem. Kashmir recencion of the Gītā has presented another problem. It appears that the author has not taken into consideration the discussion made by Dr. G. S. Khair in his work "Quest for the Original Gītā" (1969) on this subject.

In the preface the editor has regretted his inability to obtain papers on the interpretation of the Gītā according to B. G. Tilak and Chaitanya. If these lapses are ignored the work is certainly a very useful addition for any one undertaking the study of Gītā, as several view points ancient and modern are brought together in a single volume.

G. H .G

PETER HARDY, *Partners in Freedom and True Muslims.* Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, Lund, Sweden 1971. pp. 63, Price not mentioned.

In recent years a number of books have appeared to increase our knowledge of Indian Muslims and their thought, chief among which are: Abid Husain, Hindostanī Musalmān ā'īn-e *Ayyām mēn,* Urdu, Jamia Millia, New Delhi, 1965; M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims.* London, 1967; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment,* Oxford, 1964; and Aziz Ahmad and G. E. von Grunebaum, *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan,* Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1970. Mr. Peter Hardy's brief monograph supplements the information contained in these standard works, and guides the first steps of students of Indian Islam.

Peter Hardy is a Cambridge man, who is now Reader in the History of Islam in South Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

In discussing the political ideas of some of the important leaders during the period 1912-47, he emphasizes the importance of Mawlānā Abū'l-Kalām Āzād. The author begins with the early period of Islam, and tells us what the Qur'ān lays down about civic duties, and what the rules should be for electing a leader (*khalīfa, imām*) of the Muslims. Āzād shows rightly that the *umma* was a religious and not a political concept at its inception, and how the *sharī'a* views the necessity for the Imamate. Originally the Sultan was "pious"; later he became "political." In this connexion, it may be noted that Hardy omits Māwardi and his school completely.

In dealing with individuals, the major part of the book deals with Āzād, and his view of the Khilafat. It is obvious that he was somewhat politically motivated. Hardy also discusses briefly the views of Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī and the Jam'iyyat 'ulamā-e Hind.

This is an excellent introduction to the period in review. There is a useful list of the principal movements and persons, and a brief glossary; but, surprisingly, no index.

A few inconsequential slips may be mentioned:

Page 24, line 5, *kā* should be *kī;* p. 27, 1. 24, *'uẓmā*, not *azma*; *Mas'ala-e Khilāfat*, not *masla;* p. 38, 1.18, *Mi'yār*, not *ma'yār*.

<div align="right">A. A. A. F.</div>

STERN C. A. *Republican Heyday: Republicanism Through the* Mckinley Years, pp. xi; 97, $ 1.25. Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 1962. Published by the author.

The decades following the Civil War were the years when the Westward movement reached its zenith. A whole continent was tamed and brought under the plough. The railways literally banded the sprawling continent together. These were also the years when captains of industry and the tycoons of business ruled the nation. Laissez faire, protectionism and Gold standard were the ruling doctrines. The Republican party was in power most of the time and business was in the ascendancy. The demands for popular election of the Senators, regulation of trusts and the abolition of the Gold standard were the chief demands of the champions of the common man, the populists. By the 1890's they were able to arouse enough popular support to achieve partial monetization of silver and secure the passage of the famous Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1897.

The dominant business interests were able to stymie their implementation. The Congress was full of members owing allegiance to business and the Presidents were willing to defer to the Congressional leadership. The business domination was rounded of by the fact that the Supreme Court acted as a faithful ally of the business and propertied interests. One of the dominant political figures of last decades of the 19th century was Hanna, the Republication "King Maker". He believed that government should be the servant of business. He believed that political power should be applied for the promotion of dynamic capitalism. In such a policy did Hanna see the most effective key to the elimination of the menace of radical Western agrarianism. Hanna believed in prosperity that "percolated from the governing group at the top downward through all the layers."

Stern's easy is well researched and is worthy of close study. It might be added that it would have been better if he brought out his three small booklets on the rise of Republicanism in one book.

<div align="right">B. R. B.</div>

K. MADHAVA KRISHNA SARMA. *Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali*, Sri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Delhi, 1968, pp. xii, 186, Price Rs. 15/-.

This work substantially represents a thesis submitted for the degree of M.O.L. of the University of Madras, but is nevertheless a scholarly work of mature understanding. The L.B.S.R.S. Vidyapeeth may be congratulated on including it in their publications as No. 4.

The relationship between these three great linguistic scholars of the pre-Christian era has been a matter of much general discussion among scholars of the 19th century who considered Kātyāyana as a severe critic of Pāṇini but Patañjali as a critic of K. but supporter of P. It is only the perspective of the 20th century linguists which considers the development of Sanskrit between the periods from P. to K. and K. to Pat. as the basis on which their respective statements are made. Indeed, in the beginning of the present century Liebich has proved that Candragomin, while reshaping P's sūtras into his own treatise has taken note of changes which were effected in the śiṣṭa speech from P's days to his own time. Mr. Sarma has followed this line of approach successfully and presented the three great ācāryas in their true light, as applying the same methodology to the actual state of Sanskrit as current during their times.

One might notice in this connection that a very detailed study has since been completed as a Ph.D., dissertation in the University of Poona by Dr. S. D. Laddu in which the changes which have taken place in the structure of Sanskrit during the intervening periods between the triumvirate munis who have given us an incomparable description of Sanskrit, never surpassed since. Mr. Sarma's contribution gives testimony of his deep understanding of Aṣṭādhyāyi and the Vārttikas and on the whole represents a correct picture of the situation. That he did this more than two decades ago is a matter on which he deserves congratulations. No serious student of A. of Pāṇini can fail to gain an insight in the subject by reading this interesting treatise. Thanks must be accorded to the Vidyapeeth for publishing this valuable work.

S.M.K.

SEETA PADMANABHAN, ed., *Śrīpraśna Saṁhitā*, Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Tirupati, 1969, pp. A-R; i-lxxxxvi and 1-522, Price not mentioned.

The *Śrīpraśna Saṁhitā* is one of the Āgamas or canonical texts of the Pāñcarātra school of Vaiṣṇavism. The text has been printed before in Grantha characters. The present is a new edition in Devanagari characters, in the preparation of which a Grantha manuscript from the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library has also been utilised. The editing has been done with great competence and the printing and get-up of the publication are of a high standard.

The *Śrīpraśna Saṁhitā* is in the form of a dialogue between Śrī or Lakṣmī and her consort Bhagavat or Viṣṇu. On being questioned by the former (hence the name Śrīpraśna), the latter expounds in full the Pāñcarātra teaching. This consists, first of a description at great length of the procedure to be followed for building temples and installing images of Viṣṇu therein. This is followed by a full description of the ritual of daily worship in the temples and of the special celebrations to be observed on the occasions of various festivals. In the Foreword, Dr. V. Raghavan, who had inspired the undertaking of this work by the Editor, has pointed out that the practices described in it have been in vogue in the great Vaiṣṇava temples in Tamil Nadu. And it seems that the temples have maintained the traditional ritual as recorded in this and the other Saṁhitās of the School.

In a brief Introduction the Editor touches upon the question of the origin and antiquity of Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇavism. She argues for its existence since at least the later Vedic period. The Introduction is followed by a number of Tables, setting forth a lot of information culled from the text, for example, on the rāgas and tālas, on musical instruments, on dances, on mantras used in the ritual and so on. Perhaps a description in brief of the ritual itself as found in this work would have been a welcome addition.

This edition of the *Śrīpraśna Saṁhitā* will no doubt be found very useful by students of Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇavism and of temple worship.

                                                                    R.P.K.

J. GONDA, *Viṣṇuism and Śivaism*, A Comparison. Jordan Lectures, 1969. The Athlone Press, University of London, 1970, pp. 228, Price 70s.

The Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion were instituted in 1951 at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Professor J. Gonda of Utrecht delivered the ninth series of lectures in 1969 on Viṣṇuism and Śivaism. The publication under

review presents these lectures in an extended form as originally written out by him in 1967 and 1968.

Gonda has already published a work in two volumes on the religions of India (*Die Religionen Indiens*, Stuttgart, 1960 and 1963) *His Aspects of Early Viṣṇuism* (Utrecht, 1954) had also appeared earlier. The purpose of the present lectures is to institute a com parison between Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism 'the two most prominent religious currents and communities' in Hindu India. They do not seek to give a regular history of these two religious streams, but rather to find out what they have in common and wherein they differ from one another. Nevertheless Gonda devotes the first two lectures to an elucidation of the characters of Viṣṇu and Rudra-Śiva as revealed in the Vedas and later literature, culminating in the rise to superiority of these two gods over the others. Moving away from the commonly held view about Viṣṇu being, in origin, a solar god, he is inclined to regard him as representing rather the 'idea of universal pervasiveness or penetration, of the omnipresence of a mighty and beneficent energy (p. 10). As to Rudra in the Veda, his essence, according to him, was 'the power of the uncultivated and the unconquered, dangerous, unreliable, unpredictable hence much to be feared, nature, experienced as a divinity (p. 5)

In the chapters that follow Gonda refers to the various forms and aspects,—such as the aṣṭamūrti, liṅga etc. in the case of Śiva and the vyūhas, avatāras, etc. in the case of Viṣṇu,—in which these two gods appear in the theologies of the two religious streams and then describes at some length the ritual followed in connection with the worship of the two gods. He is inclined to think that that the opposition between the two is related more to 'socio-ritual' differences than to the theoretical side of their religion (pp. 66-67).

In a chapter on the mutual relation of the two religions Gonda refers to the various forms this relationship has taken sometimes of open hostility between their followers, at other times, however, of some sort of mutual accommodation, even a sort of inclusiveness, in which one god is given a place of honour in the scheme of worship of the other. The ultimate in reconciliation between the two is the concept of Hari-Hara. Finally Gonda dwells on the characteristics of the two gods as they appear in folklore, in mythology and in classical literature.

Towards the end of this extensive comparison of the two religious movements. Gonda remarks 'notwithstanding the endless diversity of Indian religious life, notwithstanding the existence of a few great religious currents and many sects and denominations, the

conception of the fundamental unity of all aspects and manifestations of the divine is not lost'. As an ancient seer said long ago, *ekaṁ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti.*

The erudition that has gone into the preparation of these lectures is overwhelming. To a text of 142 pages are appended 75 pages of closely printed Notes, which show Gonda's mastery of tho vast material having a bearing on this subject. There is little doubt that the book, which is beautifully produced, will serve the purpose of giving the reader an adequate idea of the points of similarity and contrast between the two religious currents present in Hinduism.

R.P.K

ASAF A. A. FYZEE, *Compendium of Fatimid Law*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1969, pp. 1, 160, Price Rs. 25/-.

Professor Asaf A. A. Fyzee, a versatile genius and an acknow ledged authority on Islamicology, has many remarkable works to his credit. *Outlines of Muhammadan Law* and *A Modern Approach to Islam* are his outstanding works which have been internationally received. The present work, *Compendium of Fatimid Law*, is another piece of research on Ismā'īlīs and their laws on marriage, divorce gifts, trusts, endowments, wills and inheritance besides two appendixes containing rules and regulations about food and drink, and dress and ornaments.

The learned author admits that "in comparison with other schools of law such as the *Hanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi'ī, Hambalī* and *Ithnā 'Ashar* the literature of Fatimid law is extremely meagre (xx) and further adds that". In such a state of comparative lack of material, the only course was to take the principal text, *Da'ā'im al-Islām*" (xxi) which is "compared with other ancient texts" (xxi), and hence the work under review.

Professor Fyzee has discussed and explained the subject-matter in a matter-of-fact style and delightful manner. The law refers to a particular sub-sect of Shi'aite school of thought, distinctly different from the Sunnite school of thought. The author is justified when he says "that simple and logical as the Fatimid doctrine seems to the lay mind, it is neither more practical nor theoritically more sound than the principles of Sunnite *uṣūl* so ably expounded by *Shāfi'ī,* and adopted by the Sunnite schools all over the world"(L).

It is wished that Professor Fyzee, who is one of the most enlightened personality, presents an integrated legal work for all the

sections of Islam, irrespective of their doctrinal approach to the problems of life in this world and the next.

However, Professor Fyzee deserves congratulations for his wonderful work, and it is hoped that this book will be read by all and will be preserved in all the well-equipped libraries.

N.S.G.

ASKO PARPOLA, SEPPO KOSKENNIEMI, SIMO PARPOLA &
   PENTTI AALTO, Progress in the Decipherment of the Proto-
   Dravidian Indus Script. Scandinavian Institute of Asian
   Studies, Denmark, 1969.

Archaeological researches carried on since 1922 make it possible to say that at least five thousand years ago, at the time when the great sumerian civilization was flourishing at places like Kish and Tell—Asmar, and the royal palaces and tombs were being built at Ur, in Mesopotamia, north-western India, too, boasted an advanced civilization of its own. The Indus civilization, as it is now officially called, was not confined to the Indus Valley. In fact it was the grandest of the ancient civilizations. It included Harappa and Rupar in the Punjab; Mohenjo-daro, Chanhu-daro and Amri in Sind; Desalpur, Rangpur, Lothal, Bhagatrav and Rojdi in Gujarat and Kathiawar; Alamgirpur in the upper Gangetic basin; Kalibaugan in Rajasthan and Dabarkot and Suktagendor in Baluchistan. It was thus far greater in extent than the Sumerian or Egyptian or Mesopotamian civilization. Even its town-planning, underground drainage, artistic seals, fabulous ornaments, wonderful art, advanced maritime commerce, utilitarian brick architecture and picto-phonetic script far surpass similar facets of other civilizations. But as long as the Indus Valley civilization of preserves the secrecy of its mysterious script, a proper assessment of the civilization would continue to be difficult.

It is now generally believed that at some very remote past northern India was occupied by the pre-Aryan Dravidians before they came into conflict with the Aryan-speaking people and were driven south. Like the Southern people, the Gonds one of the primitive tribes dwelling in central India, speak a Dravidian dialect. And even to this day there is a small area of Dravidian—speaking people living in Baluchistan, though there is no evidence whatsoever of their contact with any Dravidian culture within historical times. Yet their language, Brahui, belongs to the Dravidian family. It is, therefore, evident that Dravidian influences must have existed in this north-western corner of India in very early pre-Aryan period.

The Indus Valley has sheltered the archaeological evidence of an advanced pre-Aryan city civilization five thousand years ago. This civilization, therefore. could have been essentially Dravidian in origin.

Since Sir John Marshall published his two volumes "Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization" in 1931, several attempts have been made to decipher the Indus script. The most spectacular, however, were those made by the Russians in 1965 and by the Finns in 1968. Both the attempts were co-operative in nature. The Russian team of scholars consisted of Knorozov who analysed the Indus Valley inscriptions, Volcok who interpreted the signs of the script and Gurov who read the script. They published their result in Russian in 1965 and subsequently in English in 1968. They grouped all the inscriptions according to the various symbols. They used the computer to do their analytical work. The booklet under review entitled "*Progress in the Decipherment of the Proto-Dravidian Indus Script*" has been published in April 1969 at Copenhagen as "The Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies—Special Publications No. 2.

It is the result of the research done by the Finnish team of a Vedic philologist Asko Parpola, a mathematician Seppo Koskenniemi, an Assyriologist Simo Parpola and a linguist Pentti Aalto. They published their result in February 1969—The Scandinavian Institute of Asian studies: Special publications No. 1, and the present work under review, in April 1969 as Special Publications No. 2. The analysis of these scholars. though done on the computer like that of the Russians, has been different. They prepared in all three lists of the signs of script appearing at the beginning and end of the inscriptions, pairs of signs and combinations of more than two signs.

In a review like this it becomes difficult to discuss the actual reading of the script as it is difficult to print the signs. There seem to be, however. conspicuous defects in their decipherment. First of all there is no agreement among the decipherers. Secondly all the signs are not copied well and with any consistency or uniformity. Therefore even the signs that look alike are read and interpreted in different ways. The same sign is not always associated with the same sound. It is, however, suggested in the Preface that the independent researches of the Russians confirm the Finnish "decipherment in some respects" (Page 3).

The book contains very useful "Notes" eighty in number (pages 31-37). But to understand the Indus Valley and Vedic tra-

ditions, particularly religions, the authors depend very heavily on Ernst Arbman's book "published before anything was known about the Indus civilization, in 1922" (Page 31). A number of observations regarding these traditions as reflected by the authors throughout the book need a revision inspite of the "Additions and corrections to First Announcement" (Pages 38-44).

Referring to Arbman's book without its title, the authors have made the following observations. "Rudra is a formidable murderer, the lord of a host (gaṇa) of demons (bhūta, Vināyaka), who, like he himself, cause all kind of diseases and evil (11) As a bloodthirsty, wild hunter he is the lord of the beasts (paśupati) (12)". "The ritual with which Rudra was worshipped differs radically from the Vedic sacrifice and liturgy. It consisted simply in depositing the offering in a place where the deity was known to reside. Even the flesh of slaughtered animals was offered raw. The name given to this kind of sacrifice is *bali* (18)" (Page 10). "Though the Vedic texts evidently on purpose avoid all reference to idols and temples so characteristic of Dravidian religion, the Gṛhyasūtras and Pāṇini show that images of Śiva as well as of other deities, snakes, trees, etc. were worshipped (20). This pūjā (a term of non-Aryan, probably Dravidian origin) has been incorporated in the Vedic ritual as the arghya ceremony (21)". It would have been proper on the part of the authors to explain the use of their words "evidently on purpose". The authors very probably (?) due to their heavy reliance on Arbman, have failed to understand and appreciate the lapse of a few centuries between the "Dravidian" Indus Civilization and the Gṛhyasūtras. The early Vedic texts "avoid all references to idols and temples" simply because they had no such practices prevalent among them. But "the Gṛhyasūtras and Pāṇini show that images of Śiva as well as of other deities, snakes, trees, etc. were worshipped" because of the assimilation of these practices by later Vedic society. In this context one fails even to understand the observation of the authors that "The undeniable celestial nature of Rudra in the Rgveda as opposed to his later plainly chthonic character has puzzled scholars" (Page 15). On page 30 the authors again state: "Rāhu, the demon of eclipse, is also mentioned (72), what we would not expect in an orthodox Brahmanical text". In the light of our above observation this statement too needs to be revised.

The authors, however, deserve congratulations for their magnificent achievement in the decipherment of the Indus Valley Script.

It would not be out of place here to bring to the notice of the readers that almost a quarter of a century earlier, my esteemed

guru late Fr. Heras of the St. Xavier's College, Bombay, made known to the world his decipherment of the Indus Valley script. He has to his credit the publication of the voluminous book *"Studies in Proto-Indo-Mediterranean Culture, Vol. I* and a large number of research papers published in various research journals. Gratefully acknowledging the earlier work of Hunter who maintained that the Indus Valley people spoke an Aryan language, Fr. Heras improved on Hunter's work by preparing elaborate charts of all the known signs of the Indus Valley script. He suggested that the main signs represented nouns, the prefixes as their adjectives and the suffices as their genders, cases or numbers. Knowing that such constructions are peculiar to Dravidian languages and not to the Indo-European ones, he concluded that the language of the Indus Valley people must have been "proto-Dravidian". Though the Russians and the Finns did not know of Fr. Heras's method, and the Finns did not know the Russian technique, all the scholars have independently proved that the language of the Harappans was proto-Dravidian.

Let us hope that with more scholars entering the field and more material becoming available, an agreed decipherment of the Indus script remains only a matter of time.

L.B.K.

HAJRA SANKARPRASAD, *Essays on Harappa Culture*, Indranath Mujumdar, Subarnarekha, 73, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Calcutta-9, pp. 97, Price Rs. 15/-.

The above work consists of three chapters. The first chapter is entitled "Dying Harappa and the New-Comers". Here Mr. Hajra discusses various Harappan sites and their chronology. For him C-14 dating is a unmitigated nonsense and worthless thing. He feel Harappans were the Indo-Caspians (Vedic Aryans). He puts the beginning of Harappan Culture in c. 1800 B.C. and the disappearnce of the Harappans from the Indus Valley in c. 1000 B.C. The second chapter deals with weights and measures. Here Mr. Hajra is trying to relate Harappan weights with the ancient Indian weights of gold, silver and copper. The third chapter deals with the decipherment of the Indus script. According to Hajra the language of the inscriptions of the Indus seals is Sanskritic. On this basis he has tried to read a number of seals which is unconvincing. With the available facts which modern researches have revealed one could hardly support the views expressed by Mr. Hajra.

In the past Dr. Pran Nath supposed the Indus language to be some form of old-Sanskrit or Prakrit and with the help of Brahmi script tried to read Indus seals without success. Others have followed suit without any tangible results.

The decipherment of an unknown language in a known script or a known language in an unknown script is much more hopeful than that of an unknown script and in unknown language. The absence of long inscriptions in the Indus Valley Culture makes the task all the more difficult. If a bilingual inscription is found the decipherment of the Indus script will be much more easy.

The present work is in the form of cyclostyled sheets bound together and not printed and is probably meant for private circulation. Unfortunately this work is based on highly speculative theories and unscientific approach and I doubt whether the writer will find any publisher to print it in a book form.

Moti Chandra

V. V. MIRASHI AND N. R. NAVALEKAR, *Kālidāsa*, Popular Prakashan, Bombay-34, 1969, pp. viii, 473, Price Rs. 25/-.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. V. V. Mirashi, one of the foremost living Indologists, is known to all scholars for his painstaking researches in many fields such as Sankrit, Ancient Indian History, Epigraphy, Numismatics etc. Prof. N. R. Navalekar who has worked as Professor of English as well as Sanskrit is known to scholars through his book 'New Approach to the Rāmāyaṇa' which is acclaimed as an excellent attempt to interprete Rāmāyaṇa from a rationalistic standpoint. The volume under review is a result of the collaboration of these two scholars. It is a comprehensive work of Kālidāsa consisting of 9 chapters spread over 458 printed pages full of information as well as critical acumen. The chief merit of the book consists in exhaustively discussing all problems connected with the date, life and works of the prince of Indian poets in the light of the recent researches as well as views expressed by several scholars. The date as well as the birth-place of Kālidāsa have been the most vexed problems of our literary history. They are, here, dealt with (in chapters I and III) characteristic thoroughness and force of Dr. Mirashi adducing sound arguments able to carry conviction to the readers. The frankness expressed in the concluding paragraph of the

first chapter namely 'It must be admitted that we have no direct and incontrovertible evidence for fixing the date of the poet such as could have been furnished by a contemporary inscription mentioning his name' (Page 35) admirably brings out the attitude of a researcher who is not prone to overstep his limits. Chapter II entitled 'The Age of Kālidāsa' for the first time ably takes stock of the social, political and religious conditions of Kālidāsa's times. Chapter IV excellently portrays the picture of Kālidāsa, the typical scholar of ancient India as well as 'the man that we get from a careful study of his works'. Chapters V as well as VI first briefly survey poetic and dramatic literature up to the age of Kālidāsa and then give an exhaustive account of his poems and dramas and are useful even to the lay readers enabling them to follow and appreciate the skill of Kālidāsa in handling his themes. Due care, however, is taken to discuss important and knotty questions such as the authorship of cantoes IX-XVIII of the Kumārasambhavam or that of Setubandha, the identification of Rāmagiri in as well as the sources of Meghadūta or the Vikramorvaśīyam and Ravindranāth's view regarding the two unions in the Śākuntalam. Chapter VII not only evaluates Kālidāsa's poetry according to the standards laid down by Sanskrit rhetoricians but also goes to the length of adequately bringing out the charm of Kālidāsa's similes and other figures of speech. Last two chapters ably bring out Kālidāsa's views on different matters such as religious, philosophical etc. as well as his influence on later Sanskrit authors. It must be said however, that at times it is not possible to agree with their view e.g. the statement 'three stories in Mālavikāgnimitram are so interwoven as to converge in hero's triumph' etc. (P. 357). Similarly while discussing defects of Kālidāsa it will have been better to refer to Mahavirprasad Dwivedi's work in Hindi viz.   महाकवि कालिदासकी निरङ्कुणता.

This does not detract the value of the book. Appendix bringing together the tributes to Kālidāsa, Bibliography as well as Index certainly add to the value of the book. The book also contains profuse quotations to bear out the truth of the remarks. Above all, the book has the distinct advantage of interpreting Kālidāsa's literature in English in a beautiful and elegant style. It is, therefore, a must for all students as well as readers of Kālidāsa and the authors deserve best compliments for presenting such a volume to lovers of Sanskrit literature.

                                                        M. D. P.

VASUDEV DIKSHITA, *Adhvara-Mīmāṁsā-Kutūhala Vritti*, Lal-bahadurshastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Delhi, 1969, pp. 609+27, Rs. 30/.

1. The book under review is a commenatry on the Purva-Mīmāṁsā sūtras of Jaimini. The colophon to the commentary shows that the author, Vasudev Dikhshita, was born in a village in the Tanjore district which was then under the rule of Shahaji, Sharabhji and Tukoji of the Bhonsla family. This places the author in a major portion of the 18th century.

2. Vasudev Dikshshit is well-known to students of Sanskrit as the author of Bālamanoramā, a popular commentary on the Sid-dhānta-Kaumudī of Bhattoji Dikhshita. His exceptional skill in unravelling difficult and forbiding texts, so evident in that book, is fully revealed in the present commentary.

3. The pūrva-mīmāṁsā sūtras, according to the Nyāyamālā (Anāndāshrama edition), number 2745. These are divided into 12 adhyāyas, each consisting of 4 pādas, excepting three which contain as many as 8 pādas each. These sūtras are divided into 907 adhi-karaṇas or topics. The present volume which contains the com-mentary upto the end of the third adhyāya is the first part of the proposed 3 to 4 volumes in which the entire commentary is expected to be published. As the present volume consists of over 600 pages, we get a fair idea of the extent of the entire commentary which will run into over 2000 pages when complete—truly a monumental venture!

4. The doctrine of the infallibility of Vedas, that they were in-herently authoritative— स्वत: प्रमाण —placed an obligation on the pūrva-mīmāṁsā to resolve, reconcile and harmonize the several vedic texts even when there were seeming inconsistencies, contra-dictions or even what appeared to be absurdities. It met the chal-lenge by evolving principles of exegesis, of interpretation and ad-justment. These were so thorough going and comprehensive that they became invested with the dignity of Nyāyas or Maxims. These maxims apply equally to all texts, whether profane or sacred. Since all sciences and systems ultimately involve the question of final significance and interpretation, the study of pūrva-mīmāṁsā which provides precise maxims for this purpose, becomes highly de-sirable. This is especially so in the case of Dharmaśāstra and Vedānta which are concerned with questions of interpretation and significance.

A.S.—18

5. Between the composition of the BHĀSHYA of Śabaraswa-
min on the sūtras and the publications of this commentary, more
than 2000 years had elapsed and during this long interval, there
was no suitable commentary which explained the sūtras and ex-
pounded the arguments embodied in them. Most of the standard
books like Śāstradīpikā, Nyāyamālā, were concerned with the ex-
planation of the adhikaraṇas and did not touch sūtras. The Bril-
liant Vārtikas of the incomparable Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on the Bhāshya
too offered little help to the student to grasp the meaning of the
sūtras. The only publication on which this reviewer was able to
lay hands in his student-days was the Ṣad-Darśanachintanikā, a
monthly magazine published from Poona about a hundred years ago
which carried serially translation of the sūtras and comments there-
on in Marathi and English with a brief rendering of the meaning
of the sūtras in Sanskrit. The magazine which contained useful in-
formation about some of the Vedic sacrifices from the pen of the
highly erudite editor (the reviewer believes his name is Prof. Kunte)
seems to have stopped publication before the completion of the Ven-
ture but not before 6 out of the 12 Adhyāyas had been translated
and published in a series running into 2084 pages! The curious
reader will find several highly original suggestions interspersed be-
tween its pages.*

6. Students of pūrva-mīmāṁsā, handicapped so long by the ab-
sence of a suitable commentary on the sūtras, will welcome this pub-
lications. The author, who belongs to the Kumārila school of Mīm-
āṁsā, has explained each word of the sūtras and the argument aris-
ing out of them. The following extract is an example of the author's
delectable style:

औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशाऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं
बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् । (जै. सू. 1-1-5)

(टी.) शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः प्रत्याख्यप्रत्यायकभावावनक्षण औत्पत्तिकी–नित्यः; जातः शब्दार्थ-
त्वस्य कृत्यधिकरणे व्युत्पादिष्यमाणवात्, जातेश्च नित्यत्वात्, शब्दनित्यत्वस्य चानुपदमेव वक्ष्य-
माणत्वात् । एतेन शक्तेरनित्यत्ववदोषो निवारितः । तस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्य शक्तेर्ज्ञानं–शक्ति-
ग्रहमिति यावत् । उपदेशः वेदवाक्यं, जनयति प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्याहारादिति शेषः। उपदेश इत्यस्य
प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्याहार इत्यप्यर्थ इत्यन्यं । × × × । अनुपलब्धे–प्रत्यक्षाद्यगृहीतेर्ऽर्थे, विधिवाक्य-
जन्यज्ञानस्य अव्यतिरेकश्चव्यभिचारोऽपि नास्ति–विषयधर्मज्ञयजनकत्वं नास्तीति यावत्। अनुपलब्ध
इत्यनेनानुवादत्वनिरासः । तत् तस्मात् अगृहीतार्थविषयकत्वे सति धर्मसंख्यान्यज्ञानजनकत्वात्
चोदनावाक्यं प्रमाणम् । तुष्यधारणे । प्रमाणमेव । अनेवक्षत्वात् पुरुषान्तरे प्रत्ययान्तरे चापेक्षा-
राहित्यात् । × × × । बादरायणग्रहणमादरार्थम् । अनधिगतार्थगन्तृत्वमेव प्रमाणलक्षण –
मादर्तव्यं न त्वन्यदिति ।

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(*) For aught the reviewer knows the magazine might have prospered further. But he
has been unable to find issues carrying the publication further. He is open to correction
on this point.

This surely is the final word in clarity of thought and expression!

7. The author's knowledge of the Saṁhitā texts is encyclopaedic and his acquaintance with the procedure of the Vedic sacrifices such as the AGNIHOTRA, the DARŚAPOORNAMĀSA, the VĀJAPEYA and the rest is that of an expert. No wonder that he dissents from the interpretation in the bhāshya on the sūtras given by Śabara—he does this often and offers different interpretations based on varying texts. On occasions he differs even from Kumārila for whom he has great reverence and whom he calls Vaidicaśiromaṇi, the crest-jewel among the followers or practitioners of the Vedic cult. He generally follows the bhāshya but, in addition, expounds the sūtras in accordance with Kumārila as well where the latter rejects the interpretation of the bhāshya, and readers of the commentary have therefore the views of both bhāshya and Vārtika on each adhikaraṇa before them when they read the book.

8. The commentary on the first adhyāya is comparatively brief though the sūtras, as elsewhere, have been thoroughly explained. Doubtless this is so because a consderable portion of this adhyāya has been commented upon by Sāyaṇa in his introduction to the bhāshya on the Ṛigveda and also because there exists a classic expositions of the most important part of it—the Tarkapāda —in Pārthasārathi's Śāstradīpikā. The commentary on the second and third adhyāyas is quite extensive and takes note of the important views of the preceding writers on the subject. These two adhyāyas contain some of the fundamental doctrines of the pūrvamīmāṁsā on such important subjects as Bhāvanā, the causal volition and Apūrva or the unseen principle intervening between action and its fruit. They also contain important principles of exegesis, interpretation and adjustment which make mīmāṁsā a rich storehouse of Nyāyas or Maxims and give it a unique place in the ancient orthodox systems of Indian thought. All these have been treated of at length in the commentary which is particularly illuminating when dealing with the sūtra—

श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात् (3–3–13)

This sūtra is repository of important exegetical principles and supplies proofs to which all questions of interpretation and evidential force are referred for final adjudication. The sūtra lays down the condition of relative impotency of proofs *inter se* when two or more of them apply to the same text. The instances adduced in the commentary make the sūtra thoroughly clear.

9. This is a superlative book which will be welcomed by students of pūrva-mīmāṁsā and of Sanskrit philosophical systems. The editor has contributed an introduction in which he has given a

summary of the contents and has pointed out at length the role which pūrva-mīmāṁsā plays in other Indian systems of thought. The book contains an appendix giving an alphabetical list of quotations and their sources but this has been broken off after the listing of quotations with initial vowel आ had been concluded as the learned editor, Pandit Pattabhirama Shastri of the Vārāṇaseya Sanskrit Vishwa-Vidyālaya decided to differ this work and to incorporate the references all together at the end of the final volume when the entire commentary would be published. The decision seems to be hardon the readers and makes the publication of the succeeding volumes even more urgent. The editor might consider the advisability of explaining in foot-notes in the subsequent volumes the meaning of some of the more difficult Vedic texts dealing with the sacrifices. A glossary of the several technical terms with references to the corresponding pages where they appear would also be welcome. The get-up, the binding and the printing which is done on quality paper have nothing to desire. The publishers deserve warm congratulations on bringing out this publication.

D.S.J.

R. N. MEHTA, S. N. CHOWDHARY, K. T. M. HEGDE AND (MRS.) D. R. SHAH, *Excavation at Jokha*. Maharaja Sayajirao University Archaeology Series No. 11, Baroda 1971. pp. 1-81, Seven half-tone plates and 27 line drawings Index. Rs. 15/-

This is an excellent excavation Report. Though Jokha is a small site some six km. to the south of the Tapi in Kamrej Taluka, Surat District, still it has received all the attention from Dr. Mehta and his colleagues which it deserves. We thus know that the rich black soil immediately behind the Western coast was inhabited by man around 2000 B.C. because here besides having game such as deer, man could also exploit the rich soil, not by deep ploughing which was not then possible, but by dropping seeds in the soil crevices, which such a soil alone has!! And incredible as it might seem, this primitive method of sowing was practised until the other day in Maharashtra. Drinking water might be had from the river, which is now flowing at a considerable distance; otherwise from numerous shallow ponds which keep water in a good rainy season even in summer. The region must have been well wooded then, (as now with artificial irrigation), so that the forest produce, wild fruits, grabbers, as well as others, could be easily had. And it should be remembered that Surat produces some of the best *Ratālu* (Marathi *Gorāḍu*) *Dioscorla alata Linn.*

Naturally such a promising region—and that too abutting on the Western coast, India's Window to the West — would draw man at all times. And the question is did he come from the hinterland, or from

across the sea — from Sind and Saurashtra, or from Maharashtra, Khandesh and Malwa? As the deposits were thin, it was not possible to differentiate stratigraphically between the various Chalcolithic wares which show affinity with the Late Harappan, Navdatoli, Jorwe and possibly Rangpur cultures.

In this discussion, the fragment of a copper axe, and the solitary celt of basalt, as well as the lithic blades — some made on the crested ridge technique are not of much value. All these could have been brought by the people from Maharashtra, Mysore (Tekhalkota) would be too far, and also from Malwa. If there is a chance of excavating another site on the Surat-Broach coast, this point might be kept in view, and perhaps a more rigorous scrutiny of the sherds *as they are found*, might help in subdividing the Chalcolithic occupation into various sub-phases. And even the Jorwe — Navdatoli need not be from the hinterland, but might have come from across the sea! For as it is we do not know the source of both these cultures, though we know that had developed in Western Maharashtra and Malwa respectively. It is conceivable, as the authors argue, that the area was deserted because there was a draught owing to a continuous period of low rainfall and potable water could not be had. But when later the normal conditions returned, the region was re-occupied by an iron-using man in about the 2nd century B.C. as the occurrence of the NBP shows.

Jokha and Malvan (excavated by Allchin) both illustrate the fact that the whole of the west coast on the mainland (as was the Saurashtra Peninsula) was settled by man at various periods, right from 3rd millennium B.C. as the earlier discoveries at Bhagat Rav indicated, and as the traditions about Broach being a great port before the Maurya period proved. In fact, these and others must have been small ports, right from protohistoric times.

H.D.S.

PRABHASHANKAR O. SOMPURA AND MADHUSUDAN DHANKI, *Bharatiya Durga Vidhana* (canons of fort making in India), with a Foreward by Dr. Motichandra (In Gujarati). Somaiya Publications, Bombay, 1971, pp. 1-66+12 half tone illustrations. Rs. 35/-

This is an excellent publication, very much wanted. It tells us about the literature on ancient and mediaeval forts, the purpose for which these were built, their types and characteristics, all gathered from Purāṇas and books on architecture. The attempt is not quite literary or academic, because the authors have sought to apply the canons to a few surviving forts or their remains. But these touch on the decorative parts of the fort, such as the arch (*toraṇa*)

of gateway's *pratoli* (Fig. 7). Figs. 6 and 8 illustrate some technical features like *madalā, nirvyuha* and *bāhu,* while the *stambha* pillar is obvious.

However what one should have liked to know how far the ancient and mediaeval forts were built from military point of view. This is not at all clear from the text. When one reads 36 kinds of *prākāras,* containing from 6 to 146 *bāhu,* one should know whether these are really functional distinctions or theoretical, as was the wont of Sanskrit writers!

Hence there is an urgent need to test these canons with regard to a few existing forts beginning with the earliest that we have, for instance. Sisupalgarh and see how many *bāhus* still exist in these forts. Such a test alone will tell us how far these canons are credible. This is the first of its book kind in Gujarat and therefore should be extremely useful. However, its high flown Sanskritized Gujarati will deter many a young reader whose knowledge of Sanskrit is next to nothing.

<div align="right">H.D.S.</div>

PRĀCĪ-JYOTI: A DIGEST OF INDOLOGICAL STUDIES [*Yearly Publication*] Vol. VII.   Editor: Gopikamohan Bhattacharya. Published by Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra (Haryana), 1971, Roy Oct. pp. 1+280.   Rs. 30/-.

Started in December 1963, *Prācī-Jyoti, Digest of Indological Studies,* published six Volumes comprising ten issues till 1968, when the publication was suspended for reasons beyond control.   The Journal was admirably answering a long-felt want and scholars naturally desired its revival.   Thanks to the keen interest in the matter by Dr. S. K. Dutta, Vice-Chancellor of Kurukshetra University it was decided to restart publication.   The present Volume, number VII, containing abstracts of 625 articles, published in about 90 journals between 1966 and 1970.   The next Volume will include articles from the remaining journals.   The material has been divided into fifteen different sections as in the previous Volumes.

It is stated in the Editorial that "wherever necessary cross-references have been given".   We could find three cross-references (Nos. 240, 261 and 262), and these cover the cases of the same article being placed under two different headings (Nos. 56 and 261, 78 and 262) and the same article appearing under different forms of the name of the author (Nos. 240 and 251).   Similar references could have been given to Nos. 180 and 239, 265 and 453, 274 and 359, and 300 and 587 though apparently these have been treated as independant articles as would appear from the fact that separate abstracts, prepared by different scholars, appear for each of the arti-

cles of the pair [180 (M.C.) and 239 (H.A.P.), 265 (Author) and 453 (M.C.), 269 (Author) and 460 (M.C.), 274 (Author) and 359 (R.M.P.), and 300 (Author and 587 (S.R.S.)], though in fact each article in the pair is one and the same.

Cross-references, further, could have been given to articles dealing with the same topics. The problem of Rāmagupta and allied matters have been considered in Nos. 155 (Gai), 188 (Shah), 215 (Chattopadhyaya), 234 (Mirashi), 250 (Shah) and 399 (Parshad). Interpretation of the term 'Vijaya' figures in Nos. 170 (Mirashi) and 181 (Rao). The Aryan problem is considered in Nos. 210 (Bhargava) and 221 (Gupta), and the Dharmaśāstra writer Govindānanda in Nos. 265 (Bhattacharya), 269 (Chakravarty), 453 (Bhattacharya) and 460 (Chakravarty). The problem Heidegger and Indian, Eastern and Western philosophy has been dealt with in Nos. 415 (Hirasch) 426 (Mehta) and 442 (Umehara).

From actual reference to the article (Nos. 105, 130, 254 and 432), it appears that the abreviation *JBRS*, which is stated to have been used for "Journal of the Burma Research Society, Rangoon" (p. xxxix), actually stands for "Journal of the Behar Research Society, Patna". Abbreviation *VSMN* (Nos. 301-304) has not been included in "Journals consulted for Abridgment" (pp. xxxv-xlv). No. 83 does not mention the name of the author, while No. 478 gives no reference to the Journal. Nos. 115-118 contain no reference to page-numbers.

Abstracts of articles (pp. 1-214) are followed by "Titles of Doctoral Theses (pp. 215-258), "search Institutions in India and Abroad (pp. 259-265), "Reviews" (pp. 266-275), "Books Reviews (p. 276), and "Our Correspondents" (277-281).

"Titles of Doctoral Theses" include the title of theses for M. Litt., Ph.D., and D.Litt. degrees of Indian Universities, under the same fifteen sections, mentioning separately the titles for which degrees have been awarded and the titles on which research is being conducted. Such lists are intended to help the University teachers and students to avoid duplication of work. It is however, seen on a cursory look at the "Titles of Doctoral Theses" that identical subjects have been offered by different candidates in different Universities. Attention is invited here only to a few such cases. Under "Epics and Purāṇas", *Garuḍa Purāṇa* appears under Nos. 11, 16 and 20 M.Litt. degree of Madras University has been awarded to No. 11, and the subject has been offered in Allahabad (No. 16) and Bombay (No. 20) Universities. Research on *Kūrma Purāṇa* is being carried on in Delhi No. 25) and Kurukshetra (No. 40) Universities, though years back a candidate was awarded Ph.D. degree of Poona Univer-

sity for work on the same subject. Under "Linguistics and Grammar" *Laghumañjūṣā* appears as the topic of research in Delhi (No. 13) and Kerala (No. 31) Universities. Under "Literature and Rhetorics", *Dramas of Vatsarāja* has been offered as the subject in Allahabad (No. 75) and Delhi (No. 139) Universities. While degree for the same subject has been awarded by Indore University (No. 16). Two candidates from Delhi University are working on *Rāmacarita* (Nos. 122 and 135). A candidate has been awarded Ph.D. degree of Aligarh University for his thesis on *Vikramāṅkadevacarita* (No. 27) while another candidate from the same University is working on the same subject (No. 60). Under "Philosophy and Religion", *Pañcadaśe* figures as a subject in Delhi (No. 64) and Kurukshetra (No. 113) Universities, while in Aligarh (No. 19) and Bombay (No. 54) Universities research is being conducted on *Bhāskarācārya's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Considering that several Universities are not included in these "Titles", as they will appear in the next Volume, dealing with the remaining Journals and Universities, these will be a considerable rise in the number of duplications.

The list of recent Publications and particulars about Research Projects of various Research Institutions in India and abroad acquaint the reader with up-to-date information regarding the present state of research in different branches of Indology. These are critical reviews of six research publications followed by a list of "Books Received". Finally is given a list of Correspondents from 14 foreign countries.

The Editor, Dr. Gopikāmohan Bhattacharya, has not only maintained the high standard of the Journal, but has also enhanced its utility by introducing the Author-Index. He has performed the arduous task quite creditably, and it is hoped that under his able stewardship, *Prācī-Jyoti* will go from strength to strength.

<div align="right">A.D.P.</div>

H. D. SANKALIA, *Some Aspects of Prehistoric Technology in India*, Indian National Science Academy, Monograph, Series No. 4, New Delhi, 1970. viii+69 pp. (including xvi figures): Rs. 10/-.

The aim of this monograph is to give a classified account of the various techniques used during the prehistoric period in India. The techniques discussed encompass the lithic industries, pottery manufacture, sculpture, stone vessels, beads, copper bronze and other metal technology (excluding iron), bone and ivory tools, building techniques, weights, textiles, agriculture and medicine.

The material compiled has been put together from various pubblished and unpublished sources (foreign and Indian); including his own wellknown work on *Stone tools age, their techniques and*

probable function (1964). Considering the fact that all the techniques known have been discussed within about 70 pages, the description is slight. For the nonprofessional, it may not be easy to follow since a familiarity with the subject is necessary. But as Prof. Sankalia has written these accounts bearing the students in mind, it will be very helpful. Particularly helpful is the section on pottery and metal technologies, the processes of which in the case of India are not so known.

Prof. Sankalia is a famous authority and, therefore, his understanding of the subject through several decades of first hand work helps a great deal in the manner of his description of prehistoric technology, unlike the book by O.P. Jaggi on *Prehistoric technology.* Despite the brief description, the work is useful since one can find the material compiled in one volume. Of course, there remains the urgent need for an exhaustive volume on this theme and I am sure Prof. Sankalia must already have planned such a volume.

The volume is well printed, though it is sad to note that proof-reading mistakes should be inevitable in Indian publications. For instance, the initials of K.T.M. Hegde are mentioned as K.N.T. on p. vi and in the bibliography as K.K., and so on. There is not much else to criticize as far as the description of techniques is concerned. It would be unfair to discuss here problems of the chronology of the Stone Ages, terminology, interpretation (what use is comparing a kiln at Lothal with a recent one in Kashmir?), since that is beyond the topic. This small monograph will be found to be very handy for all budding archaeologists, under training.

S.C.M

MANDANMISHRA, ed., *Pancāmṛtam* with a foreword by Dr. A. N. Jha. Lalbhadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Delhi, 1968, pp. iii, 139. Rs. 15/-.

This is a collection of articles on topics connected with Sanskrit studies published by Shri Lalbhadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Delhi. This is an institution which aims to promote and sustain with vigour the development of Oriental Studies and it is very meet that it periodically invites eminent scholars in the field to deliver lectures on different aspects of the rich and varied heritage that is Sanskrit. The Vidyapeetha is conceived as a international centre of Indian learning and is now doing very good work. The title Pancāmṛtam, is significantly chosen. All the speakers are scholars of repute, each one of whom has made significant contribution to the development of Sanskrit studies.

The 1st lecture, which is the largest, is on 'Vedānta Philosophy as was revealed by Buddhist Scriptures' by Dr. Nakamura, well-

known authority on Buddhist scriptures. Indian Philosophical thought, noted for its far searching analysis, depth and logical acumen is best represented by Vedānta and Buddhism. Though the two are basically different disciplines, a discerning student of both cannot fail to notice mutual influences. Though in consistency, thoroughness and profundity, vedānta holds first place in Indian Philosophy, it is surprising that the Buddhist canons make no reference to Vedānta and refer to Saṁkhya and Vaisheshika as representatives of outside path. This apparently intriguing problem. Dr. Nakamura investigates in this article. Rather than indulging in generalities, the author traces the development of Vedāntic thought through a similar development of Buddhist Literature. It is obvious that early Buddhist canons do refer to views similar to ones expounded in the upaniṣads. They were in the air for long and were no preserve of any group. The Buddhist however rejected them as pernicious. It is natural that as the Buddhist schools developed, they quoted the upaniṣadic doctrines because the latter had acquired recognition and the Buddhist scholars had studied them well. The Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Vedānta have close similarity in matter of technical terminology as well as Ideology and it is generally supposed that the Mahāyāna Buddhism adopted some of the Vedāntic views. The present writer however is of the opinion that the Vedānt-school is the borrower. He discusses in support the Vedāntic thought in Aryadeva's Śāstra, the views represented in Bhavya in the 8th chapter of Tarkajwala and others. There can be no doubt that in spite of certain resemblances, the differences between the two theories are serious. This is a long article, well-documented and gives comprehensive idea of the Vedānta theories mentioned in Buddhist canons. The distinction however between the Vedāntic teachings and the emergence of Vedānta as an independent and all towering Darśana is not kept in mind.

The article by Dr. Mirashi who is an recognised authority on Ancient Indian History, Culture and Inscriptions gives additional evidence to support the generally accepted view that Kālidāsa was a contemporary of Chandragupta II. The additional evidence is supplied by inscriptions of the early Rāṣṭrakuta dynasty.

The article 'Sanskrit in Modern India' is of general interest and would be found useful by all who are connected with educational matters. That Sanskrit has a special place in Indian Linguistic situation should be recognised by all. Modern Indo Aryan languages have a filial link with this language. It has a rich and varied literature, is a carrier of our culture and contributes to our sense of oneness. Therefore this article written by a scholar who has a great name as a Sanskritist and Linguist should be of interest to all of us who want to find out the precise role Sanskrit can play

in Modern India. Dr. Lutse's article on 'Brecht's theatre' is a new approach to Sanskrit drama. Brecht is a German playwrit whose theoretical writings have a relevance to Indian theatre. In this article the characteristics of Sanskrit drama and Brecht's Dramatic theory and Art are studied for finding out common characteristics. The combining of 'epical and descriptive' elements in the Sanskrit drama, which is considered as a drawback by scholars like A. B. Brecht's theory. All students of Sanskrit dramaturgy who normally follow the obiter dictums of traditional critics of Sanskrit drama should find this approach a refreshing change. The last is by Prof. Nagendra who is a very good of Poetics and the author of Rasasiddhānta which has earned him National honour. He discusses here 3 basic questions regarding the aesthetic experience. In his view, human experience and Art-stimuli are essential for aesthetic experience. The latter is a complex experience in which motional and intellectual elements have a part to play. It has however a separate identity because it is more refined and colourful than emotional pleasure.

The volume is a distinct contribution to existing Sanskrit literature and the Vidyapeeth is to be congratulated for making it available to the students in the field.

S.N.G.

S. N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, *East Indian Fisher Flok* (Dialects in the Bombay Area I) by S. N. Gajendragadkar, Department of Linguistics, University of Bombay, Bombay 1970, pp. vii+152. Rs. 15/-.

With the revival of interest in descriptive linguistics in the country, dialect studies are being carried on with greater interest and zeal at various places and Universities. While linguistic surveys on the pattern of the 19th and 20th century European studies require independent organised units with great mobility and in India, this task is of even greater complexity, detailed studies of individual dialects of Indian languages offer a more attractive field for University Departments and scholars working for the doctorate degrees. The result has been descriptive studies of numerous dialects of Indian languages, which add to our knowledge of dialectal material of our regions and make us aware of the extreme complexity of the situation both linguistically and sociologically than is apparent from the now antiquated Linguistic Survey of India of Grierson.

The present work is the first of a series of monographs which is intended to cover the various dialects in the area around Bombay and it is likely to include dialects of Marāthī, Konkaṇī and Gujarātī and possibly Urdu. Prof. Gajendragadkar has given us in this first monograph a detailed description of one of the dialects

spoken by a small but well-developed community who call themselves East Indian Fisher Folk, profess the Christian religion and are mostly engaged in the work of fishing and agriculture. The material is collected from an old speaker of 76 years, who is gifted in many ways, takes pride in his traditions and knows the dialect well. The method followed in presenting the material is the now well established one of descriptive linguistics and the book covers the phonology and morphology of the dialect in a thorough manner. A sketch of syntax is, however, missing and one would have liked to have some idea of it in view of the fact that the texts reveal many peculiarities of syntax and word-order, in which this dialect differ from both Marāthī and Konkaṇī. The author has given a fair amount of texts with translations from which an interested reader can form some idea of the syntax. The texts are chosen with an eye on their contents as well, which adds to their value. The sentences which are added at the end are kept the same as found in other studies of Marāṭhī dialects which will facilitate the comparison of this dialect with them and this is one important use of these, other than providing material for grammatical analysis. More valuable are the collection of proverbs current among the community and their popular songs which are also given in the musical notations, helpful for those who are interested in the folk music of the country. In view of the interest shown in the dialect vocabulary one would have expected a larger collection including the words belonging to the professions of these people.

It is a matter of personal choice and interest to decide to what extent the morphemic analysis of a dialect should be carried on in detail. Personally I feel that a very detailed analysis of the forms of pronouns and numerals of Indian languages is more a luxury than a necessity and appears to give a picture of greater complexity than is really warrented. A well-come feature of the present study is the inclusion of derivative morphemes and a statistical statement of the frequencies of phonemes which helps to form a more precise picture of the phonology of the dialect. Would it not have been much better to add the percentages as well?

Printing of studies of this type with the use of phonetic symbols is a problem with the printing facilities available. A large number of missprints are duly corrected at the end of the book. I have however some doubts about a statement like 'So far as retroflex stops are concerned some of them are phonemes, some allophones' (p. 9) or the accuracy of a cluster like -čc- (p. 10). On the whole the work is done with care and is bound to help one to know accurately the dialect it describes and adds to our reportoire of dialect material.

A.M.G.

S. VENTITASUBRAMONIK IYER, *Dhātukāvya* of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa
with a foreword by Dr. A. G. Krishna Warier, University
of Kerala, Trivendrum, 1970, pp. LX+364. Rs. 10/-.

In the rich and varied Sanskrit literature, we get a variety
which exploits the form of poetry for expounding the contents of
Śāstras like grammar and metrics. This type of literature is techni-
cally called as 'Kāvya Śāstra' because this is both a kāvya and also
śāstra. A well-known instance of this is the Rāvaṇavadha of Bhaṭṭi
in the 6th century A.D. Subhadrāharaṇa of Nārāyaṇ from Kerala (un-
published) is also one of the earliest works of this type. Raison
d'etre for such works, I believe, apart from the novelty, is to make
the study of a Śāstra like grammar easy and interesting. Rāvaṇa-
vadha for example uses the story of Rāmāyaṇa to illustrate the
sūtras of Pāṇini, *alaṅkāras*, tenses and moods. The figures, tenses
and moods, can be very conveniently if not effectively illustrated
but how far can the sūtras of Pāṇini be so explained, I have my
doubts. Any way it is a interesting intellectual exercise and makes
delightful reading.

The Dhātukāvya of Nārāyaṇa is a poem in three cantos. It uses
the Bhāgavata story from Akrūra's journey to Gokula to the death
of Kaṁsa at the hands of Kṛṣṇa to illustrate the Dhātus. In so do-
ing, he follows the order given in the Pāṇinīyadhātupāṭha as follow-
ed in Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti. The roots are treated exhaustively and
though normally one illustration is used for one root, additional
illustrations are given in the case of roots which are *ubhayapadi*,
where there is difference in meaning due to *upasarga* or otherwise,
they explain additional forms because of the *anubandha* etc. This
aspect of the procedure is explained fully in the introduction. Though
Dhātukāvya follows the Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti, it does not do so in toto
or blindly. The introduction spells out in details its difference from
Mdv.

It is rather difficult, if not unfair to judge the work of this kind
from purely literary point of view because the form imposes cer-
tain restrictions on the author, howsoever good a poet he is. Though
it follows the descriptions as given in Bhāgavata, the author cer-
tainly makes its 'additions and elaborations' to suit the purpose.
The description in many places is vivid and poetic. The two com-
mentaries given along with the text certainly make the book very
useful. The notes on the readings, index of roots and illustrations
and index of verses are a great help to the reader. The exhaustive
introduction is marked by thoroughness and objectivity and very
much to the value of the work. The Department of Sanskrit, Uni-
versity of Kerala, Trivendrum deserves the congratulations of all
the students of Sanskrit for bringing out this volume.

S.N.G.

PRIYOLKAR A.K., *Doctor Bhau Daji Vyakti, kal va kartrutva* (in Marāthi), Mumbai Marāthi Sahitya Sangh, Bombay, 1971. Rs. 15/-.

The 19th Century was a revolutionary period in Indian History. The rule of foreign power brought about a conflict, not only in political field but with our cultural values and traditions. This gave birth to a generation of Scholars who, assessing dispassionately our culture, recognised the good points of the Western Culture and sought to bring about an intellectual awakening in India. They were passionately devoted to progress of India in different fields like education and social reform. Dr. Bhau Daji was one of the foremost of such scholars. He lived a very rich and varied life and contributed a great deal to the alround development of Bombay. He was a good student of natural and applied Sciences as well as Humanities. He had a distinguished career and was a professor of Physics and Chemistry in the Elphinstone College for 2 years. It speaks highly of his inquisitive mind and thirst for knowledge that he gave up his teaching job to study Medicine in the newly found Grant Medical College. He got the degree in 1851 and practiced medicine thereafter. Fairly immediately, he acquired fame as a skilled Surgeon and a good diagnostician, which was the envy of many of his seniors. Not content with making money but true to the hippocratean oath, he opened a charitable dispensary to help the poor and the needy. It is interesting to observe that at a time when allopathy was con sidered to be a panacea for all ailments, and Ayurveda was looked down upon, Dr. Bhau Daji, himself a student of allopathy, studied the Indian system of medicine, searched for different herbs and did a good deal of research in it. His research on Leprosy and the discovery of Kavati had become a matter of great controversy, though it gave him international fame. Dr. Priyolkar's two chapters throw a flood of light on this episode.

Dr. Bhau Daji was one of the true great men of his generation. He participated very actively in the various activities of the city as an educationist, social reformer and above all a patriot. There was hardly an activity with which he was not associated. He was the founder member of the Bombay Reform Association, the 1st political association in Bombay. It was under his signature that an application was made by the Association for founding a University. The Victoria Garden (now called Jijāmātā Bāug) and the museum owe a good deal to him. He was equally interested in building up well-equipped libraries in Bombay. The Native General Library, the David Sasoon Library, the Petit Institute are standing monuments to his work in the field. He was an active Social Reformer and worked hard to spread education amongst women against much op-

position from the orthodox section of the community. At a time when toleration was badly misunderstood, Dr. Bhau Daji showed an open mind towards other religions and spoke highly of their teachings. Dr. Bhau Daji was connected with the various bodies of the Bombay University. He was a member of the Senate and member of the Arts and Medical Faculty till his death. He was the 1st Indian to be a syndic of the University. It is really surprising that with all these multi-farious, energy-consuming activities, he could find time to devote himself to research which won him enco-miums from savants like Dr. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, Max Müller etc.

The Mumbai Marāthi Sāhitya Sangh is to be congratulated for publishing on the occasion of the Centenary Celebrations, an autho-ritative Biography of this great man. The Sangh certainly could not have found a better person to do this job than Prof. Priyolkar. He is a highly respected name in the field of research and his works are always marked by industry, scholarship and fidelity to facts. His writings in fact confirm to the dictum नामूनं लिह्यते किंचित्

Those who are interested in the study of the development of Bombay are indeed grateful to this scholar for giving them a well-documented biography of Bhau Daji as well as a comprehensive pic-ture of the period in which he lived. The book is not merely a biography of the man but gives an authentic history of the develop-ment of the various Social and education institutions which make Bombay what is today—urbs prima indus.

It is a pity that being in Marāthi, this cannot reach all sections of people. An English version of it would be welcomed by many.

S.N.G

(SMT.) UJJVALA SHARMA, *Pramāṇapramodaḥ* by M. M. Citra-dhara with the commentary in Sanskrit by M. M. Dukhamocana Jha. Sri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Delhi, 1968, pp. 123. Rs. 7-50.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Citradhara (c. 18 A.D.), the son of Mahā-mahopādhyāya Vaṁśadhara, belonged to Mithila, so well-known for its contribution to Navya-Nyāya. His only work in Nyāya, *Pramā-ṇapramodaḥ* which is critically edited for the first time by Smt. Ujjvala Sharma, is a short treatise on Nyāya Theism. After an in-troductory discussion about *śruti* and *smṛti*, as the sources of the knowledge about the God, the author gives the nine inferences (*navaanumāna-s*) based on the following Kārikā of Udayanācārya:

kāryāyojanadhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śṛteḥ
vākyātsaṁkhyāviśeṣācca sādhyo viśvavidavyayaḥ //

(*Nyāyakusumāñjali* V.1)

This is followed by the statement of objections by the anti-theists (pp. 26-51) and their refutation (pp. 51-123). The editor has edited the commentary in Sanskrit by the Maithila Paṇḍita Mahāmahopā-dhyāya Duḥkhamocana Jha also. Smt. Ujjavala Sharma deserves our congratulations for carefully preparing a critical edition of the text and the commentary. The reference to the date of the commentator, as well as an index of the Nyāyas in the text and in the commentary would have, undoubtedly, proved useful to the readers. Both, the text and the commentary remind us of Karṇapūra's description of Mithila viz.

> atra vijñavadaneṣu darpitā
> nṛtyati pratigṛham sarasvatī / /
>
> (Pārijātaharaṇam XVII.59).

S.A.U.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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